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Abstract 
Background: Performance-based contracting (PBC) and similar approaches to tie funding to 
measured performance have become major characteristics of innovative financing 
mechanisms. The World Bank and Uganda's Ministry of Health pilot tested PBC in five 
districts for a period 2003 to 2006. This PhD examines the response to this pilot among 
private-not-for-profit (PNFP) hospitals. 
Methods: A multi-level analysis was undertaken to explore essential up-stream and down- 
stream institutional relationships and functions for PBC success. Agency-based and process- 
based organisational theories were used as alternative frameworks to build explanations of 
the response actions. In -depth case studies were carried out using mixed methods among 
PNFP hospitals that were assigned to different mix of PBC pilot components (performance 
targets, service output metering, performance feedback and financial bonuses). Seven PNFP 
hospitals participated in the PBC pilot while an additional three non-participating public 
hospitals provided opportunity for comparative analysis. In-depth interviews (28) covered 
hospital management teams (HMTs) and members of their Board of Governors (BOG) in all 
the ten hospitals. Five district health officials, two implementers of PBC pilots and two 
officials from Uganda Catholic Medical Bureau (UCMB) were also interviewed. A survey of 
560 hospital staff at baseline and 741 after 12 months was undertaken among the 10 hospitals 
to measure changes in perceptions relevant to hospital performance. Participant observations 
were undertaken during meetings for PBC pilot activities as well as meetings for reviewing 
the performance of health activities at national and district levels. 
Major findings: Upstream support functions like financial disbursement, staff movements 
and costs of service provision formed contextual constraints for the hospitals to respond to 
PBC. Likewise, governance relationships between HMT and BOG provided additional 
constraints for PBC success. Hospital managers were expected to respond to several 
performance-focused interventions - many of which were contradictory to the PBC targets. 
Among the difficulties observed during the PBC pilot implementation, poor metering of 
performance and inadequate financing for the essential pilot elements were particularly 
problematic. The implementation arrangements generated unanticipated negative 
performance influences especially among the control group -a situation that may over- 
estimate the pilot effectiveness. Findings show that financial bonuses at the organization level 
can create either motivation or demotivation among staff depending on the hygiene of the 
bonus allocation processes within an organization. Results from the staff surveys indicate that 
the drivers for performance improvements in the hospitals were related to job satisfaction, 
performance governance of work teams, availability of medicines and supplies, as well as 
staff satisfaction with their financial benefits. 
Conclusions: PBC may not achieve optimal effectiveness in settings without a package of 
supplementary interventions for improving resource inputs, performance governance and 
motivating the workforce. Financial incentives as predicted from agency theory were not 
sufficient for PBC success. Micro-care approaches aimed at improving the organisational 
processes (process-based theory) for better performance will be required for greater 
effectiveness of PBC initiatives and policies. Policy prescriptions and implementation 
arrangements for PBC interventions need to provide for on-going monitoring of mechanisms 
and consequences as a basis for mitigating harmful effects on health systems and optimizing 
the good. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.0 Introduction: 
There is expanding interest in the potential of performance-based contracting (PBC) as an 
intervention to fix the performance of health systems (Eichler, Auxila et al. 2001; Adam and 
Gunning 2002; Penelope and Murray 2002; Hecht, Baston et al. 2004; Loevinsohn and 
Harding 2005; Low-Beer, Afkhami et al. 2007; Allen 2009; Eichler, Levine et al. 2009). The 
advents of global financing instruments intending to support the achievement of measurable 
targets such as Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have adopted performance-based aid 
frameworks with explicit targets. Global financial instruments such as GAVI, The Global 
Fund, PEPFAR, and World Bank's Multi-country AIDS Programmes (MAP) have made 
claims for the use of performance-based aid for improving the accountability of health 
systems and recipient countries despite mixed empirical evidence of effectiveness of this 
approach (Lim, Stein et al. 2008) At the national and sub-national levels, performance-based 
aid translates into performance-based contracts between fund-holders and service providers 
(Chapin and Fetter 2002; Penelope and Murray 2002; Taylor 2003; Meessen, Kashala et al. 
2007; Eichler, Levine et al. 2009). 
At the global level, performance-based aid is a major development in the aid modalities 
between international development partners and developing countries. Although first 
advocated in the early 1990s (World Bank 1993), the renewed interest is based on a number 
of reasons (Scott, Mannion et al. 2003): 
" Millennium development goals (MDGs) are explicit commitment between governments 
and development partners to achieve measurable results in health status and poverty 
worldwide (Vandemoortele 2008). 
" Poverty reduction strategies programmes (PRSPs) of governments have sought to 
explicitly plan for and measure their performance in the reduction of poverty and other 
MDGs(Uganda Govt 2005). 
" Transition from project-based aid to Sector-wide Approaches (SWAps) in developing 
countries have necessitated the development of measurable indicators of progress as a 
form of accountability mechanism for development aid (Adam and Gunning 2002). 
" Increased efforts to leverage the non-state sectors to play a greater role in the provision of 
health services (McPake and Ngalande 1994; Palmer 2000; Palmer, Strong et al. 2006) 
" International aid disbursements are adopting performance-based financing tied to 
demonstrable progress as measured by performance indicators (GFATM 2003; OGAC 
2005; Low-Beer, Aflchami et al. 2007). 
" Increasing accountability of the health system has been promoted by reforms to make the 
services reach the intended groups. This was the theme of the 2004 World Development 
10 
Report - Making Services Work for Poor People (World Bank, 2004) as well as for the 
World Health Report in 2000(WHO 2000). It has also been a driver for reforms in the 
UK, USA and for international aid (Chapin and Fetter 2002; Hecht, Baston et al. 2004; 
Allen 2009). 
1.1 Uganda Background 
The overall government policy is to alleviate poverty. The health sector is one of the sectors 
contributing to this goal through the reduction of ill-health and premature death. As part of 
the PRSP process, the health sector's contribution is tracked by its implementation of the 
minimum health care package. The package is a set of services that were judged to be cost- 
effective in reducing morbidity and mortality in Uganda (MOH 1999a). A set of indicators 
are used by the government to monitor performance of the sector ie: 
" OPD unitisation of health services 
" DPT3 immunisation coverage 
" Deliveries in health facilities 
" Approved posts filled by trained health workers 
" Urban and rural HIV sero-prevalence 
To implement the health policy objectives of expanding access to the minimum health care 
package to all Ugandans, MoH has pursued two inter-related policies among others: 
" Expansion and up-grading of the service infrastructure by establishing functional 
health sub-districts 
" Supporting the faith-based sector also called Private-not for profit (PNFP) sector to 
deliver a more comprehensive service. 
The health sub-district (HSD) policy has invigorated the hospital sector with the intent to 
expand access to essential clinical care, at the same time broadening the participation of 
hospitals (serving as HSD referral centres) in health prevention and promotion activities 
(MOH-c 1999). 
1.2 PNFP Developments In Uganda 
The provision of health care services in Uganda is shared between the state and non-state 
providers. Although the non-state providers range from informal drug vendors to up-scale 
private hospitals, the faith-based sector or private not-for-profit (PNFP) providers makes a 
major contribution to the delivery of the Minimum Health Care Package (MHCP) and the 
realisation of the Health Sector Strategic Plan of the Government (MoH 2003a). The PNFP 
sub sector owns about 30 percent of the health facilities in the country i. e. 44 hospitals and 
520 lower level health centres and accounts for about 50 percent of the expected annual 
health service outputs of the health sector (MOH 2004; MOH 2007). PNFP facilities provide 
health services in more remote areas that are underserved by the public sector (Ritva and 
Svensson 2002). In recognition of its capacity to serve the health sector objectives, 
government has provided variable support to the PNFP sector over the years. 
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Government support to the faith-based sector in Uganda started shortly after independence in 
1962 whereby Government was required to provide subventions to the missionary hospitals. 
During the 1970s, economic and other political changes diminished the value of these 
subventions. The hospitals turned to charitable organisations abroad for support and little 
effort was put in pursuing the government subventions that were getting smaller over time 
(Green 2002). However, some mission hospitals continued to receive personnel (with salary) 
from MOH as a form of support from Government (Uganda 2002). 
From 1995, it became increasingly difficult for PNFP hospitals to cope with the costs of 
providing care. There was a decline in the funding of PNFP hospitals from charitable 
organisations abroad(Green 2002). In addition, Government progressively increased the 
emolument package of public servants to a point well above the levels sustainable in the 
PNFP sector. This situation caused an exodus of personnel especially nurses from the latter to 
the public sector (Guisti 2007). The initial response in PNFP hospitals was to increase 
charges in an effort to generate more local funds. This option did not get very far due to the 
general poverty and outcry of the communities. In 1997/98 fiscal year, Government had 
introduced a conditional primary health care grant to districts to guarantee the allocation of 
funds for PHC. In the same vein, PNFP hospitals were provided a direct subsidy(UCMB 
1999) to leverage their contribution to the provision of the Minimum Health Care Package 
and to the Health Sector Strategic Plan (Giusti and Lochoro 2002). The graph below shows 
the trend in the financial allocations to broader PNFP subsector for the period 1998 to 2007. 
Figure 1.1 Trend of Public Allocation to the PNFP Sub-sector 
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During the 2001 presidential campaigns, user-charges were retracted from all public health 
facilities. This policy change exerted pressure on the PNFP sub-sector to reduce their charges 
to ensure that those communities served by them equally benefit from the policy(Giusti and 
Lochoro 2002; Odaga and Maniple 2003). District local leaders grumbled about the lack of 
reciprocal action (removal of charges) from the PNFP facilities. Indeed, some local 
governments (eg Kamuli District) disowned the arrangement of a PNFP facility as the 
gazetted provider in their communities and constructed public facilities next to the PNFP 
ones -a situation that ran counter to the goal of efficiency being pursued in public-private 
partnerships policy. Furthermore, the change in user fee policy of Government left fee- 
charging PNFP providers relatively uncompetitive (Peter Waalwo Kajula 2004; Xu, Evans et 
al. 2006). 
Figure 1.1 shows that the government subsidies were contributing 22 - 36 percent of the 
expenditures in the PNFP sub-sector. Available evidence shows that districts local 
governments signed a memorandum of understanding with PNFP as the basis for the 
subsidies. Without any specifics of contractual obligations, the memoranda required PNFP to 
use the subsidies for the provision on the minimum health care package and gradually reduce 
their charges to the users(MOH 1999b; Giusti and Lochoro 2002). 
Administrative measures such as budgets, guidelines, reports of accounts and services 
utilisation have been used to control the PNFP providers under MoU. The MoU specified the 
details about allowable expenditures. For instance, expenditure for staff wages and salaries 
were not allowed. As noted in the mid-term review of HSSP, the key constraint in the Govt- 
PNFP partnership was the nature of contractual relationship: 
"... the administrative as opposed to contractual nature of the PNFP relationship with the 
local governments has not helped to strengthen the partnership. It may also not be providing 
the best value for money ..... 
it is recommended that a study be conducted to gather evidence- 
based data on the most appropriate contractual arrangement that would improve access to 
the minimum health care package for the poor and most vulnerable (and) at the same time 
increase value for money " (M0H f 2003 page 51). 
Upon this backdrop, a performance-based contracting (PBC) pilot was designed and 
undertaken by the World Bank Research Group and Uganda's Ministry of Health (MOH) 
with the aim of providing explicit annual service targets to the PNFP providers as the 
contractual obligations for the subsidies they received from the Government. 
1.3 Brief Description of the PBC Pilot 
The pilot was undertaken between 2003 and 2007 in five districts i. e. Arua, Bushenyi, Jinja, 
Kyenjojo, and Mukono. All health facilities in the five districts were invited to participate in 
one of the three experimental groups. Government health facilities were assigned to the 
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control group largely to avoid the legal burden associated with changing public financing 
entitlements and limited decision space for handling financial bonuses in the intervention. 
PNFP facilities were randomly assigned to the three experimental groups. The following 
table summarises the interventions and their allocation to the three experimental groups: 
Table: 1.1: Hospital Assignment to PBC Pilot Experiment and Components 
Experimental group Unique interventions Common interventions 
Control group (Status quo continues i. e. 1. Baseline assessment of 
(Public and PNFP Allocation Guidelines & MOU for service outputs, 
facilities) PNFPs) 2.6-montly assessments: 
1. Contract addendum to MOU; " service outputs achieved, 
2. Selection of 3 service targets " client satisfaction survey, 
Experimental group A 
from a list of 6; " facility inputs survey, 
(PNFP facilities only) 3. Freedom to allocate 
Govt. grant " household service, 
to PNFP. utilisation survey. 
1. Contract addendum to MOU; 3. Performance feedback from 
Experimental group B 2. Selection of 3 service targets the service output 
(PNFP facilities only) from a list of 6; assessments 3. Freedom to allocate Govt. grant 
to PNFP; 
4. Bonus payment if targets are 
achieved. 
The control study group was provided with information about the study but did not enter into 
a contractual arrangement with the district. A number of public and PNFP facilities were 
assigned to this group. 
The PNFP facilities in experimental groups A and B were required to sign a "Contract 
Addendum" to the usual Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that each facility signs with 
the District Local Government. For Study Group A and B, the Addendum specified a 
number of performance goals and allowed participants the freedom to allocate grant monies 
as they wished. For Study Group B, the Addendum also provided for bonus payments for 
successful performance. The bonus amounts to be paid to Group A facilities were calibrated 
on the basis of how many of the three targets were attained at midyear and at the end of the 
year. The total bonus payments within the fiscal year would not exceed a maximum of 11 
percent of the government subsidy provided to the health facility. The following 
performance targets were selected on the basis of the key interventions in the Health Sector 
Strategic Plan and availability of information on service outputs: 
1. Increase the number of outpatient visits by 10% 
2. Increase the number of births attended by a skilled health worker by 5% 
3. Increase the number of children under one year immunised by 10% 
4. Increase the number of new acceptors of family planning methods by 5% 
5. Increase the average number of antenatal visits by pregnant women by 10% 
6. Increase the number of children under five treated for malaria by 10% 
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The performance of all three study groups was monitored every six months over a period of 
two years, beginning with a baseline survey in September 2005. The service output 
assessments and the surveys for facility inputs, client satisfaction and household use of 
services were outsourced to the Makerere University, Institute of Public Health and a Pilot 
Coordinator was recruited by the World Bank Research Group and situated within the 
Ministry of Health headquarters. 
1.4 Study Rationale 
To understand the potential benefit of performance-based contracting (PBC) as a tool for 
improving access and equity objectives in health delivery in Uganda, the study in this thesis 
was proposed to examine how the PBC pilot would work to increase access to services in 
PNFP hospitals. This study also sought to explore the literature on performance-based 
contracting, its theoretical premise, experiences of applications to public health sectors and 
the overall impact PBC might have on improving efficiency in service delivery using the 
PBC pilot in Uganda as a case study. Contracting for performance as implemented in the 
Uganda pilot has implications on the capacity to measure and objectively verify performance 
targets. The literature review also sought to understand how control of hospital performance 
is exercised though measurement of targets and payment of bonuses and how these might 
elicit responses behaviour among hospitals. 
The next section will explore the literature on contracting in health care provision. The key 
question guiding the review was the extent to which performance-based contracts provides 
incentives for improving access to health services and how providers might respond to these 
incentives. Economic, sociological and psychological theories have been used to explain 
how individuals, groups and organisations response to incentives. Subsequent sections 
introduce contracts and why they are increasingly being used in the health sector, before 
discussing theories on how contracts may succeed or fail to improve performance. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.0 Introduction 
The concept of the contract is rooted in the historical transition from a single entrepreneur 
business to multi-disciplinary and specialised industrial economy which depends on multiple 
skills and a broader scope of action. Macneil (1974) outlined the roots and key dimensions of 
contracts in economic exchange. He observed that the concept of the contract is a result of 
the necessity in society to plan for future activity -a situation that elevated the use of 
"promises" instead of on-the-spot "quid-pro-quo" in economic exchange. 
"A contract is a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, 
or the performance of which, the law in some way, recognizes as a duty " (Macneil 1974) 
Macneil identifies three key features for a classical contract arising from the above definition 
of the contract law 1) specificity (ie exact characterization of the goods for exchange), 2) 
communication (ie clear understanding of the transaction) and 3) measured reciprocity (ie the 
exchange/monetised obligations of transactors). 
As observed by Palmer (2000) and Allen (2002) classical contracts with full specification of 
the exchange goods or services are difficult to operationalise in the health care industry. This 
has necessitated the evolution of more relational contracts whereby trust and mutual 
dependence replaces the need to resort to the legal resolution of conflicts nor the need to fully 
specify and measure the goods or services at the heart of the contractual exchange(Palmer 
2000; Allen 2002). As observed by Macneil, most economic activity is organised on the 
basis of relational contracts. 
".. in post-industrial states, with their centuries of old transactional histories, perhaps the 
most important way by which exchange is projected is through (. ) expectations that exchange 
motivations and dependence in exchange (. ) relations will continue in future. Such 
relational expectations, if firmly enough grounded in fact, assure "satisfactory" exchange in 
the future without need for present specificity, present communication and present measured 
reciprocity. A vast amount of economic activity is carried on at least partly on this basis" 
(Macneil 1974 page 718). 
However, the reforms like new-public management in the UK have shown that there is a zone 
in the middle of the classical pole and relational pole of contractual exchange where some 
degrees specifying performance targets, communicating contract obligations and measuring 
and reimbursing performance may work(Le Grand 1998). 
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2.1 Performance-based Contracting (PBC) 
By definition, performance-based contracting is a tool or approach for linking monetary or 
material rewards conditional to taking a measurable action or achievement of predetermined 
performance targets (Eichler, Levine et al. 2009 page 6). Performance-base contracting is a 
mechanism that seeks to specify the product/outcome at the centre of the exchange in the 
provider-payer relationship. Performance-based contracting has several characteristics that 
distinguish it from the more traditional types of contracting. Performance-based contracting 
typically incorporates some or all of the following: 
" Emphasises results related to output, quality, and outcomes rather than how the work 
is performed, 
" Has an outcome orientation and clearly defined objectives and timeframes, 
" Uses measurable performance standards and or quality assurance plans, and 
" Provides performance incentives that ties payment to output or outcomes. 
For example the "output contract" specifies the volume and/or quality of the outputs or 
outcome such as number of children fully immunised. By contrast, "process product" contract 
may specify a set of procedures to put into operations to bring about a desired outcome. An 
example of this nature is when contracts require accreditation regimens or specified 
institutional capabilities and resource standards such as workforce size and professional mix. 
Advances in cost-effectiveness interventions, diagnostic and information technologies have 
enabled the development of standard means of measurement and costs of treating 
interventions. For example, cost reimbursement for diagnostic related groups (DRGs) is 
widely used in the US and UK. Likewise, as the trend for provider autonomy increases, there 
is a need for fund-holders to ensure that their objectives are met by organisations that are 
outside of their bureaucratic controls. Similar needs for accountability for results are driven 
by disease-specific initiatives that would like to ensure that multi-purpose organisations 
deliver on the specific disease control objectives as much as by reforms such as new public 
management that seek to optimise outcomes from public investments. 
"As decision rights are delegated to the organisation, the ability of governments to assert 
direct accountability (through the hierarchy) is diminished. When autonomy increases, 
accountability must be secured by shifting from hierarchical supervision to reliance on 
monitoring, regulations, and the economic incentives embedded in contract "(WHO 2000 
page 65). 
" ... Performance contracts permit 
financiers to move away from the micromanagement 
associated with accounting for and examining the use of each input and toward a more hand- 
off approach where the desired results are what is counted"(Eichler, Levine et al. 2009 page 
20). 
Z2 Why Should Hospitals Respond to PBC? 
This literature review is aimed at guiding the assessment of the responses of the hospitals to 
performance contracting intervention. Three related questions are essential to guide the 
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design, implementation and evaluation of PBC pilot for public policy action and scale-up (Le 
Grand 2003; Pawson and Tilley 2004): 
1. Why should hospitals respond to PBC? 
2. How is the response elicited? 
3. What is the nature of the response? 
In answering these questions lies the theoretical and practical lessons for policy and 
programmes to guide and successfully replicate the desirable responses and mitigate the 
negative ones. These questions are addressed in turn by reviewing the relevant theoretical 
and empirical literature. The chapter ends with a synthesis and related study propositions to 
guide the assessment of the hospital responses to performance-based contracting in Uganda. 
Central to understanding why hospitals should or should not respond is in unpacking of the 
intervention - performance-based contracting (PBC) and the premises underlying its use as a 
tool for performance improvements in general and in the health system in particular. 
" Why is PBC being used in the first place? 
" What incentives are contained in PBC? 
" Why should these incentives have an effect on the hospitals? 
2.2.1 What Problem is PBC Trying to Solve? 
Traditional approaches to financing health services such as input-based or bureaucratic 
process approaches have often failed to yield sustained improvements in services, particularly 
for the poor and underprivileged populations (McPake 1997; Castro-Leal, Dayton et al. 2000; 
WHO 2000; Filmer 2001; Gwatkin 2003; Harding and Preker 2003; WDR 2004). This is one 
of the major reason for the international concern in the last decade, to explore ways to 
organize, deliver and target health services to promote efficiency, innovation and increase 
accountability for performance. 
In general performance contracting is theorised to improve contractor performance by tying 
providers' compensation to the achievement of specified objectives. Other hypothesised 
benefits includes more flexibility to the contractor to achieve the desired results usually by 
igniting creative/innovative means of production (Shen 2003; Sanchez 2004; FCS 2005). 
What constitutes "performance" in a performance-based contract is determined based on the 
objective of the payer. This has led some authors to refer to PBC as a "buyer's side solution" 
(Chapin and Fetter 2002 pg 104). In the health sector, performance specification can be based 
on service "outcomes" such as abstinence from alcohol or drug addiction (Shen 2003; Lu and 
Ma 2006) or based on volume of outputs such as patient visits, children immunised, maternal 
deliveries (Eichler, Auxila et al. 2001; Soeters and Griffiths 2003; WHO 2003; Akashi, 
Yamada et al. 2004; Palmer and Mills 2005; McNamara 2006; Meessen, Musango et al. 
2006). In some cases the measure of performance is on efficiency of resource utilisation such 
as reduction in the unit costs for care (Bartlett and Le Grand 1994; Le Grand 1998; Dawson, 
18 
Goddard et al. 2001; Dawson and Dargie 2002; Smith 2002; Jacobs and Dawson 2003) while 
in other situations the measure is on the quality of services or productivity of the workers 
(Schneider, Riehl et al. 1999; Moody 2004; Rosenthal, Frank et al. 2005; Lyroudi, Glaveli et 
al. 2006; McNamara 2006). The multiplicity of designs in the above literature attests to the 
flexibility of the PBC as a method for performance improvement in different contexts and 
performance needs. 
2.2.2 Why Performance Contracting in the Health Sector 
From the economic perspective and as expressed in the 2004 World Development Report, 
problems of inefficiency arise from lack of incentives for service providers to optimise their 
performance: 
"... teachers must be present and effective at their jobs, just as doctors, and nurses must 
provide the care that patients need. But they are often mired in a system where the incentives 
for effective service delivery are weak, ... 
Since those who do serve there are rarely 
monitored, the penalties for not being at work are low. " (WDR 2004 pg 4) 
Performance contracting is claimed to have the potential for enhancing managerial innovation 
and discipline, by exerting greater attention to performance and efficiency; by motivating 
providers to structure their services for better performance (Mills 1997; Palmer 2000; Taylor 
2003): As expressed by Eichler et al (2009), contracting is seen as a tool to convey incentives 
for preferred provider behaviours. 
"Optimism is warranted because material incentives are powerful; when incentives have 
been introduced, the improvements in key health indicators have been large and rapid and 
appear to have exceeded what would have occurred in the absence of the incentive. Based on 
an emerging base of evidence, performance incentives appear to be effective ways to achieve 
important health gains. The positive effects have been demonstrated when only a relatively 
modest sum (of money) was used as the reward" (Eichler, Levine et al. 2009 page 6). 
This optimistic view of performance contracts may be at odds with the possible differences in 
objectives of the contract parties and their motivations in pursuing contractual relations. 
Several economic and behavioural theories - sometimes referred to as agency-based theories 
- have been advanced to explain why and when contractual relationships may serve to 
coordinate and control the agent(s) to serve the interest of the principle. These are reviewed 
below. 
2.3 Agency-based Theories 
The standard agency theory (Milgrom and Roberts 1988; Mooney and Mandy 1993; Mooney 
and Ryan 1993) posits that: 
" The principal is ill-informed about the task from which he wants to maximise benefits 
" The agent is well informed and too, wants to maximise his/her own benefits from the task 
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" The agent may not want a high risk or to expend a lot of effort in maximising his/her 
benefit; 
" The principal has to design a viable contract to attract the participation of the agent; and 
" The principal has to motivate the agent to choose the set of actions that will maximize the 
principal's benefit, subject to information asymmetry. 
Agency problems arise due to the reliance on the agents in the context of asymmetry of 
information. In practice, specialized skill or knowledge makes information asymmetry the 
norm in contract relations (Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Macneil 1974; Williamson 1985; 
Strong and Waterson 1987; Sappington 1991; Douma and Schreuder 2002). The problem is 
worsened if the agents are risk averse or stand to benefit by pursuing objectives different 
from that of the principal. Attempts to remedy the conflict in objectives may take several 
forms including: 
" to bring the agents into a hierarchical command to ensure that their behaviours are 
controlled according to principals' expectations(Williamson 1985; McPake, 
Kumaranayake et al. 2002). 
" to adopt outcome benefit schemes to ensure profit sharing and/or transfer of property 
rights (Smith, Stephan et al. 1997; Saltman 2002). This approach seeks to introduce 
incentives for the agent to adopt the principal's objective. 
2.3.1 Transaction Cost Theory and Performance Metering 
By using the natural tendency by individuals to maximise own utility in a way that involves 
selfish, strategic and guileful behaviour (opportunism) and the limitation of individuals to 
acquire and process all information essential for rational decisions (bounded rationality), 
Williamson (1985) developed a typology to illustrate situations where comprehensive 
contracting (box C in table 2.1) and rational decision making are feasible as control 
mechanisms. Comprehensive contracting is possible if agents actions can be observed, 
unambiguously measured and are directly attributed to the outcome of interest (Williamson 
1985 pg 52. ). In situations where opportunism is much less, general clause contracting is the 
alternative control approach necessitating less recourse to performance measurement. 
Table 2.1: Contractual difficulties under bounded rationality and opportunism 
Bounded Rationality 
Absent Admitted 
Absent (A) Bliss (B) General Clause 
contracting 
Opportunism 
Admitted 
(C) Comprehensive (D) Serious contractual 
contracting difficulties 
ource: (wiuwamson 
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In the health sector comprehensive contracting and accompanying performance metering 
would suit highly contestable (easy market entry) and simpler services e. g. immunisations, 
antenatal, delivery care, and intermediate outputs such as client volume in out-patient 
services(Preker and Harding 2000). In contrast, the difficulty of measurement of complex 
hospital services and their quality attributes creates serious contractual difficulties (box D) 
due to less than optimal metering mechanisms for performance control. 
Following Williamson's framework, Ouchi urged that performance control mechanisms can 
be achieved by measuring the outcomes or behaviours. The behaviour of the employees can 
be measured in situations where the outcomes of employees' behaviours cannot feasibly be 
measured (Ouchi 1979; Strong and Waterson 1987). To be effective, behaviour 
measurements requires that the task(s) are programmable i. e. sequence and standards are 
specified and required behaviours are explicitly defined and readily measured. Task-specific 
behaviours are equivalent to adherence to clinical standards and care protocols in hospital 
/clinical care. These protocols lay down the processes of care and the required standards. 
Upon this assumption, a typology to explain the ability to measure performance 
behaviours/outcome and the programmability of the task looks like table 2.2. 
Table 2.2 Task measurability and information system 
Knowled e of trans rmadon process 
Perfect Imperfect 
High (A) Behaviour or (B) Outcome 
Ability to Measure outcome control control 
activity/outcome (C) Behaviour (D) Socialization Low 
control "Clan" control 
From Ouchi's typology, for the nature of measurability and knowledge of the transformation 
process (e. g. clinical protocols or algorithms), performance measurement can be organized 
through three governance (control) systems: 
" Hierarchical surveillance: This is more suited to a situation with perfect information on 
the transformation process but low measurability of the activity (box C) e. g. 
immunisations or child birth. 
" Market control: i. e. where there is imperfection in the knowledge of the transformation 
processes but high outcome measurability (eg cure from malaria) the market can be used 
to provide performance information of the production process (A) and (B). 
" Clan governance also called "peer monitoring" is most appropriate where there is poor 
measurability of outcomes and/or difficulty of standard behaviours of production e. g. 
emergency care of road traffic accident victims (box D). In these circumstances, 
individuals socialised into particular traditions of appropriate behaviour or committed to a 
code of conduct and ethics are required to constitute a clan form of control. 
From the Japanese experience, Ouchi concluded that it was cheaper to control people through 
socialisation and norms than through the use of material incentives or bureaucratic rules 
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(Ouchi 1980). In a clan system, performance information is transmitted via soft and informal 
channels and is closely associated with standards, culture and norms of professional 
behaviour, a situation also echoed by Arrow (1963): 
"the usual reason why the market acts as a check to ensure quality operates with weak force 
here (health care). It is for this reason that the ethical indoctrination is of such crucial 
importance. The control that is exercised ordinarily by informed buyers is replaced by 
internalised values" (Arrow 1963 pg 143). 
The recourse to performance-based contractual relations with incentives such as bonuses, and 
measurements based on explicit targets may be understood as attempts to introduce the 
market forces in the health care industry and overcome the dependence on the medical values 
and ethical socialisation of health professionals in the performance management of the 
industry. From economic perspectives, improving efficiency requires market-based features 
such as competition (e. g. the threat of exit) and the appeal of profitable activities to 
individuals as a means of broader welfare improvements(Homstrom and Milgrom 1991; 
Petersen, Woodard et al. 2006). Property rights and profitable entrepreneurship have been 
used as economic rationale for New Public Management reforms. A brief review of these is 
explored next. 
2.3.2 Property Rights and New Public Management 
The need to protect welfare benefits of public provision from market-induced extinction 
(exit) and at the same time address their inefficiencies led to the New Public Management 
(NPM) reforms (Shaw 1999; Stark 2002; Dawson and Dargie Ed. ). New Public Management 
came to symbolise a set of interventions aimed as replicating entrepreneurial mechanisms in 
the management of public services. Among the NPM set of interventions was the separation 
of the purchasing and provision functions and infusing competition and choice into the 
conduct of public bureaucracies (McPake 1996; Mills 1997; Ashton 1998; Taylor 2003). 
"Profit" was introduced in the form of financial incentives such as bonuses and share-holding 
which allowed public agents to claim some benefits arising from their improved performance. 
In these quasi-market arrangements, contractual arrangements replaced command and control 
of the public service bureaucracy. From the perspective of the public-private partnerships, 
contracting has been seen as a tool to engage and leverage private resources for health of the 
population for which there is little incentive(Taylor 2003; Palmer and Mills 2005). As a tool, 
contracting has therefore been used to introduce competition, financial incentives, risk 
sharing and performance measurement to guide the delivery systems in fulfilling particular 
objectives and become more accountable to the payers (Mills 1997; Harding and Preker 
2003). 
These reforms are premised on introducing market-like incentives into public or social 
systems of service provision. The incentives broadly involve the introduction of property 
rights within public service institutions. Freedom to make decisions on the use of assets and 
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rights to allocate residual returns such as revenue surplus are credited for the burgeoning 
efficiency of the for-profit sector and market-based developments (Milgrom and Roberts 
1988). For example, a rational private owner will optimise her efficiency to ensure profitable 
provision as well as expand her market share. Ownership of productive assets assigns the 
rights to claim profits/residual. As a result, property rights theorists have advanced policies to 
introduce ownership rights to ensure that public sector managers bear the full financial 
impact of their choices. For example, organisational reforms like decentralization, autonomy 
and privatisation have sought to introduce decision rights in management (eg hire and fire) 
and rights to allocate revenue surplus (McPake 1996; Harding and Preker 2003). These 
provide strong (high-powered) incentives to managers of public services to optimise 
efficiency and service coverage in a manner similar to private entrepreneurship. For example, 
Le Grand (1998) argued that "waiting lists" were used by managers in the NHS to justify 
higher hospital budgets but this changed when NPM reforms introduced throughput volume 
and cost control as a basis for resource allocation (Le Grand 1998). 
Firms may attempt to transmit these high-powered incentives internally in the form of bonus 
payment, higher salaries and promoting workers into higher paying jobs so that they too, 
share in the firm's residual returns (Akashi, Yamada et al. 2004; Jacobs and Price 2004; 
Jacobs and Price 2006; Meessen, Van Damme et al. 2006). From this perspective, the use of 
bonuses in PBC can be seen as attempts to introduce a conditional surplus (bonus) to which 
the hospitals are entitled upon fulfilment of the contractual performance-targets. 
2.3.3 Incentives and Performance Management 
From the economic perspective, the principal consideration is the need to expand the 
production frontier to the optimal level of efficiency through appropriate incentives to the 
agents. Health provision is a complex industry with many tasks, some more measurable than 
others and some requiring more attention to quality than the speed of production or requiring 
team action rather than individual effort (Preker et al 2000). There exists a tension among the 
incentives provided for performance of a particular task and the allocation of effort by agents 
on that task relative to other mandated tasks(Dixit 1996). In general, the theory of incentives 
argue that when there are multiple tasks, incentives serves not only to allocate risk and to 
motivate hard work, but also to direct the allocation of the agents' attention among the 
various tasks (Homstrom B and Milgrom P 1991). 
If volume of output is easy to measure but quality is not, then a system of incentives based on 
measures of service volume may lead health providers to increase their volume at the expense 
of quality. If responsive to the incentives, the provider (agent) would assign more effort to the 
elements that are measured compared to those that are not (Goddard et al 2000; Homstrom 
and Milgrom 1991). The implication of this theory is that the recourse to performance-based 
contracts among health providers might cause reallocation of effort away from some other 
tasks especially those that are not considered central to the obligations under the incentivised 
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contract or tasks/services that are not monitored as a basis for the payment. Therefore, the 
design of incentives needs to be well linked to all the desired outcomes as observed in 
McPake et al (2002): 
"In any payment system, rewards must be linked with some aspect of performance that is 
observable. Under incentive management and regulation, the objective is that the aspect 
chosen should also be that which is intended to be encouraged" (pg 179). 
2.4 How Would Hospitals Respond? 
Although agency-based economic theories above explain why incentives are needed for 
performance improvements, they have weak operational explanations as to how these 
incentives lead to performance improvements (Gauri 2001; Kingma 2003; Pawson and Tilley 
2004; Hodak 2005). Human resource management practitioners rightly concerned with 
sustained employee productivity and continued employee commitment to the organisation 
find little practical assistance from agency-based theories (Marsden and Richardson 1994; 
Kingma 2003; Le Grand 2003; Natasha Palmer 2003; West, Wilk et al. 2003). Operational 
mechanisms of how external incentives lead to performance improvement at the front line 
(street level) have been a central concern of the field of organisational psychology. In equal 
measure, perspectives from organisational sociology and anthropology have provided 
contrasting approaches such as Human Relations, Organisational Contingency, Leadership 
and Governance and others - to deal with the issues of performance, efficiency and labour 
force commitment. 
Process theories of motivation have been advanced to explain the causal factors for labour 
productivity and organisational performance. Process theories refer to a system of ideas or 
statements that account for or explain a group of facts or phenomena related to the 
implementation of activities - how they should be planned, organised, and scheduled in order 
to be effective (Grol, Bosch et al. 2007). Process theories vary in scope and application areas. 
Processes theories range from those seeking to explain the performance of organisations and 
work-team, to those dealing with the motivation, perceptions, organisational resources and 
support systems, and those that deal with how financial incentives influence performance. 
These are reviewed below: 
2.4.1 Motivation and Performance at the Individual Level 
Although they have a long history in the business sector, recently, attention has turned to the 
psychosocial dimensions of labour productivity in the health sector(Marsden and Richardson 
1994; Bennett, Franco et al. 2001; West, Wilk et al. 2003; Crilly and Le Grand 2004; Franco, 
Bennett et al. 2004; Moody and Pesut 2006). At the level of an individual worker within an 
organisational environment, two interrelated psychosocial streams are identified in the 
literature (Franco, Bennett et al. 2002) as sources of motivation and productivity: 
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The "will do" component relates to the extent to which a worker will adopt organisational 
goals and this is said to depend on intrinsic and extrinsic rewards from the work. 
The "can do" component depends on the extent the worker mobilises personal 
resources/skills to achieve goals and depends on perception of competency, availability of 
resources and work environment. These are expanded in turn below: 
2.4.2 Will do: Commitment to Organisational Goals 
Several process-based theories have been advanced to understand an individual's intrinsic 
and extrinsic motivation for work. These include those that seek to identify the factors 
essential for individual's motivation (content theories) such as Maslow's hierarchy of needs, 
McGregor's X and Y theories and Herzberg theory. These theories address the human needs 
that give rise to motivated behaviour. These theories identify various "needs" essential for 
the worker motivation, satisfaction and continued commitment to work. The needs arising 
from these theories range from basic ones such as food and shelter to higher ones such as 
recognition, growth and sense of accomplishment. Other needs relate to relationships with 
others and a sense of belonging. 
However in the context of human resource management as an explicit concern for sustained 
hospital performance, Herzberg's motivation-hygiene theory offers more explanatory 
potential (Baysinger and Butler 1985; Marsden and Richardson 1994; Westphal 1999; 
O'Donnell and Shields 2002; Hauck and Street 2006). It identifies the short and long term 
factors as well as personal and environmental factors for employee motivation. In brief, 
motivation-hygiene theory posits that two factors i. e. motivators and satisfiers have different 
causal elements. The satisfiers relate to what a person does while the dissatisfiers relate to the 
situation in which the person does her work. For example, supervision, interpersonal 
relations, organisational rules, working conditions and salary are short-term satisfiers rather 
than motivators. The absence of hygiene factors can create job dissatisfaction, but their 
presence does not necessarily motivate or create satisfaction. The motivators are related to 
elements that enrich a person's job; such as achievement, recognition, the work itself, 
responsibility, and advancement. These motivators are associated with long-term positive 
effects in job performance while the hygiene factors produce only short-term changes in job 
attitudes and performance, that may fluctuate over time (Herzberg, Mausner et al. 1959). In 
particular, the use of financial rewards such as salary and bonuses are classified as hygiene 
factors with transient effects on productivity. The two factor theory has found broad 
application especially in managing and motivating knowledge-based productivity where tasks 
involve broad discretionary space from the employee. This situation is similar to hospital care 
where decision making is delegated to health professionals (Weaver and Sorrells-Jones 1999; 
Horwitz, Heng et al. 2003; Chan, McBey et al. 2004; Moody 2004; Moody and Pesut 2006). 
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2.4.3 Can Do: Intrinsic Motivation for Work 
Although performance management and human resource management are related, the latter 
addresses the central concern of how to maintain productive employment relations between 
the worker and her organisation. In contrast, performance management relates to the 
processes that maintain or improve performance during employment. Performance 
management has attracted research especially in the field of industry, universities and 
hospitals (Guest 1999; May, Korczynski et al. 2002; MSH 2002; Smith 2002; Landrum and 
Baker 2004; Moody 2004; Veldhoven 2005; Hauck and Street 2006). Given its appeal to the 
incentive-based approach, Expectancy Theory has been widely embraced in this context. In 
general expectancy explains the links between external incentive and internal (or intrinsic) 
motivation to undertake or accomplish the required task by a person. Expectancy theory 
(Vroom Victor 1964; Lawler 1971) suggests that individuals can be motivated if they believe 
that: 
" There is a positive correlation between their efforts and required performance 
outcomes, 
" Favourable performance will result in a desirable reward, 
" The reward will satisfy an important personal need, and 
" The desire to satisfy the personal need is strong enough to make the effort 
worthwhile. 
Thus, expectancy theory suggests that an individual consider the outcomes associated with 
various levels of his/her performance and elects to pursue the effort level that generates the 
greatest reward. The conscious or subconscious calculus for effort behaviour called 
"motivational force" is a product of three beliefs referred to as expectancy, instrumentality 
and valence: 
" Expectancy - the belief that one's effort will result in the attainment of the desired 
performance. This depends on skills, goal difficulty and perceived control over outcome. 
For example, the resources required, the skills and support available to the worker affect 
their expectancy. 
" Instrumentality - the belief that if one does attain performance goals, a reward will be 
received depends on trust and control mechanisms for the reward to be given (ie how, 
when and why rewards are distributed). This requires policies or formal organisational 
structures and rules that link the reward to expected performance. This also encompasses 
an objective and reliable means of measuring the expected performance. 
" Valance - this encompass the value that the individual personally places on the rewards. 
This is a function of his/her needs, goals and values. For example what value does a 
worker attach to the bonus, salary, promotion or recognition for task accomplishment? 
In general the expectancy theory suggests that an employee's beliefs about expectancy, 
instrumentality, and valence interact psychologically to create a motivational force such that 
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the employee acts in ways that bring pleasure and avoid pain. From the calculus perspective, 
the motivational force is theorised as a product of the three perceptions - implying that a zero 
value, in any of the beliefs will generate zero motivation outcome. 
The implications of expectancy theory for the PBC pilot implementation in Uganda are that 
management must ensure that employees are aware of the links between their effort and the 
required task (service targets), the accomplishment of the task should lead to a promised 
reward and the reward must be of sufficient value compared to the level of effort or need of 
the worker. Communication is key to the linkages as put by Handy: "Without the knowledge 
of the [performance] score, the motivation calculus will soon dry up" (Handy 1993 pg 43). In 
addition, the concept rests on "beliefs" which operate at the cognitive level of the worker to 
form what others have called a psychological contract(Guest 1998). 
2.4.4 Psychological Contract 
A psychological contract has been advanced as a product of the "will do" and "can do" 
perceptions reviewed above (Guest 1998; Rousseau 2001; Franco, Bennett et al. 2002). It 
also attempts to remedy the criticism of the expectancy theory which assumes that individuals 
are capable of calculating all the odds and always act in accordance with their motivation 
calculus. Psychological contract has been defined by Rousseau et al as the individual 
employee's subjective perceptions of the mutual obligations between employer and 
employee. Given bounded employee rationality, this contract reflects incomplete and 
sometimes distorted understanding of the employee-employer relations (Rousseau 2001). The 
psychological contract guides the day-to-day employee behaviour in ways that cannot 
necessarily be discerned from a written job contract. 
How the psychological contract links back to employee performance is what Guest (1998) 
has identified as causes, content and consequences on the employee. Inputs into the contract 
or causes, include organisational culture, human resource practices, prior experience, 
expectations, and worker's job-alternatives. The state of the contract or its content has three 
main affective components: Sense of fairness, trust and fulfilment of workers expectations. 
Consequences include key attitudes such as job satisfaction, job security, organisational 
commitment and motivation. If this contract is violated, negative attitudes such as 
resentment, anger, mistrust and betrayal may arise. These may cause negative work 
behaviours ranging from low commitment, reduced effort or higher absenteeism, sabotage 
and worker exit(Guest 1998). In stable contexts, an existing psychological contract is likely 
to be reaffirmed by positive customs, practices and norms in relation to employer and 
employee understandings of the basis of the exchange. As such, the psychological contract 
serves as the internal glue arising from external incentives structures that helps to explain the 
commitment to relational contractual relations and sustained productivity(Moody and Pesut 
2006). 
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It is important to note that the "psychological contract" approach is an integrating concept 
that knit together the theoretic elements of motivation-hygiene and expectancy theories into 
cognitive mental schemas that guide the day-to-day motivation for productive organisational 
life and commitment(Rousseau 2001). Although presented as an individual-level concept, 
individuals share their schemas and cognitive constructs with others in the organisation 
through formal and informal ways to generate a general mood, culture or norm for 
organisational commitment and productivity. 
2.5 Motivation and Performance at the Organisational Level 
Empirical work using motivation theory have been undertaken recently in the health sector 
(Marsden and French 1998; Franco, Bennett et al. 2004). Marsden and French for example, 
used the expectancy framework to assess the organisational effectiveness arising from 
performance-based payment reforms in public services in the UK. In addition to the basic 
structure of expectancy theory, a framework used by Franco et al incorporates the influence 
of organisational factors such as organsational structures and processes, resources and culture 
to understand the effects of health sector reforms on health workers' motivation among 
hospitals in Jordan and Georgia (Franco, Bennett et al. 2004). Among the key insights from 
these efforts is the need to pay attention to organisational environment or what others have 
called work climates (MSH 2002; Paleologou, Kontodimopoulos et al. 2006; Sexton, 
Heimreich et al. 2006). From this perspective, PBC may introduce financial risks and 
uncertainty in the employment relations that may erode the psychological contract. For 
instance Eldridge and Palmer observe that - "there is a question of the appropriateness of 
transferring performance-based payment schemes to less developed health systems wherein 
much of the risk is transferred to the providers working in more challenging and fragile 
setting " (Eldridge and Palmer 2009 page 6 of 7). 
The above review thus far has highlighted the important determinants of performance from 
the institutional economics and socio-psychological perspectives. Two levels of contracts 
have emerged - one extrinsic and the other intrinsic to the cognitive level of the agent. Also 
the literature suggests that the extrinsic contract needs to work within a satisfactory context to 
be able to ignite the intrinsic one. But given the bounded rationality of the workers (agents), 
the dynamic events in the environment and the trends in the contractual relations, the intrinsic 
contract is not stable. It can oscillate along a continuum from strong motivation to negative 
one with corresponding changes in performance levels. With this understanding, narrowly 
defined incentives are likely to have temporary influence on the psychological contract if 
they are not addressing broader causes of dissatisfaction within the organisational 
environment. This literature suggests that an incentive-package approach is needed if the 
intrinsic contract is to be comprehensively affected. Saltman defines an incentive as: 
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"implicit or explicit reward for performing a particular act. It is a broad concept which can 
apply to groups and organisation as well as to single individual and may arise from external 
entity or internally generated from within the group, organisation or individual "(Saltman 
2002 pg 1679). 
In standard principal-agent relationships, compensation (money metric) systems serve the 
dual function of allocating risk and rewarding productive work (Etzioni 1964; Strong and 
Waterson 1987). Other forms of incentives within the organisations include: 
" The restriction of activities in other tasks that are not related to the main outcomes for 
which the principal is interested. For example, restriction of alternative activities that 
may provide agents private gain at the expense of the core tasks for which they are 
contracted. A hospital may require its doctors not to engage in private practice as an 
example. 
" Shifting ownership of assets i. e. changing the property rights over the productive assets to 
introduce "residual claimant" status by the agents. This may be accomplished by: - 
o Making the agent the sole residual claimant of any surplus from the agents' efforts 
after meeting the principal's set target or paying the franchise fee. Private wings 
in hospitals where the staff shares the proceeds from fees paid by clients as an 
example. 
o Making the agent share a fraction of the surplus with the principal after the set 
targets are achieved. Bonus payments arise from this form of incentives. 
o Rewarding/penalising the relative performance among agents where the winners 
take a prize (reward) and the poorest performers, a penalty. This "tournament" 
approach induces agents with similar capacity to improve performance relative to 
their peers. League tables approaches where the best agent is awarded a prize fit 
this category. 
2.5.1 Incentive and System-level Dynamics 
Unanticipated problems usually arise from incentives aimed narrowly at a particular objective 
without proper attention to a range of contextual factors and agents' characterises. These 
may include: 
" Effort redistribution or displacement for example, multi-task agents, may allocate effort 
only on the rewarded tasks to the detriment of other tasks (Homstrom and Milgrom 1991; 
Dixit 1996; Goddard, Mannion et al. 2000). 
" Performance information systems may get manipulated. Incentives attached to 
information such as budgets, status rankings, bonuses and job-security are likely to 
influence agents' reporting behaviours as noted by Goddard et al (2000): 
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"... an important attribution issue arises if it is in the power of the agent to manipulate the 
reported performance measure in a way that improves reported behaviour without any 
concomitant improvement in actual behaviour, giving rise to misrepresentation of the 
reported performance "(pg 101). 
The potential for information manipulation is great within health care industry, since the 
collection of output data is often in the hands of the health care professionals whose actions 
cannot readily be audited. Literature in the US also illustrate the "DRG creep" phenomenon 
where hospitals tried to report higher paying diagnostic related groups (DRG) to increase 
their revenues (Steinwald and Dummit 1989; Lu and Ma 2002; Lu and Ma 2006). In the UK, 
performance targets and league-tables based on hospital waiting-lists in the National Health 
Services in the UK led to a shift of hospital's attention to waiting lists to the neglect of other 
domains of health care (Anand 1992; Goddard, Mannion et al. 2000). 
Other writers such as Fehr et al and Titmuss caution against the narrowly economic character 
of incentives as implied by agency theorists and neoclassical economists who regard self- 
interestedness and self-aggrandizement as the central character of people working in public 
employment. The studies by Fehr and Gachter (2002) and Titmuss (1970) demonstrate that 
economic incentives can reduce overall levels of productivity by crowding out voluntary 
cooperation. For example, voluntary blood donors in UK were shown to achieve higher levels 
of safe blood collected than a system based on monetary incentives for blood donation. In 
such situations, the beneficence of the agent/donors may be replaced by commercialised 
objectives (Titmuss 1970; Fehr and Gachter 2002). Non-profit health providers in Uganda 
and globally are generally motivated by charitable objectives. Over monetisation of their 
relationship with the state may crowd-out charitable objectives (Le Grand 2003). There is a 
growing literature suggesting that the medical profession is quite resistant to performance- 
based payments inasmuch as it denigrates their relationship with their patients/clients and the 
psychological satisfaction health workers get from helping those in need of health care(Gauri 
2001; Fehr and Gachter 2002; Smith 2002; Kingma 2003; Moody and Pesut 2006; Petersen, 
Woodard et al. 2006). There is also plenty of literature suggesting that medical behaviour 
changes according to financial objectives(Ellis and McGuire 1986; Thorpe and Phelps 1990). 
2.5.2 Organisational Culture and Performance 
Other sociologists view organisations as more than simply rationally constructed tools to 
achieve specific goals. They contend that organisations are social and human systems in 
which people try to satisfy their needs for happiness, social recognition, prestige, self-interest 
and power - other than pursuit of money and organisational objectives. People in the 
organisation are seen as originators of informal structures and may pursue interests distinct 
from those of the organisation, creating internal politics distinct from formal rules or official 
procedures. This human or social dimension of organisation can support, undercut or have 
little relation to organisational goals or performance (Scott 1998; Handel 2003). From this 
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perspective, social scientists have encouraged higher productivity by paying more attention to 
social conditions and organisational climate. The "Hawthorn effect" is popular in this 
sociological literature as the basis for what is termed as "welfare capitalism" (Homans 1941). 
The prescriptions of welfare capitalism, also called the human relations paradigm, aimed at 
closing the gap between employees' needs for social interaction and the organisational goals. 
Employee welfare policies arising from this perspective led to greater employment security, 
fringe benefits such as health insurance, grievance mechanisms, company picnics, and 
company-sponsored athletics (Etzioni 1964; Jacoby 1997). Cultural engineering approaches 
have pushed for institutional interventions such as leadership skills development, building 
norms, values, beliefs and attitudes as well as symbols and rituals to align worker interests 
with organisational goals (Kunda 1999; Goddard, Mannion et al. 2000; Scott 2001). As put 
by Kunda, "the ideal employees are those who have internalised the organisation's goals and 
values - its culture - into their cognitive and affective make-up, and therefore no longer 
require strict and rigid external control. " For example, NHS adopted symbolic awards for 
quality such as 3-star hospital trusts to symbolise higher performance on quality in a manner 
similar to the hotel industry. Internal to the hospital trusts, the NHS also engineered a polity 
that shifted power from consultants to administrators as a structural measure to build a new 
culture for cost control(Flynn 1992; Crilly and Le Grand 2004). 
2.5.3 Expectancy Theory 
Although many theories seek to identify the factors essential for an individual's motivation to 
accomplish a given task, Expectancy Theory seeks to explain the major factors that underlie 
performance management i. e. the interface between the individual worker and the 
organisation objective. It explains how external incentives such as bonus awards for pre- 
specified targets can induce performance-related behaviours among the individual worker 
(Lawler 1989). In general the expectancy theory suggests that an employee's beliefs about 
expectancy, instrumentality and valence interact at the psychological level to create a 
motivational force such that the employee acts in a manner that bring pleasure and avoid pain 
(see section 2.4.3). The implications of expectancy theory for the PBC pilot implementation 
in Uganda are that the stakeholders in achieving the PBC targets ie: 
" Employees and hospital managers should be aware of the links between their efforts and 
the required outputs (service targets), 
" Accomplishment of the task should lead to a promised reward and a promise of the bonus 
should be credible and regularly follow successful accomplishment, 
" The reward (eg bonuses) must be commensurate with the level of expended efforts, and 
" Communication and awareness is key to building these beliefs as put by Handy: "Without 
the knowledge of the [performance] score, the motivation calculus will soon dry up" 
(Handy 1993 pg 43). 
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2.5.4 Packaging Incentives 
Taken together, agency-based economic theories and organisational process theories 
reviewed above emphasise the need for both financial and non-financial incentives and 
provide several levels at which these provide motivation for performance improvement: 
" Embedded or intrinsic to the individual i. e. physiological, psychological and social needs. 
These needs are mediated by the extrinsic incentives which together interact to form a 
psychological contract -a cognitive schema that guides the individual's mobilisation of 
effort. 
" Market or external environment-based e. g. employment, remuneration standards and 
advancement and social status. 
" Organisational-based e. g. supervision, recognition, promotion, performance rewards, job 
security, cooperative teams and participation/affiliation to an institution. These incentives 
aim to provide an organisational environment conducive for satisfactory day-to-day 
employee performance. 
" Institutional-based i. e. legal framework, carrier-path, fair rules and regulations, equitable 
benefits, threat of censure, leadership, ethics, cultural norms and values. These 
institutional incentives serve to assure an organisation and its employees of a governance 
platform on which they can build their psychological contracts and commitment to the 
organisation relative to its competition. 
As explicit from this list, financial incentives constitute a major, although not sufficient, 
incentive mechanism. An incentive package that weaves the incentives together from the 
perspectives of 1) the market, 2) organisational climate and 3) institutional governance is 
more likely to ignite the intrinsic contract of the workers for productivity. 
2.6 Unpacking the PBC Intervention and its Implementation 
As a means of determining the essential elements of a complex social programme or 
intervention, a theory-driven evaluation has been recommended (Yin 1984; Pawson and 
Tilley 2004; ICEBeRG 2006). Theory-driven assessment allows the identification of the 
essential components without which the programme would not make the desired difference. 
Theoretical conceptions of how the complex programmes would work to achieve their goals 
have received a fair amount of attention in the evaluation research especially in health 
promotion and behaviour change innovations (Judge and Bauld 2001; Pawson and Tilley 
2004; Grol, Bosch et al. 2007). 
"Successful implementation often requires a sequential approach, with different problems 
resolved at each step. Individuals or subgroups within the implementation's target group may 
be in different phases of a process of change ... subgroups may demand different approaches, 
the target group and the context for change must be well known. The implementation process 
requires a diagnostic or problem analysis to find out the reasons for departures from the 
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desired performance, setting, influential parties, and factors that could hamper or stimulate 
change "(Grol, Bosch et al. 2007 page 101). 
2.6.1 Theory of Dynamic Response: 
Despite the expanding literature on the magnitude of effects of health systems interventions, 
the mechanisms through which such outcomes accrue is sparsely addressed. The dynamic 
response model by McPake et al (2006) explicates the mechanism by which context 
influences modifies the innovations to create a difference between the intended intervention 
(de jure) and what the beneficiaries experience (de facto). The framework recognises that 
dynamic responses arise from the interaction of human agents in a particular context to 
determine the nature and form of the de facto intervention (McPake, Blaauw et al. 2006; 
Ssengooba, Rahman et al. 2007; Rifat, Ohiri et al. 2008). The intended structures, incentives 
and procedures that define the formal innovation are modified and transformed during 
implementation to create a difference in the way the innovation is experienced by the 
beneficiaries. The framework highlights the role of informal actions, behaviours, constraints 
and relationships - as some of the lynch pins for the transformation between de jure and the 
de facto interventions that seek to influence the health system. Without understanding this 
transformation process, evaluation research in the health system and social programmes fail 
and potentially misleads the policy development processes. As a remedy, authors from this 
perspective call for new, realistic and theory-driven methods for the evaluation of complex 
social programmes (Judge and Bauld 2001; Pawson and Tilley 2004; Green and Bennett 
2007). These authors emphasise the need to understand and document the role of the context 
and the mechanisms in addition to the magnitude of effects of social and health systems 
interventions. How and why the intervention work is given more prominence. In general this 
framework recommends an embedded and microscopic examination of the intervention 
mechanisms that account for the effectiveness of the interventions. 
2.6.2 Complexity Theory 
Inconsistent results from standard intervention could be related to the content of the 
underlying conceptualisation of implementation as linear and predictable. Like dynamic 
response theory, complexity theory assumes nonlinearity, and capability for interventions to 
re-organise through internal lessons, and evolve to suite contextual realities (Plsek and 
Wilson 2001; Leykum, Pugh et al. 2007; Rifat, Ohiri et al. 2008). As observed by Gibson, 
complexity involves `forms within forms both up and down the scale... Units are nested 
within larger units. Things are components of other things. They would constitute a hierarchy 
except that this hierarchy is not categorical but full of transitions and overlaps" (Gibson 
1979 page 9). The seminal work by Pressman and Wildavsky illuminated the challenges of 
implementing complex Federal interventions in the USA. In their work, they documented 
over 30 decision points involving negotiations and networking with about 15 different 
agencies. All these reduced the probabilities for programme activities(Pressman and 
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Wildavsky 1978). PBC pilot is seen a complex intervention requiring several concurrent 
actions upstream and downstream and building horizontal relationships with other agencies 
and interventions. 
"The success of a financial incentive is likely to be inversely related to the complexity of the 
tasks it seeks to motivate ... results based 
financing is typically part of a package of 
interventions and it is difficult, if not impossible to disentangle the effects of RBF from other 
components of the intervention packages, including increased funding, technical support, 
training, new management structures and monitoring systems "(Oxman and Fretheim 2008 
page 58). 
A science of complex adoptive system (CAS) has evolved to provide tools for evaluating 
interventions that have characteristics that define complex programmes or implementation 
approaches. The key features of effective CAS are: 
1. Agents/organisations that continuously learn and adapt, 
2. Interconnections for communication among agents, 
3. Self-organizing to achieve optimal stability among agents, and 
4. Co-evolution among agents in response to changes in the environment and their 
relationships. 
From this conception of complexity, implementation of and results from the PBC experiment 
can be explained, in part, as context-driven. The tuning of the intervention to ensure context 
relevance may dictate particular adjustments. Thus the implementation arrangement is likely 
to be different from what is expected. The main implication of this perspective is the need for 
a prospective study of the contextual factors that drive the implementation decisions and 
actions. 
2.7 The Nature of Response to PBC: Strategic Options 
Some authors, using the economic rationale have advised against the need for micro-care 
approaches aimed at supporting implementers and learning about the mechanisms that 
external incentives elicit within provider organisations. For example, this "black box" and 
"hands-off' approach has been advocated as essential in Rwanda's performance-based 
contracting experiment. Soaters et al wrote: 
"Respecting the autonomous management of the service providers is important to encourage 
[provider] entrepreneurial spirit. [.. ] this "black box" or "hands off" approach also 
requires changing the mindset among the central government civil servants and aid agency 
staff ' (Soeters, Habineza et al. 2006 pg 887). 
Examination of the strategic response options available to the hospital and their potential 
implications are important for heeding the call by the USA's influential Institution of 
Medicine (IOM) to ensure learning and adjusting of interventions to avoid unintended effects. 
Hospital responsiveness to PBC service volume targets would of necessity involve cost and 
revenue considerations. This section deals with how hospital performance and response to 
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PBC can be understood from a strategic management perspective using standard 
microeconomics of production. 
To attain performance targets, the hospital has to increase the demand for its services. The 
capacity of the hospital to influence demand for health services can be understood from the 
barriers to utilisation(Ensor and San 1996). Provider-influenced barriers include user costs 
and quality of services. User costs may include user-charges, waiting time to receive 
treatment and travel costs. The provider can reduce clients' costs by reducing user-charges 
and bridging the physical distance to hospital (transport costs) by engaging in outreach 
service delivery programmes for portable services such as immunisation. Quality 
improvement generally includes availability of drugs, diagnostic processes and provider 
courtesy and technology. In the short-term, the hospital may respond to service targets under 
PBC by adjusting user costs and service quality. 
There are economic implications for decisions to increase output or to attain higher service 
quality. Strategies to enhance quality i. e. increase drug availability are subject to a budget 
constraint just as decisions to reduce user fees are constrained by their implications for the 
revenue priorities of the hospital. These implications are illustrated in Annex 1 using 
relationships between output, revenue and costs (Ellis and McGuire 1986; Clewer and 
Perkins 1998; Parkin, Powell et al. 2000). The micro-economic considerations of revenue, 
cost and quality show that the possible strategies to adjust service charges, quality and reduce 
physical access barriers (through outreach options) may require more expenditures but could 
be justified if the performance bonuses are large enough to cover the marginal costs of these 
strategies. The underlying assumption is that the health providers have the capacity to cost 
out the additional activities and/or monitor the changes in the revenues to ensure rational 
economic decision making to pursue the PBC targets. 
2.7.1 Hospital Objectives and Corporate Governance 
What an organisation seeks to maximise in its objective is critical to interpreting performance 
response to different incentives(van Montfort 1981; McGuire 1985; McPake 1996). As 
organisations, hospitals have different interest groups ranging from national Government as 
payers/purchaser, shareholders (if for profit), corporate boards, administrators, physicians, 
nurses, supplies and clients. These groups may have different objectives that may conflict. 
This implies that a hospital may not have a single unified objective but several objectives 
which vary depending on the circumstances and power relationships between the groups 
(Cyert and March 1963; Pauly and Redisch 1973; Ellis and McGuire 1986). Multiple 
objectives due to multiple stakeholders implies that the organisation attempts to "satisfice"' 
some objectives as opposed to maximising them (McGuire, 1985). The range of objective 
' Satisficing is an alternative to optimization for situations where there are multiple and competitive objectives 
in which one gives up the idea of obtaining a "best" solution but sets lower bounds for the various objectives 
that, if attained, will be "good enough" and then seeks a solution that will exceed these bounds. 
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functions or legitimate performance domains for hospitals in the predominantly USA and UK 
literature include: 
" Maximizing profit: Models based on the cost/price constraints imposed on the hospitals 
show that doctors alter the bundled care in a manner that reduces costs to the hospital, 
increases doctors' own incomes and lowers service quality or intensity provided to the 
clients (Morrissey, Conrad et al. 1984; Ellis and McGuire 1986; Thorpe and Phelps 
1990). 
" Optimising managers' on job consumption or managerial perks: Some literature 
show that health care managers use resources for personal status, comfort and power by 
seeking higher salaries, large number of subordinates and fringe benefits such as cars, and 
lavish offices (Newhouse 1970) 
" Optimising hospital status: Lee et al urge that hospital managers especially in the 
private sector elevate hospital quality and market share by expanding the technology and 
attracting specialist services (Lee 1971). This might lead to underutilised capacity and 
unnecessary use of higher quality of inputs. 
" Quality maximisation: Evidence especially from non-profit hospitals show that they re- 
invested any surplus (profit) back into the hospital such that higher quality is sustained. 
The implication here is that non-profit hospitals seek high price inputs resulting into 
inefficiency relative to for-profit hospitals (Newhouse 1970). 
" Labour- welfare maximization: Evidence from NHS in the UK shows that among the 
objectives of hospitals is to increase incomes or working conditions of the employees. 
This was made possible by pursuing a budget surplus for re-investing in the employee 
welfare. The implication here is that the hospital will seek to increase the welfare 
benefits by keeping a small number of employees and invest in less labour-intensive 
technologies or low-cost labour substitutes such as non-tenured and unskilled workers 
(Bartlett and Le Grand 1994). 
" Supply-side and demand-side objectives: Some studies have documented the existence 
of binary and competing objectives between the interests of managers and clinical 
departments respectively. Implication here is that hospital objectives are a balance 
between the two groups - clinical staff and administrative departments who face inputs 
constraints and budget constraints respectively (Harris 1977; Crilly and Le Grand 2004). 
" Optimising professional aspirations: Among organisations with predominantly skilled 
health professionals, behaviours that attempt to seize control of the organisation decision 
making processes to meet the demands for professionals aspirations have been observed 
(Mintzberg 1981), Crilly and Le Grand 2004). 
From a normative perspective, governance structures exist to ensure that firms behave to 
maximise set objectives and mitigate others. Understanding the objectives of the hospital 
stakeholders above provides a menu of choices the hospitals might take when subjected to 
PBC. The governance mechanisms to enforce the desired objectives is an important 
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contextual variables for performance-based contracts. In general, Boards of Governors 
(BOG) exercise these roles. The mechanisms available for the BOG to enforce desired 
objectives include recruitment discretion, setting pay levels and the basis for the pay, and can 
use the threat of dismissal of executives to ensure compliance to organisation objectives 
(Eldenburg, Hermalin et al. 2001; Ellstrand, Tihanyi et al. 2002). Studies have documented 
correlations between the composition and size of Governance Boards to differences in 
organisational performance (Eldenburg, Hermalin et al. 2001; Rhoades, Rechner et al. 2001). 
The relationship between BOGs and executives responsible for management roles is an 
important interface for performance management and use of incentives for improving 
performance (Young, Beekun et al. 1992; Alexander and Lee 2006). 
2.8 Experiences of Performances-based Contracting 
Within a public system, the overall goal of performance-based contracting is to ensure that 
public funds are channelled in a way that provides incentives for improving the delivery of 
services to the intended recipients. This usually requires expansion of the supply capacity of 
agents in a way that ensures accountability for results (OECD 1999; Penelope and Murray 
2002; Taylor 2003). Preliminary evidence is emerging in middle and low income countries 
about performance-based contracting in health sector management. Established literature on 
the subject is found in United Kingdom (UK) especially about the reforms in the National 
Health Services (NHS) and in United States of America - especially in managed care 
settings. These two sets of literature illustrate the potential benefits of PBC, the remaining 
challenges in using these approaches and the methodological constraints in measurement of 
performance and evaluating impact of PBC initiatives. 
2.8.1 High Income Country Experiences 
Experiences in the NHS and USA are illustrative in a number of ways. For example, 
performance-based contracting is being used for improvements in service quality and 
outcomes in the USA where performance targets and outcome measures focus more on 
quality (Schneider, Riehl et al. 1999; Chapin and Fetter 2002; Shen 2003; WHO 2003; 
Epping-Jordan, Pruitt et al. 2005; Rosenthal, Frank et al. 2005; IOM 2006; Lu and Ma 2006; 
Petersen, Woodard et al. 2006). 
In the UK's NHS, performance-based contracting has been particularly driven by cost 
reduction imperatives with performance targets being set for unit costs or relative costs along 
with other targets such as waiting-times(Le Grand 1998; Dawson, Goddard et al. 2001; 
Sheila, Cox Sir et al. 2005; Allen 2009). Empirical work on performance-based targets on 
waiting time and unit/average cost reduction have been documented in the UK during the 
NHS reforms (Dawson, Goddard et al. 2001; Jacobs and Dawson 2003). In the UK the 
performance targets were set as a means of improving the hospital efficiency and controlling 
the rate of budget growth. Hospitals with high unit costs were given higher targets i. e. 4 
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percent reduction in costs and those with lower unit costs were given targets of 0-2 percent 
(Dawson, Goddard et al. 2001). Performance of Trust Hospital was assessed by indicators 
such as the rate of return on capital employed, the number of patients, and the costs per case 
or cost per patient-day (Bartlett and Le Grand 1994). The strategies adopted by the hospitals 
to attain unit cost targets ranged from increasing outputs and seeking higher discounts from 
suppliers and cutting back on fulltime nursing staff -a phenomenon referred to as 
"outsourcing nursing services". 
These experiences indicate the promise of performance management that underlies the PBC 
approaches. More accountability between stakeholders was a major outcome. The response 
behaviours among the providers were both positive and negative to the reform objectives. 
For example, despite a strong institutional base in both the UK and US, performance 
measurement, indicators and information systems have been a major challenge for the 
performance-based contracting approaches(Sheila, Cox Sir et al. 2005). Transactional costs 
for running the system have been high(Marini and Street 2007). A similar sentiment was 
raised by Saltman in 2002: 
"as a result of the shift to a more entrepreneurial environment, both within the public sector 
and beyond, requires not only a similar level of state activity but substantially more 
sophisticated types and levels of activity. This requires better training and motivated 
personnel, better information and greater financial and accounting expertise, All of these in 
turn requires considerable funding . "page 1682) 
Studies that tried to understand the response mechanisms to performance incentives cast 
some doubt about the systematic and sustained responses among providers. For example 
Jacobs and Dawson noted: 
"It was apparent from interviews that the term `strategy' to describe ways of meeting 
efficiency targets was clearly a misnomer. .. While there was strategic planning in Trusts, the 
evidence suggested that most time and effort is devoted to the very short-term problems of 
trying to stay within budget and meet activity and waiting time targets "(Jacobs and Dawson 
2003 pg 677). 
After more than a decade of experimenting with the performance-based contracting 
framework in the NHS and USA health care systems, performance indicators, measurement 
tools and institutional arrangements were still undergoing design by 2005 (Dawson, Gravelle 
et al. 2005; Sheila, Cox Sir et al. 2005; IOM 2006; IOM 2006-a). The costs of implementing 
a more robust performance verification and evaluation systems were becoming a concern as 
well as the emergence of unintended effects (Smith 1995; Marshall, Shekelle et al. 2003). In 
their report entitled "Performance Indictor: Good, Bad and Ugly" the UK's Inquiry 
Commission on Performance Monitoring cautioned against costs and behaviour effects that 
had started to emerge in response to the performance frameworks: 
"Inspirational targets have a distinctive role but one which is largely irrelevant to the design 
of the PM (performance management) procedures. Motivational targets which are not 
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rationally based may demoralise and distort. Anticipated and actual side-effects of PM, 
including on individuals' behaviour and priorities, may need to be monitored as an intrinsic 
part ofPMprocess"(Sheila, Cox Sir et al. 2005) 
In the United States, the experience with performance-based payments is over 15 years 
especially under Managed Care interventions. However, the policy framework for pay-for- 
performance approach is as recently as 2006 and as captured by the Institute of Medicine 
report of 2006, there are still major challenges for performance-based approaches within the 
US health system: 
"Pay-for-performance programmes should be implemented within a learning system that has 
capacity to monitor and assess early experiences, adjust for unintended consequences and 
evaluate impact "(IOM 2006-a). 
2.8.2 Low income country experiences 
Experiences from low income countries are more recent - i. e. in the last 10 years. 
Experiences in Haiti, Guatemala, Cambodia, Afghanistan and Rwanda are indicative of the 
potential and challenge of performance-based contracting in low income country settings 
(Eichler, Auxila et al. 2001; La Forgia, Mintz et al. 2005; Loevinsohn and Harding 2005; 
Meessen, Musango et al. 2006; Soeters, Habineza et al. 2006). The experiences, especially in 
Haiti are relevant to Uganda's assessment given the similar design features (Talyor 2003). 
Due to the differences in the measures used and the incentive designs in these studies it is 
difficult to compare all PBC schemes. Among the key features shared by most of these 
experiences is that they have been driven by external (donor) resources and heavily 
dependent on external technical assistance. Most are started as demonstration pilots 
(experiment) in situations that have marked shortages of resource for health care provision 
and contexts emerging from marked destruction of the health system. This probably explains 
why most are designed to target non-state health providers. Despite these similarities, there 
are differences in how the performance incentives are structured, how performance is 
measured and the magnitude of contract effectiveness. The methods of evaluating 
effectiveness are themselves subject to methodological weakness which makes the 
effectiveness of these initiatives unclear for policy replication (Eldridge, Palmer 2009). These 
issues are briefly discussed below. 
1. Designs of Performance Incentives: In Haiti, nongovernmental primary care providers 
were made to earn up to 5% of their withheld budget and 5% bonus on achieving 
negotiated targets for childhood immunisations, prenatal and maternal care and in health 
promotion. Both bonus and basic payments were tied to performance in Rwanda with 
40% of staff earnings coming from performance contracts. In Cambodia, the bonus was 
used for staff but the (NGO) district managers' salaries were totally part of the contract. 
The entire cost of the pilot (Cambodia) was not clear but the management contract and 
bonuses were paid out of $1.5 million World Bank loan. In Haiti, the bonuses were paid 
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to the provider organisation. In Cambodia and Rwanda the internal contracts were made 
between the managers and each staff member in the organisation as a means of 
communicating the performance requirements of the schemes. For example, the contract 
in Cambodia indicated that job absenteeism was punishable with reduced share of the 
bonus. However, as illustrated by the Haitian pilot, bonuses were awarded to all 
participating NGOs including the ones that missed most of the targets. This reflects the 
"lock-in" problem whereby the incentive-based approach failed to punish poor 
performance (Eichler, Auxila et al. 2001). These problems of lock-in illustrate the "small 
numbers" bargaining and asset specificity, that result into a relational contractual 
relationship. Punishments (withholding of incentives) are replaced by mutual adjustments 
whereby the need to support the NGOs to do better becomes more important than to 
switch-off essential resources (Williamson 1985). Of particular interest in Haiti is that 
some NGOs tried to transmit the risk of PBC to their staff by reverting to performance- 
based salary payments. However, lower staff morale and less worker performance was 
observed as a result of the uncertain wage incomes. The NGO managers, while satisfied 
with the high-powered incentives by which they were paid, found it unsuitable to pay 
frontline providers in a similar way(Penelope and Murray 2002; Loevinsohn and Harding 
2005). Also displayed in the Haiti case is the potential for perverse incentives arising 
from the use of prior performance as the basis for negotiating future target levels. Best 
performing NGOs in the first year exposed themselves to steeper targets, while those that 
under-performed stood a better chance of netting a bonus with smaller improvement in 
the subsequent year. In Rwanda, the incentives were designed to avoid this problem of 
"always push the carrot further ahead". Performance targets based on annual increment of 
throughput volumes with the prior year as the benchmark (as the case in Uganda) 
punishes those that are operating at the maximum of their production frontier. It is not 
rational to assume that providers have inexhaustible capacity for indefinite expansion of 
productivity. This problem does illustrate the short-term nature of motivation arising from 
designs of incentive contract similar to Haiti pilots. On balance, the designs similar to the 
Haiti example were bound to cause dissatisfaction in the long-term. 
2. Measuring performance: Performance indicators in most cases only covered primary 
care services such as child immunisations, use of oral rehydration therapy (ORT), 
maternal delivery, client satisfaction (waiting time) and general health centre visits. Some 
contracts had management process indicators such as attendance of coordination or 
management meetings. Due to their measurement and organisational complexity, 
hospitals were explicitly excluded in the pilots in Rwanda and Haiti. The capacity to 
sustain the performance monitoring system was questionable. For example the cost of 
monitoring activities was about $1 per capita, or 5 percent of per capita health spending in 
Haiti at the time (Eichler, Auxila et al. 2001). In Rwanda the performance verification 
costs were 11 percent of the project cost in two small districts. In all cases, a third party 
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was contracted to verify performance through household surveys and/or random 
household checks among clients that received a service. Service records were directly 
used to impute performance in all cases although in Haiti, 50 percent of the bonus was 
based on household survey data. This reflects the need to balance the information sources 
for performance audit - given the vulnerability of the service records to opportunistic 
distortion by providers. Measurement problems were prominent in the Haiti case and 
serve to illustrate the difficulty of the performance framework especially in resource-poor 
settings. Where indicators reflected poor performance for all agencies or were difficult to 
interpret, the bonus attributed to the indicators was given to all NGOs (Eichler, Auxila et 
al. 2001). WHO cluster survey methodology was used for verification of performance for 
immunisation coverage. The surveys required specialists and sophisticated analytical 
methods which only one institution in Haiti could provide. Policy adoption of the Haiti 
model would require annual surveys covering the entire country and outsourcing survey 
activities from outside of Haiti would be necessary. Little is published about the time lag 
it took from survey activities to providing performance feedback (findings) and paying 
the bonuses. In general, large surveys take a long time to produce results upon which 
bonus payment would be based. In Rwanda, and in the redesigned Haiti model, 
performance verification was based on routine self-reported performance data by the 
health centres with random audit of these reports (Eichler, Levine et al. 2009). Threats of 
censor were communicated in the contract to avoid data manipulation. For instance, 
random verification of health centre data was performed by visiting households listed in 
health centre records by a third party. It is not clear how effective such random threats are 
in mitigating data manipulation by the providers. 
3. Institutional arrangements: Temporary institutional arrangements that do not assure 
capacity for sustaining the innovations beyond the pilot projects are a common feature in 
the literature. In Rwanda, Haiti and Cambodia, foreign NGOs were performing the 
institutional roles such as contract design, service purchasing and in some cases, district 
health management functions. The foreign NGOs were initially attracted by the resources 
made available by the World Bank loans or bilateral grants which had time limits of 3-5 
years. For the pilot in Rwanda, institution building was considered inevitable to ensure 
that the performance incentives operate within restructured institutional, organisational 
and management arrangements. For example decision-making was democratised by 
setting up and obligating an inclusive approach to organisational decision making. A 
"health centre management committee" was created as a structure to oversee the 
performance of the health centre and the schemes(Meessen, Musango et al. 2006). 
Incentives were also given for the upstream functions for example supervising 
organisations were supported to improve the support provided to the health centres 
implementing PBC. Nonetheless, other experimenters with PBC in Rwanda preferred a 
"hands off' approach and did not invest in institutional strengthening activities (Soeters, 
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Habineza et al. 2006). A similar "hands-off' approach is promoted by the Performance- 
based Incentives Working Group (PbIWG) as one of the benefits of performance 
incentives (Eichler, Levine et al. 2009 page 20). The interventions that create a package 
of incentives for both down-stream facilities to perform and for up-stream institutions to 
function and provide the needed support are in part responsible for the successful national 
scale-up of the PBC pilots in Rwanda and Guatemala. As expressed below, the 
Guatemala case shows that incremental but purposeful institutional developments up- 
stream were central to sustainable implementation and scaling-up of performance 
contracting: 
"In addition to forging the "downstream" infrastructure related to NGO selection, 
contractual design, payment mechanisms and information and monitoring systems, the 
Guatemalans had to develop the "upstream " institutional infrastructure to support 
service purchasing, including the policy framework, regulatory environment, consensus- 
building strategies, financial structures and processes and auditing systems"(La Forgia, 
Mintz et al. 2005 pg 11). 
4. Contract effectiveness: Over a period of two and half years the contracting pilot in 
Cambodia achieved a marked improvement in service utilisation (21% difference) 
compared to control districts (Jacobs and Price 2003; Soeters and Griffiths 2003; 
Loevinsohn and Harding 2005). Among the unique features of the Cambodia example is 
that it also tested internal contracting within the public health facilities where the 
incentive was bonus payment in addition to their operational budgets. In addition, the 
management contract involved the entire district health system with population-level 
outcome targets used as the performance measures. In Haiti immunisation increased by 
24 percent and attended deliveries by 27 percent due to performance-based incentives in 
regions served by NGOs paid on the basis of results(Penelope and Murray 2002). In 
Afghanistan, an increase in the proportion of pregnant women receiving at least one 
antenatal care visit increased from 19% to 58% and attended deliveries increased from 
4% to 13% in one year in provinces covering 3.5 million people. In Rwanda, 
performance contracting is claimed to have increased the OPD visits (utilisation) by 80 
percent on the average. Attended deliveries increased byl2%-23% in provinces with 
performance-based funding in comparison with 6-9 percent in provinces without 
(Meessen, Kashala et al. 2007). In Guatemala, management contract with performance- 
based payment in rural districts performed better - average 11 percent points better than 
districts without contracts (La Forgia, Mintz et al. 2005). 
5. Attribution of effectiveness: Like in the Cambodia case, the experimentation design was 
initially meant to be a randomised controlled trial. However the descriptions of the 
implementation of the pilots shows that several adjustments were made especially in the 
intervention arm, making it difficult to attribute the changes purely to performance-based 
contracting. For example, higher extra budgets ($4 per capita) were allocated to the 
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experimental districts where management contracts were awarded. This is in contrast to 
control districts which operated with less - i. e. $0.25 per capita and did not have 
comparable management capacity from experienced international NGOs. Variable 
attempts were made to improve health workers' satisfaction through financial and non 
financial means in the experimental group. For instance, user fees were introduced and 
revenues used to provide additional staff benefits. Internal to the provider organisations, 
health workers were made responsible for revenue collection and sharing of proceeds - 
implying additional organisational climate interventions among the experimental group. 
Indeed the introduced user-fee scheme and salary top-up to the workers were responsible 
for over 80 percent of the employee total earnings (Soeters and Griffiths 2003). This 
reduced informal fees and dual practice. In Haiti, Eichler et al (2009) state that "more 
funding" was a critical "compromise" to the participation of NGOs in the performance- 
based scheme (page 167). In Rwanda, the contracting experience was undertaken together 
with a shift from out-of-pocket payment to third-party (insurance) payment that removed 
the cost barrier to seeking care (Meessen, Kashala et al. 2007). These supplementary 
interventions i. e. more financing, better salaries, third-party payments and organisational 
restructuring coupled with performance-based contracting are by themselves powerful 
and independent determinants of provider performance thus confounding any direct 
attribution of effectiveness to contracting initiatives or the sub-components thereof (Rusa, 
Schneidman et al. 2009). In addition, most of these countries were emerging from 
conflicts that had destroyed the health provision systems -a situation that makes 
improvement in health service utilisation a normal phenomenon as the systems get re- 
established. In both Haiti and Rwanda, initial enrolment into the pilots was based on a 
criterion for good performance. Despite these different determinants of performance 
improvement (i. e. consumption of health services), authors generally make implicit or 
explicit simplifying assumptions to attribute performance changes to PBC. For example, 
Meessen and Kashala et al (2007) states that : 
"... all the changes observed in the production of health centres stem from changes in the 
contracts " (page 110). 
Some experimenters have authored policy prescriptions (Loevinsohn and Harding 2005; 
Soeters, Habineza et al. 2006; Meessen, Kashala et al. 2007) without taking cognisance of the 
weakness in the evidence arising from problematic designs, unique contexts and 
implementation adjustments. This problem has been highlighted by Galvin: " .. the 
methodology used in these evaluations along with the overwhelming preponderance of 
positive results, makes it difficult to distinguish proven findings from enthusiasm and 
marketing"(Galvin 2006 pg 126). 
Among the concerns raised about the weak evidence base for PBC schemes are related to 
complex design with many sub-components, experiments with weak control groups, weak 
designs, and the high costs of schemes relative to the small effects of these schemes(Eichler, 
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Levine et al. 2009; Eldridge and Palmer 2009). Other concerns relate to the relevance of the 
PBC policy transfer to fragile health systems. 
Most of these studies take a strict "black box" rationale i. e. that performance would follow 
from the health facilities if performance-based bonuses or compensation is to be received. 
Other than describing changes in staff salaries, none of these studies have examined the 
mechanisms of how provider institutions internally responded to performance contracts and 
what internal adjustments, if any, were made to account for the performance improvements. 
For some authors, the need to understand how provider facilities adjust is dismissed outright 
as micro-management that should not interfere with providers' capacity to innovate and attain 
performance. This attitude seems to promote the concept that "performance outputs justify 
the means" and within it lies the problem of pervasive short-cuts and displacements of other 
essential processes and outputs of health care as has been documented by several authors 
(Goddard, Mannion et al. 2000; Teleki, Damberg et al. 2006; Allen 2009). 
2.9 State of Knowledge about PBC 
From the review above, several issues emerge regarding the mechanisms of incentives in 
driving performance improvements, implementation approaches and behavioural responses of 
organisations and individual workers to such incentives. These are summarised below: 
1. Although Agency theory provides the rationale for performance incentives, there are 
equally challenging prospects for operationalising incentives into health care 
programmes. Most challenges arise as incentives ignite unintended effects such as 
distortions of information and disease profiles or modifying the value set of the 
workforce. To address these problems, operational research to track the intended and 
unintended effects has been recommended. 
2. Although Agency theory helps to provide explanations as to why performance incentives 
might work, processes based theories have been most useful in building explanations on 
how incentives might elicit changes in behaviors. Processes theories like Expectancy 
theory have found wide applications in building explanations about how organisational- 
level incentives can be implemented to motivate individual-level efforts to achieve 
organisational objectives. 
3. Theories of motivation provide more proximal explanations about how individuals or 
hospital workers sustain external and internal motivation and build a psychological 
contract to their tasks and host organisations. From this perspective, a package of 
incentives that provide ongoing job satisfaction and motivation for advancement, job 
security and fair governance and leadership are essential variables. 
4. From the experiences of applying performance-based contracting in developed and 
developing countries, the operational challenges are many despite an expanded 
application in both country contexts. Setting measurable performance objectives and 
establishing optimal capacity to measure performance remain some of the major 
challenges. 
44 
5. Although several PBC pilots have been implemented and claimed successful, the 
institutional development required to support the scale-up of such pilots has attracted 
contestations in the literature. Some authors recommend a "hands-off' approach while 
others invest in expensive and foreign technical assistance to play the institutional roles 
such as designing, implementing, monitoring and evaluating the PBC schemes. In 
Rwanda and Guatemala where governance institutions like health facility committees and 
district managers were empowered to support PBC, national level scale-up has happened 
faster than in Haiti where the institutional functions have remained part of foreign 
technical assistance. From this perspective, upstream interventions to strengthen health 
system governance may need to be part of the package to make PBC more feasible for 
policy actions. 
6. Although the literature about effectiveness of PBC schemes is expanding, the claims of 
effectiveness have not been matched with methodological rigor and attention to health 
system contexts. The attribution of changes in performance has been entangled with the 
complexity of additional interventions that accompany PBC schemes. Most evaluations 
have not provided the causal pathways through which PBC leads to changes in 
performance at either individual or organisational level. 
7. From the implementation sciences perspective, the literature such as Complexity Theory 
and Dynamic Actions Theory suggest that implementation is non-linear and involve 
adjustments and adaptations to the historical precedents, contextual realities, and new 
information generated during actual implementation. Authors from this perspective 
recommend a more processes-oriented evaluation that tracks actions, challenges and 
adaptations during implementation of programmes like PBC. Process evaluations 
embedded within the implementation are favored to generate evidence in real-time and 
have feedback loops to guide the decisions for adaptations and adjustments. 
8. Most PBC schemes especially in the developing countries have been designed for 
relatively simple health conditions like child immunisation, oral rehydration therapy, 
antenatal care, and maternal deliveries. Although improvements in performance among 
hospitals represent high efficiency gain in most health systems in the developing 
countries, most PBC schemes have excluded hospitals on the basis of being more 
complex with multiple performance objectives and multiple stakeholders. 
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Chapter 3 Study Objectives and Methods 
3.0 Introduction 
An implication of the above literature review is that there is need to examine the processes 
that get triggered due to performance-based contracting. At a policy level, the question of 1) 
why should hospitals respond is important. At the hospital level, the question of 2) the how 
do the response actions lead to performance improvements and 3) how does the existence of 
PBC pilot affect the job satisfaction of hospital workforce - are critical for policy uptake, 
implementation planning and monitoring (Pawson and Tilley 2004; Dobrow, Goel et al. 
2006; May 2006). 
3.1 Conceptual Framework 
Performance-based contracting as premised on agency theory explains why the principal (e. g. 
MOH) and the agents (PNFP hospitals) seek a contractual partnership to provide health care 
services. In the contractual relationship, MOH provides the PNFP hospitals subsidies and tax 
exemptions and the hospitals in turn provide health care services for the clients. In this 
relationship the principal has objectives she seeks to maximise. They may be related to the 
type of services e. g. essential health services or a subset of these services as in the case of six 
targets in Uganda's PBC pilot. On the side of the agents, the PNFP objectives may or may 
not be related to the MOH objectives. For example, availability of budget surplus among a 
number of the PNFP hospitals in Uganda may attest to the possibility of a profit objective 
(Reinikka and Svensson 2003). Although many hospitals do not make a surplus from the 
client charges, they receive government subsidies, charitable donations and tax exemptions 
on the basis of a social objective of serving the poor and underprivileged (Green 1987; Good 
1991; Hanson, Atuyambe et al. 2002; Ssengooba, Atuyambe et al. 2002). As central to the 
agency problem, MOH has limited information about the magnitude of input resources and 
efficiency with which these resources are used in the PNFP sector. The implication of this 
agency problem is captured in Newhouse's (1970) reference to US non-profit hospitals: 
"Private philanthropy ... permits [non profit] hospitals some deviation from the minimum 
average costs than a hypothetical profit-making one, and yet be able to charge a price equal 
to or below that of a private firm. The difference in costs would simply be made up by the 
subsidy" (page 66). 
In a situation of limited information and a desire to optimise service provision, agency theory 
suggests that MOH should structure incentives to ensure that her set of objectives are met. 
The recourse to PBC could be understood as a lever to drive hospital provision to a higher 
level of production/performance. In the context of poor information on the internal cost 
structure and efficiency level of the PNFP hospitals, the performance bonus (11 percent of 
government subsidy) does represent both a minimum profit (incentive) to the hospital that the 
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principal (MOH) is prepared to accept or a premium to the agent against added costs that 
might arise in securing higher service targets. 
The response to the performance-based contracting is likely to be influenced by performance 
governance relationships of upstream agencies and their resource inputs and support to the 
hospitals (Alexander and Lee 2006). These agencies include MOH, districts and other 
projects seeking to achieve specific performance objectives from the hospitals. Performance 
surveillance and bonus payments are shown to interact at the levels of the hospital - where 
managers and clinical staff will make the decisions regarding the strategies to attain targets 
and how to allocate the bonuses. Given their vital roles in performance governance, Boards 
of Governors represent a structural institution within hospitals whose function is vital for 
PBC response. The conceptual framework thus encompass PBC pilot and its implementation 
as a singular intervention within multiple performance frameworks - both upstream and 
within the hospitals. Contextual variables such as changes in upstream resources, 
relationships, market structure, and internal dynamics such as bonus allocation, institutional 
rules and the work environment within hospital organisations (Figure 3.1) are also important. 
Learning from ongoing interactions also creates opportunities for adjustments and some 
deviation from prior objectives, plans, and implementation activities. 
Figure 3.1 Conceptual Framework for Hospital Response to PBC Pilot 
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Upstream variables (to the left side) such as financial, technical assistance and other 
resources are vital for hospital performance (see figure 3.1). Internal to the hospital, 
performance governance requires a relationship between the Board of Governors and the 
hospital managers (executives) as well as a motivated and supported workforce. The PBC 
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pilot's key contributions to the hospital performance are related to the, performance audit, 
feedback and bonus payments - all predicted to influence the hospital's strategies to improve 
service outputs. The PBC pilot is not the only intervention that is working to improve 
hospital performance. Other down-stream interventions (on the right side) such as Yellow 
Star, performance league (rankings) and UCMB are key interventions that influence the 
service outputs targeted by the PBC pilot. 
From the literature reviewed, the question of why hospitals should response to PBC and how 
the response will be elicited has highlighted a broad range of determinants and their potential 
relationships. These are summaries below. 
3.2 Will Hospitals Respond? 
The hospital as an organisation may or may not respond to the PBC. The agency framework 
and model of revenue and costs of production (Annex 1) predict that the agent would respond 
if the contract provides sufficient revenue to meet their reservation utility or cover the 
marginal costs of producing more services - in other words, if the size of the bonus is worth 
the effort. If the risk (marginal costs of effort) of performance targets is judged to be worth 
the bonus amount, economic rationality would commit the hospital to PBC. 
Organisation-based theories suggest alternative approaches to the question. Since 
organisations are not single-minded, and may not have capacity to assess and monitor their 
reservation utility or marginal costs, the approach to organisational rewards and worker 
commitment to productivity is embedded in the environmental factors within the organisation 
and not limited to money (bonus). Organisational governance, such as rules and aspirations 
of the different constituencies, influences the psychological contract, strategic decision- 
making and goal transmission within the organisation. The perceptions of health workers 
towards their organisation, leaders and leadership style may affect motivation and 
performance. In particular, the degree of information sharing, consultation or participatory 
decision-making among managers and professional staff may influence the choice of selected 
performance innovations, psychological contract/commitment to PBC and other 
organisational objectives. Governance relationships among stakeholders i. e. the hospital 
Boards, core managers and professional staff would provide an environmental context that 
may facilitate or hinder the capacity of the hospitals to respond to PBC. 
Thus, unlike economic theory that assumes incentivising agents with money-metric 
incentives to achieve better performance; organisational theories suggest that organisational 
objectives can be manipulated by a package of process-based interventions that motivate 
people's productivity and job commitment at the same time providing a satisfactory work 
environment. In this respect, cultural engineering (clan control) suggested by Ouchi (1980) - 
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i. e. the specification of behavioural norms, procedures and processes, provide alternative 
control mechanism for organisational performance that is distinct from money-metric 
incentives. 
Expectancy theory also provides process-based conditions that the pilot implementation 
project must fulfil if hospitals are to respond. For example, communication that links the 
hospitals' effort to the accomplishment of the service target is essential but not sufficient. 
Additional communication requires that the measurements of outcomes will be fair, relevant 
and unambiguous. Institutional arrangements such as rules and structures for bonus 
allocation need to inspire trust that the pilot will "stay-the-course" and "measure-up to the 
bargain". In this respect, hospitals may choose response behaviours (innovations) that are 
tailored to the perceived stability/transience of the pilot or its chance of adoption at the 
national level. For example short-term and low-cost innovations may be chosen in light of 
uncertainty of the pilot outcome. As predicted from agency and expectancy perspectives, the 
size of the bonus relative to hospitals' effort and needs is an important factor in the response 
strategy. 
3.3 How Will Hospitals Respond? 
By the definition implied in the specification of PBC service targets, hospital response entails 
increasing output in those selected services. From the economics perspective of hospital 
production, the nature of response predicted depends on its objective function, input resource 
costs and revenue constraints (Annex 1). The bonus (if sufficient to cover the marginal or 
average costs) is predicted to enable a response strategy of reducing client fees. In addition, a 
hospital can lower average costs on input resources to achieve higher output levels. This 
strategy would reduce quality and thus be subject to quality elasticity of demand. Lowering 
average costs could be achieved by using low-cost substitutes such as less drugs per client, 
generic medical supplies, or low-skill personnel such as assistant nurses and trainees. 
Strategies that increase average costs by either boosting service quality or adopting outreach- 
based provision are predicted to succeed with much higher additional revenue (or bonus) 
relative to additional costs. Given the concentration of PBC targets on simpler outpatient 
services as opposed to inpatient services, the hospital could respond by shifting resources 
internally to reorganise workload and average costs in the relevant departments concerned 
with accomplishing performance targets. In this respect, hospital response to performance 
targets may subtract from the non-target services (internal displacement). At the level of the 
staff, agency theory predicts that the incentives to staff have to be high-powered enough to 
motivate them to take on more workload or provide high quality. From this perspective the 
hospitals would need to pay the bonus proceeds to the departments and individuals that are 
directly related to the success of service targets. 
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If the bonuses are sufficiently large, the high-powered incentives thus created are predicted to 
cause opportunistic response behaviours that could lead to distorting performance 
information. Manipulation of performance data could be a possible strategy to meet 
performance targets since the performance records are in the control of the agents whose 
performance they reflect. For example, distortion of data in the UK hospitals was a feature 
during the transition to the performance framework (Goddard, Mannion et al. 2000; 
Hargreaves 2003). 
Ideally, the design of the performance-based payment schemes in hospitals in Uganda needs 
to ensure that: 
1. Both volume and quality dimension of outputs/effects are integrated in measures of 
output, 
2. Performance targets are fairly comprehensive not to relegate some essential services 
to under investments of effort by agents, and 
3. Performance evaluation needs to cut across a wide range of mandated tasks to allow 
for the understanding of the displaced activities. 
Organisational-process perspectives relating to how the hospital would respond to PBC are 
rather complex to predict ex ante. Insights from process-based theories of motivation shed 
light on key variables. In general the external incentives need to empower the intrinsic 
contract for the worker, teams and the organisation as a whole to mobilise their efforts to 
accomplish targets. From the perspective of a psychological contract, incentives need to be 
comprehensive to empower cognitive beliefs that the employee-employer relations reduce 
dissatisfaction as well as enhance employee motivation. The incentive package needs to 
address the organisational environment by paying attention to input resources, human 
resource practices such as supervision, job security, teamwork and corporative work culture; 
and a sense of equity in effort and reward systems. Others include customs, norms and 
leadership style. From this perspective the bonuses would do well to motivate the hospital 
staff if the allocation decisions improve the work environments, avoid inequities and thus 
enhance satisfaction. Unlike agency theory that predicts high-powered incentives to a few 
staff, organisational process theories predict low-powered, equity/equality-based and indirect 
incentives for productivity centred around broad employee welfare and work environment. 
However, the contingency of events, organisational circumstances and learning from prior 
actions and decisions during pilot implementation suggest that hospital response is not a one- 
off phenomenon but an iterative and complex process. As noted by Jacobs and Dawson 
(2003) while examining the strategies by hospitals to meet targets for cost saving and waiting 
time; "the issue of strategy was a misnomer". Instead ad hoc "fire-fighting arrangements" 
varied according to circumstances of the hospital from year to year(Jacobs and Dawson 2003 
page 682). Process-based theories for implementation show that the de jury and the de-facto 
perspectives often differ markedly. Similarly, complexity theory predicts that processes are 
partly determined by the need to evolve and adapt to realities in the context. 
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The dynamics within the pilot implementation project may themselves determine the 
effectiveness of responses among hospitals to PBC. If the pilot implementation is effective, 
hospital responses will need to traverse the remits of organisational governance to ensure 
appropriate performance management within the hospitals. For example, the processes of 
decision making on bonus allocation and choice of strategies for performance innovations 
need strong communication, support supervision and resourcing. If the governance interface 
is effectively mobilised, the real performance engine of hospitals lies in motivating the 
individuals and teams in the work units (departments). Available staff numbers, skill mix, 
workload, customer care and diligence practices on performance-surveillance are all 
important variables that affect performance on the hospital floor. 
3.4 Study Propositions: Competing Paradigms 
The study propositions are used as theoretical guides for the building explanations of the 
observed response to PBC as either economic-based or organisational process-based 
motivations (or a combination). In this regard, propositions are not hypotheses to be tested in 
this study but serve as guiding framework for investigation and interpretation of findings, and 
framing the policy implications thereof. Each strand of theory offers a proposition: 
Proposition 1: Agency-based theories will be sufficient to explain the observed response of 
the hospitals to PBC. The response behaviour will exhibit the following: 
" Economic interests of the stakeholders will shape the agency relationships and 
determine the type and size of performance response to PBC. 
" The hospital response behaviours to PBC will be sufficiently explained by the size of 
the bonus, i. e. higher performance will arise if larger bonuses are promised. 
" High-powered, money-metric approaches will be used to allocate the bonuses to 
"motivate" those directly involved with the service targets, i. e. direct link between 
bonus benefits and persons or work-units responsible for targets. 
" Measurement of performance will be restricted to defined output targets and use audit 
like methods. 
Proposition 2: The theoretical framework of organisational processes will be sufficient to 
explain the response actions of the hospitals to PBC. The response behaviours will exhibit the 
following: 
" Satisfactory organisational climate such as welfare, resources availability, 
supportiveness, participatory decision-making will determine the response actions to 
PBC targets. 
" The responses to PBC will be best explained by the experiences from the 
implementation processes and less from the bonus size. 
" The use of the performance bonuses will be guided by enhancing staff welfare 
satisfaction. 
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" Equity principle among staff will be used to allocate performance bonuses, thus 
delinking performance of individuals and work units from bonus benefits (low 
powered incentives). 
" The behaviour of the hospital staff will be important in performance measurement. 
" Performance measurement will be broad and encompass metering of behaviours and 
processes of production. 
3.5 Study Questions, Aims and Objectives 
The general objective is to learn from the pilot implementation activities, mechanisms and 
contexts that underlay successful or none successful hospital performance improvements. 
Two alternative theoretical frameworks of agency and organisational process are used to 
arrive at policy and practice recommendations. 
3.5.1 Study Questions 
1. Were hospitals responding to PBC? 
1.1 What are hospital stakeholders' performance objectives? 
1.2 How do governance mechanisms relate to PBC service targets? 
1.3 How effective is the implementation of PBC pilot among hospitals? 
1.4 What strategies are adopted to attain performance targets and how do these 
change over time? 
2. What effects does the pilot PBC have on the hospital performance? 
2.1 How are the bonuses used and how does this affect performance? 
2.2 What changes in job perceptions arise among staff in response to PBC? 
3.5.2 Research objectives 
During the 18 months of PBC pilot implementation in Uganda from January 2005 to June 
2006, the study objectives were: 
1. To assess upstream performance-management, support systems and influences on PBC 
performance; 
2. To analyse the governance mechanisms between BOG and hospital managers for PBC 
performance; 
3. To evaluate PBC pilot implementation arrangements and their effectiveness among two 
case study hospitals; 
4. To analyse the strategies adopted by two case-study hospitals to attain PBC targets and 
processes for the allocation of bonus funds 
5. To compare changes in job satisfaction and performance among hospital staff 
participating and not participating in the PBC pilot 
52 
3.6 Methods and Study Design 
This research employed a mixed methods approach within a case study design to explicate 
the operational mechanisms about how PBC implementation triggers improved performance 
of hospitals. The unit of analysis in the study was the response of the hospital to 
performance-based contracts. Perceptions, behaviours, practices and decision processes 
were the basis for assessing the response. The analysis sub-units embedded in the case study 
included the interaction between hospital actors i. e. Board of Governors, managers and 
clinical staff in relation to prerequisites for hospital performance improvement. These 
relationships i. e. nature of strategic control (governance) by Boards, and performance 
surveillance, feedback mechanisms and technical assistance provided by the PBC pilot 
implementation team shed light on the mechanisms that PBC might elicit and provide the 
causal pathways to explain PBC response to PBC pilot. The propositions 1 and 2 (section 
3.4) were used as alternative theoretical frameworks for building explanations of the 
observed response patterns. Several considerations outlined below provide the rational for 
both case study design and mixed methods used in this study. Table 3.1 provides the 
summary of the methods used in this study. 
3.6.1 Case Study Approach 
The case study methodology was considered suitable for addressing the study objectives. 
These study objectives seek to understand a social phenomenon "system reaction to PBC" at 
an organic entity "the hospital" that can be referred to as a social system (Flynn 1992). 
Indeed the hospital has a number of actors, a culture for interactions, rules and professional 
and personal interpretation of experience (Handy 1993). As such, when the hospital system 
is subjected to the PBC as a structural intervention, the experience and interpretation of the 
actors provided the basis for understanding the impact that PBC had on the performance of 
hospitals. The strength of the case study methodology is the depth of study it enables for the 
phenomenon to be better understood. 
Yin's definition of a case study illustrates its appropriateness to the study questions and the 
nature of this study as described above: 
"The case study is an empirical enquiry that: Investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real life context; when-the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident, and in which multiple sources of evidence are used. " (Yin 2003 page 13) 
As (Burgess 1984) notes, prominence (in a case study) is given to understanding the actions 
of participants on the basis of their active experience of the world and the ways in which their 
actions arise from and reflect back on experience. 
"Thus within this approach the researched are not seen as objects with the given properties - 
attitudes, norms, behavioural characteristics - which can be readily measured given due 
care, but as actors whose own frame of reference needs detailed understanding before their 
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actions can be adequately interpreted and explained. Lewis (1980) referred to these methods 
as "inquiryfrom the inside rather than inquiry from the outside "(Bryman 1989 page 50) 
The case study also depends on the careful selection of the object for the study as a way to 
make broader generalization from very small cases studied. The ex ante "representativeness" 
of the study object at the selection phase is in sharp contrast to the statistical methods that use 
an ex post approach (Hamel, Dufour et al. 1993). As quoted in Hamel 1993, "the case study 
is an induction approach: Details about the object of the study are considered in the light of 
the context ... to explain the social with the social" (pg 41). 
According to (Yin 2003), case studies are considered to have advantage over other methods 
where: 
" "why" or "how" (explanatory and exploratory) questions are being posed in the research 
study 
" ongoing policy implementation is being studied empirically 
" it is not feasible to have control over the study events 
" causal links are complex due to numerous variables 
" contextual factors are of relevance to the study questions 
Thus the focus on contemporary phenomena such as PBC in real life settings (PNFP 
hospitals) - allows an investigation to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of 
real-life events. 
3.6.2 Case Study Limitations 
Among the limitations of the case-study approach is the issue of generalizebility, validity and 
a potential for subjective bias. On generalization, Mitchell 1983 urges that case studies 
cannot use statistical inference as the basis for generalization but use logical or theoretical 
links between them. The practical consequence for extrapolation from case studies is that 
generalization depends upon the adequacy of the underlying theory and related knowledge, 
and needs to be qualified by the relevant contextual condition: 
".. the inference about the logical relationship between the two characteristics is not based 
upon the representativeness of the sample and therefore upon its typicality, but rather upon 
the plausibility or upon the logicality of the nexus between the two characteristics" (1983: 
198). 
Others like Seale (2000) take a view that transferability of qualitative inquiry hinges on the 
"thick" description of the contextual to allow informed transferability: 
"whether (the) working hypothesis hold in some other context, or even in the same context at 
some other time, is an empirical issue, the resolution of which depends upon the degree of 
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similarity between sending and receiving (or earlier and later) contexts. Thus the naturalist 
(analyst) can not specify the external validity of an inquiry; he or she can provide only the 
thick description necessary to enable someone interested in making a transfer to reach a 
conclusion about whether the transfer can be contemplated as a possibility " (Seale 2000) pg 
107). 
On the issues of bias, the study object (if not well selected), the researcher's and the 
informant's interpretations can introduced bias. Seale posits that field research potentially 
follows a convenience, snowballing or volunteer sampling according to conscious or 
unconscious opportunistic criteria, or researcher characteristic e. g. age, gender, ethnic and 
culturally ascribed access to information. According to (Hamel, Dufour et al. 1993; Seale 
2000; Yin 2003; Highhouse 2007), comparative methods could be used in this situation, not 
for demonstrating proof, but to construct analytical categories free from value judgment and 
from the categories used by informants for practical purposes. Triangulation is therefore used 
to corroborate findings by using more than one method and to some extent overcome bias in 
any one method. 
3.6.3 Selection Criteria for Case Study Hospitals 
As explained below, only two case study hospitals were selected for in-depth study on PBC 
pilot. The selection of these case study hospital(s) was guided by the discussion above about 
seeking validity of and generalizability in the case study approach ie: 
"A qualitative logic for selection of cases for the study. The qualitative logic here refers to 
"one or more selected examples of a social phenomenon" (Hakim 1987,61). 
" Selection of an event or series of related events which exhibit the operation of some 
identified theoretical principle (Mitchell, 1983: 192) 
" Case(s) should pose greater explanatory power for analytical generalization of an 
adequate underlying theory. 
" Case that allow a thick description of the context i. e. where a degree of complexity is 
allowed to approximate real life conditions. 
" Where comparative learning is vital, selection of events that optimizing the contrasts and 
contributes to broader explanatory power or broaden the theory (Yin 2003). 
Although the MOH PBC study covered most PNFP health facilities in five (out of 56) 
districts that were selected using a regionally stratified random approach, the study questions 
in this research were best addressed at hospital-level as opposed to smaller facilities. The 
major reasons for seeking to study the effect of the PBC at hospital-level was that hospitals 
represented complex organisations and findings from these hospitals would engender greater 
theoretical and operational generalization to guide policy and practice for performance-based 
contracting in contexts similar to Uganda's health system. Likewise, hospitals, as opposed to 
smaller health centres, have several organisational structures such as board of trustees, 
managers, and diverse mix (cadres) of workforce that are essential for the exploration of the 
theoretical propositions and conceptual framework for this study. 
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In addition, hospitals represent higher costs of resource inputs (finance, personnel and 
technology) in the health system. The social benefits accruing from improved performance of 
hospitals may therefore be of higher importance to policy. PBC pilot was promoted by the 
Ugandan MOH as a basis to improve value-for-money and access to the minimum health care 
package for the poor and most vulnerable(MoH 2003a). 
3.6.4 Selection of Study Hospitals 
Although seven hospitals participated in the PBC pilot, only two PNFP hospitals were 
assigned to a full range of PBC intervention (Group B see table 1.1 page 16). These two 
hospitals were purposively selected as the in-depth case-study for objectives 3 and 4. The 
assumption made here was that - if it were to become policy, PBC would be implemented and 
experienced in a manner similar to that observed in these two case study hospitals (see figure 
3.2). 
Figure 3.2 Purposive Hospital Sample Driven By Pbc Pilot Participation 
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For objectives 1,2 and 5, the five additional PNFP hospitals assigned to the control group 
(Group A) by the PBC pilot and three Government-owned hospitals (not participating in the 
pilot but located in same districts) were added to the two hospitals above (group B) to provide 
comparative perspectives across all objectives. These three government hospitals were not 
involved in the PBC pilot activities. Overall, 10 hospitals participated in this study but only 
two provided in-depth insights for objectives 4 and 5 that concern implementation processes 
and mechanisms of response to the PBC pilot. Table 3.2 shows the key features of hospitals 
in this study. 
Pubic Hospitals not 
participating in Pilot 
13 hospital) 
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The case study was designed to provide explanations for events across time through a 
prospective approach. Especially for objective 5, baseline and post-baseline survey of all the 
ten participating hospitals provided information for comparison between case study hospitals 
(intervention arm) and hospitals that were assigned to control group for PBC pilot and the 
three that were non-participants. 
Table 3.2 Characteristics of hospitals* participating in the stud 
Bed size Ownership Allocation in the PBC pilot 
Hospital 1 100 UCMB Bonus Group 
Hospital 2 180 UPMB Bonus Group 
Hospital 3 100 UCMB Control Group 
Hospital 4 100 UCMB Control Group 
Hospital 5 100 UCMB Control Group 
Hospital 6 110 UPMB Control Group 
Hospital 7 180 UCMB Control Group 
Hospital 8 100 Govt Non participant 
Hospital 9 100 Govt Non participant 
Hospital 10 100 Govt Non participant 
ept anonymous for ethical reasons 
3.6.5 The Case for Prospective In-depth Study Approach 
The hospitals being subjected to PBC were complex in their operations and relationships. 
The contexts in terms of resource endowment, benefactor control and service environment 
were different. Although the PBC intervention provided a broadly uniform new experience 
across the case-study hospitals, unique differences were anticipated within each case study 
hospital based on the choices of the service targets and decision on allocation of the bonus 
funds. It was impossible to predict and structure a quantitative method to address all the 
possible contingencies. A flexible but systematic approach to answering the study questions 
required a mixed methods approach i. e. qualitative and quantitative approach within a case 
study design. 
This study was started shortly after the active implementation of PBC pilot, before the actors 
had experienced all the phenomena and its implications. The data collection (January 2005 to 
June 2006) aimed to collect cumulative experiences over the time of the pilot. This provided 
the opportunity to identify key milestones in the PBC implementation and how experiences 
of these milestones shape the behaviours, decision making and perceptions of the actors. The 
prospective inquiry was therefore used as an appropriate design strategy. The major 
milestone in the PBC pilot included the six monthly performance surveillance (ie verification 
output volumes for selected service targets), the size of the bonus received and how the bonus 
funds were used to motivate better performance - either as rewards to providers themselves 
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and/or inputs needed to improve/sustain performance. These events were expected to vary 
over time depending on the experience that was gained during the pilot period. This kind of 
interactive and dynamic nature of the study thus justified the prospective approach to data 
collection and the use of qualitative methods in addition to quantitative approach. The 
prospective qualitative inquires are recommended especially if causal linkages are to be 
extracted from a chain of events across time: 
"[t]he process-tracing approach attempts to uncover what stimuli the actors attend to; the 
decision process that makes use of these stimuli to arrive at decisions; the actual behavior 
that then occurs; (George and McKeown 1985 pg 35) 
"... the particular significance of the extended case study is that since it traces the events in 
which the same set of actors in the case study are involved over a relatively long period, the 
processual aspect is given particular emphasis. The extended case study enables the analyst 
to trace how the events chain on to one another and how therefore events are necessarily 
linked to one another through time" (Mitchell 1983: 194). 
Granham Allan (1996) also notes that: 
" Those involved may sometime actually not be in position to recognise easily the factors 
that influenced their behaviours. In such cases observation or detailed questioning of 
different actors over time is probably the only way in which adequate data can be collected" 
(pg 178). 
The interviews in the case study hospitals were conducted every 6 months to allow at least a 
3 month interval after the performance surveillance and bonus payment have been completed. 
This allowed enough time for reflection (by the actors) on the effects arising from activities 
linked to PBC. 
3.6.6 Units of Analysis -a Summary 
The unit of analysis refer to the objects of the study - that provide the source mechanisms or 
embody the objectives of interest in the study (Graneheim and Lundman 2004). The 
following are the units of analysis that guided the understanding of the hospital responses to 
PBC pilot. These are listed below and in table 3.2. 
1. The expectations, nature and power of influence that different stakeholders have in the 
performance of the hospitals. These are linked to the first objective. The data sources for 
this objective were interviews and participant observations of meetings at the national 
level and at district level. These were supplemented by documentary reviews that 
provided the context, performance objectives, resource inputs and other influences on 
hospital performance. The analysis was also aimed at finding the relative power of 
influence of the different stakeholders on the hospitals' choices and priorities. 
2. The expectations, nature and power of influence of Board of Governors, and the 
relationships BOG have with Hospital management team. These are related to second 
objective. The data sources here were the two groups that control the decision-making 
process and resource allocation in the hospital ie the Boards of Governors and the 
Hospital management teams. 
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3. The implementation processes, contextual constraints and enablers; learning, decision- 
making and adaptations by all concerned parties in the PBC pilot processes. These were 
the subjects for objective three in the study. The data sources for this analysis were key 
informant interviews with participants in the pilot - both hospital management teams and 
pilot coordinators. For comparative analysis, additional information was collected from 
other performance-based schemes led by the Yellow star program and UCMB. 
Table 3.3: Summary of Units of Analysis, Method and Data Sources 
Objectives Analysis sub-units Analysis methods Data sources 
Performance Nature and power Operational definitions o f-'o Participant 
objectives, of influential "performance" at different observation of 
relationships mechanism for interface meetings: 
and interests. performance Comparative means of 1. PBC pilot 
improvements in incentivising performance: 2. Performance 
[Chapter 4] the " Low powered or reviews at 
upstream/broader " High powered district and health system: Comparative ways to meter national level Govt - MOH performance features: " Literature review MOH - District " SWAP for Health sector " Administrative UCMB - its health " District league table reports and 
network " UCMB accreditation records 
performance Nature and power Performance expectation of 
governance of influential BOGs; Key informant 
relationships mechanism within Influential mechanisms at the interviews among between BOG hospitals disposal of the BOGs to HMTs and BOGs 
and hospital Governance improve performance; repeated 
managers structures i. e. Comparative analysis of 
between BOGs and composition of BOG for (21 interviews) [Chapter 51 HMTs effective stewardshi 
Implementation Identification of vital implementation processes and their mechanisms for PBC 
arrangements 
d capacity 
to trigger intervention; 
their an performance Comparison between de jury 
effectiveness improvements and de-facto implementation of 
[Chapter 6] among participating hospitals. 
PBC pilot; 
Reasons for adaptations & 
omissions Key informant 
Comparison of implementation interviews among 
processes between PBC pilot PBC pilot Team, 
and Yellow Star programme & UCMB and HMTs. UCMB. Three sets of HMT 
Strategies i etween PBC Building explanations for interviews in 2 case 
adopted by and attempted success and failure to achieve study hospitals 
hospitals to actions by hospitals targets/bonus; i. e. at: 
attain PBC to improve Trajectories for purposive " Baseline 
targets and performance; and actions to improve "6 months and 
processes for performance; " 12 months 
allocation of Decision processes Trajectories for decision bonus funds and outcomes for making processes to allocate (16 Interviews) 
bonus allocation. bonus; 
[Chapter 7] Comparison of response 
actions of PBC and Yellow 
Star programme. 
anges in staff Essential factors for Comparison of baseline an Survey of hospital 
motivation and hospital staff post-baseline survey of staff 
perceptions (internal clients of perceptions of hospital staff. Baseline (n=560) 
about their PBC) to improve Comparison of perceptions Post-baseline 
performance their personal level between hospitals receiving (n=741) 
performance. PBC bonuses and those not. 
[Chapter 8 
59 
4. The strategies adopted by hospitals to succeed in improving performance, and decision- 
processes for the allocation of the bonus by hospitals. This was the focus of the fourth 
objective. Unlike for objective three above, the information here was extracted from the 
participants in two hospitals that were subjected to the full PBC pilot. These two hospitals 
were treated as in-depth case studies since they experienced the full pilot interventions 
including the performance-based bonuses. 
5. The key performance drivers from the perceptions of the hospital staff early in the pilot 
implementation and after one year of pilot experience. The objective five in the study 
required a survey (before and after) of the front-line workers in all hospitals (including in- 
depth case study ones) to collect the perceptions about the performance drivers of internal 
clients - the staff. 
3.6.6 Research Data 
The influential mechanisms of PBC intervention were synthesised from four main data 
sources; 1) the inception workshop in July 2003 which was attended by the author. At the 
workshop, the rationale, methodology and preparation for the pilot were explained to the 
stakeholders in MOH, local government and private not for profit providers (PNFPs); 2) 
Participant observations were made at three performance feedback meetings of PBC pilot 
during January and February 2005; and 3) from administrative records i. e. monthly progress 
reports and other documents related to the pilot. The monthly reports provided 
contemporaneous accounts of the pilot activities, schedules, constraints and coping strategies. 
Annual reports of the case study hospitals for the years 2003 to 2005 were also reviewed. 
The fourth data source was interviews with members of the hospital management team 
(HMT) in the two bonus-eligible hospitals that were subjected to full pilot intervention2. The 
HMTs were asked how the targets were selected and what influenced their choices. Repeated 
interviews with the HMT aimed to describe their reactions to performance feedback, bonus 
awards and constraints in achieving the performance targets. The interviews with HMTs 
were conducted 2-3 months following performance feedback workshops to optimise the lead- 
time for decision-making and corrective actions. Prospective interviews were conducted at 
different times between April 2005 and June 2006 (Fig 3.2), in attempt to piece together the 
purposive actions in response to PBC pilot. Three sets of interviews were conducted in 
April-June 2005, November 2005 through to January 2006 and the last set in May - June 
2006. 
In-depth interviews were also done with members of the pilot implementation team (PIT) i. e. 
the Pilot Coordinator and officials responsible for verification of performance targets. Both 
the HMT and the PIT respondents were asked about the changes they had made as a result of 
experiences they encountered during pilot activities. The in-depth interviews were only 
2 The study covered 10 hospitals. Two were in the intervention arm 4 PNFPs in the control arm and 4 Govt. one 
that did not participate in the pilot activities. 
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repeated among the two case-study hospitals. The survey of the perceptions of health 
workers was done in all the 10 hospitals at both baseline (April 2005) and post-baseline (May 
2006). 
Figure 3.3 Timelines for PBC Pilot and Research Events 
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3.6.6.1 Participant Observations 
Observation of strategic meetings taking place before and during the period of data collection 
(le from July 2004 to June 2006) aimed to understand the concept of performance and its 
management at the national and district levels. The observations were also made at meetings 
related to PBC pilot implementation. 
1. National level meetings 
At the national level, performance review meetings for the health sector were organised as 
part of the SWAP arrangements by the Ministry of Health. The main objectives of these 
meetings were to review performance of the previous year and agree on priorities for the 
subsequent year. Annual Sector Performance Report for MOH contained league tables 
ranking districts on the basis of a common performance criterion (see section 4.5). 
Participants at these meetings included the MOH, Finance, Public Service, donors and civil 
society. In addition these meetings also drew participation from district level implementers of 
programmes such as District Health Officers and hospital managers. Three meetings were 
attended at the national level as follows: 
" Annual Health Assembly and Technical Review Meetings October 2005 
" Hospital Managers Meetings November 2005 
" Biannual Technical Reviews Meeting April 2006 
2. District level meetings 
At the district level, one meeting was attended in Arua district. The quarterly performance 
review meeting was organised by the District Health Office (DHO) and included managers of 
all hospitals and people representing technical departments of DHO. Others in attendance 
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included project staff from projects that had a presence in the district i. e. (AIC, AIM, 
CUAMM). 
The meetings related to the implementation of the PBC pilot were organised at each of the 
five districts to provide performance feedback to the participating health units as well as to 
the district officials. An additional objective of these meetings was to award bonuses to the 
eligible health units i. e. units that achieved the performance targets. Observations were made 
at three meetings (districts of Arua, Bushenyi and Mukono) during the first round of 
performance feedback in January 2005. Participants at these meetings included members of 
PIT from MOH/World Bank, representatives from the DHO (usually the PNFP desk officer), 
at least one manager from each of the participating health units, a representative of the Health 
Unit Management Committee and district level politicians. Discussions at the meetings 
covered aspects related to setting targets, records and health information systems, approaches 
to improve performance and advice on how to use the bonus. Participants also reacted to the 
performance assessment results (feedback) provided by the PIT. The meetings culminated 
into the award of bank cheques (money) to the managers of health facilities that qualified to 
get performance bonuses. 
3.6.6.2 Key Informant Interviews 
In-depth interviews with key informants were conducted across a range of persons that held 
responsibilities and roles that concern hospitals performance and response to PBC pilot. 
A structured dialogue approach was taken where the respondent was informed about the 
purpose of the research and given opportunity to opt in or out of the interview. When consent 
was given, in-depth interviews initially followed a structured guide (Annex 3 questionnaire). 
However, subsequent interviews (after 6 and 12 months) with the same group of persons took 
on a more unstructured approach to focus on the issues of interest like the reactions to the 
milestones and specific activities in the implementation of the pilot. These included 
performance feedback, bonus allocation and key issues in the organisational context that had 
potential effects on hospital performance. 
Probing was used to focus on the domains of interest that emerged from the responses. When 
issues of interest did not emerge in the discussion, specific questions in the questionnaire 
guide were asked. In the subsequent rounds of interviews - especially in the case study 
hospitals - the interviews were more unstructured but linked to what had changed since the 
previous interview and how those changes affected the domains of interest to the research. 
The key domains in the interviews include understanding the following: 
" How was performance defined in the power relations between the BOG and HMT 
" Incentives that exist for performance at difference level 
" Capacity for the hospital to perform i. e. staffing, finances, resource allocations and 
strategies 
" Records and how they were being used 
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" For the two case study hospitals: 
o What was being done differently to succeed in achieving the target or getting a 
bonus? 
o Why the hospital failed to achieve X (Y& Z) target or why it failed to get the 
optimum bonus? 
o When a bonus was received, additional questions aimed to understand how the 
bonus was used and processes leading to these decisions. 
Most interviews were recorded on a digital recorder although some interviews were done 
without recording. Most interviews were done in English. Only five (out of 35) were done 
with a high interchange (mix) of English and local language (Luganda). Recordings were 
downloaded to the computer and stored with the file name of the hospital, designated title of 
respondent and the date of interview. Transcription was done by listening to the recorded 
interviews and referring to the shorthand notes made during the interviews. The recorded 
interviews were transcribed verbatim. The unrecorded interviews were written and expaned 
immediately after the interview from the shorthand notes and also the recall of the interview 
session. About 7 (out of 37) of the interviews were not verbatim recorded or transcribed. 
Given the need to get familiar with the data, the interviewing and transcriptions were all done 
by the researcher/author. Most importantly, the transcriptions by the researcher/author 
enabled acquisition of more insights for follow-up interview in the next round or decision on 
new directions for inquiry. For example, during the interviews, information occasionally 
emerged that required new respondents to be sought and interviewed or adding a new track of 
questioning in the next interview round(s). This type of snowballing was particularly used to 
understand the various other interventions seeking to influence the performance of the 
hospitals. New track for research activities targeted UCMB and Yellow Star as possible 
comparators to PBC. Interviews and documents about UCMB and Yellow Star programmes 
were subsequently added to the research processes as alternative performance frameworks 
upon which to compare PBC. 
3.6.6.3 Analysis of Qualitative Data 
Analysis of the qualitative data was undertaken within a guiding principle of building 
explanations on the basis of observation, document reviews and narratives in the interviews 
of respondents. Building explanations was approached by interpreting information in the 
context in which the information is provided. To build explanations, the analysis units (table 
3.1) and frameworks for hospital performance were used. These frameworks for analysis 
included the two theoretic propositions, and the two study questions ( section 3.4) - i. e. "will 
hospitals respond and how would they respond to PBC pilot". Data were analysed using both 
deductions methods driven by these theoretic framework as well as by inductions methods 
that were grounded in the data (Patton 1999; Patton 2002; Graneheim and Lundman 2004; 
Pawson and Tilley 2004). 
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Building explanations used the "realistic evaluation" notion of understanding interventions as 
complex social programmes whose effects are realised if certain mechanisms are triggered in 
a particular context. Pawson and Tilly (2004) asserts that: 
"Theories must be framed in terms of propositions about how mechanisms are fired in 
context to produce outcomes. " (Pages 84-85) 
"Understanding a programme requires that evaluators are mindful of processes both macro 
and micro, influences from both individuals and institutions, causal powers emanating from 
both reasoning and resources. Programmes, in short, are complex social organisations" 
(page 160). 
".. combination of qualitative and quantitative data should offer something more than the 
weight of evidence but should invite a sense of explanatory completeness, synthesis or 
closure "(page 158). 
For both induction and deduction approaches to qualitative data analysis, content analysis 
was used to generate themes or categorise data into pre-determined frameworks. Interview 
extracts were used to extract latent and manifest content. For latent and content analysis, the 
meaning beyond the interview text was sought by interpreting interview extracts within the 
context of the interview dialogue (eg tables 4.7 & 5.1). The analysis approach built from the 
narrative units (or extracts of texts) to meaning units and to thematic domains or categories in 
a logical order of aggregation(Patton 2002; Graneheim and Lundman 2004). 
"... analysis of what the text talks about deals with the relationship aspect and involves an 
interpretation of the underlying meaning of the text, referred to as the latent content"[ ... 
J 
abstraction, emphasises descriptions and interpretations on a higher logical level. Examples 
of abstraction include the creations of codes, categories and themes on varying 
levels. "(Graneheim and Lundman 2004 page 106). 
Triangulation of information from different perspectives was undertaken as a method of 
synthesising the information from the different sources i. e. both national, and hospital level, 
and from managers, to Governing Board members and other relevant sources to provide 
coherence and explanations that are most plausible to address the analysis units in the study. 
Triangulation is recognised as a useful approach for dealing with varied sources of 
information in mixed methods and in case-study research (Patton 1999; Foss and Ellefsen 
2002). 
3.6.6.4 Staff Questionnaire Survey 
Perceptions of staff regarding relevant organisation climate variables within each hospital 
were assessed through a self-administered questionnaire. The questionnaires were anonymous 
to encourage objective assessment. Perceptions or cognitive feelings of health workers were 
assessed using a purpose-made tool drawing on concepts of expectancy and motivation 
theories. Perception questionnaires serve the value of measuring latent variables that operate 
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at the cognitive level (Nunnally 1978; Hicks, Hennessy et al. 1996; Podsakoff, Ahearne et at. 
1997). Table 3.3 illustrates the theory, concepts and questionnaire items that were developed 
based on the two theoretic concepts. 
Each of the domains was assessed using a set of questions. The domains and the questions 
within each were constructed and or adopted from the literature and the two theories above. 
The major drivers of the construct validity of the questionnaire were the process-based 
theories for motivation especially by Lawler (1971) and Hertzberg (1959). These were 
blended with questions that addressed the economic benefits in the work place. The literature 
provided a range of validated questions that had been used to assess similar issues in different 
contexts (Bennett, Franco et al. 2001; Franco, Bennett et al. 2004; Paleologou, 
Kontodimopoulos et al. 2006; Petersen, Woodard et at. 2006). 
Table 3.4 Content Validity: Theories, Concepts and Questionnaire Itemst 
Theo Concepts questionnaire Item 
Effort-performance ormation a out targets 
perceptions Affordability of a 10% increase in workload 
Availability of drugs for patients 
Availability of necessary s! ! Relies & equipment Expectancy Performance- ow likely to get a reward if hospital achieves 
theory reward linkage targets 
Willingness to contribute to target 
Perceived value of Extent job benefits cover basic needs 
the rewards (bonus) Extent of private activities to supplement salary 
Satisfaction if salary is increased by 10 percent Satisfiers Working conditions, receipt o supervision, 
confidence from superiors, meetings to evaluate 
work, fairness of rules and regulations, job contract, Herzberg's peer cooperation, conflict among workmates. theory Motivators ppreciation by superiors, encouraging 
. 
ar 
working persons, entrusting of responsibility to gain l expertise, job as a source of satisfaction, professiona 
status due to working at this organisation 
in me Annex 
The questions were structured in a manner that fitted a 5-point response categories (see 
Annex 3 for Questionnaire). The responses to each question were structured along a 5-point 
unipolar adjective scale ranging from "very low", "low", "moderate", "high" and "very 
high". The questions were positively structured in relation to the aspect of measure - for 
example "To what extent does working at this hospital improve your professional status? " or 
"To what extent does your job-contract provide security for your work? " The positive 
structuring is known to increase clarity of questions and avoid cultural disinclination to 
response (Bennett, Franco et al. 2001; Franco, Bennett et al. 2004). The questions were 
sequenced in a careful manner to help the respondent focus on the underlying domain of the 
measure. In addition to the domains of interest to the study above, the tool also collected 
background details about the respondents such as age, sex, cadre and hospital department and 
duration of stay (employment) at the hospital. 
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The tool was pre-tested for clarity of questions and relevance of the response categories on 
the scale. Fifteen nurses attending the nurse training at Mulago Hospital nursing school 
participated in the pre-test. A group interview was conducted with these nurses after they had 
completed the questionnaire to give feedback about the items that were not clear. Also the 
time it took to complete the tool ranged from 35 to 45 minutes. The tool was modified 
accordingly and was administered in English. 3 
3.6.6.5 Administering the Survey 
The survey was administered twice to each of the 10 selected hospitals. The first round was 
during the months April - May 2005 and the second round was after about one year i. e. June 
-August 2006. The rationale of the 2-point survey was to set a baseline early in the 
implementation of PBC pilot and be able to detect changes in staff perceptions over a period 
of one year. The survey aim was to collect data from all the clinical and administrative staff 
at each study hospital. Overall, the response rate at baseline was 78 percent while that for the 
post-base line was 88 percent for the targeted cadres. Clinical, laboratory, and administrative 
cadres were given the forms to fill. Cleaners, gatekeepers and similar categories of non- 
clinical and support staff were excluded. 
Each data collection form had a cover letter signed by the researcher/author. The letter 
provided information about the research purpose as well as providing information for consent 
of the respondent. An open envelop was provided together with the form and the respondents 
were requested to enclose the completed questionnaire and to seal the envelope. Information 
was also provided in the cover letter suggesting that the respondents name should not appear 
anywhere on the form or envelop. Arrangements were made at each hospital to provide a 
token of Uganda shilling 2,000 (bout $1) for whoever returned the sealed envelope. The 
token was approved by the ethical review board to enable improved response rate. In general, 
the person in charge of records in the hospital played the role of collecting the sealed 
envelopes from the staff and dispensing the cash token. Forms were unsealed by the principal 
researcher before the data was captured into the computer. SPSS software version 11 was 
used to analyse the data (Bryman and Cramer 2002). Analysis of the survey data was based 
on Exploratory Factor Analysis and is further described in chapter 8. 
3.6.6.6 Study Biases, Limitations and Quality Control 
The major study bias was the inadequate implementation of the pilot activities partly due to 
design weakness and financial constraints. Given the centrality of this bias to influence the 
findings of this study, a detailed assessment of implementation and its (in)effectiveness was 
3 The targeted respondents have a minimum of 11 years of formal education (4 years post-primary) and English is the 
official medium of instruction in Ugandan education system. The cadre of nurse assistants, the least cadre in terms of 
educational hierarchy among hospitals - are required to have completed 4 years of post-primary education and have 
acceptable English competence. 
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treated as a valid and independent objective in this study. Chapter six provided the details of 
this bias and as such makes explicit the contextual constraints that readers of this work and its 
recommendations need to take into account. Although this was a bias in terms of the pilot 
effectiveness, the structural constraints such as the pilot design, financial resources and the 
implementation adoptability/flexibility are common variables to the field of implementation 
analyses (Hill and Hupe 2002). 
The author and researcher (myself) had potential characteristics to bias the respondent's 
answers especially since he was affiliated to the institution implementing some of the pilot 
activities (Makerere University School of Public Health) and as an educator at the major 
medical school that trained some of the respondents (medical doctors). Research data such as 
the questions about the implementation effectiveness of the pilot could have been answered 
in a manner that makes the respondent socially acceptable or provide answers that were 
assumed to be in the interest of the School. During the research process, the author made it 
clear that his work was separate, independent and objective about the experiences of the 
respondent with the PBC pilot. The author was also introduced to the participants during the 
meetings as interested in the pilot process for academic purpose i. e. for PHD research study. 
In addition, the respondents were assured that their views were anonymous and confidential. 
Since the researcher interacted with the respondents several times in the course of 18 months, 
the biases arising from these relationships were assumed to decline as trust was established 
over the study period. In their narratives, there were indeed candid accounts of their 
commissions, omissions and experiences - both positive and negative, which implied a 
limited impact of this bias. Given the limited number of in-depth case study hospitals, there 
was a constant risk in the textual descriptions to un-mask the identity of these hospitals 
especially where there are unique features particular to these hospitals or their contexts. Some 
of these features were too close to the explanations needed to understand the hospital 
performance and response to PBC pilot. In these respects, a trade-off was made to keep the 
identity of the study hospital anonymous by subtracting some details from the descriptions 
with minimal loss of explanatory power. Sub-texts and footnotes were added where 
appropriate, to explain to the reader why more explicit details were withheld. 
Among the major limitation to this study were the weak and incomparable data systems 
among study hospitals. Administrative data on finances, expenditures and service outputs 
were organized differently among the hospitals in the study. Hospitals under UCMB had 
evolved an advanced and common approach to the data system. However, hospitals in the 
sister UPMB and Govt hospitals did not have similar level of systematic organisation of the 
data. For example, wage expenditures for the Govt hospitals was centralised in the Public 
Service Payroll that made it difficult to compare with UCMB expenditures. During this study 
there were several changes in the HMIS system of the MOH as a new system was being 
introduced. It was common to find new and old data capture forms being used by the study 
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hospitals. This made the process of generating service outputs trends more problematic. 
Attempts to mitigate this problem required very heavy time and money investments that were 
not possible within the logistical support available for this research. 
Given the mixed methods approach used in this study, the variety of research materials was 
high. Analysis and interpretation required competence building for the researcher as well as 
testing the interpretations with academic supervisors and other experts to build confidence in 
qualitative research findings. The researcher/author attended several workshops and seminars 
on how to analyse qualitative research. Analysis extracts were presented among peer PhD 
students, at seminars at LSHTM facilitated by Prof. Jude Green. Seminars were also given at 
LSHTM, Makerere University School of Public Health, Ministry of Health, UCMB and at 
international conferences such as IHEA 2007 and Implementation Science Seminar in 
Bergen, Norway in late 2008. Presentation at UCMB and MOH and MUSPH involved 
several persons that participated as respondents in this research, thus providing feedback and 
confidence of the interpretation of the research findings. Although less formal feedback was 
received, chapters 6 and 7 were shared with managers of case-study hospitals. Chapters 5,6 
and 7 were shared with key members of the pilot implementation team at MOH and MUSPH. 
Findings in chapter 4 and 5 were presented to officials of UCMB secretariat for validation as 
well as sharing information for decision making. Feedback did not raise major objections to 
the findings or their interpretations. 
In some cases, the research activities were more ambitious and generated lots of data 
especially for the hospital staff surveys. Some of the data collected are not presented in this 
dissertation mostly because it was driven by the demands by MOH to generate some baseline 
information for the upcoming social health insurance policy. Some of this data will be 
processed for use by MOH and for separate publication(s). 
3.7 Ethical Approval and Its Implications 
Ethical approval was sought and granted for the study at four different levels. 1) LSHTM 
Ethics and Review Board. 2) Higher Degrees and Ethical Review Board (HDERB) of 
Makerere University School of Public Health; and 3) Uganda National Council of Science 
and Technology (UNCST). Upon approval by the UNCST in March 2005,4) letters were 
written to the selected hospitals requesting their participation in the study in addition to the 
notification letters provided by the UNCST. As it become known during the study that some 
research objectives would be better served by interviewing technical staff of Uganda Catholic 
Medical Bureau (UCMB) and Uganda Protestant Medical Bureau (UPMB), further 
permission was sought and received from these agencies as well. Annual progress report was 
also provided in June 2006 to the HRERB as required by the guidelines and conditions of 
UNCST. 
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Central to the ethical requirement of this study was the promise of anonymity of the 
respondent and hospitals in the publications arising from this research activity. As such, the 
names of the participating individuals' i. e. key informants are categorised into broader 
groupings to mask the identity of the respondents. The groupings are "Staff", "Hospital 
Management Team (HMT), Board of Governors (BOD), District Health Officers (DOHs), 
Uganda Catholic Medical Bureau (UCMB) PBC Pilot Team. The participating hospitals are 
presented with numeric labels such as from I to 10. 
However, some aspects of the identity such as the unique history of a particular hospital or 
organization posed a challenge since this unique history was tied to some core units of 
analysis i. e. building explanation for performance trends/history (chapter 7). In this respect, 
the author had to use a delicate descriptive language and eliminated features that would give 
away the hospital identity to the readers. For example, attempts were made to make 
anonymous these key features by using descriptive terms such as "previously stigmatised 
hospital" instead of making explicit the source of stigma. This was done as a means to 
preserving the major findings and causal explanations as to why performance baseline was 
low in particular hospital(s). 
3.8 Overview of results chapters: 
Apart from the assessment of the operational mechanisms, the analysis also aims to deduce 
theoretical generalisations about how to organise and design performance improvement 
innovations in health systems with contexts similar to Uganda. This would form the basis for 
policy recommendation and practice guidelines on decisions for adoption and practical 
application of PBC. Therefore, the analysis was driven by the need to draw both the practical 
implications and the broader theoretical basis for organising performance improvements in 
the health systems. For the latter purpose, agency theory and organisation process theories 
were taken as alternative theoretic frameworks against which to compare the findings from 
this study. As the study progressed, more information about alternative interventions for 
performance improvements was obtained. These interventions provided additional 
frameworks for comparing PBC pilot as well as enriching the analysis and lessons for policy 
and practice. 
Please refer to Table 3.2 above for the summary of the analysis units and main methods for 
analysis for each of the results chapters 4,5,6,7 and 8. 
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Chapter 4: Performance Management in the Health System 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter attempts to describe performance management in the Ugandan health system. It 
describes the performance frameworks upstream and how this links with the hospital sector, 
which forms part of the ultimate interface for service provision. The purpose is to portray the 
mix and range of performance frameworks in the upstream and their instrumental 
mechanisms of influence on the hospitals. The chapter uses case studies to explore different 
levers on performance and how they trickle down to the hospitals from the upstream actors. 
Case studies of 1) the District Performance Ranking (league table) and 2) Accreditation by 
Uganda Catholic Medical Bureau (UCMB) are presented as upstream interventions to 
improve performance at the time PBC pilot was being implemented. In addition to exploring 
the synergies and constraints to successful implementation and response to performance- 
based contracting (PBC) in the Ugandan context, this chapter also illustrates the use of clan- 
based control mechanisms to manage hospital performance at a system and network level by 
MOH and UCMB respectively. 
Performance as a concept is central to the understanding of the context and response of 
hospitals to performance-based contracting (PBC). Although the specifications of service 
targets to be achieved under the PBC framework provide fairly clear performance 
dimensions, the hospital response to PBC is tenuously interwoven in the broader performance 
expectations contingent on these hospitals. Different stakeholders have different mechanisms 
for inducing their desired performance dimension from hospitals. The key stakeholders for 
the hospital sector in Uganda include those internal to the hospital such as the staff, 
managers, and board of governors. The external stakeholders include the district leaders and 
health managers, central ministries of Health and Finance and several national health projects 
that link with hospitals for their implementation arrangements. For the PNFP hospitals, 
additional stakeholders include religious medical bureaus and religious congregations that 
own or run the hospitals. A multiplicity of performance expectations arising from all 
stakeholders, their mechanisms and power of influence -formed a context that is central to 
understanding the response to PBC as a singular intervention in a complex context. 
Secondly, hospitals as organisations have a multitude of products and processes that in 
combination constitute "performance" to different stakeholders. Given the hierarchy of 
agency relationships in the decentralised health and administrative systems, some 
performance influences are direct while others are channelled to the hospitals through other 
agencies (see figure 3.1). Both agency and organisational theories identify the need for 
coordination among multiple principals to ensure that the multitask-agent like hospitals 
respond optimally to the relevant performance expectations and avoid displacement of efforts 
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between objectives and avoid goal-confusion (Lawler 1971; Homstrom and Milgrom 1991; 
Smith, Stephan et al. 1997). Given several layers of agency relationships, in the Ugandan 
health care system, each level in the agency chain transmits incentives to the next agent in the 
system. 
The chapter presents findings at three interfaces in the performance management of the health 
system. These are (1) the state-sector (MOH) level (2) the MOH-district level and (3) the 
district-hospital (facility) level. 
The findings in this chapter were generated from three sets of data collection activities: 
document reviews, participant observations at meetings discussing health sector performance 
and from in-depth interviews with stakeholders proximal to the governance of study 
hospitals. The latter category included the district health officials (DHO), officials in the 
Uganda Catholic Medical Bureau (UCMB), Boards of Governors (BOG) and members of the 
hospital management team (HMT). Two main questions guided this description and analysis: 
1. What dimensions of hospital performance do upstream stakeholders value? 
2. What mechanisms do these upstream stakeholders use to influence hospital 
performance towards their expectations? 
4.1 Macro Level Performance Expectation 
Uganda being a low income country, much of the health system and provision of health 
services is financed by donor assistance. In 2005, the national health sector budget was 48 
percent financed by donor funds (Uganda Government 2005). Donor assistance is sourced 
from both multilateral and bilateral agencies. The financial, material and technical support are 
provided on the basis of a number of objectives. Objectives at this level can be deduced from 
international conventions. The Millennium Development Goals, the poverty reduction 
strategy programmes (PRSP), the disease control priorities project and the report of the 
Commission on Macroeconomics and Health are the contemporary reference points for 
performance expectations of multilateral and bilateral agencies (CMH 2001; World Bank 
2001; UNDP 2003; DCPP 2006). 
The performance expectations at the global level are generally health outcomes at the 
national level such as health status improvements, reduced inequalities, poverty reduction and 
enhanced human capacity and productivity. The main performance influence is financing i. e. 
grants and loans and project funds for health programmes. The threat of withholding funding 
to the country is another form of influence. Such threats are usually linked to broad 
performance indicators such as governance, corruption and political developments (Oliveira- 
Cruz 2007). Through mechanisms introduced by performance-based aid such as the Global 
Fund, performance auditing has been explicitly added as a requirement for disbursement of 
aid at the donor-government level (GFATM 2003). For example, Uganda's HIV and malaria 
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grants from GFATM were suspended and some prematurely terminated after the performance 
audit indicated unsatisfactory results in 2005(The Global Fund 2005; The Global Fund 2008). 
The integration of agents of the donor countries and projects into sector planning and 
monitoring in the form of Sector-wide Approaches (SWAP) is an additional instrumental 
influence by stakeholders at this level. Vertical projects designed to directly influence the 
health outcomes are also a common approach to addressing performance expectations arising 
from this level. Financing and provision of technical support to conduct demographic and 
household surveys at national level are now well established mechanisms of assessment for 
health outcome indicators(UBOS 2001). Special studies are usually commissioned by both 
government and donor countries to evaluate implementation processes and 
outcomes(Horizons International Ltd 2001; Business Synergies 2002; AMREF 2004). The 
performance expectations at this level and their mechanisms of influence are summarised in 
table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: Macro level performance expectations and influences for health outcomes 
Level Performance expectations 
relevant to hospitals 
Mechanisms of influence 
Global objectives Improved health status " Conditional financing 
" MDGs, Reduced inequalities - performance-base aid 
" PRSPs More productivity/efficiency - donor integration into sector 
" CMH, Reduced catastrophic expenses management/SWAPs 
" DCPP Reduced corruption among " Project-based initiatives 
government institutions " Technical assistance missions Reduced population growth " measuring process/outcome Responsive providers - implementation reports Improved management practices - Tracking studies Expanded effective interventions -mortality and morbidity Implementation benchmarks surveys e. g. DHS, Household 
surveys, national census 
4.2 Performance Expectations at the NationalUState Level 
The World Health Organisation, in its 2000 World Health Report (WHR-2000), introduced 
measures of national health system performance. At a systems level, the report identified 
three main objectives: improving the health of the population, responding to people's 
expectations and providing financial protection against the cost of ill health (WHO 2000). 
The National Health Sector Strategic Plan II in Uganda draws on WHR-2000 in framing the 
performance expectations of the Uganda Health Sector Strategic Plan (Uganda Government 
2005). The sector plan identified its objectives as producing, restoring and maintaining 
health. Hospitals are key players in all three objectives(WHO 2000). To meet these three 
health system objectives, the WHR identified four functional domains whose performance is 
critical for objective attainment. These four include financing, stewardship, creating 
resources/capacity and service provision (WHO 2000 pg 25). The report contains 
assessments of health outcomes such as life expectancy and process measurements for 
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respect, confidentiality and autonomy. Other measures are for responsiveness i. e. prompt 
attention, quality of health care amenities and availability of a range of providers to choose 
from. Hospitals are also key symbols for the national health system and the social welfare 
infrastructure which makes them subject to broader socio-political development 
aspirations(McPake 1996). 
4.2.1 National Development Expectations Versus the Health Sector 
The main driving force for the diffusion of performance assessment and monitoring can be 
attributed to a number of national and global financial assistance programmes. The advent of 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Programmes (PRSP) led by the World Bank and IMF had a 
strong influence at the national treasury and development planning directorate under the 
custodianship of the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development 
(MOFP&ED) and indeed the Government in general(World Bank 2001). The national 
development plan referred to as the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP), was developed 
with an explicit set of outcome performance indictors that each government sector had to 
contribute in order to achieve the overall national objective of poverty eradication and 
development (MOFP&ED 2001). The main contribution by the health sector to PEAP (table 
4.2) is related to improving health outcome indicators i. e. infant and child mortality, maternal 
mortality and effects of poor nutrition. Explicit indicators and targets were set and have been 
actively monitored by household surveys (MOFP&ED 2003). 
Table 4.2: Health indi 
Indicator 1990 1995 2000 PEAP 
target by 
2005 
IMR (infant death/1000 
live birth) 122 81 88 68 
Under 5 Mortality rate 180 147 152 103 
Maternal mortality rate 527 506 505 354 
Stunting (chronic 
malnutrition 
38 38 38.5 28 
ource (U ; Uganda ovemmen pgI6-3U). 
However given the multiple determinants of the PEAP, these indicators (table 4.2) and lack 
of capacity for regular measurement4, the Health Sector Strategic Plans (HSSP) adopted 
process measures (table 4.3) as proxies to the outcome indicators for PEAP. Out of the 25 
indicators listed in the HSSP, a short-list of five (table 4.3) were identified as the instruments 
for performance management and assessment at the implementation level (districts). The five 
indicators (table 4.3) were being accessed annually using a routine data collection system 
known as the Health Management Information System (HMIS) and a sentinel HIV 
surveillance system. The availability of performance data in these two routine information 
4 Outcome indicators are assessed every five years using household surveys. 
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systems was important in the selection of the indicators for HSSP monitoring (Talisuna 
2001). 
Table 4.3: Health sector HSSP indicators (1999 to 2005) for monitoring by MOH 
Indicator Baseline 2000 - 2001- 2002- 2003- 2004- 2004/05 
1999/00 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 tar et OPD utilisation 0.40 0.43 0.60 0.72 0.79 0.90 0.70 
DPT3/pentavalent vaccine 41 48 63 84 83 89 85 coverage % 
Delivery at health facility - 25 2 22 6 19 20 3 24 4 25 35 GoU and PNFP . . . . 
Approved post filled by 33 40 42 66 68 68 52 trained health workers 
National average for HIV 
sero-prevalence from ANC 6.8 6.1 6.5 6.2 -- 7.1 5 sentinel sites 
4.2.2 Health Sector Performance Monitoring - SWAP 
A review of the resolutions and "agreed actions" (also called Undertakings) of the Health 
Sector Annual Performance Review Meetings provided the priority actions to be achieved. 
This list of actions, usually appended to the Annual Health Sector Performance Report, 
reflects the formal performance concerns of the health sector stakeholder forum - or SWAP. 
For the period 2000-2002, most of the undertakings reflect attention to the capacity of the 
health system to absorb the available funding and generate value-for-money in terms of 
HSSP results (indicators). In addition to HSSP indicators, tracking studies were 
commissioned to identify bottlenecks for implementation of the plan. These studies were 
commissioned to track the flow of funds and availability of human resources and drugs. The 
studies found major weaknesses in the financial accounting function, drug procurements and 
severe shortages of qualified health workers (Horizons International Ltd 2001; Business 
Synergies 2002; AMREF 2004; Ssennono, Petit et al. 2005). Efforts were made to strengthen 
the disbursements of funds, and accounts assistants were recruited. Drugs budgets were 
increased and procurement systems were changed to allow better responsiveness to health 
facilities to reduce acute drug shortages (Nazerali, Oteba et al. 2006). Significant efforts were 
also made to train Nurse Assistants as a temporary measure to address staff shortage 
especially in the remote and underserved areas (MOH 2003; Ssengooba 2004). This period 
was characterised by increased utilisation of health services due to the withdrawal of user- 
fees in 2001 and better availability of drugs (Xu, Evans et al. 2006; Yates, Kirunga et al. 
2006). 
The period 2003 to 2006 was, however, beset with less tractable health sector performance 
concerns such as health worker shortage, inadequate salaries, sub-optimal functioning of the 
infrastructure, inadequate drugs budgets and problematic procurement processes of medical 
goods(Nazerali, Oteba et al. 2006). Priority actions listed in the Annual Health Sector 
74 
Performance Reports for the period 2003 to 2006 reflect strong performance constraints 
arising from human resources inadequacy, low staffing norms (size of establishment), 
inequitable staff deployment and efforts to overcome government freeze on recruitment of 
health workers(MOH 2003; MOH 2004). Solutions such as increased health worker 
recruitment and increased salary for government health workers caused problems for PNFP 
providers. The latter lost their staff to the government sector due to the salary disparities 
created by better pay by Government (UCMB 2005a). Expanding health care infrastructure 
especially to underserved areas and to accommodate new interventions like laboratories for 
ARV treatment also faced the constraint of lack of human resources to function optimally. 
National level procurement of drugs and other medical products was a recurrent problem. 
Overall, the performance expectations at the national health sector level reflected a need to 
build and strengthen the support systems such as human resources and product procurement, 
increase financing and expand provision of infrastructure. These concerns were also shared 
by the hospitals participating in this study and the PBC pilot. 
4.2.3 The league Table: Ministry of Health - Districts' Performance 
Given a national policy of decentralized governance, the Districts are the sub-national 
structures for implementation of national programmes including health plans. In this respect, 
the performance of the districts was central for the success of the HSSP for the Ministry of 
Health (MOH). As holders of the implementation mandate for the national programmes, the 
District Councils (DCs) were increasingly being subjected to performance assessments and 
monitoring of implementation of essential national programmes (Birungi 2003). For example 
the education sector used the "pass and failure rates" of pupils and students at the Uganda 
National Examinations Board to rank districts according to their performance in education 
achievements. DCs responded to poor rankings by sacking the Head Teachers and District 
Education Officers (Williamson 2003). 
The developments in the education sector had effects on the health sector (Okuonzi and 
Birungi 2000). In its third Annual Health Sector Performance Report, the MOH had devised a 
league table to address the gap in the previous two annual sector reports that did not have 
district-level performance information. The "performance" measures included in the league 
table were driven by the ease of data availability at the district level. In the 2002/03 financial 
year, MOH published the league table ranking all districts (see table 4.4) in its Annual Health 
Sector Report(MOH 2003b). As a measure of drilling down the performance governance 
responsibility of the DCs and attempting to galvanise performance accountability at the 
district level, MOH and its SWAP partners started hosting the annual National Health 
Assemblies (NHA). Using the district as the unit of assessment, the league table rankings 
were presented to the NHA where the delegates included district and national political 
leaders, technocrats, civil society and the media. The political leaders and their technocrat 
(DHOs) that were ranked among the top ten districts were invited during the assembly to 
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receive a recognition award -a placard and a handshake from the chief guest -i. e. vice 
president. 
As expected from the league table approach of winner-loser or "name and shame", there were 
many objections and controversies about the measures used, the missing data, the weights 
given to the different measurements and indeed the overall purpose the table would serve 
especially for the districts that were ranked at the top and bottom (Komakech 2005). Indeed 
the incentives arising from a good league table position were controversial and demotivating 
in the long term. For example, views emerging from the interviews with the DHO indicated 
that good performance on the league table was a reason for being denied resources such as 
cars and lack of increments for district wage allocation for health workers. Following the 
launch of the league table, MOH allocated some resources in a manner to boost the 
performance of districts that performed poorly -a practice that generated different signals for 
performance. 
"Good performance is a risk. ..... People in the ministry say we are doing well and they 
do 
not give us resources. When they were giving out ambulances, small districts received some 
and have since parked them due to (lack of) fuel budgets. For us, they say we are doing well 
(top on the league table) and no ambulance is given. So we have to let things slip down (let 
performance decline) and be reconsidered. It's demotivating sometimes to do well " (DHO). 
It is such concerns that led to the Annual Health Assembly resolution to revise measures used 
with a view to empower districts to monitor their performance better (MOH 2004). This 
researcher attended the Working Group meetings organised to revise the league table at the 
health sector Technical Reviews Meeting on 27th April 2006. Some of the views expressed 
at this meeting are captured alongside the components and weights of the league table 
elements in table 4.4. The main concerns were related to the locus of control for the actions 
being measures in the league table. In particular, the attendees felt that some of the measures 
were partly a reflection of performance of the central ministries as opposed to districts. For 
example, league table measure such as proportion of disbursed funds that were expended was 
assigned 10 points but participants indicated that funds were being disbursed too late for 
time-sensitive activities at the district-level to be undertaken. This affected the rate at which 
disbursed funds were expended. This was captured in the experience of one participant as: 
"we plan to go to outreach 10 times a month. If the money comes three months late, we can 
not do 30 outreach in the next month to catch up. Why do you penalize us and not the 
ministry that did not send the money in time? " (DHO) 
In addition, the perceived performance failures of the intermediary agencies such as National 
Medical Store (NMS) were not being taken into account in awarding 10 performance points 
in league table for the measure about "drug purchase". The National Medical Store (NMS) 
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was said to have insufficient stocks and yet the performance points (and guidelines) were 
obliging districts to buy from NMS. 
Table 4.4: league table measures, weights and expressed concerns by actors 
League table Measure Score Major comments on measure by annual health assembly 
weights 
Percent of PHC funds disbursed 10 Ignores disbursement delays from treasury to districts and 
that were expended implementing units. Participants want a measure of timeliness 
of disbursement added. 
Percent of health units 5 Ignores availability of stationery i. e. new HMIS forms were 
submitting complete HMIS not widely available. Coexistence of old and new data forms 
returns to the district made comparison of outputs difficult. 
Percent of district HMIS returns 5 Loss of data by recipient office, no feedback to districts 
submitted (to MOH) timely except league table, vacant posts amongst personnel to deal 
with records. 
Proportion of approved posts 5 Recruitment is not controlled by districts but Treasury, MOH 
that are filled by trained health and Public Service. Districts only recruit if funds and 
personnel standards are provided or when the recruitment ban is lifted. 
Proportion of PHC grants spent 10 NMS sometime does not have enough drugs stocks and does 
on drugs purchased at NMS (or not want to refund the money/credits to the units or districts to 
JMS) shop elsewhere. 
[Guideline is 50% spent on 
The budget ratio for drugs was opposed. Hospital actors felt 
drugs] 50% was too much. Lack of funds for repairs and 
maintenance were cited as rationale for lower score. 
Percent of children under 1 year 12.5 No significant controversy on this indicator. 
received 3 doses of DPT 
accordin to schedule 
Total Govt and NGO OPD 12.5 Insufficient drugs at NMS was a recurrent complaint here too. 
utilisation per person per year Without enough drugs OPD attendances decline. 
Percent of deliveries in Govt 12.5 Lack of doctors, ill equipped maternity units, recruitment 
and NGO health facilities budgets. 
Proportion of TB cases notified 10 Contestation of uniformity of TB incidence among districts 
comp tred to expected 
Percent of pregnant women 10 Conflict with new guideline on malaria treatment. Coartem 
received 2nd dose of Fansidar had replaced Fansidar in guidelines. 
for malaria prevention 
Pit latrine coverage 7.5 Credibility of data questioned. No routine data are collected 
on this surve s are expensive. 
It is important to note that the league table which represented the measurement instrument for 
the district health services was a significant deviation from the HSSP indicators (table 4.4). 
The league table dropped the indicator on HIV prevalence. Other indicators were added - TB, 
malaria, sanitation and a host of administrative indicators to monitor absorption capacity for 
disbursed funds, procurement of drugs, and two indicators to measure adequacy of reporting 
and information flow from districts to MOH. 
Despite its short comings, the league table rankings did spur a number of responses among 
the DHOs and politicians at the district level. Two DHOs were interviewed in this study and 
asked what they had done differently as a result of their league table position for the 2004/05. 
The league table position (rank) for their district had ignited some performance related 
queries from district political leaders. Political leaders had started to ask why their districts 
were in unfavourable positions, or why they had fallen in the rankings from the previous 
year. But the most tangible finding was the adoption of the league table idea by the district 
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health system in these two districts. The sub-nationalisation of the league table idea and by 
adopting similar indictors and providing some form of recognition awards to "good 
performers" within the districts, showed that the districts were sensitive to the rankings at the 
national level. As illustrated by the extracts of the interview below, this DHO appreciated the 
general idea behind the league table despite the limitations of its measures. 
"Sometimes the criteria MOH people use are meaningless. ... They put scores on things that 
are not of any purpose on the ground. Imagine they give 10 points for purchasing drugs from 
NMS. If I purchase drug items worth Sh. 20 million from NMS, I get the score even if the drug 
is only serving two persons. Drug availability to me is a better measure but the guy (MOH 
official) was offended when I challenged him about this. You see these scores, they make IDP 
camps to do better than us - God forbid" (DHO) 
"This (league) table is brought in a Political Leaders' Forum... You get them (District 
Council) Chairman asking "what has happened to our district to be (ranked) down". Of 
course no one wants to be at the tail end We defended this since they (MOH) had not 
included a score on drugs for our district and yet this drug item attracts a score of 10. When 
we asked for a reason why they left it out, we've never received a response. But the idea is 
good. It arouses the interest of the leaders. But the quality of the measurement (is not good) 
- the purpose is delivery to people. .. satisfaction of beneficiaries are needed.... 
We also rank 
our units through HMS-completeness, promptness and adequacy. Also reproductive health 
- deliveries, School health, child health days, (we) give prizes biannually to the HSDs that 
perform better. It's now routine " (DHO). 
Table 4.5 below provides a summary of the performance expectations and influences at the 
national (Ministry of Health) level. 
4.3 Expectations at the Decentralised/District Health System 
The district health managers expect improvement in the utilisation of the health services and 
proper reports of utilisation and reports of accounts from downstream implementers of 
district health programmes. It is upon the aggregation and submissions of these reports to the 
Ministry of Health that quarterly disbursement of funds are triggered. The official 
withdrawal of user-fees in public health facilities had also led to the expectation that PNFP 
services would also be made affordable to local communities. As will be discussed in more 
detail in section 5.1, the push for the reduction of fees by PNFPs providers and non 
increasing subsidy from Government had raised sustainability questions among PNFP 
providers. This led to active efforts by the district health directorates to assist the PNFP 
providers in their districts by seconding staff, donating vehicles and allocating project-based 
resources to PNFP hospitals. This active support mechanism was mainly to boost the 
operational capacity of these providers. 
Gulu district with camps of internally displaced population (IDP) was ranked best overall 
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Table 4.5: Summary performance expectations, support and enforcement at MOH level 
Performance Performance Performance Mechanisms of 
Expectations support Measurements enforcement 
Upstream " aid flows and Overall resources Display of evidence 
expectations predictability Technical experts and donor committed to the health of need i. e. 
of MOH " mobilizing more sponsored studies sector plan mortality rates, 
resources shortages of staff, 
(MOFPED " Larger budget 
drugs and poor 
infrastructure 
Donors) share from , Treasury 
Internal or Effective support to " Budget support by donors " Donor funds channelled " Inter agency 
horizontal implementers with " Advocacy for higher budget through the national committee 
expectations " policy and allocation budget or through meetings or 
of MOH guidelines " Resource mobilization i. e. projects working groups 
" Area team projects grants from Global " Availability of sufficient 
[le from other support 
Fund drugs stocks at NMS & " Quarterly 
national 
supervision 
Improved function 
" Bulk procurement of drugs 
and equipment 
JAM 
" Number of graduating 
performance 
reviews by MOH 
agencies that of Autonomous " Negotiating performance health workers from staff play vital roles agencies reports with Global Health training schools " Public stakeholder 
complementary " National medical Initiatives. " Timeliness of PHC fund performance 
to MOH - i. e. stores " Negotiating budgets and disbursement to districts review meetings 
NMS, National " Health service disbursements with National " Annual Sector Review with district 
Drug commission Treasury - fact finding visits 
leaders, NGOs & 
Authority, Ministry of - annual reports media. 
Health Service education - tracking studies " 
Open 
accountability Commission " Enrolment and 
output health public information etc] worker training sharing: 
programmes pressure of "name and 
shame" or 
"name and 
lori" 
Downstream " Adequate stock " Advocacy & timely 
expectations of quality staff disbursement of funds " Area team supervision " Name and shame 
of MOH and mix " Planning and allocation of and support visits in the league table 
" Expand coverage national budgets thru the " League tables of district 
(districts) e. g. ARVs, TB, MTEFs. performance " Withholding 
malaria Reducing bureaucracy " Special studies budget 
" quality of - earmarking PNFP funds - tracking studies disbursements 
services - providing drug credit lines - disease surveillance 
" provide output " Guidelines for Periodic surveys " Not allocating 
information implementation and " household poverty resources such as 
" value for money managing care delivery monitoring cars, project 
funds, 
accountability - recruitment quotas " demographic and health 
infrastructure fund 
" prompt - earmarking drug budgets to non compliant 
performance Media campaigns for national 
districts 
reports programmes . Can advise the " absorption n 
funds available 
district employer 
" PHC against 
an 
infrastructure incompetent 
development manager 
" community PHC 
participation 
ource: researcher construction Trom observations at stakeholder meetings and rel. v 
4.3.1 Performance Review Meetings 
In relation to the district level performance management, quarterly and annual performance 
review meetings were innovations in the process of being established in two of the three 
districts hosting the study hospitals. In these two districts, the processes of performance 
analysis and review were being supported financially and also technically by international 
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NGO projects working in these districts. One of the NGO projects that was involved in 
supporting Quarterly Performance Review Meetings (QPRMs) had a presence in the two 
districts where this practice was being established. Publicly available information about this 
NGO project showed that its objectives and therefore its success, were dependent on the 
performance improvements of the UCMB health facilities in these two districts (CUAMM 
2002). The project was directly involved in the performance assessments and also financing 
the QPRMs in the two districts as a means of accessing performance information for 
monitoring its project. The performance targets and review processes were guided by the 
short-list of MOH indicators for HSSP and the measures used in the national league table 
(tables 4.3 and 4.4). 
4.3.2 Performance Recognition and Awards 
In addition to the PBC pilot, other projects were also found in the districts trying to influence 
the performance of study hospitals. These projects were providing funds and assessing 
hospital performance against their objectives. The following four projects used some form of 
performance frameworks (measurement and rewards) to directly influence the specific 
performance objectives within the study hospitals: 
a) Yellow Star programme (YSP) was being adopted by districts to promote service quality 
improvements. Although not well institutionalised in the districts hosting the study 
hospitals, YSP was starting to assess service quality in hospitals and health centres. As 
described further in chapter 6, the programme was providing certificates and other forms 
of recognition to the hospitals for good quality of services provided. It was also 
supporting activities that signal to the communities the service quality of the health 
facilities. This programme was just starting in some of the hospitals at the time this study 
was winding up its field activities. 
b) UCMB was influential among the hospitals affiliated to the Catholic Church. Section 4.4 
provides more discussion of its objectives and influence. 
c) The reproductive health programme of MOH and UNFPA were supporting districts to 
implement project activities aimed at tracking causes of maternal mortality. The 
performance measures here included maternal death audits in health facilities and in the 
communities. 
d) The rolling out of ARVs in most hospitals in 2004 had also introduced performance- 
targets for antiretroviral therapy enrolments as well as performance interest in tracking 
drug stocks and adherence to HIV/AIDS care. As incentives, all study hospitals were 
receiving project funding in accordance with the number of clients they had enrolled onto 
ART programmes. Some of these projects were being coordinated through the district 
health management offices. 
However, the main challenge was the unpredictability of resources to support these 
performance frameworks. There was poor information about their schedules and uncertainty 
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surrounded their prospects for sustainability. Table 4.7 provides a summary of performance 
expectations and influences at the district level. 
4.3.3 Districts as Middlemen in Performance Management 
It is essential to recognise that the district level served an intermediary role in the 
management of service delivery systems. In general the districts did not have locally 
generated funds to implement their programmes. Performance expectations at this level were 
contingent on upstream provision of funds, guidelines and policies for district level activities 
to run. Much as the District Health Offices were assessing the upstream support they 
received, they did not have strong mechanisms to enforce their upstream expectations 
especially from the ministries of Health and Finance. The down-stream expectations, support 
and influences of the District Health Directorates towards the hospitals were contingent on 
the fulfilment of the upstream expectations. As a result, the District Health Officers had low 
powered influences which were sometimes counterproductive due to slow or delayed 
disbursement of funds from the central government. The following interview and meeting 
extracts illustrate the difficulty of demanding better performance from providers when they 
are not receiving adequate resources to perform their activities. It also illustrates the 
unorthodox ways the district providers and their managers try to secure funds by 
pragmatically bending institutional rules and norms: 
"We have explained to them (hospitals) in many meetings that the delays (in disbursements) 
are from central government. This is (an) issue of (insufficient) cash budget and a problem of 
revenue collection. The problem is also with proportionate disbursements. I was doing my 
computation of disbursements - hospital X6 has 100% disbursed, PNFPs have 70 to 80% disbursed - yet this is June (the end of the financial year) " (DHO). 
"Supervision funds for this district are not forthcoming and most supervision activities have 
been put on hold for a month and half. .... The project officer informs the quarterly 
performance review meeting that 2.2 million shillings is now available to start the overdue 
supervision visits. However, the project officer needs accountability for this money within 
three days after (today's) meeting. This accountability will enable him to get access to a 
larger disbursement of 9 million shillings from project office in Kampala. Attendees at the 
performance review meeting discuss briefly the ethics of giving accountability before doing 
the supervision visits. Eventually they agree to provide the accountability as a means of 
securing funds for project activities in the next quarter (Researcher Observation at District 
Quarterly Performance Reviews Meeting). 
s Name of a public hospital edited out to conceal identity of the hospital and the respondent 
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Table 4.6: Summary of district performance framework towards hospitals 
Performance 
Expectations 
Performance 
Support 
Performance 
assessment 
Mechanisms of 
enforcement 
Increased funds for activities Complaints when given 
Regular disbursement of fund Developing operational Disbursements of funds opportunity to talk to 
Guidelines and coherent plans for district from the treasury MOH and MOFP&ED 
policies programmes Project-based support - especially during National procurement and Share district level especially that channelled Annual Health 
availability of medical goods information to MOH through the districts Assembly and SWAP 
Support supervision Accountability reports Fair share of facilitation sector review meetings 
Empowering measures of Service utilisation e. g. development projects, 
performance reporting cars 
MOH feedback systems on Coordinating actions for 
district level performance implementation 
Preparation of operational On-ward disbursement of Routine monitoring and 
plans operational funds support visits Integration with PNFP 
Timely reports of activities Mobilizing project-based " infrastructure management i. e. 
and accountability funds for programmes " staffing seconding staff for 
Quality - drugs & satisfaction Recruitment & " drug availability HSD work Increased use of curative and deployment of staff& Quarterly performance 
preventive services secondment to PNFP review meetings: Recommendation for 
" achieving HSSP league Procurement support " Reports of accounts access to national and 
table set targets Coordination with local " Reports of activities project resources 
i. e. 
" acceptable staff standards and national authorities " HSSP targets vehicles and project 
" Sustainable initiatives Supporting systems: attainment grants - also 
threats of 
" visibility of health facilities " Information systems District-based league exclusion 
from project 
" programmes/projects " Accounting systems table grants e. g. 
for ARV, 
" Affordable services to users " Support supervision to Project-based measures: 
PMTCT, etc 
" HSD supervision to lower HSD and lower level 
its " 
Maternal mortality Awards for excelling on health facilities 
Implementing ad hoc national 
un 
" Facility planning 
audits 
" Drugs stocks for key 
league table 
programmes such as " Setting HSSP annual programmes i. e. ARVs, Awards of certificate " immunisations days (NIDs), service targets g condoms, malaria for quality - under the " MMR audits " Networking with 
d UPMB UCMB 
" Yellow star rankings Yellow Star 
" ARV drugs an " Performance-based Programme 
" Yellow star contracting pilot 
4.4 UCMB and its Performance Expectations: A Case Study 
The PNFP medical bureaus (especially the catholic one) had profound influence on the 
performance of the study hospitals affiliated to them. Five study hospitals fall under the 
Uganda Catholic Medical Bureau (UCMB), two belong to Uganda Protestant Medical Bureau 
(UPMB) and three were public district hospitals. The performance interactions between the 
bureaus and the hospitals are an essential component of understanding the context of the 
study hospitals and their response to performance contracts. More importantly, the Bureaus 
provide reports of the aggregate health service outputs as performance accountability for the 
grants the government extends to the PNFP sector. PNFPs were active players in influencing 
hospitals and lower level providers to provide performance information to government. They 
play an advocacy role aimed at improving government subsidies to the PNFP sector and in 
advancing the public private partnership policies. 
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4.4.1 UCMB and its Institutional Basis for Performance Governance 
UCMB is the technical arm of the Catholic Church of Uganda (CCU) in health service 
delivery. UCMB programmes have a direct influence on the performance of its members and 
other PNFP providers. Overall, CCU has about 60 percent of the PNFP health facilities with 
27 hospitals, 11 nurse training schools, and 228 lower level health facilities. Given this large 
network of PNFP health providers and relatively well resourced support programmes, UCMB 
had more performance enhancing innovations for its members and enjoyed more authority in 
comparison to its sister Bureaus. In brief, the mandate of the UCMB as reflected in its 1999 
Mission and Policy Statement covers the following (UCMB 1999): 
1. improving managerial, administrative, fiscal and legal capacities of its members, 
2. collecting data for demonstrating the relevance, cost efficiency/effectiveness and 
social orientation of the CCU health services, 
3. disseminating relevant information to CCU health services, 
4. facilitating forums of common discussion, learning, collaboration, exchange of 
experience, identification of common problems and priorities, 
5. advocating/lobbying for CCU health services with Government, private-or-profit, 
international agencies and donor community, 
6. representing the CCU health services and liaising with Government, 
7. cooperating with Government in areas of health policy development, planning quality 
assurance, training and other relevant issues. 
Given its linkage with the Catholic Church, UCMB was able to mobilise funds from local and 
international agencies, to actively pursue its mandate. Its programmes were geared to 
providing support to its members in the domains of organisational development, 
strengthening management training, information systems and establishing systems for quality 
improvement. Its mandate also links it to the Catholic-founded university - Uganda Martyrs 
University for the development of management and administration skills of health service 
managers. In addition, UCMB and UPMB together are cofounders of one of Uganda's largest 
drugs procurement agency - Joint Medical Stores (JMS). Through JMS, subsidised drugs 
were procured and sold to member organisations of UCMB and UPMC. UCMB used its 
network and church influence to attract projects that work to enhance the UCMB mandate 
and to provide support for operational activities in the hospitals(UCMB 2006b). Several 
European sponsored projects were found active in expanding the infrastructure of study 
hospitals, providing sponsorship for management training and to a lesser extent, contributing 
to drug-costs and salaries of doctors. 
Due to its relatively well resourced mandate, UCMB's performance expectations and 
supportive arrangements espouses a powerful influence within its network and in the five 
study hospitals affiliated to it. Given a history of collaboration between UCMB and UPMB, 
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the latter was adopting a number of similar mechanisms (UPMB 2005) in its own network to 
which two study hospitals belonged. 
4.4.2 The Complementary Roles of UCMB 
It is worth noting that UCMB articulated most of its operational mandates as facilitating its 
member organisations to comply with and address national and district health objectives. In 
general therefore, UCMB's role was mostly to complement government's health objectives. 
This cooperation with national and local governments was an essential basis for government 
subsidies to UCMB and other PNFPs(Guisti 2006). The following examples indicate the 
complementarities of UCMB to MOH guidelines and tools: 
1. use of MOH health management information systems (HMIS) for reporting the 
productivity of the UCMB units to government and to the governing boards. 
2. use of a similar accounts reporting format to that used by the government system 
3. use of a set of quality indicators extracted from the Yellow Star Programme adopted by 
MOH. 
4. striving to use the MOH staffing standards despite problems of staff attrition, 
5. gazetting UCMB hospitals to take on additional roles as Health Sub-District (HSD). As 
HSD, hospitals were expected to support lower level units (both public and PNFP) by 
undertaking activities for planning, supervision, drug procurement, information 
management and performance reporting. Providing outreach services such as 
immunisation, health promotion and supporting community health workers were part of 
the HSD activities. With the exception of one, all study hospitals had accepted the added 
role as HSD. 
4.4.3 UCMB - Hospital Interface 
Performance expectations arising from the implementation of UCMB mandate were prevalent 
among the narratives of study hospital managers affiliated to UCC. The table 4.7 below seeks 
to provide the emergent themes and illustrative statements abstracted from in-depth 
interviews. The table also presents how the narratives about UCMB were interpreted in the 
context of the interviews. The interview extracts are from 13 respondents at the managerial 
level in the five UCMB hospitals at baseline in 2005. 
Arising from repeated reference to UCMB in the interviews with hospital managers, this 
researcher decided to interview two UCMB officials to understand the underpinnings of the 
organisational development activities that were being attributed to UCMB by hospital 
managers. 
84 
Table 4.7: Illustrative analytic induction for performance expectations of UCMB 
Interview extracts Condensed Interpretatio Sub-theme Theme 
meaning n of 
underlying 
meaning 
UCMB requires us to report on under- Expectation of Monitoring of Incentives 
takings (actions for improvement) agreed progress reports change for change Managing 
in the year. on agreed actions actions or change 
improveme 
We were not accredited for 2004/05 due Consequence of nt 
to failure of reporting. We had all the failure and Valued 
information, we [have now] prepared all Responsiveness to benefits of 
and gave it. So we are accredited this sanctions UCMB 
time. accreditation 
What is behind (improvement in hospital Intervening in 
performance) is one: change of management Organisatio 
administrator. Because the previous one processes by nal Modernising 
did not know much. She was not setting ground Capacity managemen Management 
educated at all in issues of administration rules building for t 
-I also went to school for (MSc) Health better 
Services Management, .... also UCMB 
Training persons hospitals 
streamlined management. New manuals for management administration 
and hospital charter". positions 
You find for example that a doctor gets 
about 650,000 per month which is just Strictness in UCMB seen Strengthen Human 
close to what government is paying and human resource as a source of ng Systems resource 
as you know the work is a lot and of management control and of HR 
course being a mission hospital, they institutional control 
have a tight grip - for example UCMB Curbing practices authority 
doesn't allow having (private) clinics - that compete with 
at least not near the hospital. hospital activities 
It's a requirement of CUAMM and Require managers Increase Governance Governance 
UCMB that the board meet monthly. It's and Board of oversight of oversight/ 
there on paper but we usually meet Governors (BOG) BOGs on supervision 
quarterly. to meet more hospital of managers 
often management 
... also UCMB requires that we report to board of governors before sending 
[reports] to UCMB. 
Essentially what they have done - ... 
is Supportive Assistance Build 
to make diocesan co-ordinators ensure complementarities with strategic organisation Business 
that the hospital have their finances, from linkages to issues of al systems strategy 
how they make money [business plan], UCMB hospital for 
their vision and that kind of thing. They management sustainable 
are the link to UCMB. Extension of (vision, operations 
UCMB influence sustainable 
via Diocesan financing) 
coordinators 
The following section draws on the interviews of the two UCMB officials, documents about 
UCMB activities and the interviews with hospital management teams (HMT) to analyse the 
mechanism behind the change processes (table 4.7) that exhibited features of strong 
compliance from the study hospitals. The process of change that UCMB was championing 
covered core domains of organisational functioning such as revisions for hospital mission 
statements, strategic governance manuals and performance management. Understanding the 
levers for the apparent good compliance from the hospitals was necessary in as much as it 
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provides a comparative dimension for evaluating hospital response to PBC. PBC pilot, like 
UCMB's mandate, required organisational level responses in performance management and 
governance processes (Smith 2002; Scott, Mannion et al. 2003). 
4.4.3.1 Institutionalising Improved Performance by UCMB 
The fieldwork for this study coincided with a period of revising hospital mission statements 
and constitutions (Hospital Charters) in most UCMB hospitals. This was mostly influenced 
by UCMB as a basis for managing the broader organisational change process. Hospitals were 
required to align their mission with the newly revised CCU mission for health services. As 
evident from the CCU mission statement below, values and norms were central mechanisms 
that were being strengthened (UCMB 1999). 
I. The mission of the Catholic health services in Uganda is derived from the mission of the Church 
which has a mandate, based on the imitation of Christ and His deeds, to promote life to the full 
and to heal. These services are committed to a holistic approach in healing by treating and 
preventing diseases, with a preferential option for the less privileged. 
2. Since the person is at the centre of all activities of the Catholic health services, a basic attitude of 
respect for the human dignity will be the guideline for all. Therefore the principle of subsidiarity 
will be applied with equity in all relationships within the Catholic health service network. 
3. Justice, universality and equality will mark the work of all Catholic health units in Uganda. Their 
work will be done in a professional way and in a spirit of total dedication and transparency. 
Human life being sacred, the basic attitude of all personnel in Catholic health services will be the 
healing of the person with total respect for life. 
The information abstracted from the UCMB Annual General Meetings from 2003 to 2005 
shows a gradual change process moving its focus initially on output performance assessment 
and management training to institutional building processes such as new hospital charters and 
operations manuals. This process was interpreted as efforts to codify best practices in 
organisational decision making(Scott 2001). For example, during the first round of interviews 
between April - June 2005, most of the hospitals were starting to revise their missions and 
governance manuals. The manuals developed included that for financial management and 
personnel management (employment). The templates for the revision of these manuals were 
traced to the Mission Statement and Policy of the Uganda Catholic Health Services (UCMB 
1999). Similar activities of reviewing the "hospital constitution and mission" were found in 
one of the two study hospitals affiliated to UPMB. By 2006, the change processes among 
UCMB were targeting fiduciary obligations of managers and quality of health services 
provided by these hospitals. The UCMB change processes - like preparing new mission, 
charters and operational manuals targeted hospitals as opposed to smaller health centres 
because of the high investment costs in hospitals and the overall impact they have on service 
delivery (UCMB 2003). 
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4.4.3.2 Integration of UCMB into Hospital Operations 
The advent of UCMB revitalization in 1999 also introduced a new structure - the Diocesan 
Health Coordinator (DHC) as the technical extension of the Diocesan Health Boards (DHB). 
The DHB played the role of supervising health facilities affiliated to the UCC in each 
dioceses. The powers of the DHBs were exercised most directly by the DHCs. For example, 
the DHCs were members of the hospital Boards of Governors by virtue of their office and 
supervised all the UCC/UCMB health facilities. As such, the DHC received reports of 
performance and reports of accounts from all member facilities every month. In practice, the 
DHC were supervised directly by UCMB due to the technical nature of their work. The 
operations of DHCs' offices, salaries and their training had been financially supported by 
UCMB. In effect, the DHCs were the extended arm of UCMB that enabled the latter to 
observe the hospitals more directly for example through membership of BOGs. The DHC 
were also instrumental extension of UCMB in influencing the functions of DHBs at the 
diocese level. In general UCMB had through its agents - the DHCs - integrated itself into the 
hospitals and the DHBs. As explained by Williamson (1979) integration can be one 
mechanism to achieve control in transactional relationships at less cost under circumstances 
including information asymmetry (Williamson 1979). 
4.4.3.3 Providing Technical Support and Training 
UCMB had at its headquarters technical experts in the field of Information Systems, Human 
Resource Management, Organisational Development and Financial Management. These 
experts were also boosted by the staff of the Catholic founded University - the Uganda 
Martyrs University (UMU). Individualised needs of hospitals were identified and tailor-made 
training and mentoring of the hospital managers was regularly provided in the key domains of 
the expertise above. Research on key issues such as policy implementation of user-fee 
reduction, service quality assessment and use of information in management decisions, had 
been commissioned. The research findings were being presented and discussed at the 
performance review meetings hosted by UCMB (UCMB 2005). 
Training scholarships for short courses, Diploma and Masters in Health Service Management 
had been provided especially to those in management positions in hospitals. By May 2006,22 
and 46 managers from UCMB network had benefited from the diploma and masters courses 
respectively. Additionally, a fund has been created by UCMB to support the conduct of 
operational research in the domains relevant to UCMB mandate. Most of the research papers 
produced under this support were published by UMU journal called Health Policy and 
Development (HPD 2003-5). The journal topics include management information systems, 
strategic planning, human resource, user fees and utilisation, costing of services and service 
quality. Other research activities were being undertaken with the support of NGOs affiliated 
to UCMB. 
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In general, management support through coaching, workshops and training was an important 
aspect of UCMB reforms to strengthen the performance of its hospitals. Likewise, operational 
research was actively resourced to inform the reform processes. The research findings were 
being generated by and shared among the key players. 
4.4.3.4 UCMB Accreditation Regimen 
UCMB devised a system of accreditation for both hospitals and lower level health units in 
their network since 2003. The purpose for the accreditation was stated as aiming to transform 
CCU health service mission from the religious values to practical steps that could be 
measured objectively to assess compliance. Compliance to the accreditation requirements 
and the performance assessment of service outputs was branded as "Faithfulness to the 
Mission"(UCMB 2006). 
"They (church) delegated to us (UCMB) the task of implementing the mission. We devised a tool to 
ensure that the mission moves from moral authority to practical set of things that need to be done to 
show cohesion and adherence to the mission. We have invented tools referred to as accreditation 
requirements to foster faithfulness to the mission. As the bureau (UCMB), we have translated the 
mission, its processes and results that are measured objectively. These are (health service) access, 
equity to the poor and vulnerable, efficiency, productivity and improved quality " (UCMB official). 
The accreditation consisted of statutory requirements, agreed undertakings and other 
necessary submissions as illustrated in table 4.8. The important attributes of the accreditation 
included a focus on fulfilling the legal status of the hospitals and strengthening accountability 
of managers to their BOG. The accreditation also sought to bring the BOG into active 
oversight by ensuring that they received analytic and credible information about hospital 
performance from their HMTs. For example, graphic plots of trends of key services outputs 
were required to enable BOG to make informed strategic decisions. As a recent development, 
additional accreditation requirements were added in 2005 to encourage prescription audits, 
and client satisfaction surveys (Lochoro 2004). 
As illustrated in the quotations below, financial and non-financial incentives were attached to 
the fulfilment of accreditation requirements by the hospitals (and health centres). These 
included discounts on drug purchases from the JMS, representation by UCMB especially by 
mobilising donor grants, training scholarships of managers, free learning resources i. e. 
journal and bulletins and above all, providing a credible institutions for hospitals to access 
donor funds. 
The benefits [of accreditation] includes: (enumerates) 1. Discounts of (drugs) procurement 
with JMS, 2 -Advocacy - UCMB has little influence if there is no data to defend the hospital. 3- Scholarships by UCMB. Myself I benefited from that - (I) did a DHSM (diploma health services 
management). The Administrator also benefited. " HMT-PNFP 
"... about 90 percent of all Catholic units are accredited. 45 units still do not have a valid 
charter. ... in theory these units have already missed accreditation for 2006/7 since the deadline is passed (31June 2006). When units are not accredited, it means that they will not benefit from 
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our bulletin, scholarships and above all cannot be trusted" UCMB Executive Secretary (UCMB 
2006 page 2). 
".. concerning management and corporate governance in hospitals, there has been evidence of 
progress towards a fair corporate governance. UCMB had to push a lot and a lot has been 
achieved to `please UCMB ". Yet UCMB has no vested interest for itself but it knows that without 
good governance there is no fiduciary assurance hence no chance of attracting donors and no 
possibility to give real accountability upwards and downwards" UCMB Executive Secretary 
(UCMB 2006 pg 2). 
In general terms, UCMB accreditation represented a tool to translate UCC mission from 
abstract values and norms to measurable performance processes and outputs. Accreditation 
was seen not as an end but as a process towards better governance and building institutional 
trust for financial survival of the hospitals. The incentives attached to accreditation were 
relatively more powerful compared to the incentives in the PBC pilot or league table 
approach of the local governments. 
Table 4.8: UCMB accreditation requirements for 2005/06. 
Statutory Undertakings Other necessary 
submissions 
" License issued by " Receipt of quarterly HR notification form, " Submission of 
registrar " Receipt of job description of information officer, summary report 
" Annual contribution " Copy of report of Faithfulness to the Mission on fulfilment of 
to UCMB submitted to the BOG and copied to UCMB, statutory 
" Existence of " Submission of 60 - 80 survey form for assessment requirements, 
manual of financial of patients' prescription audit, undertakings and 
management " Submission of at least 50 survey forms for patient actions 
" Annual hospital satisfaction, " Receipt of staffing 
analytical report for " Annual comprehensive report (inputs, revenues situation as of 
the financial year and outputs) using UCMB format, including EDF 30.06.2006 
prior. drugs, signed, stamped, " Receipt of 
" Statement of achievement of audited Accounts for questionnaires to 
the concluded financial year, monitor and 
" Report of one page about one action taken to evaluate the 
improve quality of care and its effect(s), effects of global 
" (if has a nurse school) submission of complete 
initiatives project 
annual report. 
in hospital 
services 
ource: (U(: MB 2UU5 pg 7j 
4.4.3.5 UCMB Relative Performance Assessment 
A database had been created in 1997 to collect comparable information for hospitals and 
lower level health units. Analysis of efficiency, access, and equity had been undertaken 
annually using this database as a means of providing MOH and the Government with 
aggregate performance accountability (service outputs) for the subsidies provided to the 
UCMB (Guisti 2006). Additionally, and probably more central to this study, the database 
was being used to compute relative (Amone, Asio et al. 2005) measures of service output and 
efficiency among hospitals. These measures - referred to as "standard unit of outputs" 
(SUOs) were used to construct relative performance measures of hospitals. These measures 
were presented by UCMB in its annual and biannual performance review meetings (PRMs) 
attended by all managers from UCMB affiliated hospitals. Although similar to the league 
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table in concept and method, the relative performance rankings were used to identify 
explanations for both good and poor performance. Put differently, the relative performance 
rankings were used as entry points for a learning process and sharing of information among 
all hospital managers attending the PRMs. Unlike the league table at the national and district 
level, UCMB's measures included the following performance measures of productivity, 
efficiency and equity: 
I. Weighting all major hospital services outputs (inpatient, outpatient and immunisations) 
into "OPD-equivalent" units called SUO. 
2. Output efficiency was computed by comparing SUO with inputs such as expenditures and 
available staff. 
3. Average user-fee charged per SUO was used as a measure of equity (affordability) of 
services. 
4. The comparative measure (average values) were endogenously generated for each 
comparable group such as hospitals and health centres. This allowed the "standard" or 
"benchmark" scenario to take into account contextual dynamics that affect all providers - 
such as fluctuation in amount of government subsidies. Unlike PBC that demanded an 
increase in outputs every year, UCMB measures were based on deviation from the group 
average value - i. e. the benchmark was set within the groups. 
5. The measurement of SUO was for internal hospital assessment. The measures were 
considered to be technical but the interpretation and feasible actions was considered to be 
contextual(UCMB 2006). Therefore, HMT were required during the PRMs to elaborate 
the explanations for their hospital's performance and develop action plans for 
improvement. The action plans were submitted to UCMB for monitoring and as a basis 
for organising supportive arrangements required. 
Performance review meetings of UCMB were also used as forums for sharing best practices. 
Health units that were making "good" progress were given subtle recognition such as a 
podium at the review meetings to tell others about their success stories. 
Table 4.9 summarises the performance interactions in the three domains of expectations, 
performance support and assessment between UCMB and its affiliated study hospitals. Like 
the district health directorates, PNFP bureaus are intermediary organisations whose 
downstream performance expectations are subject to, or moderated by, upstream 
contingencies. 
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Table 4.9: Summary of UCMB performance expectations, support and assessment 
Performance 
expectation 
Performance Support Performance assessment Mechanisms of 
Enforcement 
(complimentary to the Advocacy at national Accreditation regimen for 
DHOs expectation) plus: level for higher PNFP UCMB membership eg: A range of incentives for 
allocations " hospital constitution accredited members eg: 
Sustainable provider Technical assistance to " organisational manuals 
organisations provider organisations " accounting to the Boards 1. Financial incentives: Alignment to the CCU Host regular forums for " performance reports " Discount on drug Mission peer exchange and ("faithfulness to the purchases Improved service quality learning mission") " Grants from projects Capable managers Scholarships for " annual financial audit sourced by UCMB Improved managerial managers and " operating licence as NGO 2. Non financial systems administrators in UCMB incentives: 
" Accountability to network performance assessment: " Scholarships for Boards Resource mobilization " analysis of utilisation data management training " Governance best for capital developments . comparing across units " Information practices eg 
" service quality measures 
Technology i. e. email 
" Human resource "5 European NGO in " customised plans for system 
& internet 
management practices UCMB study improvements " Free journal and 
" Communication within hospitals bulletins 
organisations Operations research for " Peer learning 
" Performance reporting policy changes: 3. Reputation incentive: 
" User fee reduction " Trust for UCMB 
" research grants for accredited members 
Msc trainees at UCC 
University 
Summary: 
This chapter has outlined the context within which PBC intervention was implemented in 
Uganda. It shows that performance objectives set at the macro (upstream-macro) level were 
different from those espoused at (upstream-meso) MOH/sector and sub-national (district) 
levels. At the level of service provision (down-stream) - hospitals are subjected to fulfilling 
several objectives of the upstream agencies as well as their own objectives. Chapter 4 shed 
some light on the multiplicity of performance objectives among upstream agencies in the 
Ugandan health system. The chapter also illustrated different influence mechanisms for 
performance objectives of these stakeholders. Some of these influences were weak, (ie at the 
district level - DHOs) and some were relatively more powerful - i. e. those linked to financial 
allocation, disbursement and accreditation of UCMB. This context is bound to have both 
synergy and constraints to the success of PBC. Synergies are related to similar service targets 
with other performance framework like reduction in user fees, national league table and 
UCMB accreditation. In contrast, contextual factors like increase in the costs of production 
and less stable workforce especially for PNFP hospitals would make PBC success more 
difficult. The uses of a league table by MOH and accreditation processes by UCMB case 
study illustrate the use of clan-based approached as suggested by Ouchi (1980) for managing 
performance by these institutions. 
Chapter 5 examines the structures for performance governance at the interface most proximal 
to the hospital - i. e. between the Boards of Governors and hospital management teams. 
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Chapter 5: Performance Governance Mechanisms 
5.0 Introduction 
Performance-based contracting as a policy lever assumes a platform of organisational 
governance that is result oriented, that has well articulated goals and objectives and above all, 
aligned governance structures such as rules, regulation, protocols and conventions(Palmer 
2000; Eeckloo, Van Herck et al. 2004; Latham, Almost et al. 2005; Palmer and Mills 2005). 
Governance structures refer to all those arrangements by which power and authority are 
exercised involving variously, formal and informal systems, public and private auspices, 
regulative and normative mechanisms(Scott 2001). Both social science and institutional 
economics recognise the need to have structures of control to ensure that the agent bound into 
a contract performs in terms of desired effort, action or behaviour. A distinction is made in 
the governance structure between the groups acting on behalf of the owners and the executors 
of the task - the agents or executives. Williamson (1985) notes "the board of directors should 
be regarded primarily as a governance structure safeguard between the firm and owners and 
secondarily as a way by which to safeguard the contractual relation between the fine and its 
management" (page 298). PNFP and public hospitals act as agent organisations on behalf of 
the church, government or other non-profit owners. Within hospitals, governance structures 
involve the governance Boards, Boards of Directors or Supervising Boards (Weiner and 
Alexander 1993; Johnson, Daily et al. 1996; Wagner, Stimpert et al. 1998; Vining 2003). The 
principle underlying the need for the governance Boards is to ensure responsibility and 
accountability for the overall performance of the organisation and act as the eyes and ears of 
the shareholder or owners (Taylor 2000). For PBC to succeed, governance structures need to 
encourage result-oriented objectives that are aligned with the service targets as specified in 
the PBC contract. In situations where governance structures do not value and encourage 
result-oriented performance, the internal incentives for managers and executives to achieve 
PBC service targets would be weaker. 
As normative structures that provide oversight and strategic support to the hospital 
management team (HMT), boards of governors (BOG) are a common feature in non-profit 
and public hospitals and serve three main functions: 1) developing corporate policies and 
plans, 2) providing oversight on organisational performance against the plans /mission and 3) 
acting as the voice of the ownership of the hospitals. To perform these roles, BOGs have 
privileged access to information about the internal processes of the hospitals. In theory, 
access to information about the internal organisational processes is essential to effectively 
influence the operations and direction of the hospital to achieve legitimate performance 
expectations. On their part, the HMT represents the executive function of directing and 
managing the hospital care resources, processes and support systems (Taylor 2000; 
Alexander and Lee 2006; Alexander, Ye et al. 2006). 
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The context of the governance mechanisms at the interface between the BOG and HMT in 
the study hospitals provided an important dimension for understanding the capacity of the 
hospital to respond to performance-based contracting (PBC). This chapter seeks to describe 
the governance interactions between the BOGs and the HMT. These two groups occupy an 
essential interface that has most responsibility for performance governance of hospitals. Data 
for this chapter were extracted from the administrative documents - in particular the annual 
hospital performance reports and in-depth interviews with 16 members of the BOG and 
HMT. The interview data were extracted by response to four broad themes of inquiry: 
1. What are the expectations of the board and how are they influencing the hospital to 
achieve these expectations? 
2. What is the composition of the BOG (i. e. professional mix of members and the 
chairperson)? 
3. How has the BOG characterised the interactions with HMT (and vice versa)? 
4. What information was being exchanged during BOG-HMT interactions? 
5.1 Performance Expectations of Boards of Governors 
The following description and analysis illustrates the main domains that emerged regarding 
performance expectations of the BOG towards HMT and the hospital as a whole. The 
opinions of the BOGs were elicited by asking two related questions in a strict order: 
1. What opinion did BOGs members have about the performance of HMT and 
2. On what basis did respondents form the expressed opinion (in response to above 
question). 
The aim was to assess the means used by BOG to assess the performance of the HMT. The 
interview technique of getting an interviewee to form an opinion on an outcome of interest - 
the performance of the HMT, and later asked the basis for the opinion is used in in-depth 
interviews to move from the performance outcome to the mechanisms behind the outcome 
and to understand the circumstances or context within which the outcome is expected (Patton 
2002; Pawson and Tilley 2004). Respondents were probed for examples to clarify their 
views. Table 5.1 provides a summary of the emerging themes and illustrative interview- 
extracts that best captured the attributed meanings in the context of the narratives. 
From the summary (table 5.1), five main themes emerged from the interviews. Sections 5.1.1 
to 5.1.7 attempt to interpret the emerging themes in the broader contexts facing the hospitals. 
Additional information is provided that seeks to tie up the range of views - both reinforcing 
and contradicting - into a coherent interpretation of the themes. 
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Table 5.1 Illustrative Analytic Induction of the Performance Expectations of the BOGs 
Illustrative interview extracts Condensed Interpretation Theme 
meaning of meaning in 
context 
. as you would expect, the number one (concern) is money. Issues about funds from the ministry, the disbursement from 
donors the ex endit i l th di l d " Availability of Financial , p ures, an ces, a so e me ca serv 
.. 
[BOG] always want to see the delivery [maternity] operational sustainability of 
improving. " 
"The other issue is the reduction of fees. Although we are 
funds 
" Increasing 
operations 
getting more money, its still not enough to pay salaries and run 
th h it l Th d service outputs Meeting the Viability of e osp a . e ru*', costs have shot-up as numbers (utilisation) increase. 
" 
" Providing a 
comprehensive 
needs of the p hospital 
Because the patients have increased, the demands and range of community supplies have increased. Really the money running the hospital i " services s the biggest constraint. "They [BOG] also would expect that we handle as many 
-(Patients) as ossible with 
low referrals. " "Among the development issues, we are trying to expand e infrastructure This hos We need to build ital is oun I i h . p y g. administration block, the children's ward and male ward. " 
" mprov ng t e 
hospital 
Improving and 
expanding 
"I think they (managers) are doing fine.. because .. 
if you show 
infrastructure hospital capacity expansion of 
(named hospital) five years back, .. they have also 
done a lot of " Mobilising infrastructure 
renovations. All those buildings were old but are all renovated. financial capacity Much of the money is coming from (named country in Euro e) That administr rant) man ( ritin t h b 
resources for 
t i l p . y g een w g a or as projec s cap ta proposals, new buildings. I am sure you have seen the new 
administration block... staff block also comin u" One area or BoG monitoring mission) is patients 
complaints on staff behaviour, abuse, mistreatment, neglect. Recruitment of nurses and other clinical staff also get them 
" Behaviour of Upholding of key 
(BOG) involved. " values in work 
"We are concerned about the handling of patients and the patients place behaviour of the staff. You know this is a mission hospital " Exemplary 
where Christ's values have to be reflected in the work of the religious 
staff. So the behaviour is not the best.... some are stealing and behaviours 
take alcohol and get badly drunk. These are not Christ-like behaviours" 
. recently we were interviewing for recruiting a nurse, of all " Recruiting staff Code of the seven candidates only one was of (named religion) and this with Competition conduct (person) performed the worst in interviews, but some 
_panellist w d appropriate between as trying to make a case for her because she was (of name 
religion). The doctor could not stomach this and told them to religious religious values be serious. " orientation and "The (named hospital) used not to recruit single (not married) " Tension technical/medical people like me. Its the pressure of staff leaving all the time between values values that they relaxed and became flexible. " and staff 
competence 
ey also expect me to ensure discipline and Harmony in the 
patient complaints. Whenever there are complaints from the " Resolving work place community about the hospital, they (board members) approach conflict me and as k why such a thing is happening" "they (BOG) asked why many staff are leaving. They thought "I rovin user Customer/public that it was due to poor management, but when we explained to satisfaction relations them, they understood the issue of salary and government jobs bein lained about su ort more secure o com Th l h 
" Good handling 
f staff 
Staff - g pp . ey ave a s p o satisfaction nurses (assistant nurses) on the ward. They were feeling that the quality of the staff and care is low, due to the support 
" Quality of the 
staff 
Staff - 
nurses. " competence 
ere was laxity in the administration with issues of finance. 
their budgets were run haphazardly. There was no documentatio misused bein f th d Th d 
" Building 
systems for 
f ti tt b 
Strengthening 
Management 
competence . g no rugs were e rugs. e When we came in we developed a three pillar system to deal 
with thi bl h 
er unc on e 
" Improving the management 
stems s pro e em of drugs. This involves the Store, t information for sy Pharmacy and Administration. We have put there registers at 
all these departments. When we come like today, we inspect 
verification of 
hospital 
the store, the pharmacy and look at the registers and meet with funs ions by the administration to address the issues we observe in these. " board 
at we o, at a en oeyu timate y, we have to 
give them reports on how the hospital is performing, which 
projects we have m d so man d d di d f 
" Provide 
progress 
Monitoring 
activities 
y a scuss a way orwar e an an things. information on Accountability activities. 
" Make action Planning 
plans 
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5.1.1 Viability of the Hospital Operation 
The major performance concern across all the PNFP respondents was the challenge of 
sustaining, besides increasing, the hospital operations in the context of declining financial 
support from government. Although grants from government to all hospitals (Govt and 
PNFP) had increased for the period 1999 to 2004, there was a decline in 2005 and 2006 
(Lochoro, Batalingaya et al. 2006). The graph below provides the financial allocation to the 
seven PNFP hospitals and three Govt Hospitals included in this study for the period 1998 to 
2006. 
Figure 5.1: Operational funds (grants) per bed among study hos iP tals* 
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This decline notwithstanding, PNFP hospitals were being pushed by Government to reduce 
their user-charges in lieu of the grants from government. All the PNFP study hospitals had 
reduced user-charges especially for the services monitored by the MOH HSSP indicators. 
However, these services were the ones that attracted the highest client volumes (and revenue) 
e. g. antenatal care, maternal delivery, in-patient care for children and generally for all OPD 
visits. The reduction of client charges led to a marked increase in the utilisation of services, 
according to the respondents, and also an increase in drug consumption(Odaga and Maniple 
2003). In some instances, respondents implied that most of the revenues generated from 
client fees were insufficient to meet the increased cost of medicines and sundries - let alone 
the salaries of staff. 
We did a pilot study (user fee reduction) and it brought out more revenue, used more of the available 
staff and capacity, so at the end of it, we had some results [output]to show. However we had to 
increase the number of staff the workload was high. On materials - drugs, sundries , even the 
administration had to move from other systems to a new and better system. We ended up having many 
more people to manage. Eventually also paper (consumption) increased due to records to he kept " 
(HMT-PNFP- Hosp-3). 
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As a consequence and due to its stability as a source of funding, the government grants were 
used to pay salaries for hospital staff. The government grant constituted about 30 to 60 
percent of the operational funds of the study hospitals (Odaga and Maniple 2003; Giusti, 
Lochoro et al. 2004). Although considered stable (secure) as a source of funding, the 
regularity of (monthly) disbursement of these funds was the biggest performance constraint 
described by the managers and board respondents. Delays in disbursements of 2 to 3 months 
were common during the study period, causing delayed and unpredictable salary payments 
among the PNFP hospitals. Combined with what was mostly described as "staff exodus", 
"seeking greener pastures" or "staff sneaking way", the staff movements from PNFP to join 
the government sector during the study period, elevated the issue of the viability of PNFP 
hospitals. in their narratives regarding performance expectations, some respondents had 
explicit or implicit trade-offs that would affect PNFP performance. As illustrated by the 
following views, some managers were contemplating reducing their activities and BOGs 
were reluctant to enforce some rules in the context of staff dissatisfaction with low salaries: 
"The biggest problem is that our budget lines [from Govt] are already getting reduced. I was telling 
the DHO that we might have to scale down activities due to less funds. UCMB has advised us to try 
and cut - minimise costs. The challenge is to keep essential services " (HMT-PNFP- Hosp 7). 
"The last release was December (3 months ago) and even that delayed since July, they released in 
bulk. This affect us very much. We are already charging little. This is a problem and this thing can 
affect the performance - the plan cannot be implemented. We have to pay salaries, drugs... we have 
made the service fees very low to access to the poor - that is the vision of the church. But flow (of 
funds) from Government is poor. Also our donors. These like (3 named European donors) their 
projects have ended. Now the hospital is looking of ways to fill the gap " (BOG-PNFP - Hosp 6). 
"... welfare issues?  its all salaries - salaries - salaries. 
You know, the government has been 
increasing the salaries of its staff. This is putting pressure on the board to pay similar salaries. We 
have lost a number of staff to the district. Government should help us so that they pay for the salaries 
of our staf. When these staff leave the work is too much for the remaining ones and they also get 
unhappy and want to leave" (BOG-PNFP- Hosp-5). 
"Umm 
the main one (incentives to managers) is 
free time to do their other business. You see we 
cannot pay the doctor enough money yet. In the clinics they are able to earn more to supplement their 
income " (BOG-PNFP - Hosp-5). 
5.1.2 Expanding Infrastructure 
Renovations and new buildings is one of the key distinguishing features between the PNFP 
and Government hospitals in the study sample. The members of the board (HUMC) in the 
government units lamented the lack of funds and partnerships for renovation of the old and 
dilapidated hospital buildings - most of them built in the 1960s. All PNFP hospitals had 
major recent and on-going renovations and construction works. Members of the board in 
PNFP hospitals attached sufficient importance to performance in this area and used such 
construction works to infer positive judgment on the performance of hospital managers. For 
example, the capacity of the hospital managers to attract grants for, or to implement, the 
In contravention of the government guidelines that disallows the grant to PNFP to be used to pay for salaries 
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construction works received positive performance perceptions from the BOGs. However, it 
was not clear what roles HMT, had played in the sourcing of these grants. The respondents' 
rationales for the infrastructure improvements had a resonance with improving hospital 
performance in several ways. Some of the expressed links to hospital performance included 
statements like: "Projecting a better image", "making patients comfortable", "improving the 
working environment for staff' and "modernising the hospital". Other reasons were related to 
insufficient space especially due to increased patients being served, providing staff 
accommodation as an incentive and adding new services to the profile of the hospital. In two 
PNFP hospitals, the infrastructure costs that were reported in their annual reports over the 
previous 2-3 year was about half the total annual hospital expenditures. The investments in 
infrastructure also did generate additional expectations for hospital managers especially from 
district level managers. As the extract below indicates, BOGs place too much emphasis on 
infrastructure development that would generate unsustainable recurrent costs, according to 
some respondents. The infrastructure focus seemed to be at the expense of priority 
operational needs of the hospital such as improvements in salaries. 
" we get information about these hospital. I was in (named hospital) when they were commissioning 
the sewage plant last month. They got 1.5 billion (shillings) installation from (named European 
country). The challenge will be to maintain the installation. Donors give these hospital funds but they 
are for strict purpose only..... Most of the funds are for capital development for example and they do 
not want to assist with the recurrent costs. Currently the problems they [PNFP hospitals] have is 
salaries and no donor is helping on this" (CAO and Member BOG - PNFP hospital). 
"It (maintenance) can be a headache. We have some people who are trained to maintain the 
equipment when we find the problem is difficult, we communicate with those people (in Europe) to 
come in - especially those that did the wetland (sewage system) " (HMT- PNFP-Hosp 7). 
".., I do not see how they (equipment) will be sustained if you do not save money. The hospital needs 
to save money to do the repairs and servicing of the equipment. Ok, they have trained some mechanics 
to repair but money to buy spares and replace some is not there" (HMT-PNFP- Hosp 7). 
5.1.3 Code of Conduct 
Performance expectations that reflected religious values or serving God or being a good 
Christian were expected by the PNFP BOG from both the hospital management team (HMT) 
and the hospital staff. With the exception of the representatives of the district (local) 
authorities, the governing boards in PNFP hospitals were generally appointed using a 
criterion of "religious faithfulness". The terms of reference for the BOGs included 
overseeing the "Christian Code of Conduct" (UCMB 1999; KCH 2005). Generally, the 
religious values the BOG expected included the displaying of good behaviours such as 
"sacrificing for the good of the hospital". Poor attitude towards patients, stealing of drugs, 
lacking voluntary spirit in serving the hospital, being driven by "selfish interests" instead of 
the "common good" of the hospital or patients - were some of the descriptions used to 
explain poor performance of the BOGs, managers or staff. Given the context of a crisis of 
nurses and doctors deserting the from PNFP hospitals in large numbers, values of 
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volunteerism and sacrificing were being used by the BOG to appeal to the remaining staff to 
stay and to deflect the staff demands for higher pay. Performance expectations geared 
towards religious values and norms were invoked by both managers and board respondents in 
situations of negative behaviours. Examples here included BOG pressurising the HMT to 
recruit unsuitable staff (eg family relatives) or when managers were drunk (with alcohol) on 
duty. Reference to institutional symbols, ritual and norms rooted in religious beliefs were 
also used by respondents as means for performance assessment. Examples given included 
recruitment of staff from the same religious faith, respecting Christian calendar events and 
perceptions related to being married in a Christian way. It was observed that catholic 
hospitals had Nuns (religious sisters also trained as nurses) heading most of hospital 
departments. In addition, it was observed that all PNFP hospitals practiced routine religious 
ceremonies such as prayer sessions, "devotions" and "fellowships" for their staff members. 
However tensions and contradictions did exist about the elements related to the code of 
conduct. The opinions of medical professionals that constituted the HMT reflected some 
disapproval of the code of conduct especially when used to interfere with their private life or 
professional activities. Interestingly, the HMT were keen to use the language of the behaviour 
code when dealing with conflict situations with members of the board or their subordinates. 
Clearly, there were views that did indicate a pragmatic flexibility in enforcing the code of 
conduct especially in the context of the contemporary shortage of clinical staff. This 
pragmatism tended to allow recruiting of clinical staff with different religions, "improper" 
marital relationships and doctors to participate in private practice. The issue of code of 
conduct was not prominent among the respondents from government hospitals. 
".. we in management are Catholics,, (for the example) SNO is a nun, The Chaplain is -a priest. 
We have a code of conduct - what we should and should not do. As management we have a challenge 
- not to make every person a Catholic in the hospital. The majority of our patients are not Catholics. 
Many are Muslims -that is one thing. Many times when we advertise for jobs here, you find that 
there is no catholic applying, so we have a very mixed staff. But when the staff come we tell them that 
this is a Catholic institution. Mostly these are uniform Christian values, which are known "(HMT- 
PNFP Hosp-3). 
"The other issue is the Medical staff. They do their best working within ethics and staff rules and 
regulations on how to handle patients and to administer drugs. Underlying that is the mission of 
hospital. This is a Christian hospital. We keep reminding the staf. The service we do is to glorify God 
by proper attention to the patients. And we keep reminding them about this mission. We discourage 
private practice and encourage service above self. These are some of the major control measures - 
according to the mission of the hospital "(HMT-PNFP Hosp-2). 
"I have noticed that DHO sends indisciplined staff to us for correction and shaping them into better 
people. We have that kind of thing. But it takes daily devotions. Every morning we have prayers, 
praise and preaching. These are done by the staff or the reverend" (HMT-PNFP Hosp-2) 
"Other issues (challenges) relate to staf. This is a Christian hospital, not being married can be a 
problem for nurses. If one gets pregnant, they commission an inquiry on how she got pregnant - yet 
this is biologically clear (laughs). These are adults with rights but it can be dcult. I have had 
problems to deal with both staff and church on this .... Also having two or more wives (polygamy) is a 
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cause of (staf dismissal despite good performance. This amounts to social interference" (HMT- 
PNFP Hosp-2) 
"... something (religion) you have not grown-up in is sometimes difficult to appreciate. What we have 
decided - my Admin[istrator] is a staunch Catholic. So I said to him to represent me on such things 
(religious ceremonies). I go and sit close to him to get some tips and coaching. But as it were, I am a 
surgeon, and appointed - now also appointed as M/S [hospital director] " (HMT-PNFP Hosp-3). 
5.1.4 Management Competence 
Within this theme, management competence referred to both what people do or should do and 
the systems or arrangements that should be put in place to make them do those things in a 
proper, acceptable and organised way within the hospital. The views from the BOG 
respondents for this theme did overlap to some extent with the views captured under the 
viability theme. For example, the capacity for managers to increase the revenues from user 
charges subject to the constraint of reduced charges spans both themes on viability and 
management competence. The predominant views in this area did reflect the need for the 
managers (or the hospital as a whole) to improve its public relations and customer satisfaction 
as a means to increase the number of patients and revenue. The descriptions of the 
interactions between BOGs and managers had a lot to do with sorting out internal systems 
constraints to performance as well as addressing external barriers to utilisation of services. 
Three contextual issues are important to understand the expressed views relating to 
management competence during the study period. 
1. ) Given the context of free services in the government health units, the performance of 
PNFP hospitals that still charged users (even though fees had recently been reduced) did 
present a competitive disadvantage that needed proactive approaches to increase the 
PNFP hospital share of the market. But more importantly, PNFPs had to justify increasing 
size of grants provided to them by the Government for the period 1997 to 2004. 
Communities needed to be aware that the fees in PNFP hospitals were reduced so that the 
utilisation could improve. Active marketing activities in the community were being 
undertaken to attract more utilisation and revenues. 
2. ) Reduction in the user charges did bring in more users to the hospital and increased the 
workload. Complaints by staff about the workload and low salary, coupled with PNFP 
staff crossing over to the public sector during the study period, must have focused the 
boards' attention towards the performance of the managers in handling of staff or 
managing what was referred to as "staff exodus". 
3. ) The increased number of donor projects in PNFP hospitals also brought with them new 
stakeholders and accountability relationships. For example, a feasibility study done by 
European engineers before the refurbishment of one of the study hospitals by such 
projects made 23 recommendations for "correcting" problems in the 
management/administrative systems. Among the recommendation was a requirement to 
develop a written hospital constitution and written clear terms of reference for the 
governing board (DKA Austria 1999). 
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"The Hospital needs a re-organisation of its management .... The management needs to implement 
urgent measures of correction of the problems related to employment, financial and resource control 
systems have to be introduced with urgency. " (Extract from executive summary(DKA Austria 1999 pg 
3). 
Given the weakness of governance, the study also recommended that a representative of the 
project be co-opted (or integrated) into the BOG. This practice of donor projects integrating 
themselves into the BOG or HMT was common among PNFP hospitals with big donor 
funded projects. 
"... What I have been doing is not to control but to know what is going on" (Donor-Rep & HMT- 
PNFP) 
Respondents from the government study hospitals also did express views reflective of active 
attention to strengthening systems for financial accountability and responsiveness to views 
from the community. One hospital board8 among the three government hospitals in the study 
was proactive and unique in its activities to strengthen systems. This board had devised its 
own systems within the hospital to get performance information in areas related to the use of 
finances, drugs and ward-level absenteeism of nursing staff. In the community they had 
instituted a system of oversight of hospital performance in areas of drugs availability and 
staff courtesy to patients. The vice-chairman of this board was heading a community-based 
NGO providing primary health care service in the catchment area of the hospital. This role 
enabled him to monitor the hospital performance from the community's perspective. 
"The other problem was the drugs. We have informants in the community and they tell us that the 
drugs used to disappear from the hospital in (hand) bags. This, we have investigated and involved the 
community and we have apprehended some culprits. ... 
Police has done its investigations and made 
arrests. We have about 10 informants in the community. They come as patients and are not identified 
by the hospital staf. ... Before I come 
for the (board) meeting I gather my information from the 
informants and get the key issues to discuss with management. " (BOG- Govt-Hosp- 10) 
"Before we sit down to discuss, we do an inspection of the hospital again we gather information on 
cleanliness, OPD and ward records. One of the sources is the daily hand-over records (for on-duty 
nurses). We have tried to make sure that when nurses are leaving the duty, they have proper 
handover records to the next team " (BOG-Govt Hosp-10) 
5.2 The Boards of Governors (BOG) and their Capacity to Govern 
The normative function of the governing Boards is to provide oversight and guidance to the 
executives. This presupposes an effective Board with knowledge of the industry as well as 
capability to observe or monitor the executives (HMTs) and organisations' management 
processes (Taylor 2000; Alexander and Lee 2006). Indeed business firms invest a lot in the 
boards to ensure that the oversight capacity is effective (Wagner, Stimpert et al. 1998; Coles, 
McWilliams et al. 2001; Hillman and Dalziel 2003; Vining 2003). By implication, the BOG 
needs to have capacity to serve these dual functions of monitoring and strategic guidance. 
s Governing boards in government hospitals are misleadingly called Hospital Management Committees (HMC) 
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This section provides analytical insights into the capacity of the board to undertake these 
functions given the structural arrangements that affect the interactions between them and the 
HMT. The structural concerns for this study are related to Board composition and locus of 
power in the interactions between board and HMTs. Knowledge as a source of power of 
leadership or governance is essential in knowledge-intensive organisations like hospitals. 
Without the requisite knowledge, the information exchanged between HMT and BOG may 
not lead to effective control or performance governance. Other sources of power in 
governance are related to ownership of productive assets such as the hospital infrastructure. 
Power in governance may also be gained through the use of symbolic artefacts such as ranks 
and titles that order the social structure of actors (Scott 2001; Struyk 2002). 
5.2.1 Board Composition 
The MOH guidelines (MOH 2006) require that the district level technocrats i. e. the Chief 
Administrative Officer (CAO) and the District Health Officers (DHOs) be part of the hospital 
boards in both government and PNFP hospitals. Members of the hospital management team 
also form part of the BOG, and these include - the Medical Superintendent (MS), Senior 
Nursing Officer (SNO), and Hospital Administrator (HA). Among the study hospitals, the 
HMT sometimes included either an Accounts Officer or a staff representative. The different 
hospital ownership structures - diocesan health boards - had different approaches to 
constituting the BOGs in the PNFP hospitals. Three notable differences existed among the 
study hospitals in the composition of the boards and the board leader (chairperson): 
1) Mix of professional experts led by a doctor as chairperson of the board (3/10) 
2) Predominantly clergy people and led by senior clergyman or bishop (4/10) 
3) Predominantly politicians and led by a chairperson who is a politician (3/10) 
Regarding the hospitals management team (HMT), two main differences seem to capture the 
difference in structure regarding the interactions between the BOG and HMTs: 
1) Doctor (medical superintendent) as leader of the HMT (8/10) 
2) Administrator9 (or "chief executive officer") as leader of the HMT (2/10) 
5.2.2 Governance Structures and Power Play 
This section describes the respondent views regarding the capacity of the BOG to support and 
provide effective oversight and stewardship of the hospital management and performance. 
Both HMT and BOG respondents were asked to express opinions on how effective the BOG 
was and also asked to provide views about the exchange of information between the two 
groups of actors. The views expressed regarding the board capacity differed significantly 
across the three predominant professional groups of the board and the two forms of 
9 Administrators were not medically trained although one was trained to a level of Master of Business 
Administration (MBA). All were Ugandans. 
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professional leadership of the HMT. Five heuristic scenarios (figure 5.2) emerged in relation 
to the characteristics of the interactions between the HMT and BOG regarding the capacity of 
the latter to influence performance management or organisational governance in general. 
These scenarios map out better the differences in the structural mechanisms that were 
observed in the data regarding the BOG and HMT interaction in the study hospitals. The 
structural mechanisms are confined to the two categories of lead actors in the governance 
exchange - the chairperson of the BOG and the lead manager in the HMT since these 
embody the institutional powers in the interactions (Taylor 2000; Alexander and Lee 2006; 
Ditzel, Strach et al. 2006). These interactions are highlighted here because they represent the 
exchange of information essential for the BOGs to effectively exercise their roles as stewards 
of hospital performance (Goddard, Mannion et al. 2000; Taylor 2000; Coles, McWilliams et 
al. 2001). 
Table 5.2: Dominant Characteristics in The Interactions Between the BOG And HMT 
Lead Person -Board of Governors 
I. 
bQ 
ý 
ý 
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W 
a 0 ý ý w 
a 
b 0 ý 
Medical 
doctors 
(MS) 
Church 
Clergyman 
or women 
(CEO) 
Medical Doctor 
D 
[Hosp-3, Hosp-4] 
Regular Board meetings 
Active exchange in board 
" Sense of challenge i. e. 
"Pinning down" 
"defending actions" 
" Graphs/visual 
information 
F2--j 
[Hosp-1 ] 
Regular board meetings 
Active Board exchange but 
within narrow limits, 
Graphs/visual information, 
Transparency problems , 
Complex power hierarchy 
" Dysfunctional HMT 
" CEO powers seemed 
above that of BOG. 
" Delegating CEO-ship 
Church Clete 
D 
[Hosp-5, Hosp-2, Hosp-61 
Infrequent board meetings 
Delegating chairpersonship 
MS more powerful 
(knowledge and executive) 
Simplification of 
information to boards 
F-3-1 
[Hosp-7] 
Infrequent board meetings 
Delegating chairpersonship 
Passive board meetings 
Transparency concerns 
Complex power relations 
" Dysfunctional HMT 
" CEO controls BOG. 
" Takeover of the BOG by 
some hospital donors 
Politician ov1 
Ifl 
[Hosp-8, Hosp-10, Hosp-9] 
More frequent meetings 
Audit-orientation 
MS more powerful 
Over simplification of 
performance report 
Stronger mutual dependence 
between the HMT and BOGs 
The limitations in this categorisation are nonetheless recognised. For example the boards and 
HMTs are not stationary objects to be described within a given box. Their views may capture 
feelings of the moment and may have huge variation over time and across different 
respondents that may have dissimilar perspectives. For example, some contradictory views 
were encountered across the two groups of actors and within the groups but these were minor 
and did not pose a strong challenge to the value of analytic insights according to the five 
characterizations. 
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5.2.1.1 Scenario-1: Doctor - Doctor Interactions 
One Catholic diocese owned the hospitals in this category (and one hospital in scenario 2) 
where the chairperson of the board had a medical professional background. This did reflect 
the decision of the diocesan health board (DHB) that had the powers for appointing the BOGs 
in each hospital in its dioceses. In addition, the chairperson of the BOG in these two 
hospitals (also scenario 2) was also a Medical Superintendent (lead hospital 
manager/director) in other Catholic hospital. In effect, a peer-review system was established 
since the two leaders for the BOG and HMT had similar experience in hospital management, 
medical orientation and religious socialisation. The BOG-HMT interaction in this model were 
described with accounts such as "being pinned down", "blamed for overspending", "put our 
position", "defended our actions", "opened our eyes to this problem", being embarrassed. 
These accounts were interpreted to imply active governance accountability and or active 
oversight in the interactions of the two groups in this scenario. The information provided to 
the BOGs in these two hospitals comprised of graphic display of trends in hospital outputs in 
addition to reports of accounts and other administrative information. Graphic displays of 
hospital outputs were also shared within the hospitals on Notice-boards, and at ward-level. 
Below are illustrative views in this category: 
"They (BOD) say "Doctor, the graph is going down - patients are decreasing what is happening? " But when 
you compare with the target you see that we are doing well. There are seasonal variations of cause in these 
trends - but overall the targets are achieved" (HMT-PNFP-Hosp-4). 
"Yeah. Even the other week, when it (Board) sat these are graphs they got. ... they are impressed by the improvement" (HMT-PNFP-Hosp-3). 
"... we are not balancing our budgets. Everybody has reasons. They (BOG) were blaming us for overspending 
but again we put our position clear... "Ladies and gentlemen, we are receiving a new ambulance worth 60 
million shillings and Customs want us to clear taxes - 4.5 million - should we leave the ambulance because we 
are trying to save expenditure? " So this is what I told them " (HMT-PNFP-Hosp-3) 
5.2.1.2 Scenario-2: Doctor as BOG - Clergy person as CEO interactions 
One hospital falls under this category. As described in chapters 6 and 7, this hospital was one 
of the two that were selected for in-depth case study since it was allocated to the full set of 
the PBC pilot. This hospital also had several opportunities to network with the hospitals in 
scenario 1 since all three belonged to the same diocese. Like in scenario 1 above, the board 
chairperson was a lead manager in a different hospital1°. However the lead manager for the 
HMT was a clergywoman with no medical background but had an MBA degree. The official 
title in the organogram for this person was Chief Executive Officer (CEO) ". Three 
departmental heads reported to the CEO -a Medical Department headed by a doctor (also 
called Medical Superintendent or MS), Nursing Department headed by a Senior Nursing 
Officer (SNO), and Administration Department headed by assistant CEO. More importantly 
the CEO also symbolized hospital ownership in this hospital since she was a senior member 
10 The board chairman was a catholic doctor and the medical superintendent (MS) in a government hospital also 
participating in this study (scenario 5). ' In the narratives of the rest of the HMT respondents in this hospital, the title of "Administrator" was used 
instead of CEO. 
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of the founding religious congregation. The ownership claim was even more enhanced given 
an additional leadership position the CEO held at the national headquarters of the founding 
congregation. As a result, the CEO represented the powers of the ownership of the hospital, 
a situation that had implications for the effective governance oversight and CEO 
accountability to the BOG. Due to dual leadership roles in different locations, the CEO was a 
part-timer in her hospital job with frequent delegation to a junior non-medical assistant CEO. 
The narratives in this hospital indicated problems in the interactions within the HMT itself 
and between BOG-HMT. For example, there was a sense of poor coordination within the 
HMT as captured by descriptions such as "impatience (among managers)", "confusion", "not 
sure what to do", "overstepping roles", "rumours" and "different ways of making decisions". 
Narratives about the BOG - HMT interactions, seemed to indicate dysfunctional 
accountability: "managers doing their own things", "not transparent", "fear to challenge holy 
people", "odd ways of managing" and "too much power" assigned to some individuals. 
Below are illustrative views: 
"I sit in these boards. I see lots of problems with accountability. They (managers) depend on 
individuals and not systems and since some individuals are "holy ", people fear to ask them questions. 
Or they think holy persons don't make mistakes. They have orders to do things and orders may be 
wrong" (DHO - member BOG-PNFP-Hosp-1). 
"This is a Catholic institution. It has given so much powers to the nuns [... J the way those ladies do 
their stuff is not very transparent sometimes. The kind of leadership is like [... ] the Admin (CEO) is 
the centre of everything [... J also the Admin is both above and below the Board. The SNO, and myself 
... all have literally little role - all issues centre on Admin[istrator] " (HMT-PNFP-Hosp-1). 
",,, I do my work and there is no big difference 12 (between this hospital and the one before). But as 
MS things are different here -a lot different. Institutions headed by the veiled ladies (nuns) work in 
some odd ways. (some silence) The way decisions are made is very different, Sometimes workers are 
not that free - they are not sure to do what they know should be done.  People get sacked at will (without required procedure).,, (nuns) have odd ways of managing. I am doing my work and studying 
the situation "(HMT-PNFP-Hosp-1). 
Despite these largely negative accounts, there were indications that within bounds, 
governance interactions were active. The board meetings were regular (every 3 months), 
proposals for grants were being endorsed by the chairperson and some financial allocation 
decisions were open to board influence. However, examples given implied that hard 
decisions presented to the BOG were being pushed back to the CEO to handle - which might 
implying that the CEO had the ultimate decision making powers. 
"Even as we talk now the non-offset arrears of NSSF (Pension Fund) are very big. The board 
meeting last week could not help on this. They just said, "Sister (CEO) do something" (laughs) " 
(HMT-PNFP Hosp-1). 
"Well, these board members, they know (competent) - they ask why nurses are leaving for example " 
(HMT-PNFP-Hosp-1). 
'2 A senior medical doctor (lead manager) found in scenario 1 hospital at the start of the study was transferred to 
scenario 2 as MS towards the end of the study. He is interviewed after 4 months in the new place. 
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The use of visual graphics to show trends in service outputs and active reactions from the 
Board on issues presented was evident in the narratives. The district level technocrats were 
also active in the board meetings. 
"When we meet, it's like politicians - they (BOG) need to look at those data and ask - "you are 
supposed to be here. Why? " And using these graphics, it's better than talk talk. " (HMT-PNFP- 
Hosp-1). 
" they draw nice graphs on computer and the department see how they are doing (performing). You 
can see that OPD now is falling and try to find out why? Why OPD is falling. For example like now,, 
you find that the OPD is low since parents are sending children to school13 " (BOG-PNFP Hosp-1). 
One essential aspect of the context in the three hospitals (both scenario I and 2) was the 
presence of an NGO project with objectives to improve health provider performance in 
UCMB facilities during the implementation of the policy to reduce user-fees (Santini 2002; 
Mugisha 2004; Amone, Asio et al. 2005). As a way of monitoring the project results and 
impact, the project had established a computerised system for data capture and processing of 
the Health Management Information Systems (HMIS). Computers and excel spreadsheets 
with automated generation of graphs for trends of service utilisation and revenue generation 
were installed at all three hospitals. The project systems of performance monitoring also 
included quarterly performance review meetings at the diocese-level that brought together the 
three hospitals and other lower-level providers. The project monitoring system probably 
explains better the widespread use of service data and graphics in BOG-HMT interactions in 
these three hospitals (scenarios 1 and 2). 
"We have been drawing them (graphs) ,,, previously it's 
been for (named) project. (Named) project 
have been using them as a way to solicit for funds from abroad" (HMT-PNFP-Hosp-3). 
5.2.3.3 Scenario-3: Clergy Person both as Board and as CEO 
One hospital fitted this category. The board in this hospital was chaired by the bishop who 
delegated the functions to the nearby parish priest. Three members of the board were drawn 
from the lower level units belonging to the diocese. These had a medical background - mostly 
nurses. The district technocrats that represent the District Council on the board rarely 
attended the board meetings - sometimes delegating to junior officers. The lead manager - 
officially called CEO was clergy person -a priest 14. The board meetings were rare (twice a 
year) probably since the two major actors - the acting board chairperson and the CEO stayed 
in the same building thus facilitating daily interactions. 
When it did meet, the interactions within the board were variously described as: - "not 
proactive", "things are slow", "no discussion", "normally approve whatever is given", "weak 
13 Seasons when families do not attend hospitals as a result of low cash arising from having paid school fees for 
their children's return to school. 
14 Towards the end of this study the CEO changed from clergyman to a clergywoman. 
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control from above", "do not ask any question", "just say go ahead", "delegate attendance to 
junior people" , "not held accountable by the board". The power relations were a major 
source of negative accounts. UCMB accreditation regimen - especially the drafting of a new 
hospital charter, had imposed explicit changes in the power relations between the medical 
members in the HMT and the role of the clergy person as CEO. Power relationships and 
friction arising from the need to get accredited created dissent and led to the quitting of the 
doctor. The turnover of the members in the HMT in this hospital was high - i. e. 3 out of 4 
key members left during the 12 months of this study. 
".. what I see here is that the Board is not proactive. They normally approve what they have been 
given. Sometimes I feel disappointed at the end of the meeting. I would expect some reactions but they 
just do not say anything. They just say "yes go ahead". We have good relations with the Bishop but he 
does not attend much -he just says 'you go ahead "(HMT PNFP-Hosp-7). 
"..... only meeting twice a year and there is no discussion? No questions about what was achieved or 
not achieved. They are not technical people. Some members are from other Catholics health units, 
the priest and core management. The DHO and the CAO are on the Board but do not come. 
Sometimes they send junior people to represent them " (HMTPNFP-Hosp-7). 
"Most managers .. came through relatives - priests and nuns. They are not 
held accountable by the 
Board. These power relations will bring the hospital down. Confronting these persons in the hospital 
is like confronting the bishop " (Former HTM PNFP Hosp-7). 
"The Bishop also trusts these persons better than the MIS. There is a small circle of disgruntled 
relatives of priests and nuns .... they give 
him [bishop] wrong information " (Former HMTPNFP- 
Hosp- 7). 
Given the weakness of the governance in this hospital, a donor project that was supporting 
this hospital had to employ their own staff to be part of both the management team and BOG 
partly as a means of ensuring performance accountability and transparency. The changes in 
HMT and the structure of power in the hospital had made the donor representative' 5 worried 
about accountability and transparency. 
5.2.3.4 Scenario-4: Clergy as Board- Person and Doctor as Lead Manager 
One of the two case study hospital for this study belonged to this group. The three hospitals 
in this group had a bishop as the chairperson of the Board of Governors. Two hospitals 
belonged to the UPMB and one to UCMB. Infrequent meetings were reported among UPMB 
hospitals although this changed somewhat due to the need to review the hospital constitution 
(charter) during the study period. One hospital in this category had a Board that was too 
scattered geographically within the country probably making it expensive to meet more 
frequently. This board sat once a year. 
In the remaining two, the bishops delegated their roles as board chairpersons to other clergy 
members - usually closest to the hospital. Like in scenario 3 above, the district technocrats 
(CAO and DDSH) mandated to represent the district were not attending most of the time or 
" One donor representative (European national) was acting as a member of the HMT during the study period 
and interviewed in this respect. 
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delegated to junior staff. In these circumstances the lead manager -a doctor, tended to have a 
wider scope for autonomous decision-making. The board was seen more as a body to notify 
of what is going on. Accounts here related to the scope and boundaries for Board actions. For 
example, the roles of BOG were perceived to be limited to a set of activities such as "limited 
to policy making", "their interest is [mostly] cash flow". In this scenario, the Board was not 
invited to make decisions such as erecting new buildings because the manager considered 
such decision as " day-to-day matters for management to decide", and the Board only needed 
to be notified about the outcomes - "we report what we have done". 
"They are definitely interested in the expenditure report. We provide a detailed expenditure report. 
That is where most of their focus is in the meeting. We will present what we have done with the funds 
in the expenditures " (HMT-PNFP -Hosp-2) 
"No input (from the BoG was needed). This is day-to-day running of operations and the management 
does this sort of day-to-day matters (decision to use bonus funds to build a staff house). The board of 
governors is for policy. We report to them everything we have done. They meet only three times a 
year, but more if there is a need. The house will be there to see " (HMT-PNFP-Hosp-2). 
"They are all ministers [church leaders] except the treasurer, who is an accountant ... 
They 
understand only the finance statement and liquidity - working capital, and revenue figures " (HMT- PNFP-6). 
These accounts indicate a narrower scope of functions accorded to the Board by the lead 
managers. From the perspective of the board members, contrasting views were expressed 
indicating some conflicts of objectives among the two groups. For instance the Board 
respondents complained that managers were "ignoring structures", "do not want to account", 
"slow to act on Board decisions", "do not coordinate well [with BOG]" and "do not provide 
feedback outcomes on prior decisions". These seem to indicate a contestation of the power 
relationship between the Board and the HMT. 
"The administrator and the MS sometimes do not coordinate well [... ] some of the mishandling -I 
think - is due to lack of management training. ... For example, financial mishandling - you find these 
problems. People spend without authority, do not want to account to the board sometime" (BOG- 
PNFP- Hosp 5). 
"Some of the workers' problems are not well handled. [... J like recently a staff was suspended. The 
board has a disciplinary committee but we were only copied the suspension letter. Sometimes people 
do not know why these structures exist. Since I stay very near the hospital, the staff come to me to 
complain about their issues " (BOG-PNFP- Hosp 5). 
There was also a problem related to the use of technical language in the exchange that could 
have reduced the effectiveness of the communication between the BOG and HMT in this 
category as illustrated by this respondent's struggle to reproduce the word "mortality" and 
"morbidity" which were used in the reports the HMT provided to the BOG. 
"The doctor gives us a summary of what they have achieved in the period and also the actions on 
what was decided on in the last meeting. The report has those medical details of diseases, motaliza, 
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motalita ,,, you16 doctors use terminologies. We have asked them (doctors) to use clear language " (BOD-PNFP-Hosp 5). 
Nonetheless, attempts to simplify the technical information for easy consumption by the 
BOG were encountered - but these efforts also posed a new problem of oversimplification. 
For example, despite a similar practice of generating graphic trends in service volumes, by 
managers in this group, these graphics were not shared with the boards largely due to feelings 
that the board members would not understand them. 
not all of them (BOGs) have basic medical experience and qualification. Especially those that do 
not have this- find it difficult to comprehend. They use their common sense to give advice. But those 
that are medical, deliberate on the technical" (HMT-PNFP-Hosp-2). 
Faced with the difficulty of executing its roles, one Board in this category had expressed a 
need to learn from other hospital Boards. 
"Well, we are not perfect as the board. We have requested the chairman to organize and take us for a 
study trip to other mission hospitals to see how other boards do their business. .. 
You see, issues such 
as salary levels in other hospitals and the benefits they give their staff would help. We have a big 
number of staff deserting the hospital and we thought the visit might help to learn from others and 
compare notes. The hospital administration was asked to plan for this but they are slow to act. " 
(BOG-PNFP- Hosp 2) 
5.2.3.5 Scenario 5: Politician as Board-chair and Doctor as Lead Manager 
This scenario has all the three government hospitals in this study. Due to the political nature 
of the supervision Boards in this group, most of them were engaged in electioneering or 
electoral campaigns during the study period and were hard to find and interview. Related to 
the outcomes of the elections, new Boards were constituted during the study period. 
Nonetheless, two interviews were done with BOG with sufficient experience in this group 
and six interviews with HMT. The HMT respondents provided additional views about their 
Boards members - current and previous ones. One of the key features within this group is 
that relatively frequent Board meetings were held - usually monthly meetings of the entire 
Board or its sub-committee. District technocrats always attended the board meetings. The 
narratives used to describe the BOG-HMT interactions had some unique language such as 
"watchdogs", "tracking" or descriptions of processes that can be called "espionage". Some 
narratives among the HMT implied a fear of victimization and a prominent expectation of 
monetary benefits by the members of the Board. Narratives from the HMT did indicate 
some areas of cooperation between the two. For instance, the Board was used by HMT to 
intercede between contract providers - firms contracted to clean the hospital and provide 
catering services. The BOG was also used to "to advocate" for the hospitals' interests such 
as protecting the hospital budgets from being diverted to other use by the District Councils. 
16 The interviewer (researcher) introduced himself as a doctor to the respondents. 
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"When we complain about the tenderers they (contract providers) feel it is a personal issue. So we 
ask them (Board) to intervene. Also they are helpful to take the information on the effectiveness of the 
tenderers... we have complained before about these people (contract holders) who do a poor job. Of 
course some are politically connected. You cannot raise much complaint about them. That is why we 
prefer that fellow politicians (the Board) deal with them - so that the issue is not personalized" 
(HMT-Govt-Hosp 9). 
"We sit every month with the hospital committee (board)... we have had this feeling (too frequent 
meetings) as management but the issue is, when they were made members ..., they expected some 
money..... We also buy some sodas. Chairman gets [Ug Shillings] 55,000, other 40,000, staff get 
20,000 
..... If you suggest making meetings every quarter, they 
do not accept. It's a personal issue. 
They were made members with expectation of allowance every month. Like now this month, there is 
nothing new to report. So we just went around the hospital on a tour and they observed cleanliness, 
noting some repairs. We just had the old issues to discuss "(HMT-Govt-Hosp 9). 
The information generated and provided by the HMT to the Board showed a marked 
difference across all three hospitals in this group. In one hospital graphic summaries of 
utilisation were provided but in a remarkably different way. In this hospital each ward had a 
hand-drawn graph on the wall which displayed the trends in the services provided on that 
ward or department. As part of the board meeting, the members are taken on a tour of the 
hospital wards and the graphs were used to show performance of each department. This 
innovation seems to have been imported from the UCMB hospital where the lead manager 
acted as chairperson for the BOG. As Board chairperson, he got regular exposure to the 
information and graphics from the PNFP hospital. Although not directly admitted, the lead 
manager's role as board chairperson may have contributed to adaptation of graphic 
information for the interactions with his BOG. Additionally, this hospital also had high media 
visibility especially due to road traffic accidents (located on a busy highway) and the hospital 
was used by MOH as the show-case for the launch of the 2004 World Health Report that 
focused on road traffic accidents (WHO and World Bank 2004). This critical incident may 
have instigated17 the adoption of this practice although the rationale for its sustenance was 
described as an imperative for improving performance: 
".. when I got here, people did not know that data was for administration use - until I told them that 
they should draw data in their own area [departments] and know how they are performing. ... So this 
has helped the staff to know what they are doing - other than giving it to administration, to 
district 
and ministry. They should also know what they are doing. "Are you improving? " For example, in 
maternity, "are you [midwives] delivering more women? Are you having still-birth or live-birth? 
" 
There you would know your quality " (HMT-Govt-Hosp 8). 
In another government hospital, information provided to the board was different. Although 
graphs of service outputs were nicely displayed in the lead manager's office, little attention 
was paid to the graphs by either the HMT or the board. Incidentally, the graphs were 
indicating output trends far below the set targets for several of the service outputs plotted. 
For this hospital, the graph was seen as a requirement by the District Health Office (DHO) to 
monitor immunisation. 
" This author had carried out a different research project in this hospital in 2003 and the practice of displaying 
service output graphs was not in use. 
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"No (we do not use graphs in the report to the Board). We give them outlines with numbers we have 
seen (utilisation figures) in a month. We make it simple for them. But they see the graphs,... They are 
always in this office (graphs are displayed in respondent's office)..... The graphs are plotted by the 
Records person. The only thing that I have been following is the immunisation. The DHO always asks 
about DPT3 target not being achieved We have constantly failed to meet that target" (HMT-Govt- 
Hosp 9). 
As discussed already in section 5.5 above, another unique case relevant here was the board 
that had set up its own system of information to track the performance of the hospital in the 
areas it considered important. 
5.2.3 The Complication of Delegated Managers 
All medical doctors that exercised directly the powers of the lead manager (scenarios 1 and 4) 
or indirectly by participating in the HMT under the CEO (scenarios 2 and 3), were delegated 
staff to PNFP hospitals by either the local governments or donor projects. Delegated 
(seconded) staff in this context meant that the salaries of the delegated staff were paid not by 
the hospital but by local governments or the NGO projects. In principle, the Government or 
project reserved the right to recall such seconded staff and redeploy them elsewhere. The 
delegated staff represented a financial contribution to these hospitals, although it was 
considered problematic by the hospital BOGs. The expressed complications were related to 
the delegated doctors who also played management/ governance roles. For example, the 
respondents among the BOG feared that such staff could be recalled at the discretion of 
Government or projects, have different allegiances in decision making and that such staff are 
difficult to control since the hospital was not paying their salaries. Probably as a means of 
buying some stake for allegiance to the hospitals, these delegated staffs were being paid 
substantial "salary top-up" and benefits. The consequence of this approach was an 
underlying problem of wide disparities in the employment benefits among the HMT and a 
potential for dysfunctional teamwork and poor performance. 
"Both doctors in the hospital belong to the district; they are seconded by the district. These come 
with clear terms of work, the duration of tenure and different pay. They may not share the missionary 
work of volunteering spirit. When the hospital begins to suffer, they leave. " BOG-PNFP-Hosp-2 
5.3 Summary: Strategic Intents and their Control. 
As summarised in the table 5.1, the performance expectations of the BOGs included: 1) 
viability of the hospitals; 2) expansion of hospital capacity; 3) adherence to code of conduct 
and 4) competent management. With respect to the control of hospital performance and 
supporting innovations like PBC, the findings show that the BOGs were using a mix of 
approaches. Although result-oriented performance is needed for PBC, these findings show a 
mix of mechanisms used by governance structures in hospitals. Prominent among these were 
the following: 
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1. Assessments of inputs, processes and outcomes: The findings indicate that all boards 
generally were monitoring the hospital financial accounts and client volumes by way of 
information provided to them by the hospital management teams (HMTs). This 
information, however, had different formats across the study hospitals. Graphic plots of 
output/financial trends - considered more empowering to the boards' monitoring role - 
were established in mostly UCMB hospitals. Where networking was enabled between 
UCMB and government hospitals (cross membership on BOG), the findings show that the 
practice to use graphical information was diffusing to the latter. Observation of resource 
inputs by the BOG was being actively used in monitoring the hospital performance, 
infrastructure developments such as renovations and new buildings were most observed 
aspects. The performance perceptions of the board members tended to assign higher 
judgments of managerial competence on the basis of improvements in the hospital 
infrastructure. Although the findings showed that the BOGs were most likely to examine 
the financial information, obvious limitations to their financial control were related to 
erratic disbursements of grants from Government and restricted increases in public grants 
/subsidies. For instance, when faced with what they described as "staff exodus" from the 
NGO hospitals, the BOGs were unable to use available (donor project) funds to prop-up 
the staff salaries and prevent the staff exodus. Other domains of outcomes that were being 
monitored by some boards - albeit unsystematically - included client satisfaction, drug 
pillage, hospital cleanliness, staff attrition, quality of nursing staff and disbursement of 
funds from Government and donors. 
2. Assessments of behaviours: Behavioural assessment or monitoring was implicit in the 
boards' expectations related to the code of conduct by the managers and staff. Behaviours 
such as drunkenness, stealing, adherence to managerial procedures, duty hand-over by 
nurses, and compliance to religious practices (e. g. proper marriage) were some of the 
information sources upon which the BOGs formed their perceptions for performance 
effectiveness or control. Religious norms were the most prominent basis for behaviour 
assessments. Behavioural assessment based on clinical and managerial protocols required 
the boards to have more technical capacity than was available within most BOGs. 
Nonetheless, some attempts were being made to set up systems for observing 
medical/professional and managerial behaviours as exemplified by the establishments of 
ward registers to monitor change-over of nursing duties in one public hospital, and 
constituting hospital boards on the basis of professional peers to enable peer-review 
mechanisms for medical and managerial behaviours. 
3. Inculcating norms for behaviour: Mostly among PNFP hospitals, findings such as the 
religious-oriented staff recruitments, insistence on rituals such as prayers and devotions, 
and expectations that the managers (and staff) actions be "Christ-like", "volunteering", 
"sacrificing for the good of the hospital", "glorify God by attending to patients" - 
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suggests efforts to inculcate norms for behaviours as a form of control. As a structural 
design for inculcating religious values or ensuring norms-driven control, most department 
leaders in UCMB hospitals were religious cadres (nuns) with nursing or midwifery 
professions. Justification for this pattern was directly related to ability of nuns to 
"following orders" and being able to inculcate religious discipline among the hospital 
staff. A related finding among PNFP hospitals was that board members were more likely 
to be socialised in religious norms either as clergy persons or selected on the basis of their 
religious devotions. Taken together with the findings related to religious-based 
recruitments, religion was one of the common operating norms among PNFP hospitals. 
These findings show that, at best, there were two norms for controlling behaviour in the 
PNFP hospitals -a religious and a medical profession one. 
4. Conflict in the control mechanisms: Some indication of conflict in the control 
mechanisms were observed in the data presented in chapter 5.4. The medical staff seemed 
to resist some aspects of the behaviour norms based on religious faith. In particular, 
behaviour controls that reduced autonomy of staff or constrained their social interactions 
such as marital status and pregnancy among unmarried females or polygamy and male 
staff, were considered as "social interference". Technocrats within the board were 
worried about what they referred to as "blind actions" and "religious commands" arising 
from inappropriate advice from "holy people". The findings also support a proposition 
that dominance of clergymen and clergywomen in the management of the PNFP hospitals 
had a higher preponderance for dysfunctional governance relationships within BOGs. 
This mix of approaches for managing performance illustrates the preponderance for using 
norms, behaviours and process-based control mechanisms in the BOD-HMT governance 
arrangements in addition to output-oriented management. 
5.3.1 Context: Performance Governance as a barrier 
Findings in this chapter shed some light on the level of awareness of strategic intent, 
exchange of information and capacity of the Boards to effectively and legitimately undertake 
their roles and support innovations like PBC. Composition of the Board and the information 
systems to provide usable information are essential for the Board to optimise and legitimise 
their performance control and oversight. The following issues show the promise and 
challenge of optimizing performance governance and control at the interface between the 
BOG and HMT: 
1. Composition: The capacity of the Boards to provide effective leadership expected from 
them was dependent on the composition of the Boards. There were findings to suggest 
that the Boards with medical orientation and managerial experience were relatively better 
suited to provide governance leadership of hospitals. The hospital Boards that were 
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composed on the basis of "peer-review" mechanism engendered better governance 
interactions between BOGs and HMTs. Peer review systems are considered appropriate 
mechanisms for institutional control in situation of complex performance objectives and 
in knowledge-based organisations (Williamson 1979; Ouchi 1980; Moss, Dugal et al. 
2005). Hospitals are knowledge-based organisations with complex objectives and outputs. 
However, as illustrated in section 5.6.2.3, medical or managerial orientation may not be a 
sufficient condition if the intrinsic power of the Boards are inferior to that of the HMTs. 
For example the peer-review systems did not counter governance problems in the hospital 
where the CEO symbolised ownership-rights (section 5.6.2.2). 
2. Information quality: Information provided to the Boards was being tailored according to 
the perceived capacity of the Boards to understand complex activities in the hospitals. 
Boards with predominantly non-medical members i. e. clergymen or politicians received 
over simplified information with less value for effective performance control and 
oversight. UCMB and projects associated with it had succeeded in standardising the 
information to be provided to the Boards. Due to their recent introduction by UCMB, the 
study was not able to capture the effects of these changes on the capacity of the hospital 
Board. Among government hospitals, similar findings were observed. There were no 
specific programmes to prepare members of Boards for their roles in government and 
PNFP hospitals. 
3. Power structures: The institutional power structures - especially the symbolisation of 
ownership of the hospitals by some members in the HMT was associated with 
dysfunctional interactions between the Board and HMT, contributing to ineffective 
control, poor accountability and sub-optimal management of operations. Partly, this may 
be a result of a clash of values and norms between professional autonomy as a value 
among medical professionals versus values of "order-obedience-sacrifice" based on 
religious culture in PNFP hospitals. Similarly, in public hospitals, the rent-seeking culture 
among politicians (Eeckloo, Van Herck et al. 2004) may explain in part, the observed 
dysfunctional power relationships with the HMTs. The power of HMT to award financial 
allowances to the Board members seemed to insubordinate the latter to the former. 
4. External control of organisations: The external source of salaries for doctors that play a 
major role in the HMT imposed a problem of multiple allegiances among the executive, 
thus blunting the influence of the Boards. The majority of the doctors undertaking 
management roles in PNFP hospitals were seconded by either District Governments or 
NGO projects. When the Boards of Governors did not pay the managers directly, the 
latter's control was blunt. For instance, members of the Board were reluctant to 
reprimand managers whose salaries they did not pay for fear that the doctor may request 
for redeployment to another hospital. Performance governance and organisational control 
is built on the assumption of reciprocal exchange of valuable benefits among the agent 
and the principal (Goddard, Mannion et al. 2000; Taylor 2000; George 2003). 
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External pressures such as to reduce user fees, increase staff salaries and massive staff 
departures created disempowerment of the governing Boards especially in the PNFP 
hospitals. Inability of the Boards to provide salaries comparable to those paid to 
government employees and constraints against growth of hospital revenues put the PNFP 
Boards in a disempowered position. In these circumstances, the Boards were willing to 
tolerate illegitimate behaviours such as dual-practice by some hospital staff. 
5. Delegation in the Boards: Delegation of authority within the Boards was observed to be 
a major feature especially in hospitals where the Board chairperson was a bishop or a 
senior/prominent clergyman or woman with major responsibilities elsewhere. Delegation 
of Board membership was also common among the local government representatives on 
the PNFP hospital Boards. In such a situation, there were problems related to slow 
decision-making, poor accountability and overall poor assertion of good leadership. 
6. Performance control by integration: Probably as an implication of the weakness in the 
governance systems within the study hospitals, donor projects seeking to access 
performance information for their objectives resorted to integrating their staff into the 
BOGs or HMT. Many donor projects in the PNFP hospitals planted their representatives 
into the BOG and/or within HMTs with explicit objectives to access the information they 
needed to monitor the performance of their projects. In government hospitals, more 
frequent Board meetings can be interpreted as attempts by the Boards to integrate 
themselves into managerial operations to overcome poor access to performance 
information. Alternatively, more frequent Board meetings could be due to the need to 
extract some financial benefits (allowances). By seconding medical staff to PNFP 
hospitals - some as hospital managers, the local governments achieved instrumental 
means of integrating themselves with the PNFP hospitals and achieve a vantage position 
to observe their performance. 
Overall, the governance of hospitals (both PNFP and Government) created a context that 
was weak to provide synergistic support to performance-based contracting pilot. For a 
more successful PBC initiative, additional efforts would be required to improve 
performance governance at the interface between BOGs and HMTs. Promising models in 
the data include establishing BOG on the basis of "professional peer review" and 
establishing systems that harvest user-information from the community about the 
performance of the hospitals. 
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Chapter 6: PBC Implementation 
6.0 Introduction 
This chapter aims to explore the mechanisms of effect of the PBC pilot by analysing the 
designs, implementation arrangements and their influence on the hospital performance given 
a plethora of performance expectations and a myriad of performance influences in study 
hospitals. To be able to appeal to hospitals, PBC interventions needed to be sufficiently 
powered to overcome the competition from other frameworks likes that of UCMB and 
Yellow Star Program, or ride on the synergistic tide of these and similar interventions. By 
analysing the implementation activities, explanations of the success and failures to achieve 
targets, this chapter tries to illuminate the vital mechanisms at play within the PBC 
intervention for the hospitals to respond. Thus, this chapter attempts an objective evaluation 
of the PBC pilot design and implementation activities to ignite effective response 
mechanisms. The evaluation is also aided by a brief description of the implementation 
arrangements of UCMB and the Yellow Star Programme (YSP). As comparative 
programmes with similar purpose of influencing performance improvements among 
hospitals, UCMB and YSP provided local benchmarks upon which to compare PBC and 
arrive at more practical policy and practice alternatives (Nolte, Wait et al. 2006). During the 
field activities of this research it was observed that UCMB and Yellow Star Programmes 
were actively engaged with the same study hospitals with demonstrable responsiveness. 
Chapter 7 deals with the response patterns arising from the implementation of PBC 
innovation from the perspective of two case-study hospitals. 
For PBC to have an effect on its specified performance expectations - the six goals (see table 
6.1) - it would need to compete with the influence mechanisms of other performance 
frameworks such as UCMB, district league table and YSP. In general, PBC needs to appeal to 
the hospitals to pay attention to its set of targets. Alternatively, PBC response could capitalise 
on the synergistic influences of other performance frameworks with similar performance 
goals and/or similar interests in the mechanisms underlying the performance of hospitals. 
Text Box 6.1: Performance goals menu for PBC 
A choice of three performance goals selected from a list of six: 
1. increase the number of outpatient visits by 10% 
2. increase the number of birth attended by a skilled health worker by 5% 
3. increase the number of children under one year who are fully immunised by 10% 
4. increase the number of new acceptors of modem family planning methods by 5% 
5. increase the average number of antenatal visits by pregnant women by 10% 
16. increase the number of children under five years treated for malaria by 10% 
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6.1 PBC Implementation: De jure and De facto 
The influential mechanisms of PBC intervention were related to the major design features 
discussed below. These features are extracted from four main data sources. The inception 
preparation workshop in July 2003 which this researcher attended, participant observations at 
three meetings of PBC pilot during January and February 2005, and from monthly pilot 
progress reports. The monthly reports provided contemporaneous accounts of the 
implementation of the pilot activities. The fourth data source was interviews with members of 
the hospital management team (HMT) in the bonus-eligible hospitals. The HMTs were asked 
how the targets were selected and what influenced their choices. Additional data was 
collected by interviewing members of the pilot implementing team (PIT) such as the pilot 
coordinator and officials implementing the performance surveillance/verification activities. 
The PIT respondents were also asked about the changes they had made as a result of field 
experiences they encountered during pilot activities. Analytical frameworks provided by 
complexity theory and the theory of dynamic response actions were used for data extraction 
and analysis. 
The following sections provide a description as well as a qualitative analysis of the 
implementation arrangements and the range of mechanisms the pilot employed. In analysing 
the implementation arrangements, it is important to note that the pilot design and activities 
were implemented using district-based forums (meetings) that targeted all the participating 
health facilities in each of the five districts. Given this arrangement, the PNFP'8 hospitals in 
this study were part of a large set of health facilities in these districts that were subject to the 
pilot activities. 
The implementation arrangements had several components that together formed the PBC 
pilot intervention. Each of these components represents the cluster of essential activities for 
PBC as implemented in Uganda: 
I. A consultative meeting for consensus building among stakeholders at national level at the 
start of the pilot in July 2003, 
2. Meetings to select service targets and create awareness about PBC at the district level, 
3. Semi-annual performance surveillance activities measured the output volumes for the 
selected service targets, 
4. Meetings to provide performance feedback to the participating health facilities, and 
5. Providing the performance bonuses where eligible. 
18 Only PNFP hospitals were eligible to participate in these processes. The 3 government hospitals were not part 
of the PBC pilot and did not have any participation in the PBC pilot activities. 
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6.1.1 Consensus Building for PBC Pilot 
A consensus-building meeting with national stakeholders was an essential first step in the 
pilot activities. The stakeholders included MOH, PNFP bureaus, Makerere University 
Institute of Public Health (MUIPH)19, District Health Officers (DHO) from the selected 
districts, and some of the managers of the health facilities. The first meeting at the national 
level took place in July 2003. At the national level, the stakeholders included the Ministry of 
Health (MOH), the three Medical Bureaus and the Makerere University Institute of Public 
Health (MUIPH). 
At the first national level meeting that this researcher attended, there was strong support from 
the three PNFP Bureaus for the PBC pilot. This support was premised on the dissatisfaction 
of the Bureaus about the administrative controls that Government (MOH) was using to 
control the use of the grants it was providing to the PNFP sector. Among the main causes of 
discontent about the administrative controls was the government guidelines that restricted the 
use of the Primary Health Care (PHC) grants to pay salaries of PNFP staff and the 
specification of the grant proportion (50%) to be spent on drugs (Giusti 2003; MOH MTR 
2003). At the first PBC meeting, Bureau officials presented papers that advocated for a 
contractual arrangement with Government that allowed more autonomy for managerial 
decisions in using this grant money. The PBC experiment by the World Bank was a welcome 
development. 
After a 2-day meeting at the national level, the PNFP health facilities in the five selected 
districts were randomised into control group and treatment group. The treatment group were 
eligible to receive a bonus only if they achieved or surpassed their service targets. Facilities 
in the control group were not eligible for bonus even if they achieved or surpassed their 
targets. At the end of the national meeting, there was broad consensus to have similar 
meetings at the district level to sensitise the local leaders especially about their roles in PBC 
contract experiment and its legal implications. The main legal implication was that a subset 
of small health centres in the control group and all facilities in the treatment group were 
allowed to allocate the grants from Government freely - in disregard to the MOH guidelines. 
MOH guidelines required all grant beneficiaries to spend the grants in a specific manner. For 
instance, about 50 percent of the grants were to be used for procuring drugs, and no wage- 
related expenditures were allowed. MOH guidelines against salary expenditure had been 
relaxed for PNFP hospitals before PBC pilot started (MOH 2005). 
19 MUIPH was the holder of the World Bank sub-contract to undertake the performance surveillance activities 
for the PBC pilot. Their contract also involved other data collection for impact evaluation of the pilot. The 
author of this dissertation did not play active roles in the pilot activities other than those limited to participant 
observations of some pilot activities. Nonetheless some ideas, complaints and influence could have been 
introduced during interviews and informal interactions with the pilot implementers. Given the limited decision 
space and resource constraints on the pilot implementers, these influences may have had limited impact on the 
pilot processes. 
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At the district level, the stakeholders included the District Health Officers, the District PNFP 
Coordinators, District Health Secretaries (political leaders in-charge of health) and Chief 
Administrative Officers (in charge of district administration). Facility managers and 
representatives of their Board of Governors were also invited. 
Subsequent meetings were held in the five selected districts of Arua, Bushenyi, Jinja, 
Kyenjojo and Mukono. The aim of these meetings was to build commitment for participation, 
compliance and support among the stakeholders at the national and district level. 
6.1.2 Selection of the Targets for PBC Contract 
Ideally, the selection of the three service targets represented a strategic step for the bonus 
eligible hospitals to succeed in achieving PBC contract targets. The best approach to strategic 
choice (ie selecting three out of a menu of six) would entail some analysis of prior trends in 
service outputs, the needs of the community, alternative providers and the capacity of the 
hospital to succeed for the selected targets. Capacity considerations would include things like 
internal resources such as staff and external resources such as grants and technical support to 
fulfil the PBC contract obligations. From the Expectancy theoretic construct, this represents 
the need or belief that the agent's (hospital) efforts will result in the attainment of the desired 
performance. In general, strategic choice of PBC targets would be best done by the internal 
hospital actors since they have access to this set of strategic information about their capacity 
(Gibson, Martin et al. 2005). The internal actors here included the members of the Board, 
Hospital management team (HMT), the heads of department and clinical staff. In addition, 
the internalisation or "ownership" of the PBC innovation would be best served if the choice- 
making process and analyses were open to discussion by the service departments in the 
hospitals (Gardner and Schermerhorn 2004). It is the service departments that have more 
specialised information on their capacity as well as strategic information for success. In 
general, a participatory process for making the choice of targets would have the effect of 
communicating the performance expectations to those at the frontline of producing the 
contracted services - thus fulfilling one of the predicted requirements from Expectancy 
Theory. 
In reality (de-facto situation) the selection of the targets was done differently. The targets 
were selected during the district meetings organised to generate PBC awareness. At these 
meetings, 2-3 members of the HMT (inclusive of one member of BoG) from each hospital 
and other participating health facilities were invited to the PBC district awareness meeting 
(DAMs). At the meeting, the 2-3 representatives were required to make the selection of the 
service targets. At the end of the one-day DAM, a PBC contract was signed between the 
hospital representatives and the PBC pilot team. The signing of the contract signalled the 
start of the PBC obligations. These workshops were held during September and October 
2003. Of interest to this study is the implication of the choice of service targets that were 
made by the two invited persons from each hospital, in particular, the likelihood of 
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insufficient consultation within the hospitals regarding the selection of the performance 
targets. 
"We selected as a group - me and back then there was a doctor XX - we both attended the meeting at the district (DAM) and chose these targets " (HTM-Hosp-2). 
6.1.2.1 Limited Awareness of Performance Targets 
There was evidence of limited knowledge of PBC contracts and the service targets that had 
been selected among PNFP study hospitals. It was apparent that little effort was made to 
create wider organisational awareness about PBC contracts. The knowledge about targets 
was limited to a few persons that had attended the DAMs. The commitment to the three 
selected performance targets was therefore limited to members of the hospital management 
team (HMT). 
Secondly, the lack of dissemination of targets within the hospitals could have been due to the 
loss of momentum of pilot activities soon after the performance contracts had been signed. 
For nearly 12 months following the DAM and signing of the PBC contracts, there was little 
pilot activity. For example, in some health centres (not hospitals) the persons that had 
participated in signing the performance contract and selecting the performance target had 
moved or died. This slow start of the pilot activities was attributed to two reasons: delayed 
disbursement of funds by the Bank and the departure of the person that was supposed to 
coordinate the pilot activities. Partly due to the delayed disbursement of funds, the 
replacement of the coordinator took eight months and during this period, the pilot activities 
stalled. 
"Another thing that happened in that period is that many of the health workers left their positions. 
Many left for greener pastures or were transferred. One died. As a result when (we) started in August 
2004, I found out that people who had also been sensitised had moved and fresh sensitization was 
done by myself" (PIT-MOH). 
"In other cases, the in-charges were new, did not know and did not add extra effort. In certain units, 
they (had) transferred the people and we would find a new management team with no information at 
all about the pilot" (PIT-MOH). 
Partial ignorance about the selected targets remained even after the pilot activities had been 
revived. For example, inconsistency about which targets were chosen by the hospital was 
common after an 8-month period (September 2004- April 2005) of invigorated pilot 
activities. In this period, re-sensitisation workshops had been held, performance verification 
visits had been made and the first round of performance feedback (f bonus payment) had 
been accomplished. When asked a direct question such as "which targets did you choose? " 
most respondents among hospital managers tried to search for and read their answers from 
their copies of the contract. In one instance illustrated by the extract below, the lead manager 
119 
discovered during the interview with this author that the targets in the contract were different 
from what he thought they were: 
"we selected- I think OPD - (looks up the file and reads from file) - we had selected -(smile of 
surprise). I wish we had selected OPD. We selected deliveries, immunisation and under-5s treated 
for malaria. But you know - back then, these are targets we,,,,. I wish we had selected 1,2,3 (OPD, 
deliveries and immunisation of under 5s) " (HMT Hosp-2). 
6.1.2.2 Replacing Flexibility with Rigidity 
According to the original design and the contract document, the hospitals (and other health 
centres) had the freedom to choose different service targets at the beginning of each financial 
year (World Bank and MOH Uganda 2003). During the first round of performance-feedback 
workshops (PFW) in January 2005, the freedom to change and choose different targets was 
ruled out. The pilot implementation team (PIT) wanted to ensure that the hospitals did not 
abandon selected targets before purposeful strategies to improve them. In effect, the hospitals 
(and other participating health centres) were locked-in with the choices made in haste or 
whose context had changed sufficiently for the hospitals to make any meaningful efforts to 
succeed. For example, community-based programmes to prevent malaria had been initiated 
within the catchment population of the study hospitals after the contracts were signed. These 
prevention initiatives were being led and supported by the study hospitals that had selected 
the malaria treatment target. Success for such a target would mean reneging on the prevention 
programme objectives of the same hospital. 
"... for the one of malaria (target), I am not so sure (of success). We have - (stops and laughs). (.... ) 
there are many things we are improving down there (in the communities), you know. We are 
responsible to the Health sub-district (prevention programmes) and we are making sure they have 
drugs for community-based malaria treatment" (HMT-Hosp-2). 
".... You know - (for) malaria, there was this home-based management (new programme) that we did 
not factor in. We thought the malaria will always be there but it was not to be. The immunisation one, 
I thinly is right" (HMT-Hosp-2). 
6.1.3 Performance Verification 
Performance verification (PV) or assessment of the magnitude of service outputs related to 
the performance targets was one of the major mechanisms to influence hospitals to respond to 
PBC. In agency theory this relates to the ability to observe the effort of the agent and is seen 
as an essential tool to overcome the agency problem of non-observable effort (Goddard, 
Mannion et al. 2000). PV also serves to focus the agent's interest on the records or systems 
that generate the performance data. According to the pilot design, and implicit in the PBC 
contract document, PV was to be "confirmed based on HMIS reports". HMIS (health 
management information systems) reports were monthly and quarterly reports of service 
outputs that each health facility was obliged to submit to the District Health Office. The 
reports use a standard format (Govt of Uganda 2005). To guard against distortion of the 
HMIS reports, the contract included the penalty clause below: 
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" ... the health unit's performance will be confirmed based on HMIS reports, institutional surveys and household surveys. If any large discrepancies between the survey and health unit's data are found 
regarding over-reporting, any bonus payment received will be claimed back. The district reserves the 
right to take other disciplinary actions based on those findings "(World Bank and MOH Uganda 
2003). 
During implementation of PV activities, the sub-contractor - Makerere University, Institute 
of Public Health decided to modify the source of PV data. Primary registers instead of HMIS 
reports were used by the performance verification team (PVT) to compile the performance 
data. Primary registers are the detailed medical records that have each patient/client details 
e. g. name, age, diagnosis and treatment items. Monthly HMIS reports on the other hand have 
aggregated performance data generated by adding up every entry in the primary registers. 
The basis for this change was due to the alleged fear that the HMIS reports were vulnerable 
to manipulation. Despite the apparent deviation from the contract specification implicit in this 
action, the PVT set themselves a large task. Processing performance data from primary 
registers required several stages with workload implications. For example, the PVT had to 
identify the contract - relevant services from multipurpose registers. They had to tally 
thousands of cases, visits or services provided by a hospital during the verification period. 
From the perspective of understanding the effectiveness of the PVT activities, three main 
implications could be attributable to its workload. These are discussed in sections 6.2.3.1 to 
6.2.3.3. 
6.1.3.1 Crowding out Performance Verification Activities 
In addition to the PV activities related to the three selected service targets, the financiers of 
the pilot - the World Bank Research Group (WBRG) sought to collect a broader set of data to 
analyse the impact of PBC pilot in Uganda. The need for impact data required the PVT to 
conduct several surveys in addition to PV activities in the registers. The impact assessment 
required data from five survey components: 1) facility equipment, 2) the staff, 3) exit poll of 
patients, 4) households and 5) survey of the support systems (supervision and financing). 
As a result, the workload for the performance verification team (2-3 persons) in the hospitals 
was not restricted to tallying the cases in the registers related to the three PBC targets. 
According to the Health Facility Module of the survey tools, the PVT had to extract from the 
hospital registers and tally outputs for a total of 39 different services (World Bank, MOH 
Uganda et al. 2004 pg 3&4). The same team had to conduct an exit poll of clients (at least 
30), interview the clinical staff (average of 60 in hospitals), as well as conduct household 
interviews (at least 10 households). Given the financial constraints within which the PVT 
operated (see section 6.2.5.1), all these activities were done within three days for each 
hospital. These activities were supposed to be repeated four times i. e. every six months for a 
period of two years. 
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"An overriding constraint was that due to a tight budget, each facility/community had been budgeted for one day but hospitals and big health centers needed three days on average to collect facility data 
and also to do staff and exit interviews. " (progress report December 2004 - page2). 
6.1.3.2 Reliability of Baseline Performance Measures 
It was necessary to collect the baseline performance of each provider 12 months before 
September 2003 when the PBC contracts were signed. However, the baseline performance 
verification activities were delayed for 12 months. The implication of this delay was to 
increase the workload for the PVT. For instance, the review of patient registers for the 
baseline covered 18 months instead of 12. This long period for performance verification and 
the decision to use primary registers instead of monthly (aggregated) HMIS reports, caused 
excessive workload especially for the baseline PVT in April May 2004. There was also a 
steep learning curve as the PVT was new to the task. There were particular challenges in 
extraction of PBC related target and non-target services from primary registers full of clinical 
jargon and shorthand. 
The verification of performance data was probably the most challenging and as illustrated in 
box 6.2, was also most likely to attract shortcuts by the PVT. It also illustrates the problems 
of performance auditing such as disruption of service provision with likely negative effects 
on clients' waiting-time and satisfaction. 
Textbox 6.2: Bottlenecks to PBC Pilot Implementation 
Question: - What needs to be strengthened for the pilot process to work better at the district level? 
Answer: - "Monitoring is key. (.. ) For example in (named health centre) -a health centre III 
was in the bonus group. It did not meet the target at all in both first and second round. We 
decided to give it a visit to find out what was happening..... We realised that it is far from 
(named town). That is 60 miles. (.. ) These people (clinic staff) told us that the research 
assistant [PVT] arrived late and was in a hurry and did not look at all their records. That is 
how they did not make the targets. But on the second round the research assistant [PVT] did 
not actually arrive -so you see how monitoring is very important? He might have sat under 
a tree and wrote the data. So monitoring of research assistants [PVT] is very important. 
We also had emphasised that they notify the health units about their schedules - sometimes 
you find that in the middle of a busy clinic, the research assistants [PVT] are collecting all 
the registers, stopping the clinic to talk to (interview) the staff. The health workers find it 
very difficult to organise themselves. The other issue was the exit interviews. These were 
very few simply because they had taken away all the staff for interviews and there was no 
one left to see the patients and therefore no exit patients [to interview]. Some of these units 
have 2 or 3 staff only. At the exit poll, the patients were very tired. They had waited for too 
long and did not cooperate ". 
Question: - Were you interested in information about waiting time in these clinics? 
Answer: - " Yes (burst into laughter),,, indeed, yes " (member PIT). 
It can be implied from the above extract that the PVT team had potential for causing 
ineffective functioning of the service provision on the day of their visit while at the same time 
collecting data about service quality from the clients at the facility. The negative effects such 
as long waiting-time for clients may partly be due to the PVT processes and not the routine 
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reality of clients at the health facility. Likewise, client satisfaction would be reduced by the 
auditing activities of the pilot and not the routine experience of clients. Unfortunately the 
interpretation of such data makes all attribution of waiting time of client dissatisfaction to the 
provider organization. 
The faults in baseline PV activities affected the legitimacy of the performance feedback 
activities (see section 6.2.4) but also provided an unreliable performance benchmark for the 
rest of the PBC pilot. Most discussions during the performance feedback workshops 
contested the service output figures used for calculating the bonus amounts. The discussions 
and explanations during the performance feedback workshops did indicate a significant 
dissatisfaction with the PV activities during the baseline survey. 
"... frankly, I do not know (why we failed the target) .... What I realised, there is a problem with 
measurement - the people who collected the records -I do not know what they looked at. ... The 
data 
collection was problematic. One thing I am sure of is, our numbers are much more than what was 
reported. We have even gone again and looked at them and they are much higher " (HMT-Hosp-2). 
"What is this thing 'data not available? ' I see everywhere 'data not available', 'data not available'. 
What is the purpose of this [pilot]? What is called data? This is demotivating and makes us inferior 
saying that data is not available yet the DHO (district health Office) has been receiving these data 
and our databases are complete "(HMT at PFWArua 8'k Feb 2005). 
From the perspective of the PVT, the imperfections in performance measurement were 
explained variously as due to "missing records", "records were locked up and not accessible 
to the research assistants", "registers were misplaced" or "the staff responsible for the records 
was absent at time of the visit". Implicit from these reasons was the de-facto concept of the 
"cross-sectional survey" -a snapshot picture at a particular point in time. For example, if the 
registers (records) were locked up in a cupboard on the day of the PVT visited, a "zero 
outputs" was recorded against the service targets and no return visits were made to fill the 
missing data. This could be interpreted as a coping mechanism by the PVT that was under 
pressure of heavy workload. In addition to enormous workload as an underpinning logic for 
explaining the behaviour adopted during performance verification, restrictive budgetary 
provision and questionable financing priorities for pilot activities all biased the performance 
verification activities to ineffective execution. 
"There was a problem of facilitation (financing). For example, I was supposed to monitor and 
supervise the units but we did not move out at all, except for bonus payment " (member PIT). 
"Call-backs [return visits] to facilities or communities were impossible given the tight budget and this 
could have contributed to the teams getting less staff f' and exit interviews than targeted "(progress 
report December 2004 -page 4). 
6.1.2.3 Adjusting to the Constraints in the Records System 
The specification of some PBC targets required data that were not routinely captured in the 
aggregated HMIS reports. For example, the process of aggregating service output data 
created only two age categories "under 5-years" and "above 5-years", in the national 
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information system and facility performance reports. For antenatal visits, the HMIS 
categories included "1st visit" and "re-visits" (Govt of Uganda 2005). Three PBC targets i. e. 
antenatal, immunisation and malaria (see box 6.1) required exact "age" or "visit number" 
variables for performance verification. In response to these problems, calculation of 
"average" number of ANC visits as required by the ANC target was abandoned and instead 
the "total" number of visits was used. For the malaria target, where an age cut-off eg "one- 
year and below" was needed, the primary registers presented a problem. All malaria cases in 
the registers that did not have the "age" entries were not counted when imputing performance 
for the malaria target. This problem led to very low performance figures for the malaria and 
immunisation targets during the baseline survey and was a source of heated discussion in the 
performance-feedback workshops. 
"People used to put (make entries like) `adult' and `child' instead of the age. We had problems with 
this for immunisation and malaria (targets). We only counted such for OPD but not for immunisation 
and malaria targets " (member PIT). 
"Being able to make correct recording improved the numbers (in 2"d PV round). Some of them, it was 
improving the handwriting so that we (PVT) can understand the diagnosis for the tallying. Clinicians 
use lots of shorthand in the registers. Some used "PF" (plasmodium falciparum) for a diagnosis of 
malaria " (member PIT). 
The implication of these record-entry problems and unavailable records and workload for the 
PVT at baseline is that performance "improvements" observed in the subsequent PV 
activities potentially arose partly from the improved capacity of the PVT to deal with the 
registers and not necessarily from more clients being served by the participating health 
facilities. 
6.1.4 Performance Feedback 
Performance feedback information about the successes and failure to attain the performance 
targets was an essential part of the design. Providing information to the agents - the hospitals 
and health centres about their level of achievement in relation to the targets is meant to 
motivate them to improve or sustain required efforts. On its own, performance feedback is 
effective in improving performance of health providers (World Bank 2003; McNamara 
2006). The key findings related to the activities of this component are related to the 
adaptations that were made in the implementation arrangements for providing feedback and 
the challenge of the negative effects that arose from randomising the monetary bonuses to a 
few providers. There was also a problem in the temporal sequence between performance 
feedback and performance verification. These are discussed below: 
6.1.4.1 Performance Accountability: A Good Start but.. 
Performance feedback workshops (PFWs) were organised as a one day event in each of the 
five pilot districts at the start of 2005. As a measure of creating effective performance 
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accountability to the relevant authorities, the invited guests to the feedback workshops 
included the district political leaders, district technocrats in charge of finance, administration 
and health. One member of the Board of Governors (BOG) was invited along with two 
members of the management team from all participating health units (hospitals and health 
centres). During the first round of PFW in January/February 2005, a good turn-up of 
stakeholders was observed at the three workshops attended by this researcher. 
Participating units that had achieved or surpassed their targets and were eligible for bonuses 
received their bank cheques and a handshake from the chief-guest (mostly District Health 
Secretaries). The PFW included speeches from the chief guest and representatives of the 
Chief Administrative Officer and the District Health Office. The speeches generally provided 
guidance on how health managers can succeed to achieve better results. For example, the 
speeches contained suggestions such as: "publicising services", "making services affordable 
to the poor", "being nice to patients", "accountability for the money and outputs" and 
"making the records (data) speak for themselves". The key themes in the discussions arising 
from the three workshops attended by this author can be summarised as follows: 
1. Focus on Records 
More discussions centred on the need to keep good records. In one district which was ranked 
31st on the national MOH league table, discussion focused on improving the completeness of 
records as a strategy to improve the district's ranking in the national league table. As 
indicated in section 6.2.3.1, the performance feedback results presented at these meetings had 
several missing figures attributed to problems in the service records. Given the precedent of 
poor performance of this district at the national MOH league table for similar reasons of poor 
data completeness, the politicians and the District Health Officers (DHOs) in this district took 
advantage of the forum to emphasise the message about improving records: 
"Lack of data made the district get ranked number 31 on the national league table. You can say by 
mouth that you are performing but without evidence, this is nothing" (DHO at PFW 8`h Feb 2005). 
"We need data. That is how you account for government funds. (District political leader - 
Performance feedback workshop 8`h Feb 2005). 
2. Credibility of Performance Assessment 
During one of the PFWs, the submission of one of the bonus recipients captured the attention 
and discussions of both political and technical leaders as well as the health unit managers. 
The extract from the submission (below) indicated some loopholes in the performance 
attributed to innovative efforts as opposed to usual practice or trends. 
"Me -I have nothing to say but to thank you. I did not know of this contract thing [PBC pilot]. lam 
only seven months in the post and did not know of this contracting. I was surprised [to be] invited to 
this workshop to receive a bonus. I am very happy. Thank you very much" (laughing from the 
participant PFW 8r1J February 2005). 
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The discussion that followed variously used the language of "a joke", "fluking" or "accident" 
in reference to the connection between purposeful actions and the receipt of the bonus. 
Recommendations were made to make the bonus competitive as well as making sure that the 
performance verification activities measured "real" improvement and not "usual" expected 
increases. It emerged during the interviews with the hospital managers that the level of the set 
targets for the PBC pilot were either similar or lower than the ones the hospitals had set as 
part of their routine annual budgeting processes. 
"... for example we have a target of 19,000 OPD attendance this year and the target is based on the 
previous year and we set at 10 percent .... the issue is that as administration we are tuned to a 
10 
percent increase in the budgeting" (HMT-Hosp-2). 
It is therefore possible to speculate that PBC targets were not sufficiently challenging and the 
hospitals were taking advantage of the same or lower targets of PBC, thus not pressured to do 
anything different from the ordinary. 
6.1.4.2 Demotivating the Control Groups: "Done Better but no Bonus" 
During the first round of performance feedback workshops it become obvious that the bonus 
was a potential source of negative emotions for the health managers whose facilities had done 
better than those that were randomised to the bonus-eligible group. Facilities in the control 
group also witnessed the bonus giveaway ceremony but received nothing irrespective of good 
or better performance a situation that evoked feelings of envy and unfairness. This was 
evident as numerous and spirited attempts by the participants in control groups to contest the 
randomization approach. 
Numerous views were expressed suggesting that the bonus be made competitive for all 
participating units. In both rounds of performance feedback i. e. January and September 
2005, participants attending the PFW continued to urge that the bonuses be opened up to 
competition (tournament design). Other views within the pilot implementation team (PIT) 
and the district health officers (DHO) were suggestive of adding some forms of placebo 
benefits or recognition for the facilities in the control group that exceeded their targets. 
However, there was no guarantee that such placebo benefits would not potentially become a 
disguised "bonus" to the control group. 
" We had also suggested token things like pens, calendars, books - things to remind them about the 
study and make the study visible. ... It would 
have been a good idea that all participating (health 
centres) got something (benefit) " (Member PIT). 
Indeed some district managers were beginning to consider providing some kind of "placebo 
rewards" to counter what they described as insidious apathy to the pilot. For example, lack of 
cooperation had been observed among the control groups especially during subsequent 
performance verification activities. As illustrated in the extract of a group interview with the 
district health officer (DHO) and the district coordinator of non-profit providers (PNFP- 
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Coordinator) in box 6.3, the bonuses had elicited negative satisfaction among the control 
groups. 
Text Box 6.3: Bonus as a source of negative motivation for control group 
Interviewer: "What do you see as the future for the contracting arrangements 
with PNFPs and performance bonuses? 
PNFP Coordinator: What I hear is that the people are not happy. It also looks expensive 
and not reliable. So the (health) units did not appreciate it. They 
are participating but do not get a bonus. They said -I remember - 
one in-charge [manager] complaining that even when other health 
centres performed better, the bonus is only paid to HOSP-I 
hospital and same HOSP-1 hospital only every time. XXX health 
centre improved 20-50% They say they squeeze here and there to 
improve performance and directed resources to register 
improvement but they are not recognised (given bonus). 
DHO: May be as a district, we need to recognise them - those that are the 
controls but are doing well. I hope the study team (pilot) does not 
mind. They did not understand the issue of control group. We can 
provide certificate or sponsor managers for a study tour. 
PNFP Coordinator: The control groups have performed even better than those getting a 
bonus. HOSP-1 hospital got 10 million (shillings) and yet ZZZ 
hospital is doing far much better. It's frustrating and has lost 
meaning - done better but no bonus. " 
(Extract from a group interview of District Health Director and District PNFP Coordinator) 
6.1.4.3 Bonus-biased Performance Feedback 
A notable finding at the first PFWs (January 2005) was that the "real" performance feedback 
was only given to the bonus-eligible group of participating health units. Real performance 
feedback entailed provision of absolute service output figures for the period under review. 
These figures were also compared (percent change) with a corresponding calendar period in 
the previous year. Taking the immunisation target as an example, total immunisations figures 
for January - March 2004 were compared to a similar period in 2003 and the percentage 
increase/decrease was computed and compared with the target. Feedback was limited to the 
three service targets selected by a facility20. Although health units in the control group had 
been subjected to the same pilot activities i. e. target selection and performance verification, 
their performance figures were not provided during the first and second performance 
feedback workshops. 
`Indeed we did not give it (feedback to control groups) out. But for round 1, we did send all the 
performance feedback through the district focal persons (PNFP coordinators).,,, for the second 
round, we only processed the one for the bonus group since there was pressure to disburse the funds 
20 Even though the performance verification team collected data for about 37 different services/diagnoses, 
feedback was limited to the three service targets in the contract. 
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since (named NGO) was closing up. But the rest of the result will be worked out and sent " (Member 
PIT). 
For the second round of feedback in September - October 2005, participants from control 
groups and the local government officials were all excluded from these workshops. Only 
participants from the bonus-eligible health units were invited. The exclusion was attributed 
to lack of sufficient budgets to hold big and all-inclusive workshops. The performance 
feedback for the health units in the control groups were sent by email several months after 
providing feedback to the bonus-eligible group. 
"Another disappointment was - we were unable to organise big workshops that bring all the 
participating health units together including the district health and local government officials. This 
time (second round of performance feedback) it was a mini workshop involving only members of 
bonus group - hence could easily be looked at as discriminatory " (Progress Report, September 2005 
page 2). 
According to the interview with the pilot implementation team, the biased feedback also had 
implications for the success of the subsequent pilot activities. Cooperation from the control 
groups was eroded in the subsequent performance verification visits since they did not see 
much value in participating. Most participants in control groups did not take interest in 
signing the second PBC contract for the financial year 2005/06 as was expected of them. 
"I think the problem (lack of cooperation) was that some units were not involved... They also did not 
appreciate the issue of randomisation. All they needed was to be in the bonus group. " (Member PIT) 
"In my view we should have included some government units in the bonus group. It was an oversight. 
They did not have any interest in the study " (Member PIT). 
.. You see, the overall objective was to have all groups together in a forum (feedback workshops). 
... Also we wanted these that fail, to learn from the successful ones. Unfortunately this is not done. The funders were not willing to finance this (PFWs). They were purely paying for the bonuses. ... 
In 
the second round we called only the bonus group. " (Member PIT). 
6.1.4.4 Hitting Two Birds with One Stone Or Temporal Bias? 
According to the PBC contract, performance feedback was expected to happen within the 
first three months following the PV visits. Implicit in this time specification was the need to 
allow a minimum of three months to the recipients of performance feedback to undertake 
corrective actions before the next PV visit. 
The de facto practice did not allow time for the recipients of performance feedback to adjust 
and innovate before the next PV visits. Subsequent PV visits were started immediately 
following the performance feedback activities. From table 6.1, the performance feedback for 
round-1 took place in the months of January and February 2005. The PV for round-2 started 
also in February 2005. The performance feedback in September 2005 was immediately 
followed by PV visit in October. 
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Table 6.1: Schedule for pilot implementation activities. 
Performance Performance Period/months covered by 
verification feedback performance verification 
activities 
Round-1 April/May 2004 Jan/Feb 2005 Jan 2003-March 2004 (14 months) 
(baseline) 
Round-2 Feb/March September 2005 April-Dec 2004 (9 months) 
2005 
rooud-3 Oct/Nov 2005 Pending by Aug 2006 Jan - Sept 2005 (9 months) 
ource: Adopted from (PBC-MPK 705b) 
Although not directly admitted by the pilot implementation team the synchronisation of the 
performance feedback activities with the activities for performance verification was intended 
to "hit two birds with one stone". Less than optimal financial facilitation of the pilot 
implementation team seemed to explain why several activities were being clustered together 
to fit the budget. 
The first bonus payment was done in January (2005).... Meanwhile, the data collection teams 
left 
for fieldwork at the end of February (2005)" (progress report February 2005). 
"It is anticipated that the 2"d bonus payment (read performance feedback visit) should be done in 
August (2005), and data collection for Wave3 (PV round 3) should be conducted immediately 
thereafter " (progress report July 2005). 
The implication of this practice is that any corrective actions or performance innovations 
arising from the performance feedback would not show up in the outputs of the next round of 
performance feedback. Participants in the performance feedback workshops (PFWs) 
expressed this concern as the meeting extract below indicates: 
"We are just receiving this information and there is no time to do those things you are talking about 
(improving records). How can we change them (records) if the team (PVT)is coming hack this 
month? " (Participant - PFW, 8`" February 2005) 
Any purposeful response by the hospitals to the first performance feedback provided in 
January/February 2005 would not be picked up by the PVT until Round-3 in 
October/November 2005. Given that the pilot was limited to two years of implementation, 
this problem created a systematic bias against finding a positive response to the performance 
feedback element of PBC experiment. 
6.1.5 Bonus Payment 
The bonus represented the apex of the PBC pilot. The bonuses were computed as a proportion 
of the government annual grant given to a hospital as opposed to its total annual revenues. 
The bonus payments were designed to take place every six months. This was meant to 
provide mid-year21 and end of year bonus payments. For each of the three targets achieved or 
exceeded, one percent of the base grant was payable i. e. three percentage points at mid-year 
21 Financial year was used to synchronise with the budget cycle. The mid year target was equal to half the 
annual target. 
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and at end-of-year. The bonus award was designed to include incentives for effort to be made 
across all the three selected targets and also across time for each target i. e. at mid-year and 
end-of-year. In this respect, an extra bonus point (1%) was given if success was consistently 
achieved at both periods for each target - thus providing three additional bonus points. An 
additional point (1%) was given if two annual targets are achieved and another point (1%) 
added if all three annual targets were achieved (Talyor 2003). Overall the maximum bonus a 
hospital could get was 11 percent of its government (PHC) grant. 
At the time of computing the first bonus payments, it became clear that the bonus amounts 
were too small especially for the smaller health centres. Lower level PNFP health centres 
generally received small grants ($ 4,300 - 6,400) from Government. The pilot 
implementation team (PIT) successfully negotiated a doubling of the bonus points. By 
implication, the maximum attainable bonuses changed from 11 percent to 22 percent of 
Government grant. Among the study hospitals, the contribution of the government grant was 
30 to 60 percent of the total annual revenues. Table 6.2 shows the assessed performance and 
the proportions of bonus received and their US dollar equivalence. 
Table 6.2: Bonus payments and as proportions to annual revenues in eligible hospitals 
Hospital 
(base Govt 
grant) 
Targets 1' round 1' 
bonus 
max 
2 round Annual 
target 
(+ extras) 
2 
bonus 
(max) 
bonus as % 
(total annual 
revenue) 
Hospital OPD 0 1 1 30 3 3 3 3 HOSP-1 ANC 1* $1,480 /3 1 1+1 
$5,9 
8/8) . 
% . /0 $227 053 ($74,135) Malaria 1 (0! )** 
(2 ) 1 1+1 
( ( , ) 
Hospital Malaria 0 0 0 0 HOSP-2 Immunisation 0 $0 0/3 1 1 +1 (4/8) 
$9,040 2.0 
($451 778) 778) ($180,807) Delivery 0 ( ) 1 1 +1 , , 
t nere implies one target exceeded and two percent of tile government grant payatne as toms. 
** Target awarded when it should not have been awarded since performance declined i. e. -21% 
Despite doubling the original bonus amounts, table 6.2 shows that the received bonuses were 
too small a fraction of the total revenue of the hospitals. For example in the hospital (HOSP- 
1) that did well (got 10 out of 11 percentage points), the total bonus (1st and 2nd) was 3.3 
percent of the total annual revenues. 
Total revenue of the hospital in contrast to the size of bonus provides a better picture of the 
valence of PBC bonuses to induce a profound performance improvement response. If the 
hospital actors were rational and calculating agents as assumed under the agency and 
expectancy theories, they would pay correspondingly little attention. Chapter 7 provides 
details of the response to the bonus payments and how they were used. 
Despite it making a small contribution to hospital revenues, the bonus amount shared 
between the two hospitals (table 6.2) was equivalent to 82 percent of the total bonus 
130 
payments made by the PBC pilot. Eighteen percent was shared among the rest - 17 bonus- 
eligible health centres. The large share of the bonus funds by the hospitals was due to 
relatively larger base grants they received from the Government. The hospitals in the pilot 
also had a relatively high success with the PBC targets. This finding has implications for the 
feasibility of sustaining financial bonuses especially for hospitals that have relatively high 
operational budgets. 
6.1.6 Pilot Financing: Uncertainty of Bonus Funds 
Despite the centrality of the "bonus" in the PBC pilot as the intervention, the financing of 
bonus payments was relegated to uncertain transactions with a potential to ruin the pilot 
purpose. As the main architect of the PBC pilot, the World Bank Research Group (WBRG) 
staff secured funds for the coordination and impact research components of the pilot. A local 
research institution22 (LRI) was contracted by the WBRG to conduct the impact assessment 
surveys and performance verification activities. In addition, a local consultant was hired as a 
Pilot Coordinator (PC). The financing of the bonus payments was assigned to the Ministry of 
Health. Counterpart funding (read bonus fund) was required from MOH as a demonstration 
of the Ministry's commitment to PBC pilot. MOH also provided the office for the PC. 
However, given the government budgeting cycles, and the priorities contingent on its budget, 
the MOH could not fulfil the counterpart funding requirement. This left the pilot 
implementation team (PIT) with no guaranteed funds to pay the bonuses. 
"... This is the problem. It was assumed that MOH will take care of some of these things but this is 
wrong..... So the assumption that MOH would provide resources [for bonus payment] need to be 
streamlined at the beginning" (Member PIT). 
"... In theory, they (MOH) accepted the study to be done, but due to resource constraints, their 
commitment to the study was lost... It's possible that they (World Bank people) did not do good 
thinking and groundwork. No budget for the critical parts of the study - the bonus and facilitation of 
monitoring" (Member PIT). 
The PIT had to engage in additional activities to source for funds to finance the bonuses. 
With the recommendation of the MOH, PIT negotiated with several US-based NGO projects 
in Uganda to pay the PBC bonuses. Fortunately, one of them agreed to finance the bonus 
payments. Although this NGO assisted with two (out of three) rounds of the bonus payments, 
the NGO wound-up its programme in Uganda leaving the third round of bonus payment in 
jeopardy. By August 2006, the source of funds to pay for the third and last bonuses was still 
not secured despite a 9-months delay to pay the bonuses. The pilot coordinator's contract had 
a total of 42 days in a period of 12 months. The coordinator indicated that most of his 
contract days were used for "hunting" and "negotiating" funds for the bonus payment. The 
funds made available for the sub-contract for performance surveillance were also perceive as 
insufficient for the extensive surveys. 
22 This researcher/author belongs to the institution that was contracted to conduct the research but kept a 
reasonable distance and position not to influence the research activities related to the pilot. 
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"The research team reported that they were working under a very tight budget. They planned for 
$280,000 but only $175,000 was approved. The mode of payment too was unfriendly. That is, they got 
first payment on signing the contract ($17,000). Thereafter, they could only receive funds after the 
deliverables were submitted and accepted. As a result, they had to incur debts ..... Besides, fewer 
research assistants were recruited and time for fieldwork was limited. Budget constraints also 
affected the inland travel arrangements for the local consultant and facilitation of bonus payment 
workshops " (Alia 2005bpg 20). 
In general, the financing problems displaced activities necessary to support the pilot 
implementers and caused uncertainty in the schedules for bonus payments and performance 
feedback activities23. In the language of the expectancy theory, the uncertainty of bonus 
payment weakened the instrumentality of PBC pilot - i. e. the necessary belief among pilot 
participants that rewards will follow from the successful attainment of expected performance 
(targets). 
6.2 Comparison with Other Performance Frameworks 
As indicated from chapter 4, there were several initiatives in the study hospitals trying to 
influence their performance improvements. Although the Maternal Death Audits and District 
Performance Reviews (and infra-league table) were taking root, they lacked documentation 
and sufficient history in the study hospitals to characterise their activities. This section 
provides brief descriptions of the implementation arrangements of the two well established 
performance improvement initiatives found among some of the study hospitals. These are 
UCMB's performance reviews and the Yellow Star Programme (YSP) for quality 
improvement. This comparison is meant to highlight the strength and weakness of the PBC in 
relation to these programmes that used different mechanisms to secure improved performance 
from the same hospitals. The comparison here is used for the dual purpose of aiding the 
evaluation of PBC pilot as well as enabling learning across all these three performance 
frameworks. 
6.2.1 UCMB Performance Reviews 
As discussed in section 4.4.3.5, UCMB had since 1997 started a process of comparative 
performance assessment for its network of health facilities. The key aspects of the UCMB 
performance framework (Lochoro 2004; Mandelli and Giusti 2005; UCMB 2006) are briefly 
listed below: 
1. Annual Performance Reviews 
Hospitals and lower level health facilities in the UCMB network were required to submit to 
UCMB their annual comprehensive performance reports. These reports were only received at 
the end of the financial year. The annual reports comprised of hospital revenues, resource 
inputs and service outputs during the financial year. The information under the categories of 
23 Activities for bonus payment and performance feedback were coupled together. Failure to find funds for 
bonuses also delayed the performance feedback activities. 
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revenue, inputs and outputs was standardised to ensure comparability. The reports of hospital 
inputs and outputs were based on the national Health Management Information System 
(HMIS), thus enabling the same reports to serve both the reporting obligations of UCMB as 
well as that of the district health office and MOH. Guidelines about how to process and 
aggregate the data had been made available to the managers of health facilities affiliated to 
UCMB. There was evidence of activities by UCMB to validate the information in the reports. 
Verification of the submitted performance data was done through soft bureaucratic 
arrangements such as accreditation requirements - i. e. that these performance reports be 
endorsed by the chairperson of the Board of Governors before their submission to UCMB and 
to the districts. Additional bureaucratic control and verification of performance data was 
given to the diocesan health coordinators. These coordinators had a structural role to receive 
monthly and quarterly performance reports - that could potentially serve as validation for the 
annual performance reports. 
Before the annual performance review meetings (APRMs), the data from all the UCMB 
affiliated hospitals were analysed. The aim of the analysis was twofold: 
1. To construct an average performance among hospitals in the UCMB network (ie a 
benchmark scenario) and 
2. To compare each hospital with this average. 
Lower-level health centres had their analyses separated from hospitals. For comparative 
purposes, it is important to note that all outputs of a hospital were being converted into a 
standard unit of output (SUO). The SUO was constructed by applying weights to all hospital 
service outputs relative to outpatient visit. Thus all hospital services were converted to "OPD 
equivalence" (Beekes 2003; Giusti, Lochoro et al. 2004; Mandelli and Giusti 2005). Relative 
performance was assessed for average hospital cost, client fees, staff, and a combination of 
these. For example, comparisons were made for SUO per available staff, cost per SUO and 
client fees per SUO. Each hospital was compared with the average for each of these 
measures. Figure 6.4 illustrates the type of analyses and trends for hospital SUO. 
By 2004/05, quality assessments were introduced. These include prescription audits, client 
satisfaction and others related to infection control. Many of these measures were borrowed 
from the Yellow Star Programme. 
Attendance at the APRMs was mainly limited to the management teams of hospitals and 
health centre, diocesan coordinators and UCMB experts. Each hospital performance was 
compared with the average scenario. During the meetings, the hospital management teams for 
each hospital were tasked to come up with explanations for their performance - i. e. variance 
from the average. All hospitals, especially for those below the average scenario, action plans 
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were developed together with UCMB experts to address the identified causes of less than 
optimal performance. 
Figure 6.4: Standard Unit of Output for 63 UCMB hospitals (1997/98 to 2006/07) 
2. Performance Monitoring, Support and Incentives 
At the level of the dioceses, quarterly performance reviews meetings (QPRM) were hosted by 
the Diocesan Health Coordinators (DHC) and attended by some UCMB experts. The aim of 
the QPRMs was to monitor progress towards the action plans each hospital (and health 
centre) had developed at the previous APRM. The DHC- the diocesan link persons to UCMB 
were receiving monthly reports of outputs and revenues including reports of disbursements of 
grants from the Government. These monthly reports were aggregated before the QPRM and 
used for performance assessment during the meetings. After the second quarter's QPRM 
(semi-annual) at each dioceses level, all the DHCs were invited to UCMB headquarters to 
discuss the performance of their dioceses. At these semi-annual meetings at UCMB 
headquarters, the aggregate performance of each diocese was presented and reasons for better 
and poor performance sought. As a product of this forum, action plans for monitoring and 
supporting the dioceses or their health facilities were made by DHCs and internal UCMB 
experts. Particularly for hospitals, technical workshops were commonly organized alongside 
the second quarter's QPRM (semi-annual) meeting. These technical workshops were aimed at 
providing training to the hospital managers and DHC for identified gaps in skill and 
knowledge. Many of the training workshops focused on financial management, information 
and computing systems. 
The incentive for good performance in the UCMB framework was internal recognition. For 
example the units that performed above average were mentioned for recognition during the 
performance review meetings. The best hospital teams were given space at the podium to 
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share their success strategies with the others at the review meetings. Facilities that had 
accomplished the requirements for accreditation were also awarded their accreditation 
certificates. Other than the disincentives related to not being accredited (see section 4.4.3.4), 
there was unwillingness to use coercive approaches such as sanctions for poor performance. 
"Usually we use such graphs as these (comparative graphs) to motivate them to do better and to 
compare with others. Its also a motivation to those that are below to improve and catch up "(UCMB- 
DHC). 
"No no  we 
don't give them sanctions (for poor performance) but we look for reasons, we look 
deeper and (try to) see why. Is it (because of) free services in government units? Is it (inadequate) 
drugs? Are the staff there? " (Official, UCMB). 
".... some of the privileges (of accreditation) are access to free advice from us (UCMB), we have 
experts in Human Resources, ICT and Data Management, Organisational Development and Financial 
Management" (Official, UCMB). 
There were also activities to support and strengthen the information system of the UCMB 
members. For example, computers and email systems were found installed at the UCMB 
study hospitals and training of staff in the records departments has been undertaken. UCMB 
had in-house experts especially on information and communication technology (ICT) to 
strengthen information and communication systems in the network. For example, 
performance reports were being sent via e-mail to DHC and UCMB and there were efforts to 
activate electronic communication within the UCMB network (UCMB 2005 pg 7). Other 
experts were in human resources, organisational development and financial management. As 
discussed in chapter 4, these were critical capacities for hospitals to build their systems to 
support organisational performance. Trainings - short courses and supervision visits were 
the common forms of benefiting from the UCMB experts. The Diocesan Health Coordinators 
were required to provide support to the health facilities especially to strengthen the use of 
information technologies made available. UCMB accreditation was another form of 
performance incentive (see section 4.4.3.4). 
In general, the UCMB performance framework had a ripple-down effect of performance 
evaluation meetings and action plans for performance improvement, performance monitoring 
and performance support. There were regular quarterly, semi-annual and annual performance 
review meetings. Support was provided for developing action plans to fix performance 
problems and training especially in financial and information processing. All these were 
grounded on a platform of UCMB accreditation regimen. 
6.2.2 Yellow Star Programme 
The Yellow Star Programme is a quality improvement initiative that aimed to improve the 
quality of health care in Uganda through a system of supervision, certification and 
recognition of facilities that achieve and maintain minimum standards. It also aimed to 
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improve client satisfaction by involving communities in improving and monitoring the 
quality of services at their facilities (DISH. 2002; Ekochu 2005). The Yellow Star 
Programme was started by the MOH as an initiative to sustain quality improvement processes 
and improve performance and compliance to standards. The programme was started in seven 
districts in 2002 and was being scaled-up to all districts in a phased manner. By early 2006, 
the programme had just started in Arua district that provided this researcher an opportunity to 
encounter its effects among the study hospitals in that district. The programme started in 
Mukono district in 2003 and hospitals from this district had well-established experience of 
the programme. The programme had three sets of activities that were essential to its 
performance influence on the hospitals. These are described briefly below: 
1. Internal Assessment of Provider Quality 
The internal assessment of provider quality was based on 35 minimum quality standards. The 
standards covered six domains of the provider functions. These were infrastructure, 
management systems, infection control, information and interpersonal communication, 
clinical services and customer care. The programme concept was based on a provider and 
community report card concept (McNamara 2006). The assessments were supposed to take 
place every three months (quarterly) although there was evidence that this was not the case. 
Checklists, interviews and observations were used by an external team of supervisors to 
assess performance and provide scores for all the 35 standards. The scores were standardised 
and feedback was given for each of the six domains and as overall percentage achievement. 
2. Feedback of Performance and Action Plans 
The results of the assessment were provided as feedback immediately (within a week) after 
the assessment. The feedback was provided at a forum that included the hospital managers, 
the district technical and political leaders as well as community leaders. The feedback was 
aimed at providing the hospital managers with their internal quality assessment together with 
the views from the community about the hospital services. 
"These people (yellow star team) visited on 9`h Feb, 2006. They assessed the hospital and also went to 
the community. After their visit they called us to town and gave us their report ... All of 
findings were 
given. They also invited DHOS, political leaders of local government " (HMT-Hosp-2). 
During the feedback meetings, the facility management teams together with the community 
leaders were facilitated by the Yellow Star Team (YST) to develop action plans to address 
the shortcomings identified in the assessment. The implementation of the action plans would 
be followed up and included in the quarterly supervision by the YST. More importantly, 
financial resources had been committed to these action plans. Project grants provided to the 
hospitals for the community health programmes were being used to implement these action 
plans. The YSP activities were being financed by a USAID project known as UPHOLD. 
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3. Recognition for Quality Improvement 
The recognition of quality improvements by the YSP was similar to the one used in the hotel 
industry. "Star" insignias were used as external signals to the public for quality status of the 
hospital or health centre. Consistent attainment of scores above specified cut-off percentage 
points in two consecutive assessment rounds (i. e. quarterly assessments) qualified a hospital 
or health centre to a "Yellow Star" insignia. If continued improvements in the scores were 
sustained on two subsequent assessment rounds, the hospital would be awarded a second and 
third Yellow Star insignias -thus symbolising 2-star and 3-star status respectively. A huge 3- 
dimensional monument of a star would be erected in front of the hospital as a public 
recognition of excellence if the 3-star status is sustained over three consecutive rounds of 
assessment. Clearly these processes were indicative of an incremental process of quality 
improvement that took over one year for a facility to reach the ultimate prize. Internally 
within the hospital, small prizes - certificates and trophies were used to encourage a culture 
for quality improvements. As the message on the exhibit below shows, this cultural 
engineering was aimed at creating trust in the health services (DISH. 2002). In the early 
phase of quality assessments the hospitals were encouraged by recognising outstanding 
progress (improvements) in each of the assessed domains. Trophies or placards were awarded 
for this purpose. Mugs, individual certificates and calendars with Yellow Star messages are 
also provided to individual staff with excellent qualities24. 
4. Community Awareness of Provider Quality 
The advocacy component of the programme was geared to improving community awareness 
of good quality health services as well as for gaining support for Yellow Star Programme 
activities. For example, communities were informed about the significance of a Yellow Star 
insignia given to the health provider facility. They were also being encouraged to demand 
key aspects of service quality from health providers. Advocacy activities included talking to 
the community leaders and attending community-level meetings. Fliers and meetings were 
also being used in the early phases of the programme. For example, at each Star-award 
ceremony, the community leaders would be invited to witness the occasion. Available 
information from another district indicated that the award of the ultimate prize i. e. the event 
of erecting a huge 3-dimensional star in front of the health facility was a much-publicised 
event. Available pictures showed that the event was presided over by a Vice President of 
Uganda and included a Brass Band leading a public march in the community (UCMB 2005b). 
24 Based on feedback from the communities, names of staff identified as outstanding in their work would get 
such awards. 
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Figure 6.5: Yellow Star Programme: Log and Public Event to Recognise Success in 
Quality Improvements 
Log: Yellow Star Programme The Vice President and district Icaders at the l cllme 
Star Branding Ceremony at a health center 2005 
5. Capacity Building at the District 
One key feature of the YSP was the decentralised nature of the programme right from the 
start. Early in the start-up of the initiative in a district, a district Yellow Star Team was setup, 
trained and facilitated to undertake the programme activities in the district. Membership of 
the district yellow star team had been drawn from the health workers in hospitals, district 
health officials and a political leader in the district. The trained persons were provided with 
manuals and linked to the District Health Office. However, the financial support for YSP 
activities was still not integrated into the district budget and was a source of uncertainty and 
irregularity of YSP activities. For example, by 2006, there were only three quality assessment 
visits (10 expected) among the study hospitals that had started participating in the YSP in 
2003. 
6.3 Summary: 
This chapter has highlighted the performance mechanisms at the interface between PBC and 
the case study hospitals. The pilot mechanisms included selection of the targets, performance 
measurements, performance feedback and if eligible, a financial bonus was awarded for 
successful target accomplishment. The findings in the chapter have shown that constraints 
were encountered in animating these mechanisms in a manner that would lead to effective 
performance responses to PBC pilot. 
The chapter findings highlighted difficulties in performance measurement and in the 
feedback. The implementation of the PBC pilot was itself problematic especially due to 
insufficient financing for the essential activities. Other causes of ineffective implementation 
were related to the coupling of conflicting roles. The pilot implementation team was charged 
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with concurrent objectives for pilot implementation and pilot impact evaluation. The 
important findings regarding performance control and management are related to 
measurements, feedback and the bonuses. These are highlighted below: 
6.3.1 Measurement Difficulties 
The findings in this chapter illuminated several sources of measurement difficulties for the 
desired outcomes - PBC targets. Performance assessment together with impact surveys was 
contracted to a local research institution. As a prerequisite, from the lens of expectancy 
theory, the measurements needed to be fair, valid and consistent. These conditions were not 
achieved during PBC implementation. 
1. Fairness: Several approaches used to measure the output volumes were not fair to 
hospitals. For instance, the measurements were based on primary registers even when the 
contract document stated otherwise. Non-availability of the registers on the day the 
performance verification team (PVT) visited was punished as zero performance. The 
failure by the verification team to read or understand a diagnosis in the register also 
meant under assessment for the provider's performance. 
2. Validity: Validity requires that the measured performance arises from and encompasses 
all the dimension relevant to the efforts towards a measurable objective (Smith and Street 
2006). The main finding on validity related to problems in the format of the data in the 
registers and the behaviours of some members in the PVT. For instance some essential 
variables for computing the service targets such as "age of patients" were not routinely 
recorded. The PVT was taking shortcuts that included instances of forging performance 
data. Given the problems in the registers, steep workload and the opportunist behaviours 
of the PVT, the performance measurement process lacked validity. 
3. Consistence or reliability was a problem due to several adjustments that were made 
during implementation period. As the performance verification teams acquired some 
expertise in dealing with the registers, they were more likely to understand the recorded 
diagnoses, and shorthand used to record performance data. This improvement among the 
performance auditors meant that the data they collected was not comparable across time - 
and by extension not reliable to compute percentage change in performance of provider 
organisations. Given the decline in cooperation (providing data and being interviewed) 
from the provider organisations in subsequent rounds, additional problems of reliability 
were likely. 
4. Confusion of roles: The findings in this chapter show that there was confusion of roles 
within the performance verification team (PVT). Performance-verification and impact- 
assessment were merged and undertaken as one activity by the PVT. This caused a 
tension between proper implementation of the pilot and the evaluation of its impact. From 
the findings, the activities of impact evaluation seem to have crowded-out those aimed at 
auditing the performance against the three performance targets. 
5. Intrusive approach: It emerged from the descriptions that the PVT was disruptive to the 
provider organisations by trying to accomplish several activities in a short period of time. 
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Findings indicate that the service provision activities were nearly halted in order for the 
PVT to do its performance audits. Some implications of these problems were observed 
among the narratives of respondents. Resentment and lack of cooperation had emerged in 
the subsequent rounds of performance verification with reported decline in compliance 
with pilot activities. The narratives indicated that the PVT auditing processes may have 
affected the clients' experiences and indicators like "waiting-time", thus creating a 
potential bias for negative results in the impact data for PBC pilot. 
6.3.2 Performance Feedback 
On its own, performance feedback was shown to have important effects on the hospitals. 
Findings show that performance feedback by the PBC pilot and among Yellow Star and 
UCMB frameworks was helpful for identifying solutions for improving performance. In its 
early phase, when the feedback was given amidst an inclusive forum with representatives 
drawn from the political, technical, peer providers and their BOG members, the discussions 
in this forum suggested an opportunity for learning among the key stakeholders and 
improving performance governance. For example, political leaders and members of the BOG 
were exposed to comparative information about service volumes from many health units and 
information about operational constraints such as staffing levels and inadequate budgets. It 
was observed that the discussions at these inclusive forums provided strategic guidance for 
performance improvements and innovations. For instance providers were urged to address 
problems of incomplete records and handling clients well. However, financial insufficiency 
for the PBC pilot activities gradually eclipsed performance feedback and focused on bonus 
payment instead. The timing between performance feedback and performance assessment 
was also problematic. Little time was given to the hospitals to act on the feedback results 
before the next performance assessment was due. The synchronisation of feedback and 
assessment seem to have a structural bias against the hospital making any correction action. 
Some differences in design of performance feedback existed among PBC, Yellow Star and 
UCMB frameworks (table 6.3). Feedback under Yellow Star programme was given soon after 
the assessment. This was possible due to simpler measurement tools i. e. checklists and client 
satisfaction survey that did not require complicated analysis. Like the initial feedback by 
PBC, Yellow Star also used a stakeholder model for promoting broader performance 
accountability and governance. Feedback forums included peer providers, political and 
technical district leaders. A local team made up of clinically oriented persons from the district 
undertook the technical measurement of quality. This is equivalent to a peer-review 
mechanism that Ouchi (1979) refers to as a clan-control mechanism. Community views and 
satisfaction were undertaken together with members drawn from among the community 
leaders. As such, the district Yellow Star Teams had both a clinical and consumer orientation. 
The UCMB design for feedback and for collecting performance measurements showed 
marked differences. For instance, the collection of performance information relied on the 
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performance reports submitted by the hospital managers. Probably due to more established 
trust arising from a strong institutional foundation of UCMB hospitals, performance 
verification was anchored in bureaucratic and soft control systems. Unlike YSP and PBC, the 
performance feedback forum for UCMB included mostly UCMB members i. e. hospital 
managers, DHC and UCMB experts. In the descriptions by Ouchi, this arrangement can be 
referred as a "clan system" where feedback is for members only (Ouchi 1979). Like YSP, 
UCMB also used the performance measurement and feedback as a means for generating 
action plans for performance improvements. Both financial and technical support was being 
provided by YSP and UCMB based on the action plans for performance improvements. The 
table 6.3 provides a summary of the contrasts between the three performance frameworks. 
6.3.3 Bonus: Financing and Size 
Since bonus payment was coupled to performance feedback processes, it was subjected to 
delays due to securing the funds for both the feedback costs and the bonuses. The findings 
show that fundraising for the bonus money was transaction intensive and influenced the 
design and timing of the performance feedback. For example funds secured for bonus 
payments did not include costs for inviting key stakeholders to broaden the performance 
accountability and nurture the governance for results. Despite doubling the bonus size, the 
amounts were too small compared to the total hospital revenues. For instance the total bonus 
accounted for 3.3 percent of revenue for the case-study hospital that succeeded in achieving 
10 out of a maximum of II bonus points. It was not possible in this study to establish the 
costs of generating a five or ten percent increase among the service targets. Such information 
would be useful to make firm conclusion about the incentives implicit in the contracts 
offered. However, the findings also show that the two case study hospitals in this chapter 
were responsible for 82 percent of the entire bonus funds paid out to a total of 19 health 
facilities. As such, efforts seeking to measure the impact and cost-effectiveness of 
performance bonuses or PBC innovation need to pay more attention to the hospitals. 
In summary, the pilot implementation was faced with several technical and financial 
challenges. Adaptations were made to the implementation arrangements. These adaptations 
had both enhancing and blunting effects on the pilot design mechanisms for successful 
response to PBC pilot. Enhancing adaptations included the doubling of bonus amounts, the 
initial attempts to bridge performance accountability and governance among key stakeholders 
and establishing a forum for shared learning among pilot participants. The imbalance 
between proper implementation of the essential elements of the pilot and evaluating its 
impact was a source of problems for both. 
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Table 6.3: Performance Frameworks -contrasts between PBC, UCMB and Yellow Star 
PBC UCMB Yellow star 
Objective Increase in the 3 services Efficiency, productivity and Quality improvement and 
selected as targets equity of the provider Or g. use of quality standards. 
Measurem Percentage increase in Computation of average Multi-dimension quality 
ent target outputs. scenario for efficiency & measures - 35 process 
variables Also data for impact productivity to compare indicators for quality and 
assessment across similar units community satisfaction. 
Data Primary registers, Annual performance reports Observations, checklists 
source household survey, staff submitted by providers plus and client interviews 
interviews, organisational new surveys for client 
inventory satisfaction and quality 
Data Outsourced performance Hospital managers but reports Yellow Star Team made 
collectors assessment to a research verified by BOG and up of clinical peers, 
institution. Diocesan Coordinators administrative and 
political leaders. 
Decentralised YSP 
activities to district level 
Performan At first, a stakeholder Professional (clan model) of Internal to hospital, clan 
ce model of performance performance accountability - model of feedback is 
feedback accountability. Also i. e. feedback for members given about the clinical 
aimed to achieve peer-to- only. Strong peer-to-peer quality domains 
peer learning from best- learning from clan best External to the hospital, a 
practice. But abandoned practices. stakeholder model of 
stakeholder model due to Feedback given annually and accountability i. e. 
insufficient funds. bi-annually "public-report card" for 
Feedback delayed for 5-8 Causes of sub-optimal quality. Feedback given 
months performance are identified and soon after the 
Some informal guidance action plans are developed to assessment. 
is provided to participants address them. Funds, Aim is empowerment of 
i. e. improving records. coaching and supervision client voice & Exit as the 
provided based on plans. basis of service quality. 
Technical No technical support is Micro-care approach is used. Micro-care approach. 
support given. Action plans, monitoring and Action plans, monitoring 
provided support programmes. Active and financial resources 
to the "Arms length" and institutional support i. e. for the planned actions. 
hospital "hands-off' approach management skills training, But uncertainty and 
ICT, experts coaching, irregularity of YSP 
UCMB affiliated projects with activities. 
supporting funds. 
Incentives/ Financial bonus to the Accreditation and associated Certificates, status 
Enforceme organisation after access rights e. g. discounts on symbols i. e. STAR 
nt validated performance drugs purchases, awards and publicity of 
improvements (outcome training/scholarships, grants, hospital (both process 
incentives). information/ICT and technical and outcome incentives) 
assistance rocess incentives 
In particular, the findings show that the performance measurement lacked credibility, thus 
affecting the subsequent activities in the PBC implementation chain - feedback and bonus 
payment. Proper adaptation of the hospitals to PBC required that the selected service targets 
were adjustable over time to avoid conflict among different performance objectives. This 
adaptation was eliminated, thus locking-in the contextual causes for sub-optimal pilot 
effectiveness. 
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Chapter 7: Hospital Responses to PBC 
7.0 Introduction: 
This chapter analyses PBC response from the perspective of two in-depth case study 
hospitals. Given the implementation arrangements of the PBC pilot that focused on the 
bonus-eligible group of participants, a case study of the two bonus-eligible hospitals provides 
a closer opportunity to examine responses to PBC. Given their eligibility for performance 
bonuses (treatment group), these two case study hospitals enjoyed a relatively full package of 
PBC pilot activities. The aim of this chapter is to explicate the actions taken by hospital 
actors in response to pilot activities. 
The information in this section was extracted from the responses to two sets of questions. The 
general questions such as "how do you see the performance of the hospital? " or "how is the 
hospital doing? " were analysed together with responses given to questions directly relating to 
the success or failures to secure a bonus in each of the two bonus payment rounds. The 
responses to the general hospital performance provided contextual information on 
performance constraints and enabling factors. The more direct questions such as "why did 
you fail to achieve the targets? " or "what did you do differently to succeed in getting a 
bonus? " sought to explore the respondents' explanations for failure and for success with PBC 
targets. The respondents were mostly from hospital management teams (HMT) and in a few 
cases, clinical staff in hospital departments directly responsible for providing services 
selected for PBC contract. Additional insights for this chapter come from the observation at 
three performance feedback workshops in January 2005, two interviews with the pilot 
implementation team (PIT) and two interviews with district directors of health services. The 
interviews tried to extract information related to the responses to the Yellow Star Programme. 
The response to UCMB's framework was presented in chapter 4 along with the case study of 
UCMB's performance expectation. 
7.1 PBC performance trajectories: 
As shown in table 7.1 and 7.2, each hospital had a different temporal experience regarding its 
success with the PBC targets or securing the performance bonuses. 
Case 1 Hospital secured a bonus at both the first and second round. In total, Case 1 posted the 
best overall performance among all 19 bonus eligible health facilities in the entire PBC pilot. 
This hospital received two (out of three) bonus points in the first round (Jan 2005) and 
received the maximum (8/8) bonus points in the second round (Sep 2005). Despite the 
success in securing a bonus, the views among the hospital management teams (HMTs) 
indicated concerns for less than optimal performance for the hospital as a whole. 
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Table 7.1: Case 1 Hospital - Explanations for Success and Failure to Secure a Bonus T- Bonus 
status 
Success 
Failure 
Round 1 (targets = OPD, ANC and I Round 21 
malaria treatment for children) 
(Bonus Success =2 of targets) 
" Reduction of fees (free AMC) 
" More doctors i. e. from I to 3. 
" Outreach programme expanded 
" Marketing the reduced fees 
" Reduced waiting time 
" Government ggrant -a major 
contribution S7%. 
" History of "total collapse" i. e. starting 
from low performance baseline 
" Facelift and renovations 
(Bonus Failure =1 of 3 targets) 
" Seasonal variations 
" Government grant - delay in disbursement 
" Declined revenue amidst increased 
recurrent costs e. g. salaries 
" Nurses are leaving hospital - salaries 
are too low. 
(Bonus Success =8 of targets) 
" "Got a Surgeon" 
" Became a referral hospital due to surgeon 
" Reduction of user-charges has generated more 
utilisation (although fees raised a little since last 
year) 
" Decentralise performance accountability i. e. made 
each unit accountable for their performance e. g. each 
unit prepares its annual report and "need to show 
data . Renovations of old establishments " Historical stigma2s about this hospital is now fading 
away - so more patients are coming now than before. 
(Bonus Failure -0 of 8 target) 
" despite total success, respondents perceived failures 
due to: 
" Reduced outreach 
" Government grant cut 
" breakdown of vehicle for outreach services 
" staff (doctors and nurses) changing all the time 
Case 2 Hospital started by failing to secure any bonus in the first round but went on to secure 
five bonus points in the second round. Given a larger base-grant from the Government, this 
hospital secured a much larger bonus than the total bonus secured by Case 1 hospital. Table 
7.2 provides the summary of the explanations provided for failure and success in rounds 1 
and 2. 
Table 7.2: Case 2 Hospital - Explanations for Bonus Failure Followed by Success Bonus 
status 
Success 
Failure 
Round 1 (targets = malaria treatment, 
immunisation and delivery) 
(Bonus success =0 out of 3) 
(Bonus failure =3 out of 3) 
" Unhappy with verification method used. 
" "Unstrategic" choice-making. 
" Seasonal drought and low malaria. 
" Programmes that compete with PBC 
targets are making it had to succeed eg: 
" Community malaria treatment project 
" Making efforts to support lower units. 
" Competition from free public services. 
" Poverty in community - inability to pay for reduced fees at hospital. 
" Increasing recurrent costs at a time of 
decreasing Govt. grant (contribution). 
Round 2 
(Bonus success a5 out of 
" Improved community awareness of reduced fees 
" Improved image i. e. new buildings/renovations. 
" Government grant is essential for hospital 
survival. 
. Improved staffing- more doctors and "white" 
doctors improve confidence. 
" Marketing hospital services during community 
outreach and advertise reduced fees. 
" Offer better quality than public hospital 
(Bonus failure =3 out of 8) 
" Poor target selection especially malaria. 
" Poor disbursement of Government funds 
" Level of poverty is high - people still complain 
about reduced fees or bypass the hospital for 
free care at government hospital 
25 To protect the identity of the hospital, the historical source of stigma could not be stated. 
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7.2 General Strategies for Performance Improvement 
The narratives describing reasons for the general hospital performance had similarity with 
reasons related to success and failure to secure the PBC bonuses (table 7.1 and 7.2). For 
example, the reasons given for success with PBC were reasons that affected a broad range of 
outputs and had no direct relation to the selected PBC targets. However, the failures were 
more linked to the target - problems in verification, selection or the environment. The 
similarities implied a general lack of distinction between improvement for PBC performance 
targets and performance improvement for the hospital as an organisation. The general sense 
arising from this lack of distinction is that the response to PBC was perceived as a 
consequence of broader and arguably more powerful causal levers for organisational 
performance. This assertion arises from the following five thematic domains providing 
explanations of performance changes in the two hospitals. 
I. Quality Improvements 
In general, the improvement or success of the hospitals was attributed to enhancements in 
staffing and quality of amenities. Renovations and new buildings were described as signal to 
the community for better quality. These were variously referred to as "facelifts" and 
"projecting a better image to the community". The effects of these improvements were linked 
to "reduced stigma" towards the hospital as well as "comfort to the patients and staff'. 
Stigma was particularly important in case-1 that evolved from a specialised health centre that 
formally treated victims of a socially stigmatised disease - before it was converted to a 
general hospital. 
An increase in the number of doctors was said to be a cause for improved service utilisation 
(and PBC targets) while a decrease in nurses was ascribed to an internal workload escalation. 
In these hospitals, the availability of expatriate or "white' doctors was seen as a "boost" to 
the image and confidence of the hospital. The increase in the number of doctors and nurses as 
a source of performance improvement was always couched with a caveat about inadequate 
salaries. Sustaining doctors and higher cadre nurses was highly problematic due to what was 
described by some as a staff exodus. Staff desertion from the study hospitals during the 
period of data collection for this study was high. Quality of amenities as a reason for 
improving utilisation of services was used to describe a comparative advantage the PNFP 
study hospitals had over other providers especially the government and lower-level providers. 
For example, better diagnostics, drug availability and transparent (official) payments were 
perceived to be better in these hospitals compared to lower level providers or government 
hospitals. 
"we used to be two doctors, now we have been three. Those are the things that had put us on (PBC) 
target- because of the presence of those two young men (doctors) " (HMT-Hosp-1). 
"Indeed there is a marked increase (in attendance) if you compare with the last two years partly 
(because) there are more doctors. Patients want doctors. Also we now have these nurses with yellow 
belts (qualified nurses). Previously we had many nurse assistants. The surgeon has also added to the 
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patients. Now we are getting patients from (named referral) hospital. Before, we used to refer 
(patients) to them. This is now the opposite. The hospital has also had a face lift - buildings are 
renovated and it does feel good "(HMT-Hosp-1). 
".. In addition, we have improved on staffing. ... since December 2004, we have received two White doctors from German and two American doctors - all together we have six doctors, two native ones 
... our people believe more in White doctors. They have confidence in the hospital and this increase 
attendance. They do not know that these (White doctors) are hereto learn tropical medicine" (HMT- 
Hosp-2). 
2. Reduction of User Fees 
Most study hospitals started reducing user-fees or making fees fixed for key services -a 
phenomenon popularly called "flat" fees. This explanation was given in the case study 
hospitals and all other PNFP ones as a source of improvement in utilisation of services since 
2003 or 2004. The reduction and fixing of fees was one of the Government requirements 
arising from Government subsidies (grants) to PNFP sector. The success for PBC targets was 
seen as ridding on the momentum created by this policy imperative to reduce fees for PNFP 
services. 
Making PNFP services "affordable" to the poor was the basis upon which the Government 
grants were being provided to the PNFP. By 2004, the Government contribution to the PNFP 
hospital budgets was estimated at about 35 percent and ranged 30% to 60% depending on the 
size of the PNFP facility (Giusti, Lochoro et al. 2004; Lochoro, Batalingaya et al. 2006). The 
services whose fees were reduced included OPD services for children and maternal health 
services, especially antenatal care and delivery services. For admission services the reduction 
of fees was restricted to children and special programmes such as HIV testing and 
antiretroviral therapy (Odaga and Maniple 2003). Immunisation services had long been 
provided free by all PNFP hospitals and health centres. As illustrated by the interview extract 
below, case study hospitals were emerging from a period of low service unitisation. 
".. One of the major threats was user fees. In 1994 when the White sisters (Irish Nuns) left, also the 
funding was stopped. The management that took over grappled with shortage of funds and resorted to 
hiking fees to get more revenue. Unfortunately the clients run away. ... 
What we have done is (.. ) 
lowered the fees. This led to a turn around. Utilisation (bed occupancy) moved from 37% to 87%" 
(HMT-Hosp-1). 
3. Changes in the Government Grants 
The problems arising from the reduction of fees were related to the Government grants. 
These grants were seen as a source of hospital success with performance improvements and 
also as a source of performance failure. In relation to the total grants received by the hospital, 
the grants were viewed as critically important for the survival of the hospitals and central to 
the recent performance improvements. However, in relation to the erratic disbursements and 
perceived decline in the grant amounts for the year prior to this study, the respondents 
attributed their performance failures also to government grants. 
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"... We used to get Sh 7 million now we get about 137 million from Government. (... ) We also get 
some money from the (named European country) " (HMT-Hosp-1). 
"I even presented a paper - `managing under minimal resources'- you know hospitals are dependant 
so much on Government.... We had a crisis here. Government funds never came for three month. It 
affected us so much. So from that time what we decided is to make sure we use the money on the 
capital account (for donor projects) to pay for the salaries and when the Government funds come we 
replace. Because it does come but the problem is that it is not regular. So we get the salaries paid out 
of the funds we have "(HMT-Hosp-2). 
4. Cost-reduction Efforts 
Cost reduction strategies were closely linked to the user-fee reduction explanation for 
enhancing performance and also to the decline in government grants. Given the pressure from 
MOH to have user-charges reduced, most hospitals had experienced some increase in the 
utilisation of their services but also some variable costs like drugs had increased. Cost 
reduction in the provision of care was being recommended as means of sustaining lower user- 
charges (Odaga and Maniple 2003; UCMB 2003). 
Cost reducing measures were articulated as curbing irrational drug use; making staff 
conscious of costs in the prescriptions; and discouraging "heroic surgery" or discouraging 
admission of "chronic" and "costly" cases. As a tool for building this cost-consciousness, 
continuous medical education (CME) sessions had been invigorated to sensitise the staff on 
the cost issues (see case 1 below). As a means of inducing staff behaviour change, the future 
improvement in staff salaries (a contemporary concern) was being tagged to the staff ability 
to reduce costs through approaches such as rational drug use, longer-duty hours for nurses 
and clinical triage aimed at screening against high-cost care. The two case-study hospitals 
had training schools for nurses. These nurse trainees were increasingly used as substitutes to 
compensate for nursing staff shortages. In case 2 hospital (see below), the cost-reduction 
strategies aimed at reducing the size of the support staff that was considered too large. For 
example, a policy of non-replacement of retiring support-staff had been adopted in the 
revised employment manual. The following extracts from the manager of clinical services 
are suggestive of an active strategy to cut cost and change the case-mix of the hospital. The 
extract also raised the danger of such measures: 
".. We had to redirect CME to look at those targets.... Previously it was just to choose topics without 
(performance objective), ... 
but what we did was to choose those topical issues affecting the 
hospital.... Like rational use of drugs. Because if people do not know rational use of drugs, it directly 
affects the work because we have a flat rate (fixed charges) "(HMT-Hosp-I). 
".. for example, these days, we are not in the mood for (treating) accident patients. So what we do - 
okfor simple cases like fractures [we can fix], but this business of long (stay) - six month. ... 
If you see 
what we put in (spend) compared to what the patient pays - those are referred (to other hospitals). 
Actually, I have been telling my colleagues (doctors) - these chronic, chronic conditions, heroic 
surgery, should not be encouraged.... Because for one week of admission, we spend a lot on them. We 
rather work on those with 3-4 days - may be 5 days maximum, and someone is discharged "(HMT- Hosp-1). 
5. Historical Trends 
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Many of the narratives used historical trajectories of the hospital's performance to 
contextualise current service outputs levels. For instance, respondents tended to use historical 
comparison of hospital performance in the last 3-5 years as explanations for current 
performance successes. The elements in the historical trends to which performance 
improvements were tied included new infrastructure, past increments in the size of grants 
from Government and in some cases, reduced stigma towards the hospitals - especially the 
hospital that was established as a specialised treatment centre for a socially stigmatised 
disease. When it became a general hospital six years before this study, there was community 
stigma attached to seeking care from this hospital. There was a clear difference among the 
two case study hospitals regarding the historical trajectories and current performance. These 
are briefly outlined: 
Case I Hospital 
The respondents in this hospital used a language that implied that the hospital was near total 
collapse 5-6 years before. The hospital was said to have had "pathetic infrastructure", 
suffered from the withdrawal of funding by the founding European congregation and from 
community stigma due to its earlier focus on treating victims of a locally stigmatized disease. 
These features had been significantly overcome by 2005 due to a number of positive 
developments. Among the developments were the new and competent administration staff, 
increased26 Government grants and renovations and new buildings. The narratives implied 
very low utilisation 4-5 years ago which might have formed a relatively low and easy 
springboard (baseline) for accelerated catch-up in the recent years. 
"By the way, compared to some 4-5 years ago - we are now performing very well. For once now our 
bed occupancies is 70 percent - some time in the past it was less than 40%" (HMT-Hosp-1). 
"You probably do not know where we started, our name was so bad and people used to say (named) 
hospital was about [named disease]27. We had very old infrastructure. We have had to renovate some 
and maintain the other" (HMT-Hosp-1). 
"When I was posted here there were three people (patients) in (the) medical ward. It was dilapidated, 
I myself could not allow being treated there as a patient" (HMT-Hosp-1). 
Case 2 Hospital 
The performance of this hospital was described as very high in the past and was now on the 
recovery trend after a depression. The depression was attributed to both internal and external 
changes. The internal issues related to poor management practices culminating in a staff 
strike and short-lived hospital closure in 2003. The new management team after the strike 
made several internal changes to administrative systems to assure steady salary payments. 
One of the changes was to establish a regular staff assembly to improve communication 
between staff and administration. A reserve fund was also established to cushion staff 
salaries from irregular Government grant disbursements. The external changes were related to 
26 .,.. .. --.... . ---- . . -_ .... .... ..... -. .. -- -ý a.. i ne grant increased from 7 million in 1998 to 137 million in 2UU4 but has reduces Tor zuu: )iuo nnanci: u y-. 
" The Disease is masked here to protect the identity of the hospital. 
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the market structure for this hospital. In the past, this hospital had less competition due to 
dysfunctional public providers and lower level health facilities. From their descriptions, the 
hospital was the only place of resort for good services in the past. When the public facilities 
stopped charging user-fees in 2001 and lower level services improved in terms of drugs and 
staffing, the hospital experienced a decline in performance (attendance). 
"If you look at the overall performance of OPD attendance over the years, OPD of those years were 
about 35,000 (now about 20,000). They (OPD attendance) have been dropping, dropping until about 
2001 and started going up a little. I believe people in those years (of high OPD attendance) used to 
come here for every minor illness. There were no services working down there (lower levels) at all. 
But services down there are improving and they do not have to come to the hospital for small 
ailments " (HMT-Hosp-2). 
7.3 Performance Strategies Attributed to PBC 
It is not easy to make firm attribution of response to PBC intervention using qualitative 
interview techniques. Part of the problem is related to the multi-component intervention that 
PBC pilot signified (see chapter 6). As discussed in section 6.2, the components included 
selection of performance goals/targets, performance verification, performance feedback and 
where eligible, bonus payment. 
For the two case study hospitals, three sets of prospective interviews were conducted to try to 
unpick the strategies - purposeful actions attributable to response to PBC. The questions here 
aimed to find out what was being done to secure the next bonus and what was done 
differently to win the previous bonus. These questions were repeated in the second and third 
interviews rounds. The first and second interviews were conducted 3-4 months after PBC 
bonus payments. This temporal delay between bonus payment and interviews was essential to 
allow time for the hospitals to react to the PBC feedback and to make allocation decisions for 
the received bonus funds. However, the third interviews were done before bonus payments 
were made. The funds to pay for the third round of bonus payments were not forthcoming 
due to prolonged negotiation with potential financiers, leading to these interviews taking 
place before the bonus payment. 
The responses in the two case study hospitals are best summarised in two categories i. e. early 
adopters that failed to sustain purposeful actions and late adopters reacting to late success. As 
implicit in these qualitative descriptions, the response actions and their sustenance were 
linked to the manner in which the received bonus was used. Section 7.4 discusses the use of 
the bonuses. As already discussed in section 6.2.2, there was no evidence of consistent 
knowledge of the selected performance targets among the HMT and little evidence of 
purposeful response actions before the first round of bonus payment in both hospitals. 
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7.3.1 Early Adopters and Poor Sustainers 
There was evidence in Case 1 HOSP-1 hospital of active interest and purposeful actions 
(strategy) for attaining the targets and their second bonus during the first set of interviews in 
May 2005. This was four months after the first bonus of about $1,500 was awarded to this 
hospital (table 6.2). In the narratives of the two hospital managers and departmental leader 
(ward nurse) in-charge of one of the targets, it was clear that two active strategies were at 
play to attain targets. These were: 
1. Marketing of reduced user fees: 
The recent reduction and fixing of the fees for OPD, ANC, maternal delivery and child-care 
admission services needed to be communicated to the communities to ensure that utilisation 
improved. This strategy was being used as a means of achieving success on both the PBC 
targets as well as other performance requirements from the district, UCMB and yellow star 
programmes. This hospital had OPD, antenatal and malaria treatment as their selected PBC 
targets. The OPD and antenatal targets were similar to the targets in the league table of the 
MOH. The prospects of additional bonus from PBC pilot seemed to have synergised the 
otherwise generic strategy of marketing the new and reduced fees in all the PNFP providers. 
The marketing strategy included expansion of the outreach service team of providers to 
include a Health Inspector who was charged with the responsibility of marketing the new 
hospital fees and services. From the narratives, the duty of the Health Inspector was to talk to 
the community (outreach clients) about the changes in the hospital fees for OPD, ANC 
maternal delivery and admission for children. Awareness of new services such as ultra- 
sonography, antiretroviral therapy, and a new eye-clinic was also mentioned. 
There was little sharing of information regarding PBC within this hospital. For example, the 
head nurse for the paediatric ward was not aware about the childhood malaria treatment target 
that was under her departmental responsibility. To a large extent, the information regarding 
PBC targets was limited to those in the hospital management team and in particular the 
doctor responsible for the Community Health Department (CHD). This is probably due to the 
external focus of the marketing approach which could be justified given the fact that the 
clinical staff only dealt with clients that had elected to come into the hospital. The responses 
from the ward nurse and midwife in this hospital suggested that they had little influence over 
the number of admissions on their wards. Their responsibility was to treat those that come to 
the hospital. Nonetheless, this view did not recognise the role of building a reputation among 
clients to influence future return for the service or referral of other clients. 
2. Internal systems reorganisation: 
The second explicit and well-triangulated strategy for success with PBC targets among the 
respondents indicated an internal reorganisation to reduce waiting time. The client flow 
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within the outpatient department was reorganised to quicken the clinical processes. For 
example, the antenatal clinic was separated from the general OPD clinic -a situation made 
possible by a new building. The antenatal clinic was also made more self-contained by 
creating a provision for the clinic to hold its own drugs and to receive payments from clients. 
The reorganisation saved time for antenatal clients from queuing up at the midwife's office, 
the pharmacy and at the cashier's office, which used to cause long delays and complaints. 
Separation of the ANC clinic also reduced the congestion within the OPD clinic. This 
reorganisation of services within OPD was traced to a study in 2002 at this hospital 
(Nakafeero 2002). To enhance its competitive advantage, the study recommended that the 
hospital decongest OPD and decentralise some of the pharmacy and cashier functions to 
clinical departments. The recommendations were made in light of the study findings that 
most client complaints were related to long waiting time and multiple queues. It seems the 
decision to separate the ANC clinic from OPD was made long before the PBC pilot was 
introduced. The new building to house the ANC clinic was commissioned in mid 2004. 
Although PBC pilot did not trigger this reorganisation, it provided a "validating effect"- that 
the reorganisation of ANC clinic was a good decision and useful for the success of the new 
initiative like PBC. 
7.3.1.1 Adapting PBC Demands to Internal Changes 
Findings from the second-set of interviews conducted between December 2005 and January 
2006, showed a shift in the main strategies for success - i. e. securing the third bonus. 
Explanations had now changed from the marketing of the new fees and services to the 
influence of a new and specialised doctor -a surgeon. Although none of the PBC targets 
required the services of a surgeon, it was claimed that the surgeon had elevated the hospital to 
a "referral" status. This may imply that the surgeon was seen as a quality signal to the 
community and perceived to influence the increase of hospital clients beyond the surgical 
services. For instance, claims were made that this hospital had started receiving patients from 
the neighbouring government hospital (15Km a way) that had a regional referral function. 
During the second and third interview rounds, it was evident that the original strategy for 
marketing the fees in the community had been derailed. A number of significant changes 
had happened within the hospital six months after the first interview in May 2005, which 
made the marketing strategy unsustainable. These are reviewed briefly: 
1. An entire new set of doctors (three including a surgeon) had been recruited to replace the 
three that had left six months before December 2005. More importantly, these staff 
changes had resulted in the loss of the main strategist for PBC in this hospital. During the 
first interviews in May 2005, the doctor in charge of the Community Health Department 
(CHD) was most enthusiastic and most involved in the PBC pilot activities i. e. 
performance feedback workshops. The doctor was the most articulate about the 
contractual commitments to PBC targets and how the targets were being addressed. The 
CHD that this doctor headed was responsible for marketing of hospital services and 
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generally organising outreach services. Given the limited sharing of PBC-related 
information beyond this doctor and the hospital management team, the doctor's departure 
caused a significant loss of institutional memory for PBC pilot activities. 
2. The second significant change was related to the stoppage of funds for the CHD 28 
activities to this hospital. Without these funds to conduct CHD activities such as outreach 
immunisations and support supervision to lower-level health units, the marketing of 
hospital services and its reduced fees was also affected. Failure to properly account for 
the CHD funds to the district authorities was implied as the cause of the stoppage of the 
funds. As discussed in section 5.6.2.2 (chapter 5) the management in this hospital was 
generally perceived by the district authorities as having weak institutional structures for 
proper financial accountability. By the third and last interviews in June 2006, one of the 
new doctors had been formally assigned the role of managing the CHD activities and the 
funds for the CHD had started to flow again. 
At the end of field study activities in June 2006, the future oriented strategies for success with 
PBC targets were loosely premised on a new innovation that was being rolled out by UCMB 
at this time. The Cost-Centre Approach was being introduced in all UCMB hospitals as a 
means for enhancing "decentralised" financial-control systems within the hospitals (Akidi 
2005). This innovation was seen by the hospital respondents as a means of sustaining PBC 
success. In particular, the requirement under the cost-centre approach for each hospital 
department to prepare its own performance report was assumed to be a sufficient incentive to 
keep PBC targets improving. For example, those in administration believed that each 
department would need "data to show improvements" and the PBC targets would ride on this 
new innovation. 
" The in-charge and her team prepare their report. ... 
Our job is to give them guidelines and 
deadlines. This motivates them in a small way. ... There is no worry (of PBC targets) at all. These 
are part of the normal working. No pressure (of PBC targets) at all. In their (departmental) meetings, 
of course they are asked how they are performing. Remember they are charged with the 
responsibility of writing (departmental performance) reports. They need data and indicators to show 
improvement" (HMT-Hosp-1). 
7.3.2 Case 2- Late Adoption and a Focus on Records 
The case of HOSP-2 illustrates the influence of performance feedback about service records. 
In the first round, HOSP-2 did not qualify for any bonus and one of the reasons was that it 
had "incomplete records". A zero mark was given against its malaria target. This feedback of 
incomplete records attracted mixed reaction from the respondents in the HMT. There was 
disappointment about the feedback of "incomplete records" at the same time there was 
interest by the HMT to establish why the records were considered incomplete. Concurrent 
with PBC pilot implementation, this hospital was monitoring the effects of its recently 
28 Community Health Departments are the creation of the district health system to implement health prevention 
and promotion activities according to the Health Sub-district Policy of MOH. 
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reduced client charges. Utilisation and revenue data were actively being collected, aggregated 
and plotted to monitor client-trends and income. The office of the Lead Manager (Medical 
Superintendent) had graphic displays of utilisation and income for key services for 2003/04 
and 2004/05 financial years. The feedback of incomplete records was not well received since 
the plotted service utilisation trends were showing upward trends. Although the interest to 
investigate the problems in the records to find out why they had failed to secure the bonus 
was expressed during the first interview round (May 2005), it is after the hospital had 
successfully secured its first bonus in the second round (September 2005), that purposeful 
actions on records and internal information sharing on PBC started. 
"All along I had kept silent about this (PBC pilot) but when the bonus came, I used this story (bible 
story in Mathew about talents) to talk at the (staff assembly. I reminded them about the study and 
announced the bonus " (HMT-Hosp-2). 
By the third interview in June 2006, the HMT had completed a mini re-organisation of the 
records system. It was "found out" that there was "under-recording" of bed occupancy on the 
wards. This was partly attributed to shortage of nurses, high workload and over-delegation of 
primary records to nurse assistants and trainees to fill. As part of the reorganisation of the 
records system, new data-capture forms were designed to ensure that daily auditing of patient 
numbers on the ward was done and reported to the Medical Superintendant (MS). Likewise, 
patient registers had to be reconciled with the cashier records. More importantly, 
performance feedback to each department was initiated. The performance monitoring graphs 
that were exclusively for the management team (to track trends for fees and utilisation) were 
used to give performance feedback to each department. 
"We had to show them the graph with 50% bed occupancy and yet we are always having floor-cases 
(beyond capacity) and they would complain that they are under assessed. But this under recording is 
improved a little. Also there is this too much work (overload). They always say that they forget to 
record. Sometimes there is only one staff on the ward. If it's maternity, you would be busy with 
clearing the line and forget to record all patients you see " (HMT-Hosp-2). 
Towards the end of this study, it was claimed that the new system of auditing patient records 
had improved the bed occupancy substantially and made the hospital manager optimistic that 
they would be in position to secure the next round of bonus. It is noteworthy that two of the 
selected PBC targets, i. e. malaria and deliveries, were in-patient services and thus subject to 
"under-reporting" of bed occupancy. It is also noteworthy that the attention to records was 
more for in-patient services. The managers reported a perception that the records for OPD 
services were fine. 
The focus on the records in this hospital can also be traced to two additional contextual 
developments within the broader district. Poor and declining ranking of the district 
performance on the national MOH league table had been widely blamed on incomplete 
submission of performance reports to the district. In response to the poor district 
performance on the MOH league table, there were concerted efforts by the district health 
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directorate to ensure that all its health facilities improved their records systems and promptly 
submitted their performance reports. This author witnessed active discussions about missing 
and incomplete records in one district performance review meeting he attended. For example, 
managers of health centres that had incomplete submission of performance reports were 
booed, teased by colleagues and pressured to explain to the meeting why they had incomplete 
reports. The second contextual issue for poor records was the acute shortage of health staff in 
the PNFP sub-sector. Given better salaries and a massive recruitment exercise by the 
government sector, the remaining staff in this hospital faced a huge workload burden. 
Records become one of the tasks that the overburdened staff were less willing to complete. 
This issue is discussed further in chapter 8 on motivation of clinical staff. 
By the third and last interview, there were also actions towards the marketing of hospital 
services to the community as a way to achieve PBC targets. The marketing strategy seems to 
have arisen from the assessment and the recommendations of the recently established Yellow 
Star Programme in the district hosting this hospital. 
"... Outside in the community - like today, we are having meetings with the community leaders. The 
uptake of outreach services is poor. So we have started to mobilise the community- to inform them 
about new services available - like PMTCT, ARV , orthopaedic and 
X-rays. Last month, Yellow Star 
people assessed us and also recommended that we mobilise the community and educate them about 
the services. We are also building skills to mobilise the community better" (HTM-Hosp-2). 
7.4 Attributions for Performance Failure 
Many of the reasons advanced for poor performance regarding PBC targets and generally as 
failures to achieve maximum possible performance for the hospital as a whole were attributed 
mostly to external influences that had affected the internal capacity to perform well. In 
addition to the problems of staff shortage already discussed above, the two major reasons for 
sub-optimal performance are briefly described below: 
7.4.1 Increased Costs and Dependence on Uncertain Government Grants 
The delay in monthly disbursements and the decline in size of Government grants to the case 
study hospitals were the main reasons given for suboptimal performance. From the 
descriptions, the study hospitals were vulnerable to fluctuation in the flow of government 
grants due to reduced net revenues from user fees. The reduction of client fees had led to 
increased service utilisation and gross revenues. However, concurrent increases in the drugs 
and supplies costs as a result of more clients had increased the overall operating costs of the 
hospitals. Furthermore, higher operation costs were attributable to increased salaries. As the 
PNFP hospitals attempted to curb staff losses to the government sector, they had to increase 
the salaries of their staff to reduce the salary gap. 
Based on the narratives, it is possible to conjecture that the increased utilisation due to 
reduced and fixed fees was not sufficient to compensate for the increased costs. The 
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reduction of net revenues from user-fees increased hospital dependence on government grants 
more than before. Several narratives described financial difficulties to pay salaries and 
keeping drugs available. Expressions such as "hand-to-mouth", "challenge of managing 
broke institutions", "juggling funds" and "breaking the rules" were used to describe the 
financial constraints to performance. In some institutions, financial vulnerability had forced 
those in management to open up communication channels with hospital staff to explain why 
the salary payments were delayed or to inform staff about plans and proposals for better 
salaries in the near future. 
The heightened perception of financial vulnerability does explain to an extent why the 
winning of the PBC bonuses was not a source of triumph. Even after winning the maximum 
bonus in the second round, respondents in Case 1 HOSP-1 continued to complain about 
performance constraints when asked about the strategic actions that allowed them to succeed 
to secure PBC bonuses. Similar behaviours were observed during the first round of 
performance feedback meetings in January 2005. In these meetings, the recipients of the 
bonus preferred to speak about their performance constraints than to speak about what had 
been done to be successful. The expressed constraints in these workshops related to delays in 
disbursement of PHC grants and "poaching" of PNFP staff by local governments. The 
reasons for reluctance to take credit for success among the bonus winners were not clear from 
the data. As a conjecture, it may be an issue of the size of the bonus being small or internal 
information that such performance levels were part of the normal expectation or indeed other 
reasons. 
7.4.2 Lock-in of "Unstrategic" Choice of Targets 
Some of the reasons for failure were related to the PBC pilot itself. As experience and 
learning about PBC accumulated and events in the environment evolved, hospitals needed 
some room to adjust their initial set of PBC targets to avoid failure. The decision by the pilot 
implementation team to confine the hospitals to the performance targets they selected in haste 
two years earlier was blunting their capacity to adapt to new contextual realities. Given this 
"lock-in effect! 'of the PBC pilot (also see section 6.2.2.2), hospitals faced barriers to respond 
by altering the initial choice of service targets that were selected "unstrategically" or those 
that were redundant due to new developments. This particular feeling was building up after 
Case 2 hospital (HOSP-2) had received its first bonus - an event that increased attention paid 
to PBC targets. From the narratives, HMT members made explicit and implicit fears 
regarding the prospects for success on the malaria target in the context of seasonal variations 
and growing prevention efforts to "eradicate" malaria in Uganda. Given this context, the 
selection of OPD or malaria as service targets for this hospital was probably unwise. Uganda 
is one of the beneficiaries of the United States' Presidential Malaria Initiative to scale up 
prevention efforts for malaria (USAID 2006). 
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"... In particular ... we will ensure that supplies are available. When drugs are there attendance is 
good. But it's a tricky situation. The population may get better and PHC (primary health care) 
activities may reduce the need for (hospital) care. People are talking of malaria eradication. If they 
are serious, we will have trouble (laughs) " (HMT-Hosp-2). 
"... like for OPD attendance, the problem (is) these seasonal peaks - last year, what I realised, there 
was that dry season. It (OPD) was so, so low. Abnormally low. But this year when you look at the 
targets, we are on the way "(HMT-Hosp-1). 
7.5 How were the Bonuses Used? 
How the bonuses were used was an internal process to the hospital but subject to some 
influence from PBC pilot implementation team (PIT). In this section both PIT influences and 
the internal processes for handling the bonuses are examined in relation to the outcomes - i. e. 
what the bonus funds were used for. The question addressed in this section was: To what 
extent did the bonus use and the decision-making processes affect the response to PBC 
targets within the case study hospitals? The underlying assumption was that the decision 
processes and outcomes affect the motivation to pursue successful strategies for PBC (Lynch, 
Eisenberger et al. 1999; Gibson, Martin et al. 2005). The descriptions are limited to the two 
case study hospitals that received the bonus. To a limited extent, information regarding 
response to the Yellow Star Programme is used to compare with the responses due to PBC. 
There was also a variable time lag from the time the bonus cheques were received and the 
interviews by this researcher to establish the process and outcome of the allocation of the 
bonus funds. The two case study hospitals had some similarities in the outcome of the bonus 
allocation but very different decision making processes leading to these outcomes. The 
following sections provide the brief description of the processes and outcomes for each case 
study hospital. 
7.5.1 Case 129 Hospital 
7.5.1.1 First bonus: Open Transactions, Exhibitionist Outcome 
This hospital received two bonuses US$ 1,480 for round one, and US$ 5,930 for round two. 
During the first round there was active consultation within the Hospital management team, 
the clinical staff and some involvement of the Board of Governors on the allocation decision 
of the bonus funds. The processes were led by a doctor who was leading the community 
health departments and at the time acting in the position of the lead hospital manager. In brief 
the processes of decision making and their outcome are presented below in the order in which 
they happened following the information that the first bonus was due to be received: 
1. Consultation within the HMT: 
Before the receipt of the bonus money, the HMT made some tentative allocation decisions for 
the bonus with the underlying assumption that the bonus was to be used at the discretion of 
29 Hospital names masked due to ethical requirement. 
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the hospital actors. The HMT came up with two options for bonus allocation. The first and 
most favoured was to hold a party (picnic) at the popular tourist site - the source of the River 
Nile. The second option was to invest the bonus fund into a money-making venture i. e. buy 
tents, chairs and other accessories to be rented-out at a fee for ceremonies such as weddings 
and parties. 
".. We as management, we sat down - put down a few (options). Of course we did not know the 
amount. For us we thought that we can use it for practically anything we wanted. One of the ideas 
was to make a party and cerebrate. Ok, that was high on the agenda. Go to Bujagali (waterfalls -a 
popular tourist site). The other idea was to make packages for hire - buy a tent and chairs to make 
money by hiring them out. These were the ideas we brought to the members (of staff' (HMT-Hosp-1). 
2. Consultation with the Staff: 
The HMT presented their options to the hospital staff at one of the monthly staff meetings. 
From their narratives, the staff meetings endorsed the holding of the picnic. But because the 
size of the bonus was not known, the staff meeting also added the option of buying 
equipment for OPD such as blood pressure machines. 
3. Receiving the cheque and guidance to use funds: 
Two members of the HMT attended the performance feedback workshop (PFW) at which the 
bonus - in the form of a bank cheque was presented. At the same forum, guidance on the use 
of the bonus was given. Several speeches also emphasised proper accountability for the bonus 
funds. From their narratives and the observation of this researcher at this meeting, the 
guidance was off-the-cuff and did have strong influence in the use of the first bonus in this 
hospital. At the feedback workshop, the pilot coordinator advised that the bonus funds be 
used for "visible improvements" in the hospital. 
"We were briefed that we were not supposed to distribute it but do something that can be seen... not 
to distribute it (to staff like `you take 20,000, you take 30,000" (shillings) " (HMT-Hosp-1). 
4. Reallocation decision given the guidance: 
Following the advice to use the bonus in a manner that was visible and also allowed for 
proper accountability for the funds, the HMT decided to use the funds to build a gate at the 
entrance of the hospital, fencing around it and erect a signpost indicating the services 
provided by the hospital. 
"But when we received the (bank) cheque, (named pilot coordinator) discouraged the party (picnic) 
business and told us to use the bonus for visible improvements in the hospital. When they come next 
time, the gate is therefor accountability" (HMT-Hosp-1). 
5. Feedback to the staff about changed priorities: 
Following the advice given by the pilot coordinator at the workshop, HMT informed the staff 
during their next monthly meeting about the untenable allocation of bonus to a party or picnic 
as had been agreed. From the narratives, the hospital staff members were not happy about the 
change of priorities -a situation that resulted in loss of interest in PBC. 
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".. we called for the meeting and the administrator gave them the clarification that we are going to do 
this and that (gate and fence). Of course some people were still adamant - "our party ", "our party "- 
that kind of thing. But this was a directive, you ca not go against it. We might jeopardise our (next) 
chance. So we had to be obedient" (HMT-Hosp-1). 
".. We just told them (the staff) what we were told - how to spend the money and suggested that we 
work on the gate and fencing. It also provides security to their houses. They were complaining about 
some thefts and the fence will reduce that" (HMT-Hosp-1). 
6. Belated inputs by the Board of Governors: 
The opportunity to inform the Board arose during the construction of the gate. The Board 
meetings were held every 3 months. Although the Board's advice was late and was not taken 
into account, the Board preferred the bonus funds to be invested back in the department that 
had contributed to the achievement of the bonus. They had advised that the funds be used to 
buy equipment for OPD and antenatal departments. 
"... Although some people - the members of the Board - you know, there was pulling ... some 
(BOG 
members) saying that we should have used it to buy equipment for ANC (antenatal clinic) ... We told 
them that we are going to get equipment worth much more from (named European NGO). And 
besides, these people (PIT) might not realize the impact of their project" (HMT-Hosp-1). 
7.5.1.2 Second Bonus: Classified Transaction and Outcome 
The second bonus ($5,930) was paid out in September 2006 after the substantive hospital 
manager was back in her position as CEO. Unlike the active consultation processes and 
information sharing for the first bonus, the second bonus was handled in a manner that is best 
described as a classified secret. Only two individuals among the HMT knew the second 
bonus and how it was used - the CEO and the accountant. According to these two persons the 
bonus funds had been used to pay-off the accumulated arrears for the National Social 
Security Fund (NSSF) and the little that was left contributed to the annual hospital party. 
Several explanations can be advanced from the narratives as to why covert actions were 
preferred in handling the second bonus. 
1. Financial crisis and escalating costs: 
During the second interviews in December 2005 and January 2006, it was evident that the 
hospital had problems meeting its operating costs. Government grants had not come for a 
long time. For example the disbursements for July through September were released in one 
bulk in December 20053°. Several staff had left due to better salary in Government, and 
according to some respondents, the hospital had been "forced" to raise the salaries of its staff 
to curb the exodus of nursing staff. Matters were made worse by UCMB's accreditation 
requirement for fulfilling the statutory staff contributions to the National Social Security 
Fund (NSSF). The increased salaries also meant an increase in the NSSF contributions 31. In 
response to these increasing costs of operations, this hospital raised the user charges in 
30 Presidential elections were due in March 2006 and election pressures affected the flow of funds to the social 
sectors 
31 Employers contributed 5% and the employees 5% of salary amount 
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September 2005. For example, the price for a delivery was increased from 5,000 to 7,000 
Uganda Shillings. OPD and antenatal visits had been increased by USh 500. Antenatal visits 
were previously free of charge when this study started in May 2005. It follows from this 
context that when the second bonus was received in September 2005, there was a shortage of 
money due to the delays in disbursement of the government grants by three months and 
increased costs of operations. Thus, the bonus funds were used to mitigate the financial 
shortage. About 70 percent of the second bonus was alleged to have paid for the NSSF 
arrears that had accumulated in the four months prior to receiving the second bonus. 
2. Prior Board advice for spending the bonus: 
The advice by the Board of Governors as to how the first bonus ought to have been spent 
probably explains why the second bonus was handled in a secretive way. The Board had 
advised that the bonus be used to benefits those departments that were responsible for the 
PBC service targets - i. e. children's ward, OPD and antenatal clinics. Although the Board's 
advice came too late for the first bonus it preceded the second bonus. Given the financial 
crisis at the time of the second bonus, wider dissemination of information about the bonus 
would have legitimised the claim of the favoured departments and aroused the Board's 
interest in the matter. 
3. Internal contestation of PBC beneficiaries: 
Related to the second point above, there was a strong view among the HMT against 
privileging the clinical departments that were responsible for the PBC targets. Those in 
administration considered themselves as the main implementers of PBC in the hospital. They 
rationalised their claim by implying that the administration was the "engine" for the hospital 
to run. Other respondents in administration favoured more inclusive approaches to sharing 
the bonus benefits. 
"The Board wanted ANC, OPD and,, paediatric ward to benefit. But we urgued and said no. 
Management is the implementer. We are on the ground and know our people. If these people are to 
be promoted (privileged) and given something, it will not work. We all contribute in one way or the 
other" (HMT-Hosp-1). 
"... You should see them (nursing staff when the salaries are delayed. They are all demoralised and 
cannot work. Like the other day when the water tank was down (no piped water), the nurses were 
running to us (in administration) to fix the problem. Also the plumber is important for their infection 
control" (HMT-Hosp-1). 
In general the use of the bonus was affected by contextual circumstances such as cash flow 
problems as well as internal disagreements on how the bonus should be used. The Board's 
advice aimed to closely link the bonus and the PBC targets - e. g. advised that bonus be 
invested back into the departments responsible for the targets. Those in administration 
opposed this view and preferred a more equitable process. Lack of communication for the 
second and much larger bonus can be (in part) interpreted as a mechanism to avoid potential 
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conflicts and staff dissatisfaction arising from the high-powered incentive approach 
recommended by the Board. 
7.5.1.3 Internal Implications of Bonus Use 
There were limited reactions to the bonus use amongst this hospital's staff. The reactions 
were further limited to the first bonus that was fairly open to discussion. By June 2006, the 
interviews with clinical staff at the departmental level in the hospital showed much less 
knowledge or concern about the bonus and how it was used. Respondents vaguely 
remembered the party that was cancelled and a gate that was built instead. Although not 
admitted by the hospital management team, or the staff, the open decision-making processes 
used for the first bonus and the unsatisfactory outcome of the decision i. e. cancellation of the 
picnic left dissatisfaction among the staff. Probably as an attempt to salvage the situation, the 
Annual Hospital Day to honour the hospital patron was cerebrated at the waterfalls along the 
River Nile - the site that was preferred for the picnic to celebrate the first PBC bonus. Prior 
to this, all Annual Hospital Day celebrations had been held within the hospital. In keeping 
with the efforts to keep the round-two bonus a secret, the respondents did not recall any 
mention of the PBC bonus at this party. This was an important finding especially given the 
fact that this cerebration at the River-Nile was held during October 2005, one month after 
receiving the $ 5,930 PBC bonus. Two persons among the hospital management team 
claimed that part of the second bonus was used to contribute to this party. Other views 
indicated that the party was a regular budget item for the hospital. 
7.5.2 Case-2 Hospital 
7.5.2.1 First Bonus: Open Transaction and Exhibitionist Outcome 
Unlike Case 1 hospital discussed above, Case-2 hospital received one bonus equivalent to $ 
9,040 during the course of this study. The following section describes the process of decision 
making in the order in which its stages took place. In this hospital several outcomes from the 
PBC bonus were found. It is also important to note that this hospital spread these bonus 
outcomes over a longer period of time. It took nearly five months i. e. from September 2005 
to February 2006 to complete the transactions related to the bonus funds. Section 7.4.2.2 
describes some of the expressed effects the bonus allocation processes and outcomes had on 
some of the actors in this hospital. 
1. Consultation within HMT: 
The management team after receiving the bonus made some decisions on how to spend the 
bonus funds. Three allocation options were preferred; 1) to build a house block as 
accommodation for three nursing staff; 2) to hold a party for all hospital staff and 3) to 
recognise hardworking staff. 
2. Consultation with the heads of departments: 
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The management team presented their decisions to a meeting of departmental (ward) leaders. 
The departmental leaders were requested to identify the names of the hard working staff that 
would be recognised in each of the departments. During this meeting there was discontent 
about building a staff house but more so about the decision to recognise a few hardworking 
staff. The staff representative was commissioned to undertake wider consultations with the 
rest of the staff and report back to the management team. 
3. Feedback about staff consultation: 
The outcome of the staff consultation rejected the idea of identifying and rewarding a few 
hardworking staff. Implicit in the rejection of recognising a few individuals as hardworking 
(performers) was the need to uphold teamwork among the clinical staff. 
".. The staff representative was requested to go and consult with all the staff. He came back and his 
view was that everyone was performing hard and needed to be appreciated. You see here - there is 
that feeling that if you have got the prize, you work alone. It does not encourage team spirit" (HMT- 
Hosp-2) 
"They refused the idea of giving names. They wanted everybody to be appreciated. They said that ill 
feelings will be left with those that do not get rewarded" (HMT-Hosp-2). 
4. General assembly - 1: Ratification of Decisions: At its bi-monthly general assembly in October 2005, the broader hospital staff body had 
opportunity to provide input into the decision-making regarding the bonus. It seems that the 
main inputs were intended to make all hospital staff eligible for some bonus benefit. Ideas 
brought forward by the assembly recommended that a bale of old clothes be bought and all 
staff get some cloth item. In addition, it was suggested that electric kettles be bought for each 
department to make tea while at work. It is clear that the decision to build a staff house was 
not popular but the management team insisted on having it as part of the outcome. 
"At the general assembly many ideas where given and the one of old cloth was the best. People also 
talked about the party - which we (in Management also) had, but Management also insisted on a staff 
house of three (units). So we decided to pick three items - party, block and clothes " (HMT-Hosp-2). 
"They liked the idea of the party and it seems this is going to be the first end-of-year party in the 
history of the hospital - at least in the last about S-7 years. We will have a bull slaughtered and 
recognise some staff especially the long serving ones and those due to retire " (HTM-Hosp-2). 
5. General assembly - 2: Unwrapping presents: At its next general assembly in December 2005, each staff had a chance to pick and unwrap a 
pack of clothes as a reward for hospital performance. Three bales of used (second hand) cloth 
had been bought and sorted by "gender" categories - male and female. A random method was 
used for each staff member to pick a set of the clothes according to his/her sex. According to 
the narrative of the event, the lead manager also took the opportunity of this event to remind 
the staff about working hard albeit based on a biblical sermon. 
"We had to get three bales of cloth, old clothes, and everyone got three items. (Nursing) Sister and 
her team organised and packed these for both male and females to pick It was nice and fun. It was 
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random. People appreciated it. We also gave a kettle to each ward for making tea. That general 
assembly was the best one we have had" (HMT-Hosp-2). 
"This time I reminded them the story of the Talents (bible story) and announced that the master 
(MOH) has rewarded us for hard work" (HMT-Hosp-2). 
6. End-of-year party: 
Although belated, the end of year party for the hospital was held in February 2006. From the 
respondents' narratives and pictures of the party seen by this researcher, it was a large party 
involving over 150 people. The guests included members of the hospital governing Board and 
district leaders. A cultural troupe was hired to entertain the party and disco music was also 
hired to provide music for all to dance. The electronic copy of the lead manager's speech was 
provided to this researcher. The following extract from the speech indicates that the bonus 
and PBC were made visible at the party and the hospital staff were made aware of the link 
between the bonus and increased performance; 
"There was an increase in out patient utilisation, admissions, deliveries and immunisation as 
compared to the previous year. The outputs also surpassed the planned targets for the year. However 
a decline in antenatal attendance was noted. The increased outputs resulted in the hospital winning a 
bonus from the Ministry of Health amounting to 16 million shillings. This is the main reason for this 
ceremony. I therefore salute all the staff for this major achievement and encourage you to work even 
harder this year" (Medical Superintendent's End-of-Year Party Speech 2005). 
At the party the management team decided to restrict the recognition of individuals to those 
that were due to retire from hospital service as opposed to hardworking staff. These received 
household gifts. 
"We also gave out gifts. We got gift's also for those that were retiring. We got things like lanterns, kettles and clocks - small small household items for them. So we gave presents to about 15 staff as 
send-off" (HMT-Hosp-2). 
7. Commissioning of the new staff accommodation: 
Although the building was not ready for commissioning by the end of fieldwork for this 
study, it was included in the plans to have the new building commissioned before the end of 
the year. From the trend of events above, the commissioning of the staff accommodation 
building block represented yet another event to remind the staff about the PBC targets and the 
need to improve the performance. 
7.5.2.2 Internal Implications of Bonus Use 
There were extensive reactions about the PBC in general and the bonus in particular in this 
hospital. Most of these related to the effects on managers. In general the responses from the 
managers reflected that; "it felt good', "cemented my leadership" and "proved" that those in 
administration were effective. The implications of failing to secure a bonus in the 
forthcoming PBC performance feedback were described as "it would be very sad" and "it will 
be a big disappointment". As discussed before (see section 6.4.3.2) there was indication that 
the staff had now understood what was at stake and had started to pay attention to 
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"recording" their work. The challenge and stakes of sustaining ever increasing performance 
trends at the level specified in the PBC targets -5 or 10 percent had become a worry for the 
managers in this hospital. 
"Some time back, people (staff) used to question us 'what are those people doing in those offices? They do not care about our problems' Now that has changed - at least a bit" (HMT-Hosp-2). 
"All the staffs are aware about this bonus and they are expecting it, if they do not get it, it will be a big disappointment ( ... ) We have been pushing them to record their work but they did not appreciate. Now they know that without proper recording, they cannot show that they are performing. Records 
are now improved a lot" (HMT-Hosp-2). 
"It (securing the next bonus) is a big challenge. Now that we have got a bonus, it would be sad to fail. 
The challenge is that the bonus is based on increment of a previous performance. It's very difficult to 
always have big increases. We will try to do our part " (HMT-Hosp-2). 
The internal implications in Case-2 hospital are better understood in the context of two 
prevailing circumstances at the time of the bonus: 
1. Prolonged and incremental approach to bonus processes: 
The process of bonus handling, decision making and implementing the allocation decisions 
took five months. For example the party was held in February 2006, five months after the 
bonus was received at the end of September 2005. The extended period and incremental 
approach is best explained as "buying time" by the hospital administration. At the time the 
bonus was received, the hospital had pressing needs for money. Like in case-1 hospital 
above, the Government had not disbursed funds for four months. The bonus funds were in 
the meantime used to pay salaries for staff. When Government released some funds to the 
hospital in December, the first planned expenditure - three bales of old clothes, was made. 
The party was held after another batch of funds from the Government was released in January 
2006. As partly explained in the interview extract below, the hospital had adopted a practice 
of keeping some funds in reserve to mitigate the disruptive effects of delayed government 
funds especially on salary payments. 
"It (bonus) came at a good time. We had experienced a delay in disbursement by Government.... It 
helped to offset the problem at the time. We operate a revolving fund ... a 
back-up for smoothening 
such problem area. So the bonus came at such a time -four month delays, and it helped solve the 
urgent problem - paying salaries. When the (Government) disbursement came, we have started to implement what we planned (for the bonus) " (HMT-Hosp-2). 
2. Open and deliberative decision-making 
A staff strike in 2003 was said to have helped to establish a forum for staff deliberation and 
interaction with those in the administration of the hospital. A staff assembly was being held 
every two months. The consultations on the bonus found an existing and functional forum 
that enabled the staff to be part of the decision-making process and more importantly, to 
share information about PBC and its performance requirements. 
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"Since I came into leadership, I started dialogue between administration and the staff. There was 
accusation of aloofness in the past and a big problem of suspicions. When I became the MS (medical 
superintendent), I established the forum for discussion. Staff assemblies are held every 2 months for 
discussion of issues " (HMT-Hosp-2). 
Arising from the protracted, participative and incremental processes related to the bonus use, 
there was increased and sustained visibility of PBC in this hospital compared to its 
counterpart (Case 1 HOSP-1). The clinical staffs were generally aware of PBC although the 
knowledge about the specific PBC targets continued to be limited to persons in management 
and records departments. 
7.6 Response to Yellow Star Programme 
Both case study hospitals had experience with the Yellow Star programme. The Yellow Star 
Programme started in Case 1 hospital in 2003 while for Case 2 hospital, it had just started in 
January 2006. As detailed in section 4.4.3, UCMB also offered a powerful range of 
influences to the study hospitals in its network. Its accreditation processes, technical and 
financial support systems provided a legitimizing force for the response of its hospitals. Many 
of the responses to UCMB were related to securing accreditation and are discussed in 
sections 4.4.3.4 and 4.4.3.5. 
7.6.1 Case I HOSP-1 Hospital 
During the interviews conducted in the early phase of this research, respondents in this 
hospital made several references to the trophy that was awarded to this hospital in recognition 
of improved performance. The trophy was mentioned by five out of six respondents in this 
hospital during April - May 2005 interviews. Later it was discovered that the trophy was part 
of the Yellow Star Programme that was piloted in the district hosting this hospital since 2002. 
From the narratives, the basis for receiving the trophy was not clear. Each respondent tried to 
rationalise the trophy in relation to his/her functional roles. For example, a Board member 
thought it was given for excelling in financial accountability, a manager responsible for 
administration thought it was for "improvement in infrastructure and accountability". 
Another manager responsible for nursing thought the trophy was for "improved nursing" and 
a nurse on the ward believed it was for "better handling of patients". The uncertainty of 
criteria for receiving the award is probably a structural side-effect of the multi-dimensional 
assessment of Yellow Star Programme which made it difficult for the recipients to identify 
the basis for the award. Alternatively, it could have been due to less than optimal 
communication systems in this hospital. 
"In 2003/04 - (HOSP-1) hospital got an award as recognition for the most improved infrastructure 
and in accountability from the district. It was not imaginable - even the Board was very happy about 
this achievement" (HMT-Hosp-1). 
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More interesting, was the finding that there was no mention about the PBC bonuses (total $ 
7,410) received by the hospitals in both its annual hospital reports for 2004-05 and 2005-06 
respectively. The interest in this finding is relative to the 2003-04 annual report that had its 
second page dedicated to a full-page photograph of the trophy the hospital had won in 
recognition of its performance by the Yellow Star Programme. This 2003-04 report made 
numerous references to the improved hospital performance and to the trophy as evidence of 
this improvement. The trophy -a copper placard engraved with the words "Appreciation 
Award: In Recognition Of Your Commitment Towards Improved Health Services In The 
District" must have cost not more than US$150 from the local art shops in Kampala. The 
trophy was a decoration piece on the wall of the hospital's Board Room. 
7.6.2 Case-2 Hospital 
Since Yellow Star Programme was just starting in this hospital during the conduct of this 
research, the opportunity available was to learn about the response it was able to attract. Of 
interest to this research was the finding that this hospital showed a relatively high 
responsiveness to Yellow Star Programme feedback in a short period of time. High 
responsiveness was related to the design feature of Yellow Star in particular, the attention 
paid to the development of action plans for correcting the performance gaps identified. The 
assessment had found some gaps in infection control and communication with the 
community. 
Figure 7.1: Response to Yellow Star Programme Feedback 
Interviewer: What action plans? 
Respondent. We planned and have already done some of the activities we developed - planned 
with the LCs (community leaders), hospital staf, yellow star team - all these were 
invited to the feedback meeting in town. The action plan had objective, activities, 
date, responsible persons and resources need. The activities were agreed upon by us, 
the DHOs and LCs. The dates were identified together with the village LCs. - On the 
19th February the community sensitisation was done. The SNO (senior nurse 
officer), myself and Health Inspector responsible for PHC, we went for the meeting. 
Secondly, regarding infection control, we have already held CME (continuous 
medical education) session. The nurse who had attended infection control workshop 
was asked to do the CME and share with all sta.. 
Internal supervision for (improved) waste disposal - the buckets were bought and 
distributed to all the departments and wards. 
Interviewer: Where did you get the funds to do all these? 
Respondent: We used PHC funds since the DHO said it was ok to plan them and improve the 
hospital. Some funds were also promised from Yellow Star people (project) 
"There were many positives (feedback) from the community views but 1 only noted the negatives. ... Many of the negative views were not true but lies. Like they said that the gates are closed at night, 
that time is not given for mother to push (deliver normally) but hurriedly taken for cutting (caesarean 
section). In general they said there was a communication gap with the community. We developed a 
certain action plan about these" (HMT-Hosp-2). 
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There was evidence that the action plans for the corrective actions had been implemented 
within a period of one month from the time the yellow star team gave them feedback as the 
interview extract in Text box 7.1 indicates. 
7.7 Summary 
Several approaches to increase hospital performance can be summarised from the findings in 
this chapter. Most of the strategies were internal to the hospital although some were aimed 
outside the hospital. However, these strategies faced problems in the broader context. The 
findings regarding how the bonus was used have also illustrated important findings regarding 
the processes of decision-making and hospital priorities for spending the bonuses. The main 
findings are summarised below. 
Strategies for Improving Performance 
The range of strategies adopted by the case-study hospitals to increase their outputs during 
the period of PBC implementation and other performance demands can be summarised as 
internal and external strategies (table 7.3). Although most of them were not directly triggered 
by PBC per se, the latter seem to have had a "validating effect" in the case-study hospitals. 
Contextual Influences 
Several problems as well as opportunities were illuminated in the context of the case-study 
hospitals. The problems were mainly due to salary increases in the public sector and the 
delays and uncertain disbursements of the major source of operational funds from 
Government. Compounding the problem was the recent reduction of user-charges in the 
hospitals. The descriptions show a mixed blessing. Although the outputs (performance) were 
reported as improved especially in response to user-fee reductions, there were many problems 
internal to the hospitals. These included: 
" Increased operational costs of the hospital especially as they attempted to stem loss of 
their staff to better paying jobs in the public sector, 
" Increase in workload as more patients started to come to hospitals seem to have 
compounded the dissatisfaction of staff leading to more departures, 
" Although marked increase in government subsidies had been described 4-5 years ago, 
views indicated a recent decline in the grant amounts. 
In reference to PBC targets, constraints to performance were related to a number of design 
features and changes in the context. For example; 
" Targets were selected in haste with limited information on the hospital's capacity to 
accomplish them, 
" Changes in the external environment over time required a change in the service 
targets. For example droughts reduced malaria cases. 
" New prevention projects demanded that hospitals focus on activities that were in 
conflict with the PBC targets. For example hospitals were required to train, and 
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support activities aimed at treating malaria cases in the community - putting their 
PBC target to increase volume of hospital-based malaria treatment in jeopardy. 
Table 7.3: Range of strategies to increase service outputs. 
1. Reducing user charges for selected services especially OPD, child 
admission and maternity services 
2. Increasing staffing quality especially more doctors 
3. Ensuring availability of drugs and sufficient stocks 
4. Signalling higher quality. This was implied in "white" doctors, new 
surgeon, technology e. g. ultrasono ah, X-rays 
5. Staff welfare - reorganise the finances to buffer salaries from external 
uncertainty, attempts to increase salaries, promises of better pay in the 
future and building new staff accommodation 
6. Reorganisation of client flow to reduce waiting time, e. g. 
Internal decentralizing pharmacy and cashier functions to departments 
strategies 7. Vigilance towards records of outputs, for example audit of output data, 
new monitoring tools 
8. Internal arrangements for performance accountability - e. g. providing 
performance feedback to departmental staff and making the 
departments account for their outputs to the administration (cost centre 
approach) 
9. Cost-control approaches e. g. screening against high cost care, control 
of drug prescriptions 
10. Activating learning systems to support the desired behaviours i. e. 
CMEs for cost-awareness, prescription control and improving service 
quality 
11. Marketing of services to the community especially new and reduced External 
user-charges strategies 12. Outreach service provision to the communities 
On the positive side, the hospitals' performance was helped by a number of historical 
developments. The descriptions showed a major role played by the following: 
" Infrastructure developments in the case-study hospitals. New buildings, clinical and 
administrative technologies had been put in place mostly by projects supported by 
foreign donors. 
" Management training for hospital managers especially in the UCMB network. Better 
administration was said to be among the reasons for performance improvements. 
" Information technology investments like computers and associated training. 
" Increased subsidies to case-study hospitals from Government. Some hospitals 
described this as increasing from about USh. 7 million to USh. 137 million in the last 
seven years. 
" New project-based support for new services such as for ARVs, malaria, and Yellow 
Star activities. 
In general, the hospitals' capacity to produce more service outputs had been supported by 
these initiatives. These developments allow a possible conclusion that the changes in service 
167 
outputs (performance) during the PBC pilot activities were mostly due to these factors - as 
opposed to PBC intervention. 
Bonus Use 
Findings about how the bonuses were used provided several useful insights into the capacity 
of the hospital to handle and transmit incentives for internal performance improvements. The 
findings regarding the use of the bonuses can be categorised according to the level of 
stakeholder consensus achieved: 1) consensus; 2) controversy and 3) rejection. 
1. Consensus was achieved for the use of the bonus for holding staff-parties or picnics to 
celebrate the performance achievements. 
2. Controversial decisions included bonus allocation to build capital infrastructure such as 
staff-house, gate and fencing. Other controversial decisions aimed to award the bonus to 
the departments responsible for the service targets; offsetting operational expenses and 
investing the bonus in money-generating ventures for the hospitals. 
3. Rejected options were those seeking to use the bonus to recognise or encourage 
hardworking individuals or departments that were deemed responsible for securing the 
service targets. Upholding equity and team spirit were the main reasons given for the 
rejection of approaches seeking to link bonus rewards to individual/departmental 
performance criteria. The bonuses were used instead to ensure equity and team work 
spirit among the hospital staff. 
The findings suggest that depending on the size of the bonus, options 1 and 2 above were 
likely to be used for the bonus and not option 3. This fmding has implications for designing 
incentives for hospitals and other team-based work. Whereas the hospital staff - when 
consulted - preferred universal welfare benefits such as parties, electric kettles and clothes - 
managers preferred outcomes that had durable visibility such as buildings. This finding is 
essential in developing guidelines for reducing the potential conflicts and dissatisfaction that 
may arise from these different objectives. 
Process of Decision Making for Bonus 
The findings regarding the process of decision-making provide a cautionary tale for using 
financial incentives within weak leadership structures. The case-study hospital that had 
idiosyncratic governance structures (chapter 5) showed that a bonus might have no effects on 
performance if no communication is made to link a bonus and performance. At worst, the 
information about the bonus can cause dissatisfaction if what information is provided is of 
action contrary to the expectations of those working to achieve the service targets. These two 
patterns were exhibited in this hospital and seemed to sow the seeds for institutional distrust 
in handling money-metric performance incentives. An additional finding contributed by this 
case study (case I hospital) was the risk of losing institutional memory when information is 
not widely shared within the organisation but confined to a few individuals. When the most 
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knowledgeable individual for PBC left the hospital, the innovation momentum was 
dissipated. 
The findings from the second case-study (case 2 hospital) showed that a precedent of strong 
communication, democratic leadership style and decision-making was superior in 
communicating the performance demands for the PBC pilot. The leadership in this hospital 
was able to communicate on several occasions about the link between hospital performance 
and the social and welfare benefits arising from the bonus. Although from the agency lens the 
incentives were much weaker than the powerful money-metric ones for performance, the 
leadership in this case study hospital was able to fulfil several prerequisites predicted from 
the expectancy theory. 
Performance Management Implications 
Finally the above results show the need for strong capacity for performance management i. e. 
strategising, resourcing and monitoring processes for service outputs. The case studies also 
demonstrate that internal strategies were helped by such developments as infrastructure 
investments, and increase in revenues such as government and donor grants. Given the 
context of increasing costs and declining revenues, some strategies were aimed at reducing 
costs by screening against high-cost care such as "heroic" surgery and accidents. 
Performance monitoring and feedback was getting established mostly as a result of user-fee 
reduction and a need to closely monitor revenues and costs. In both hospitals the forums for 
continuing medical education (CME) were being used to communicate changes needed to 
sustain performance given the new innovations. CME sessions targeted towards rational drug 
prescription and infection control were found. In one hospital the PBC bonus had been used 
to enhance communication about performance. Findings in section 7.4.2 show that the bonus 
provided opportunity for managers to inspire staff to work hard and achieve more. However, 
the rejection of using high-powered incentives that make effort-attribution to the individual or 
department meant that performance management approaches available within the case-study 
hospitals were mainly driven by (low powered) universal distribution. 
169 
Chapter 8: Staff Perceptions about Hospital Performance 
8.0 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to assess staff perceptions regarding the major performance drivers 
and constraints at the level of the worker teams. In this chapter, attempts are made to assess 
the capacity of hospital staff to do more work. Staff capacity to do more is a critical 
assumption of PBC service target as designed in Uganda. Performance targets under PBC 
sought to increase annual outputs by 5 or 10 percent. If the hospitals are unable to increase 
their staff numbers in the short-term, achieving 5-10 percent higher output targets would 
entail increases in the workload among available hospital staff. Secondly, as deduced from 
the previous chapter, the staff would need to improve the service records to ensure that the 
performance (outputs) of the hospital are optimally captured and reflected in the performance 
reports. 
The performance (production of service outputs both for targets and non-targets) of the 
hospitals is mediated through its workers. There are several theoretical constructs attempting 
to explain the performance at the level of the individual worker, the work team and the 
organisation. All these theoretical explanations have a common denominator - the individual 
and his/her capacities to cooperate with others for team-based or organisational-based 
functions. The human capacity to perform required tasks in hospital setting has attracted 
several researchers (Marsden and Richardson 1994; Podsakoff, Ahearne et al. 1997; Franco, 
Bennett et al. 2002; MSH 2002; Franco, Bennett et al. 2004; Paleologou, Kontodimopoulos et 
al. 2006; Petersen, Woodard et al. 2006). The workers' performance-capacity investigated by 
these research efforts includes: Staff motivation, satisfactory work climate, organisational 
resources and support systems, teamwork and rewards. Psychometric surveys are mostly used 
in these studies as a means of measuring staff attitudes and perceptions essential for inferring 
specified performance objectives. The survey methods are described in section 3.6.6.4 and 
3.6.6.5. 
8.1 Description of the Staff Surveys 
A total of 1,301 staff in ten hospitals responded to the questionnaires in both rounds (see 
table 8.1). Of these 560 (43%) were from the baseline survey. At baseline 714 questionnaires 
were distributed while in the second round 845 were distributed among the ten study hospital. 
Table 8.1: Sample and response rates at baseline (2005) and post-baseline (2006) 
Hosp 
1 
Hosp 
2 
Hosp 
3 
Hosp 
4 
Hosp 
5 
Hosp 
6 
Hosp 
7 
Hosp 
8 
Hosp 
9 
Hosp 
10 
20O(, Returned jo 72 S> 1311 K2 II II 611 ýU -ill 62 
Response 70 100 80 94 96 89 87 70 93 96 
2UUý Returned 41 47 ?6 77 64 43 7i ti ý11 ý1 
Response 
% 
85 60 80 100 79 61 91 75 92 66 
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Distribution was according to the staff-size for each hospital except in the first round (2005) 
where a few hospital departments were excluded due to insufficient financial resources for 
the survey activities. The table 8.1 provides the response rate and sample by hospital in each 
of the survey rounds while table 8.2 presents the background characteristics of the 
respondents. Overall the response rate at baseline and post-baseline was 78 and 88 percent 
respectively. The percentage of missing responses was generally low 5-8 percent. 
Table 8.2: Respondent demographics at baseline 2005 and post-baseline (2006) 
Demographic characteristic 2005 2006 Total 
(n=560) (n=741) (n=1301) 
Q44 Sex of respondent 
Male 159 236 395 
Female 392 501 893 
Duration of service in hospital 
Under 1 year 91 122 213 
1-5 years 182 210 392 
5& above 243 383 626 
Department of service 
Administration 55 68 123 
OPD (ANC/MCH) 232 357 589 
In-Patient ward 250 308 558 
Cadre mix by survey 
Administration 18 22 40 
Clinical officer 17 36 53 
Doctor 17 23 40 
Midwife 79 104 183 
Nurse 176 227 403 
Nurse assistant 125 144 269 
Paramedics 66 95 161 
Support 42 65 107 
Staff by hospital ownership 
Government 197 297 494 
PNFP 363 444 807 
UCMB 273 262 535 
Bonus gp 94 172 266 
8.2 Exploratory Factor Analysis 
Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) as described below was employed to achieve two main 
analytic objectives: 
1. To reduce the data to fewer functional variables: 
EFA is an analytic method for determining the number and nature of fewer variables that 
underlie larger numbers of variables or measures in a dataset. This feature of EFA helps to 
explain data by reducing large amounts of information into a manageable form and size. 
It 
does this by identification of measures (factors) that belong together or virtually measure a 
similar concept or latent construct. The result is fewer functional variables (factor or patterns) 
from the 19 variables that were used to assess the determinants of staff performance. As 
stated by Rummel (1970), "it (factor analysis) disentangles complex relationships among the 
phenomenon into its functional unities (ie separate or independent patterns) of behaviour. It 
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handles social phenomena in the situation. The interrelationship between behaviour and 
environment can be analyzed as they exist in real life" (Rummel 1970 pg 3). 
2. To generate a standardised measurement scale: 
Factor analysis generates empirical weights to transform ordinal data (ie I-5 point Likert 
scale) into standardised factor scores. To determine the factor score for each case, the case's 
data on each variable that constitute the factor is multiplied by the factor weight for that 
variable. Factor weights (also called loadings, a) measure the degree of involvement of each 
variable in the given extracted factors (see table 8.4). Cases will have high or low factor 
scores, as their Likert scale values are high or low on the variables that constitute a factor. 
These factor scores are standardised or scaled so that the mean is zero and about two-thirds of 
the values lie between +1.00 and - 1.00. In effect, the factor scores are normally distributed 
continuous variables that can be used in subsequent analyses to explore relations using 
multivariate analysis such as logistic regression (section 8.6.1). Similar approaches are used 
in marketing, education psychology and health research (Dobie, McFarland et al. 1986; 
Telesi 2006). To achieve standardisation of the factor scores across the two surveys in 2005 
and 2006, EFA was applied to the combined sample for both years. In effect, the factor 
means for each survey round, each hospital and sub samples will differ from zero (combined 
sample mean)(Hays, Brown et al. 2006). It is these sub-sample differences that the analysis in 
this chapter seeks to exploit. The key purposes addressed by EFA are summarised in the table 
8.3. 
Table 8.3: Research nurnoses and ex loratorv factor analytic approaches used 
Question Method Implication 
1. What are the patterns of relationship Factor extraction i. e. Inductively extract fewer 
among the 19 variables used to data reduction by variables that capture most of 
measure different aspects considered Principle Component the variability in the data for 
essential for improving performance Analysis (section 8.3) further analysis 
from the theories used? 
2. What do the extracted factor patterns Examine the factor Examine items for multiple 
i. e. clustering of variables tell us structure i. e. variable factor loading and reliability. 
about these factors that capture the loading on each factor Descriptively label the 
most variability in the data? using varimax rotation extracted factors in 
accordance to the composite 
items (section 8.3) 
3. How do the extracted factors predict Linear regression Identify models that best 
the performance experiences analysis of extracted explain the performance 
(perceptions) captured in the factors against proxy perceptions at baseline and 
performance scores developed in "performance score" as post-baseline (section 8.4) 
section 8.4? dependent variables 
8.3 Extractions of Latent Factors 
Factor extraction employed Principal Component Analysis with varimax rotation technique 
in SPSS version 14 (Bryman and Cramer 2002). The combined sample at baseline and post- 
baseline was used to ensure standardisation of the extracted factors across the two time 
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periods. All the 19 variables assessed based on the theoretical drivers of staff performance 
were used to extract fewer but functional latent factors. Several rounds of PCA were 
performed each time, dropping variables that had high cross loading on different extracted 
factors (components) until 13 variables were left in the model. The questions that were 
dropped due to cross loading on different extracted factors implied that they were imprecise 
or had more than one meaning to the respondents. To generate reliable measurement 
instruments, this approach is recommended especially for instruments that have not been 
validated before (Hicks, Hennessy et al. 1996; Castle 2006; Hennessy, Hicks et al. 2006). 
The items (variables) that were dropped due to cross loading included the following: 
Q423 Extent supervisors showed appreciation of your work - last 2 months 
Q425 Extent job contract provide security for your work - last 2 months 
Q426 Extent superiors encouraged hardworking persons - last 2 months 
Q422 Extent your department held meetings to evaluate clinical activities - last 2 months 
Q419 Extent working condition meets your expectations - last 2 months 
Q429 Extent Workmates covered your duty hours if you needed help - last 2 month 
For the final factor extraction, all cases with missing response in any of the remaining 13 
variables were excluded (ie listwise handling) to improve the accuracy of the correlations. As 
a result, 1,050 responses (86 percent) were processed for this analysis - dropping 14 percent 
due to listwise missing values. Analysis of missing values did not show significant changes 
in the item means as a result of this sample reduction. 
Overall the sample adequacy for the remaining cases was acceptable i. e. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
measure of sampling adequacy was 0.784. The significant Bartlett's Test of Sphericity (P= 
0.000) indicated that there were significant relationships among the remaining 13 variables to 
justify the use of factor analysis to extract the latent factors. Table 8.4 presents the final 
results of the EFA. The item-to-scale loadings were substantial in magnitude, ranging from 
0.52 to 0.95 across the four extracted factors. The convention is to treat loadings above 0.44 
(negative or positive) as salient in defining a factor (Rummel 1970; Henson and Roberts 
2006). The higher the loadings (positive or negative) the more important the variable is in 
defining the factor. Negative loading imply an inverse relationship. 
8.3.1 Factor Description 
Four factors were generated that accounted for 53 percent of the variance in the 13 variables 
measuring different perceptions for worker performance and motivation. The standardized 
factor scores were saved back into the dataset for subsequent comparative and regression 
analysis. The four extracted factors (see table 8.4) were responsible for 53 percent of the 
cumulative variation (ie 24.3%, 11.4%, 9.1% and 8.4% respectively). 
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Table 8.4: Total variance explained by extracted factors 
Extracted 
factors Initial Eigen values 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadin s 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulativ 
e% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulati 
ve % Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulati 
ve % 
1 3.16 24.32 24.32 3.16 24.32 24.32 2.34 17.99 17.99 
2 1.48 11.43 35.75 1.49 11.43 35.75 1.69 12.99 30.98 
3 1.19 9.19 44.93 1.19 9.19 44.93 1.50 11.56 42.54 
4 1.09 8.41 53.35 1.09 8.41 53.35 1.40 10.81 53.35 
A descriptive approach was used to label the extracted factors as "Performance Governance"; 
"Job satisfaction"; "Drugs and Supplies" and "Financial Satisfaction". The descriptive 
labelling of the factor (factor scores) was based on the variable loadings (partial correlations) 
generated from the pattern matrix (see table 8.5). These correlations help formulate an 
interpretation of each factor or component onto which a set of variables have high correlation 
(Rummel 1970). This "intuitive" description was done by looking for a common thread 
among the variables that have large loadings for each factor. This process was influenced by 
the theoretical literature that formed the basis for the design of the questionnaire items i. e. 
Expectancy theory and Herzberg's two factor theory of work motivation. 
Table 8.5: Item descriptive statistics and item to scale partial correlations* 
Scale items can SD Perform Job Drugs & Financi 
Q421 Extent supervisors have confidence 
in your work - last 2 months Q427 Extent Superiors were friendly to 
their staff - last 2 months Q420 Extent you received supervision 
from your superiors - last 2 months 
Q428 Extent superiors entrust 
responsibilities to junior staff to enable 
gain expertise 
Q424 Extent rules and regulations were 
fairly applied to workers - last 2 months 
Q433 Extent your job provided satisfaction 
- last 2 month 
Q434 Extent your professional status is 
improved by working at this hospital 
Q443 Extent your job benefits (salary etc) 
cover your basic needs 
Q412 Extent of drugs available for your 
patients in last 2 months 
Q413A Extent supplies and equipment 
available for successful tasks completion 
Q445 Extent you supplement your salary 
by doing private activities to earn more 
income 
Q444 Extent job benefits (salary etc) differ 
among colleagues doing similar work 
Q430 Extent conflicts did exist among 
workmates in your Dept - last 2 months 
3.92 0.95 
3.18 1.11 
3.26 1.07 
3.19 1.09 
3.31 1.00 r . 54 
3.05 1.07 0.22 
3.51 1.05 0.26 
2.54 1.04 -0.06 
3.70 0.91 0.12 
3.18 0.94 0.16 
2.10 1.22 0.08 
2.98 1.20 0.19 
4.22 1.03 0.25 
Reverse coded Keverse coded 
0.04 0.04 -0.09 
0.29 0.16 -0.01 
0.12 0.02 0.10 
0.22 0.05 -0.06 
-0.02 0.27 0.10 
ý 78 0.78 0.09 -0.03 
0.69 0.02 -0.10 
0.62 0.21 0.39 
0.69 
0.62 
0.08 - 0.84 0.03 
0.14 0.80 -0.02 
0.18 0.03 
1073- 
-0.15 -0.04 
0.01 -0.02 
t Combined 2005 and 2006 (baseline and post-baseline) sample to standardise the variations scores for comparative purpose 
ance satisfactio supplies al 
Gover n satisfact 
Nance ion 
0.69 
0.66 
0.66 
0.66 
0.54 
0.73 
0.64 
-0.52 
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8.3.2 Reliability for Extracted Factors 
Table 8.6 provides the Spearman's correlation coefficient among the factor scales (off 
diagonal entries). The low correlations among the extracted factors show that these are fairly 
distinct from each other. None of the correlation coefficient was statistically significant (P- 
value range 0.557 - 0.896). With the exception of the Financial Satisfaction factor with 
Cronbach's alpha score of 0.329, the internal reliability estimate of variables underlying each 
factor was good i. e. -the Cronbach's alpha coefficient (in main diagonal) are much higher 
than the correlations among individual factors. These findings imply fair discriminate 
validity of the extracted factors. 
Table 8.6: Correlation among factors and their reliability estimates (diagona 
Governance 
factor score 
FAC_Gov 
Job Satisfaction 
factor score 
FAC_Sat 
Drugs & 
Supplies 
factor score 
FAC Avl 
Financial 
Satisfaction 
FAC_Fst 
Governance factor score (0.703) 
FAC_Gov 
Job Satisfaction factor score 0.013 (0.601) 
FAC_Sat 
Drug & tools availability -0.009 -0.009 (0.608) factor score FAC Avl 
Financial Satisfaction -0.018 0.004 -0.009 (0.329) FAC Fst 
8.3.3 Sample Differences in Relation to Extracted Factors 
The figures 8.1 to 8.4 below shows the profiles of all the ten hospitals on the basis of the four 
extracted factors from the sample at baseline in 2005 and post-baseline in 2006 respectively. 
The blocks represent the 95% confidence intervals, while the lines represent the range. The 
dots show outlaying observations. Noticeable in figure 8.1 is the lack of significant changes 
in each of the study hospital observations for the two surveys. Non significant improvements 
in the governance in hospitals 1,6,8,9 and 10 compared to baseline survey are noticeable 
however. Likewise, the governance for hospital 4 shows some declined while the rest had no 
noticeable changes. 
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Figure 8.1: Box plots: Performance governance scores at baseline (2005) and in 2006 
3.0 ý 
2.0 - 
1.0 ý 
0.0 -I 
-a. o --ý 
O® 
OOO 
O 
OO 
O 
O880 
CD- 
Survey Round 
O M2005 
oO 
M2006 
1.00 
7 T 
200 3.00 4.00 1 5.00 I 6.00 7.00 8.00 9.00 10.00 
Q43 Category Hospital Name 
Figure 8.2 shows the plot for the job satisfaction across the 10 study hospitals at baseline and 
post baseline. Although small improvements are noticeable in hospitals 1,9 and 10, these are 
not statistically significant. Similarly, a non-significant decline is noticed for hospital 3 and 7, 
while the rest had little difference from baseline. 
Figure 8.2: Boxplot for job satisfaction at baseline (2005) and at post-baseline (2006) 
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As for the factor for Drugs and Supplies, hospital 7 posted the highest score at baseline and 
was able to better this score one year later. Although not significant, the factor scores 
improved for hospitals 2,7 and 10. Marked low scores persisted for hospitals 3,9 and 10. 
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Figure 8.3: Boxplot for Drug/supplies availability at baseline (2005) and in 2006 
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The factor that captured the construct about Financial Satisfaction showed that hospital 5 had 
low relative scores about financial satisfaction especially at baseline. The next remarkable 
finding is that hospital 4 posted the highest and significant improvements in scores for this 
factor relative to baseline. In general, the extracted factors show small and statistically 
insignificant changes between baseline and post baseline indicating the little changes in the 
staff perceptions of the work climate factors. 
Figure 8.4: Boxplot Financial Satisfaction at baseline (2005) and in 2006 
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8.4 Changes in Perceptions during PBC Interventions 
Table 8.7 reports the mean changes in the factor scores from baseline survey in 2005. This 
table aggregates the hospitals in accordance to their exposure (randomisation) to the PBC 
pilot. Government hospitals were not exposed to PBC at all. As discussed in chapters 4-6 
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there was unique intervention among hospitals affiliated to UCMB in the form of 
performance interventions and accreditation system. For this reason, the UCMB group has 
been singled out in the analysis below. Among the Government hospitals, the main change 
was a decline in perceptions regarding performance governance and an increase in 
perceptions related to financial satisfaction. 
Table 8.7: Mean changes in the factor scores: Baseline (2005) and in 2006* 
Government Governance factor 
hospitals score FAC_Gov 
Job Satisfaction factor 
score FAC Sat 
Drug & tools 
availability factor 
score FAC AvI 
Financial Satisfaction 
PNFP Governance factor 
hospitals score FAC_Gov 
Job Satisfaction factor 
score FAC_Sat 
Drug Supplies 
availability factor 
score FAC Avl 
Financial Satisfaction 
UCMB Governance factor 
hospitals score FAC_Gov 
Job Satisfaction factor 
score FAC_Sat 
Drug & tools 
availability factor 
score FAC Avl 
Financial Satisfaction 
Bonus Governance factor 
hospitals score FAC_Gov 
Job Satisfaction factor 
score FAC Sat 
Drug & tools 
availability factor 
score FAC_Avl 
Financial Satisfaction 
FAC Fst 
Survey Round N Mean 
2006 259 -0.14 
2005 147 0.10 
2006 259 0.30 
2005 147 0.32 
2006 259 0.01 
2005 147 -0.07 
2006 259 0.26 
2005 147 0.11 
2006 356 0.19 
2005 288 -0.16 
2006 356 -0.14 
2005 288 -0.27 
2006 356 0.01 
2005 288 0.02 
t-test for Equality of Means 
SD Mean Dif SE tP value 
0.94 
0.96 
0.82 
0.87 
0.87 
1.07 
1.01 
1.08 
0.98 
1.06 
0.98 
1.11 
1.04 
1.03 
2006 356 -0.12 0.98 
2005 288 -0.14 0.92 
2006 209 0.14 1.02 
2005 221 -0.19 1.10 
2006 209 -0.15 0.99 
2005 221 -0.35 1.13 
2006 209 -0.02 1.13 
2005 221 -0.04 1.07 
2006 209 -0.16 1.01 
2005 221 -0.11 0.87 
2006 147 0.45 0.91 
2005 73 0.04 0.79 
2006 147 -0.13 1.03 
2005 73 -0.23 1.27 
2006 147 -0.21 0.93 
2005 73 -0.53 1.02 
2006 147 -0.10 1.00 
2005 73 -0. I8 1.03 
-0.25 0.10 -2.53 0.012 
-0.02 0.09 -0.20 0.843 
0.08 0.10 0.73 0.468 
0.15 0.11 1.42 0.154 
0.35 0.08 4.40 0.000 
0.13 0.08 1.51 0.131 
0.00 0.08 -0.05 0.958 
0.01 0.08 0.18 0.858 
0.33 0.10 3.22 0.001 
0.20 0.10 1.98 0.048 
0.02 0.11 0.15 0.885 
-0.05 0.09 -0.51 0.608 
0.40 0.12 3.25 0.001 
0.10 0.17 0.59 0.557 
0.32 0.14 2.33 0.021 
0.09 0.14 0.60 0.552 
* tac ec I'on's in icate Statistically significant mean differences at Po to 15",, -1'a ae 
level 
Compared to baseline, the factor scores for performance governance perceptions reduced 
significantly (P-value 0.012), while scores for financial satisfaction increased (p-value 0.154). 
Compared to baseline, PNFP, UCMB and hospitals in Bonus Group of the PBC pilot 
improved their perception scores of performance governance by a factor of 4.4; 3.2; and 3.2 
respectively. These governance changes were all significant (P-value below 2.0 %). Staff job 
satisfaction was significantly improved among the PNFP and UCMB hospitals (ie 1.5 and 1.9 
times, p-value 0.131 and 0.048 respectively) but not among hospitals that received 
performance bonuses. However, there was a significant improvement (t-test 2.33, p-value 
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0.021) in the perceptions of availability of drugs and supplies among the hospitals that 
received performance bonuses. 
From the table 8.7, it can be said that there was improvement in the perceptions related to 
performance governance, drugs/supplies availability and staff job-satisfaction among 
hospitals affiliated to the PNFP group and to PBC bonus group. Among government hospitals 
performance governance perceptions declined compared to the baseline. 
8.5 Measure of Performance Perceptions 
In the same staff survey described in section 3.6.6.4 (chapter 3), questions were included to 
generate staff perceptions towards performance related variables such as workload and 
service records. As noted in chapters 7 and 8, it emerged that some response to PBC pilot 
were geared towards the betterment of service records or information system in general. 
Given a before-and-after survey, changes in these perceptions too can shed some light on the 
performance-relevant variables. 
Self-assessment of performance was measured using seven items in the staff questionnaire. 
Likert scales with 5-point categories were used to rate the staff perceptions on these items. 
The questionnaire items were related to "working beyond normal experience" and "the extent 
of filling required service records" (table 8.8). These two aspects i. e. perceptions of efforts 
towards service records and doing more tasks (workload) compared to prior experience were 
used to design a proxy measure of performance among the staff. As measured, higher scores 
indicated that the staff performance on these aspects is perceived as already high and 
implying less room to expand. In contrast, lower scores indicated an opportunity for the staff 
to improve their performance. These assumptions are based on the optimal "efficiency 
frontier" as perceived by the staff from these measures (Chu and Spires 2003). 
8.5.1 Internal Consistence of Performance Measure 
A similar approach was taken as in section 8.3 above to extract fewer composite performance 
factors. Principal component analysis was employed together with Varimax rotation and 
Kaiser normalisation. Table 8.8 shows the items used for the construction of a performance 
scale and the two factors that were extracted. The two factors extracted were descriptively 
labelled "workload" and "records vigilance" in accordance with the higher item loadings. 
The reliability of the scale was acceptable as reflected in Cronback's Alpha coefficient of 
0.708. The missing values on each of the items were generally low (less than 5%) and did 
not have a significant effect on the mean and aggregate scores. 
The Spearman's correlation coefficient among the two factors was low (Spearman's rho of 
0.011, p-value 0.713), suggesting that the two factors were distinct enough from each other. 
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The reliability for Workload and Records Vigilance factors were acceptably high - 
Cronback's alpha coefficient of 0.721 and 0.736 respectively. 
Table 8.8: Item descriptive statistics and item-to-scale partial correlations 
Scale Items 
1 
S. D Missing 
(N=1165) 
Floor Ceiling 
Q447 Extent you worked beyond 3.44 1.04 2.4 5.5 15.0 
your normal experience because of 
service targets past 2 months 
Q448 Extent service targets have 3.38 0.99 3.5 4.4 11.5 
made your colleagues work beyond 
normal levels 
Q415 Extent you worked beyond 3.79 1.03 1.8 3.2 28.0 
normal expectations in last 2 
months 
Q410 Opinion on workload you 4.03 0.84 1.8 0.8 32.0 
clear daily in last 2 months 
Q416 Extent completed records 3.75 1.03 3.9 4.2 24.4 
last 2 months (task related records) 
Q417 Extent colleagues in Dept 3.66 0.96 3.6 2.8 18.4 
completed required records 
4 
8 
8.5.2 Performance Perceptions: Baseline and Post-baseline 
Figures 8.5 and 8.6 show extracted factor scores for each sample hospital. The wide 
confidence intervals around the means also indicate that the samples for each hospital were 
too small to give precise measures. Non significant increase in the perceived workload 
scores were observed in hospital 8. Several hospitals show some decline - i. e. hospitals 
1,2, 
5, and 10. 
Figure 8.5: Mean Workload score at baseline and post-baseline 
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Among hospitals 6,8,9 and 10, the scores for records vigilance (figure 8.6) were above the 
combined sample average in both survey rounds. This indicates that these 
hospitals were 
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doing generally well on records compared to others. Non-significant increase on the 
workload score was observed in hospitals I and 4, while perceptions declined in 5 and 7. 
Figure 8.6: Mean Records Vigilance score at baseline and post-baseline 
As summarised in table 8.9, the main difference from baseline across all hospital ownership 
categories was a relative decline in the workload scores indicating less workload compared to 
baseline. This decline in perception was nearly 2.5 times compared to baseline for the PNFP 
hospitals. For the government, UCMB and hospitals that received a PBC Bonus, the decline 
in scores was about 1.5 times compared to baseline (p-value range 0.131 - 0.138). There was 
no statistical difference in the mean scores capturing perceptions for efforts on records among 
these hospital categories. 
Table 8.9: Mean Change for the elements in the performance score 
t-test for Equality of Means 
Survey N Mean SD Mean SE t- test P- 
Round Diff Value 
Government Workload 2006 275 -0.01 0.87 0 13 09 0 -1 49 0.138 hospital Performance score 2005 165 0.11 0.86 . . . 
Records 2006 275 -0.01 0.86 0 03 0.10 0.28 0.782 
Performance score 2005 165 -0.03 1.03 . 
PNFP Workload 2006 407 -0.11 1.11 
-0 19 0 08 -2.43 0.015 hospitals Performance score 2005 318 0.09 1.01 . . 
Records 2006 407 0.04 0.99 0.07 0.08 0.90 0.368 
Performance score 2005 318 -0.03 1.11 
UCMB Workload 2006 241 -0.03 1.08 
-0 14 0 10 -1 51 0.131 hospitals Performance score 2005 235 0.12 1.00 . . . 
Records 2006 241 0.03 1.06 0.05 0.10 0.45 0.656 
Performance score 2005 235 -0.02 1.16 
Bonus Workload 2006 156 0.05 1.03 
-0 21 0 14 -1 49 0.137 hospitals Performance score 2005 79 0.26 1.00 . . . 
Records 2006 156 0.06 0.92 0.10 0.15 0.65 0.516 
Performance score 2005 79 -0.04 1.14 
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8.6 Performance Drivers and their Dynamics 
Regression analysis was used to find to what extent performance related perceptions - i. e. 
factor scores for workload and records were influenced by other variables. The results 
provide the magnitude of influence the independent variables had on these two derived 
measures of performance. Although the limitation of ordinal scores is acknowledged, the 
standardised scores generated by factor analysis provided an extended range of ordered 
scores from -3.0 to +3.0 that is approximate to interval data. Within these limits, the models 
indicate the essential factors influencing performance variables i. e. scores for "workload" and 
"records vigilance" at baseline and post-baseline. 
For interpretation purpose, perceptions favourable to PBC success are those that indicate a 
climate of performance that is much less from the hypothetical efficiency frontier implied in 
the measurement scale. The following predictions would aid success in attaining PBC targets: 
1. Positive correlation between performance variables and staff satisfaction variables 
(table 8.8) i. e. more staff satisfaction with greater/heavier workloads or "records 
vigilance". This would imply that greater staff satisfaction is associated with higher 
performance. 
2. Negative correlation between performance variables and different work units. This 
would indicate that staffs in these work units perceive less heavy workloads or 
"records vigilance" compared to staff in other units/hospital. Relative to other 
hospitals/units, this would imply that more room exist to expand performance in the 
units with negative correlations. Negative correlations indicate work units operating 
below their optimal efficiency frontier (Clewer and Perkins 1998; Chu and Spires 
2003). 
Table 8.10 presents the demographic, staff motivation factors (from section 8.3.1) and work- 
unit variables used in the regression models for workload and records. The staff motivation 
factor scores range from -3 to +3 with two thirds of the scores falling between -1 and +1 with 
a mean of zero. By implication, negative mean scores for staff motivation factors for 2005 
(table 8.10) imply that the perceptions for these factors in 2005 were relatively lower 
compared to the range of factor scores in the combined (total) sample. Dummy variables 
were created for different types of hospital departments (work units) and for hospital 
affiliation to Government, UCMB, PNFP and PBC Bonus group (Experiment-arm). The 
dummy variables for work-units (hospital departments) enable the perceptions of staff in 
different work teams and variable proximity to PBC targets to be examined. For instance, 
OPD, Maternity and ANC/MCH departments can be considered to house the PBC targets for 
OPD, Maternal Delivery, and Antenatal Care respectively. Support departments included 
mostly laboratory and pharmacy staff. Variables such as age and duration of stay were 
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checked for normality and the latter was log-transformed to achieve optimal normal 
distribution (skewness 0.744 and - 0.678 respectively). 
Table 8.10 Variable definition and descriptive statistics Variable Definition Percent /mean (SD) 
Demographics Age Years (Mean) 
Sex Male =1 
Female =2 
Duration of stay Log years 
Staff motivation factors 
2005 survey T-2006 survey 
32.1 (8.3) 
69.3% female 
0.57 (0.61) 
35.0 (9.4) 
67.6 % 
female 
0.65 (0.59) 
Fac_Gov "Performance Governance" -0.072 0.051 
Fac_Sat 'job Satisfaction" -0.067 0.048 Fac_Avl "Drug/tools availability" -0.013 0.009 
Fac_Fst "Financial Satisfaction " -0.054 0.038 Dummy for work unit or department 
Dp_Adm (% Administrative staff =1) 10.24% 9.28% 
Dp_Opd (% OPD Dept staff =1 ) 14.90% 18.42% 
DP_ANC (% ANC/MCH Dept staff=1) 4.28% 4.50% 
Dp_Mat (% Maternity Dept staff =1) 12.85% 11.60% 
Dp_Ped (% Paediatrics Dept staffl =1) 10.06% 8.87% 
Dp_InP (% In-patient Depts staff =1) 23.65% 21.56% 
Dp_Sup (% Support Depts staff =1) 19.18% 20.19% 
Dp_Svd (% Other service Depts staff =1) 4.84% 5.59% 
Dummy for hospital ownership 
DmGovtt % Government =1 
Otherwise =0 
35.0% 40.1% 
DmPNFP % PNFP hospitals =1°° 
% Otherwise =0 
61.2 /0 60.0 /o 
DmUCMB % UCMB hospitals =1 °° 
% Otherwise =0 
49.0 /0 35.3 /o 
DmTreat % PBC Bonus hospitals =1 
% Otherwise =0 
16.7 23.2 
xc a variables included or mu taco tnearity 
8.6.1 Regression Results 
Linear regression technique was used with all variables entered together as a block. Extracted 
factor scores for "workload" and "records vigilance" were used as the proxy dependent 
variables for staff perceptions about their performance. Regression results explaining the 
main drivers of the performance are summarised in table 8.11. The model fits were generally 
weak accounting for between 8 to 19 percent variation in the dependent variables. Although 
the models account for less variation in the performance variables, they are all statistically 
significant -F statistic less than 0.001. 
Dynamics for Workload Perception 
These regression results indicate that perceived higher (heavier) workload in 2005 was 
negatively correlated with several significant variables - mostly staff motivation factors and 
particular work-teams in the hospitals. Controlling for other variables, a unit increase in the 
factor scores for "performance governance" and "financial satisfaction" were responsible for 
10.2 and 14.0 percent increase in higher workload perceptions respectively. In contrast, a unit 
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increase in the factor scores for "Job satisfaction" and "drugs &tool availability" would lead 
to a decline of 20.5 and 9.0 percent respectively for workload perception scores. These 
findings imply that perceptions for job-satisfaction and drug availability would be adversely 
affected as workload perception increase. In contrast, better governance and financial 
satisfaction would infer positive perception of heavier workloads. Extrapolation to the PBC 
pilot, this implies that betterments in governance and financial satisfaction factors would 
engender favourable perceptions of workload. 
Table 5.11: Linear regression results: 2005 and 2006 surveys 
Workload Scores 
2005 2006 
B SE B SE 
(Constant) 
Age in log years 
Q44 Sex of respondent 
Duration of stay at this 
hospital 
Governance factor score 
FAC_Gov 
Job Satisfaction factor score 
FAC_Sat 
Drugs & tools availability 
factor score FAC Avl 
Financial Satisfaction 
Administration Department 
OPD Department 
ANC/MCH Department 
Maternity Department 
Pediatrics Department 
Other In-patient Depts. 
Support Depts. 
Other Service Depts. 
Dummy PNFP group 
Dummy UCMB group 
Dummy Bonus group 
R Square 
N 
0.481 0.451 
0.010 0.008 
-0.075 0.122 
0.001 0.010 
0.102** 0.049 
-0.205** 0.049 
-0.090* 0.053 
0.140** 0.054 
-0.587* 0.352 
-0.539* 0.323 
-0.011 0.390 
-0.429 0.331 
-0.421 0.336 
! -0.642** 0.318 
-0.761 ** 0.322 
0.880** 0.425 
-0.089 0.188 
0.025 0.160 
0.119 0.155 
0.137 
355 
-1.639 0.551 
0.018** 0.006 
0.186* 0.096 
0.005 0.007 
0.047 0.044 
-0.027 0.046 
-0.012 0.044 
0.040 0.042 
0.445 0.514 
0.536 0.497 
0.562 0.528 
0.386 0.502 
0.639 0.505 
0.516 0.496 
0.537 0.497 
0.251 0.525 
-0.176 0.141 
0.229* 0.122 
0.357** 0.127 
0.081 
554 
value ; value < u. us. 
Records Scores 
2005 2006 
B SE B SE 
-0.624 0.501 
-0.002 0.009 
0.115 0.135 
-0.002 0.011 
-0.046 0.479 
-0.005 0.005 
-0.090 0.084 
-0.002 0.006 
0.253** 0.054 
0.055 0.055 
0.290** 0.058 
-0.071 0.060 
0.392 0.391 
0.611 0.360 
0.888** 0.433 
0.429 0.368 
0.290 0.374 
0.015 0.354 
0.455 0.358 
0.358 0.472 
-0.198 0.209 
0.362** 0.178 
0.169 0.172 
0.191 
354 
0.230** 0.038 
0.076* 0.040 
0.216** 0.038 
-0.050 0.037 
0.578 0.447 
0.442 0.432 
1.107** 0.459 
0.369 0.436 
0.371 0.439 
0.252 0.431 
0.288 0.432 
0.436 0.456 
0.089 0.123 
-0.060 0.106 
-0.061 0.111 
0.179 
554 
Further still, 2005 findings show an inverse correlation between heavier workload 
perceptions and several dummy variables representing work units for administration, OPD, 
in-patient (wards) and staff working in "service departments" (ie pharmacy, laboratory and 
X-ray). For example, staff affiliation to "other service department" would reduce the 
perception of heavier workload by 88 percent (other factors being constant). By implication, 
these units, relative to other units, are more likely to have spare capacity to expand their 
workload. 
From the perspective of implementing PBC pilot that sought to expand the workload by 
increasing service volumes as defined by PBC targets, these findings suggest that the context 
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can be made more hospitable for successful PBC intervention by mitigating staff 
dissatisfaction through: 
1. Paying careful attention to improving availability of drugs and supplies if heavier 
workloads are to be acceptable to the staff. 
2. Better governance and financial satisfaction are likely to make heavier workload more 
acceptable to staff. 
3. Channelling more work to departments (work units) with relatively less perceived 
workload i. e. in Administration, OPD, In-patient wards and staff working in "service 
departments" (e. g. pharmacy, laboratory and X-ray) would be a feasible option for higher 
outputs (performance). 
By 2006, the findings show changes in the variables correlated with workload perceptions. 
Although not statistically significant, most correlations became positive. Statistically 
significant findings reflect that staff in UCMB hospitals and staff in hospitals that received 
PBC bonuses (PBC experiment arm) were more likely to perceive higher workloads in 2006. 
Controlling for other variables in the model, belonging to UCMB and to PBC Bonus Group 
would increase workload perception scores by 23.0 percent and 35.7 percent respectively. 
Age and sex of the staff were also correlated with heavier workload perceptions. These 
findings suggest that: 
1. Relative to other hospitals, increase in workload was less feasible from UCMB and 
Hospitals that were in the Bonus (treatment) group of the PBC pilot. Staff in these 
hospitals already perceived higher workload (during 2006), implying a situation closer to 
their optimal workload frontier. By extension, expansion of workloads in these groups as 
specified by the annual targets would be less feasible compared other groups. 
2. Participation in the PBC pilot was associated with higher staff perception about workload 
especially in 2006. This findings implies that PBC as implemented was associated with 
increased workload perceptions among the staff in the case-study hospitals that received 
performance bonuses. This could have resulted from an increase in the clients handled by 
each staff at these hospitals or a reduction in the staff numbers (see section 7.3 and 7.4) or 
both. Increased awareness of the performance targets may likewise influence the 
workload perception - especially as sustaining the increased targets becomes more 
challenging. 
3. Older (in age) and female staff (sex) were more likely to perceive higher workload 
relative to younger and male staff. 
Dynamics in for Perception about Service Records 
The regression models for staff perceptions towards "records vigilance" show some similarity 
over the two survey rounds. In both surveys (2005 and 2006), factor scores for performance 
governance, drugs/tools availability and working in ANC/MCH departments show positive 
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and statistically significant coefficients. Other factors being constant, the governance factor 
was associated with 25.3 percent and 23.0 percent (both P values < 0.0005) increase in the 
perception scores for higher records vigilance at baseline and post baseline respectively. 
Likewise, the "drugs and tools availability" factor was associated with 29.0 percent and 21.6 
percent higher scores (both P values < 0.0005) for attention to service records for the 
respective survey periods. 
In both rounds, the coefficient for ANC/MCH department (work unit) is highest and 
statistically significant - implying a most powerful influence in the models for records 
vigilance factor. Controlling for other variables in the model, working in ANC/MCH 
department was associated with an increase in perception scores for "records vigilance" of 
88.8 percent (p value 0.041) at baseline and 110.7 percent (p value 0.016) one year after the 
baseline survey. Similarly, belonging to UCMB at baseline was associated with a 36.2 
percent (p value 0.042) increase in factor scores for records vigilance. However this influence 
was not noticeable in 2006 for among staff of UCMB. 
From this perspective of perceived efforts on service records as measured in this study, these 
findings show that: 
1. Higher efforts on service records are consistently perceived in contexts of higher/better 
perception scores for Governance Factor by the hospital staff. By extension, better 
governance is likely to make the attainment of PBC targets successful by enabling more 
efforts (improvements) in the service records. 
2. Availability of Drugs and Tools is also essential for the perceived higher efforts on 
records. Likewise, better resourcing of drugs and tools would make service records better 
able to support PBC pilot. 
3. Relatively higher perception scores on service records among staff working in 
ANC/MCH departments, and staff working among UCMB hospitals shows that PBC 
targets in these units are less likely to succeed relative to other work units and non UCMB 
hospitals. From the efficiency perspective, UCMB staff and staff working in ANC/MCH 
indicate a perception for records performance that is closer to their efficiency frontier 
relative to staff in other units/hospital. 
Regression models for baseline (2005) and post-baseline (2006) show that there was marked 
dynamism in the factors driving the perceptions scores during the two survey periods. For 
instance, the model for Workload at baseline (2005) shows mostly negative (inverse) 
performance influences on workload compared to the positive (proportionate) model for 
2006. 
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8.7 Summary and Implications 
This chapter, using the perceptions of the hospital staff has provided additional insights about 
the performance of the hospitals during the period of PBC implementation. From their 
perceptions, important factors responsible for motivation and performance were extracted. 
Exploratory factor analysis extracted four factors to summarise the major variables 
underlying staff perceptions (motivation) measures developed. These were described as 
"Performance governance", "Job satisfaction" "Drugs/tools availability" and "Financial 
Satisfaction". In a similar manner, proxy variables for Performance were extracted and 
described as "Workload" and "Records vigilance". Taking the proxy performance variables 
as dependant variables, regression analysis provided some insights into the dynamics of the 
extracted factors for staff motivation between baseline and post baseline periods. From the 
perspective of evaluating the success of the PBC, these findings are interpreted below: 
1. Performance governance: 
Table 8.7 reports changes in means for the extracted factor score between 2005 and 2006 and 
shows that "performance governance" improved significantly for PNFP, UCMB and Bonus 
hospitals but declined significantly among government hospitals. As shown in table 8.5, the 
performance governance factor was mostly composed on variables measuring institutional 
rules and supervision i. e. supervision frequency, content and quality (table 8.3). The 
performance governance factor had positive and statistically significant correlation with 
perception scores for the proxy performance scores i. e. workload (2005) and records 
vigilance (both 2005 and 2006). In general, these findings imply that managers in non- 
governmental hospitals were perceived by their staff as providing better performance 
governance. 
2. Job satisfaction: 
The extracted factor measuring job satisfaction (table 8.7) showed that there was relatively 
more dissatisfaction at baseline (2005) compared to post-baseline. This improved markedly 
especially in UCMB hospitals (t-test 1.98, p. value 0.048) and marginally among all the 
PNFP hospitals (t-test 1.51 p. value 0.131). There was no change in the level of satisfaction 
in government hospitals between these two time periods. From the regression results, 
perception scores for job satisfaction was particularly correlated with workload performance 
at baseline (table 8.10). At baseline, and holding other factors constant, job satisfaction was 
responsible for 20.5 percent decline in workload perception scores (t-test -4.15; p value 
0.000). Job satisfaction also had a statistically significant correlation with performance factor 
score for records vigilance in 2006. 
3. Drugs/tools availability: 
The major change in drugs/tools availability was only perceived among hospitals that 
received PBC bonuses (pilot experiment arm). Drugs availability was perceived to have 
improved in 2006 by 2.3 times relative to baseline (t-test 0.021). This group of hospitals also 
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had the lowest mean for drug availability at baseline - which partly explains their capacity to 
improve. For example, the mean at baseline for drug availability for hospitals eligible for a 
PBC bonus was -0.53 and this improved to -0.21 post-baseline (table 8.7). The improved 
factor scores for drug availability in 2006 for the same hospital group was still below the 
combined sample mean (zero). Among the regression results, availability of drugs and tools 
had strong and positive correlation with the perceived performance towards "records 
vigilance" in both survey rounds. However, the influence towards workload was generally 
negative for both survey rounds. For instance, controlling for other factors in the regression 
model (table 8.11), a unit increase in factor scores for drugs availability was responsible for a 
decline of nine percent (t-test 1.71; p-value 0.087) in the perception scores for workload at 
baseline. A similar unit increase was associated with 29 percent and 21 percent increase in 
records vigilance at baseline and at post-baseline respectively. The implications of these 
findings are: 
1. Although workload is expected to increase with more drugs availability, this finding 
implies a relative ease with which tasks are completed in an environment that was 
perceived as well resourced with drugs, medical supplies and other tools for health care 
provision. 
2. More attention is paid to filling the service records in the context of better resources for 
health care provision. This may be driven by a need to account for these resources 
especially in contexts where such reports are used for calibrating the next disbursement 
financial and in-kind resources like drugs. Staff may be less driven to fill the service 
records in situations of low or insufficient resources such as drugs and medical supplies. 
3. Taken together, these findings imply that more patient care resourcing is necessary for 
PBC to inspire more effort (or tolerance for heavier workload and filling service records) 
from the staff. 
4. Financial satisfaction: 
The factor that captured the variability due to Financial Satisfaction showed weak statistical 
significance for the changes between the two periods. The biggest change from baseline was 
seen among government hospitals. There was an increase in the scores for financial 
satisfaction from baseline of 42 percent (P-value 0.154) among government hospitals. Among 
the regression models, a unit increase in Financial Satisfaction factor scores had a 14 percent 
(t-test 2.6; P-value 0.010) improvement in the perceptions scores for Workload at baseline 
(other factors constant). Although not statistically significant, financial satisfaction was 
inversely related to the models for Records Vigilance. 
5. Work-unit level differences: 
The dummy variables for Department that was added to the regression models provide 
additional information about the performance perceptions for Workload and Records among 
different work-units (teams). From the regression results, all work-units had negative 
(inverse) relationship with workload scores at baseline but all improved to positive 
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coefficients in 2006. In particular, the coefficients for OPD, Administration, In-patient wards 
and Support Departments were statistically significant at p-value of 5 or 10 percent. However 
none of these work unit variables was significant for workload in the 2006 survey. The 
regression models for Records Vigilance indicated that there was high and stable correlation 
with this dependent variable from ANC/MCH department. This dummy variable comprised 
of mostly Midwifes working in small-specialised teams to provide immunisation and 
antenatal services. These services are associated with special reporting requirements (eg for 
MOH League Table) that are driven by service statistics thus necessitating more effort on the 
service records. For example, immunisation requires several efforts on Service Records - 
tallying the official immunisation register, logging information onto the client-owned 
Immunisation Card and plotting baby weights for growth monitoring. Similarly, ANC visit 
requires logging information onto official MOH registers for ANC and PMTCT and logging 
details onto the client-owned ANC Card. It is possible that the more intensive engagement 
with records by staff in this department explains the statistically significant correlations from 
this group on both rounds. A second explanation may be that the long standing performance 
management pressure arising from measuring performance on these two services had trickled 
down to staff in these work units in form of more effort on service records. For example the 
Uganda National Expanded Programme for Immunisation (UNEPI), PMTCT programme and 
MOH League Tables regularly use these indicators for performance monitoring of 
programmes. 
6. Hospital affiliation to different performance frameworks: 
The dummy variable for PNFP, UCMB and PBC bonus (pilot experiment group) were 
included in the regression model. Statistically significant coefficient was noted for workload 
model in 2006 for staff in UCMB affiliated hospitals. Other factors being constant, affiliation 
to UCMB was responsible for 36 percent improvement in the Records Vigilance scores at 
baseline. Likewise, UCMB affiliation was responsible for 23 percent improvement in 
Workload performance scores in 2006. Hospitals that received PBC performance bonuses 
were associated with statistically significant results for Workload scores for the post-baseline 
survey (2006). Other factors being constant, affiliation to the PBC bonus hospitals was 
responsible for 35.7 percent (t-test 2.8; p-value 0.005) improvement in the Workload scores. 
8.7.1 Implications 
From the perspectives of hospital staff, these findings show that the essential performance 
drivers were Performance Governance, Job Satisfaction; Availability of Drugs and Tools and 
Financial Satisfaction. In relation to work units the performance towards service records was 
most likely to be high in the antenatal and childcare clinics. In general the findings showed 
that belonging to hospitals owned by UCMB and hospitals receiving PBC bonuses was 
associated with significant perceptions of higher workload especially in 2006. This might 
indicate that these hospitals were already feeling higher constraints to improve their 
performance. The findings also show marked dynamics in performance perceptions between 
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baseline and post-baseline. The baseline findings showed that performance drivers such as 
Job Satisfaction, Availability of Drugs and Financial Satisfaction were mostly negative 
(inverse) - implying a general dissatisfaction with workload at baselines compared to post- 
baseline. Findings also show that less capacity for performance (workload) improvements 
was mostly in work units related to the targeted services by PBC pilot i. e. ANC, maternity 
and childcare. This would imply less optimal effectiveness of PBC Pilot in this context. 
Viewed from the perceived staff efforts towards to improve service records less improvement 
in performance would arise from the same work units targeted by PBC. This is important 
especially given the centrality of service records (information systems to the performance 
measurement). 
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Chapter 9: Discussion 
9.0 Introduction 
This discussion aims to address the two broad questions that have guided this research - i. e. 
1) will hospitals respond to PBC? and 2) how will they respond? To address question 1, 
chapters 4,5 and 6 assessed the performance-related influences on the hospitals from external 
context, the internal governance and implementation effectiveness of PBC pilot respectively. 
The second study question required an in-depth case study of two hospitals to identify the 
strategies adopted to attain PBC targets. These findings were the focus in chapters 7. To 
understand the performance drivers in all hospitals, perceptions and motivations the staff to 
accomplish higher performance targets is the focus of chapter 8. The discussion is structured 
to address these two broad questions that guided the study. This discussion is structured 
along three sections: 
1) The substantive discussion is related to the research questions and objectives. These 
covered performance governance and management contexts within the broad health 
system and within the hospital Boards; how effectively PBC was implemented and how 
the hospitals responded to PBC pilot mechanisms. Additional objectives were related to 
perceptions and motivation of hospital staff about their capacity to improve performance. 
2) The theoretical discussion seeks to draw generalisable implications for adapting, 
designing and implementing performance-based contracting as a tool for reforming the 
health systems. This part of the discussion compares the observed pattern of response 
actions predicted by economic theory of Agency and those predicted by Organisation 
Process Theories. These two theoretical domains provided alternative propositions that 
guided this study. 
3) The methodological discussion provides insights gained from the evaluation of complex 
interventions like PBC that seek to achieve results within real world settings characterised 
by complex and dynamic health systems. 
9.1 Performance Management and Multiple Performance Objectives 
PBC was being introduced into the health system that has several performance objectives. 
Understanding the broad health system performance objectives was essential to assess the fit 
and synergy of PBC. At the state level, outcome measures like reduced mortality and 
improved health status were expected from the health sector investments. The indicators for 
the health sector plan were of necessity defined to be process indicators as outlined in the 
League table. The objections to the league table by the district health managers provided 
insights into the differences in performance expectations at the district level. For example 
client satisfaction and service coverage were considered more important at this level. The 
implication of MOH league table and its strong influence on local governments was that -a 
small set of the sector performance was being drilled down to the hospitals with little 
attention to other objectives that the hospital serve. If hospitals were sensitive to the league 
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table, this might blind them against other hospital service objectives which were not 
subjected to performance assessment. These include services like in-patient care, surgeries, 
diagnostic services, and measures of efficiency such as bed occupancy rates. Likewise, client 
satisfaction and better coverage of interventions were not given priority despite being 
desirable at the district level. Like MOH league table performance indicators, PBC targets 
included OPD attendance, immunisation and maternity services - thus achieving good 
alignment and synergy. 
9.1.1 Quality as a Desirable Performance Dimension 
At the district level, disbursement of operational funds, staffing levels, availability of drugs 
and satisfaction of clients and better coverage were important performance indicators. In 
general these relate to quality of care provided. Although quality becomes a more explicit 
performance expectation at the district level, the capacity to assess it was not well 
established. Diverse projects were found trying to push hospitals to pay attention to quality 
issues. These included the UCMB experimentation with client satisfaction surveys and 
clinical audits. Other players were trying to use maternal mortality audits, and provision of 
project related drugs like antiretroviral for HIV/AIDS and antimalarials. The Yellow Star 
programme was starting to scale-up among study hospitals. The Yellow Star programme was 
employing a broad range of quality assessment indicators that were being transformed into a 
public report-card aimed at branding provider-quality to the communities (DISH 2002; 
McNamara 2006). The programme was trying to assess internal process of care, provider- 
client interaction, client satisfaction, and community activities. 
These findings show that PBC was being implemented in a context with several other 
performance related interventions. Although PBC did not specify the quality of services, its 
objectives overlapped significantly with those espoused by programmes like UCMB and 
Yellow Star that had a focus on quality. At best PBC would provide a synergistic effect by 
Pushing targets based on service volumes while other programmes push the quality 
dimension. From the evaluation perspective, however, the attribution of performance 
improvements to PBC can be difficult among hospitals subjected to multiple interventions. 
The range of mechanisms for enforcing performance expectations in a decentralised system 
of government call for careful designs of financing arrangements and incentives to ensure 
complementarities and synergy among different agencies that seek to influence the same 
service provider organisations like hospitals. 
9.2 Implications of Weak Governance 
At the interface between Board of Governors (BOGs) and Hospital Management teams 
(HMT), governance of hospital performance was assessed. Findings in chapter 5 imply the 
existence of significant barriers in these governance structures for the performance 
framework to function in the manner assumed by PBC. For example, PBC as implemented in 
Uganda and elsewhere assumed a "hands-off' approach - where the incentive (bonus) 
is 
sufficient to drive performance improvement among hospitals (Soeters, Habineza et al. 2006). 
192 
Entrepreneurial science provides a basis for performance governance and organisational 
control that is vested in the Boards of Trustees or Boards of Governors and the managers as 
the executives (Young, Beekun et al. 1992; Taylor 2000; Eldenburg, Hermalin et al. 2001; 
Eeckloo, Van Herck et al. 2004; Alexander, Ye et al, 2006). The performance bonuses may 
not be a sufficient incentive or mechanism to overcome governance constraints described in 
chapter S. Problems included composition of Boards, capacity to provide effective oversight 
for hospital performance and weak information exchange with hospital managers. 
Organisational theory and management science perspectives regarding the development of 
governance systems are useful additional prerequisites for performance-based contracting to 
work more effectively in improving hospital performance. The implications of the findings 
for weak governance are well captured by Taylor (2000): 
"Over 100 years of organisational theory building and theory testing by some of the greatest minds in 
managerial sciences have resulted in one consistent finding: as ambiguity increases with and/or 
across the structure of an organisation, so does the probability of strategic error, fraud, negligence, 
anarchy, destructive power struggles, bureaupathic layering, inaction, decreased accountability and 
responsibility taken for decisions and total organisational collapse when under economic 
stress "(Taylor 2000 pg 108). 
From this perspective, strengthening of institutional capacity for good governance need to be 
Part and parcel of the performance-based incentive schemes. Studies from Rwanda, 
Guatemala and recently Haiti have focused on the governance structures both at the up-steam 
and downstream to make PBC schemes sustainable and more effective (La Forgia, Mintz et 
al. 2005; Meessen, Musango et al. 2006; Rusa, Schneidman et al. 2009). 
9.3 PBC Implementation: Measurement of Performance 
Measurement of performance is central to the PBC intervention. For measurement to function 
there must be data systems and instruments to measure the desired performance from 
hospitals. Hospitals serve various objectives. In terms of health programmes, they have 
nursing care, preventive and promotive objectives. Under nursing care, they espouse 
objectives related to paediatrics, obstetrics, gynaecology, surgery, emergency and chronic 
care. In addition they service acute care needs such as OPD consultation and emergency 
treatment for accidents. In the Uganda context and indeed globally, hospitals are being asked 
to contribute more to the prevention and promotion aspects of health in communities 
(McPake 1996; McKee and Healy 2000; Hanson, Atuyambe et al. 2002; WHO 2003; Alia 
2005a page 13). Chapter 6 illustrated among other findings the problems of metering 
Performance by the PBC pilot. Metering performance is the central mechanism of 
Performance-based contracting and more broadly, pay-for-performance approaches (Penelope 
and Murray 2002; La Forgia, Mintz et al. 2005; Palmer and Mills 2005; Soeters, Habineza et 
al. 2006). The findings show big challenges with the feasibility of measuring performance 
among hospitals. 
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9.3.1 Feasibility of Measuring Performance 
In general, measurement difficulties were experienced at all levels of performance 
management. The centrality of metering performance is captured in Lawler's comments: 
"The key to any successful reward system is effective performance measurement - and indeed, the 
most common reason that individual pay-for-performance systems fail is their lack of good appraisal 
system "(Lawler 1989 pg 57). 
Ease of measurement, access and regularity of data availability for performance assessment 
were major constraints at all levels. The ease of measuring performance was critical for 
performance indicators that were being used at the national, sector and sub-national levels. At 
the national level, the periodic national surveys for economic, health and demographic 
monitoring enabled the tracking of outcome measures such as mortality, fertility and 
morbidity patterns (UBOS 2000; UBOS 2001; UBOS 2002; UBOS 2003). 
Given its decentralised governance and service provision, measures selected at the sector 
level by MOH were driven by the need to track indicators at the level of the district using the 
well established Health Management Information Systems (HMIS). Such measures also had 
to be available annually for the national league table (NLT) to be constructed and presented 
in the Annual Sector Reports and to the Annual National Health Assembly (MOH 2003b; 
MOH 2004). The focus of the national and district level performance assessment on a limited 
set of process and service volume indicators (see league table 4.5) implied that the overriding 
performance expectations of MOH were contained in the league table. Vigorous assessments 
of the measures in the NLT influenced local governments to focus on similar measures. Since 
the PBC pilot was using a similar set of measures to those in the League table, it could 
benefit from the existing NLT incentives as well as supplement them. At the same time, the 
NLT measures faced marked dissatisfaction from those that it assessed - the district health 
managers. The dissatisfaction was mostly due to ambiguities in the measures - especially 
external factors that influenced success for the measured indicators. For example, the 
delayed and erratic disbursement of grants by Finance Ministry, was vital for district and 
hospital performance and success on most NLT indicators. 
9.3.2 The Best as the Enemy of the Good: Performance Measures for PBC Pilot 
Above all the difficulties encountered in the implementation of PBC pilot, performance 
measurement posed the greatest constraint. In particular, the use of primary records for 
Performance verification raised the workload beyond the capacity of the available financial 
and human resources for the pilot. The findings in chapter 6 illuminated several sources of 
measurement difficulties for the desired outcomes - PBC targets. Performance assessment 
together with impact surveys were contracted to the local research institution. As a 
Prerequisite, from the lens of expectancy theory, the measurements needed to be fair, valid 
and consistent. These conditions were not achieved during PBC implementation. 
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1. Fairness: Several approaches used to measure the output volumes were not fair to 
hospitals. For instance, the measurements were based on primary registers even when the 
contract document stated otherwise. Non-availability of the registers on the day the 
performance verification team (PVT) visited was punished with a zero performance score. 
The failure by the verification team to read or understand a diagnosis in the register also 
meant under-assessment for the provider's performance. 
2. Validity: Validity requires that the measured performance arise from and encompass all 
the dimension relevant to the efforts towards a measurable objective (Smith and Street 
2006). The main finding on validity related to problems in the format of the data in the 
registers and the behaviours of some members in the PVT. For instance some essential 
variables for computing the service targets such as "age of patients" were not routinely 
recorded. The PVT was taking pervasive shortcuts that included instances of forging 
performance data. Given the problems in the registers, steep workload and the opportunist 
behaviours of the PVT, the performance measurement process lacked validity. 
3. Consistence: Reliability was a problem due to several adjustments that were made during 
implementation period. As the performance verification teams acquired some expertise in 
dealing with the registers, they were more likely to understand the service records and 
diagnoses and shorthand used to record performance data. This improvement among the 
performance auditors meant that the data they collected was not comparable across time - 
and by extension not reliable to compute percentage changes in the service-output 
volumes (performance) of provider organisations. Given the complaints about the decline 
in cooperation (not providing data and refusing to be interviewed) by the provider 
organisations in subsequent pilot activities, additional problems in reliability were likely. 
4. Confusion of roles: The findings in chapter 6 show that there was a confusion of roles 
within the performance verification team (PVT). Performance-verification and impact- 
assessment were merged and undertaken as one activity by the PVT. This caused a 
tension between proper implementation of the pilot and the evaluation of its impact. From 
the findings, the activities for impact evaluation seem to have clouded-out those aimed at 
auditing the performance and providing feedback. 
5. Intrusive approach: It emerged from the descriptions (6.1.3.2) that the PVT was 
disruptive to the provider organisations by trying to accomplish several activities in one 
short visit. Findings indicate that the service provision activities were nearly halted in 
order for the PVT to do its performance audits. Some implications of these problems 
were observed among the narratives of respondents: 
"sometimes you find that in the middle of a busy clinic, the research assistants (PVT) are 
collecting all the registers, stops the clinic to talk to (interview) the staff. The health workers find 
it very difficult to organise themselves. The other issue was the exit interviews. These were very 
few simply because they had taken away all the staff for interviews and there was no one left to 
see the patients and therefore no exit patients. Some of these units have 2 or 3 staff only. At the 
exit poll, the patients were very tired, .. waited for too long and did not cooperate 
"( Member, 
Pilot Implementation Team). 
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Resentment and lack of cooperation had emerged in the subsequent rounds of 
performance validation (data collection), with reported decline in compliance with pilot 
activities. As the extract above shows, volume targets may be counterproductive. Client 
satisfaction could be worsened by the PBC approaches themselves. 
9.3.3 Implication of Measurement Problems: 
Problems in the measurement of the baseline performance and the records used for this 
purpose had negative credibility implications for the rest of the pilot. For example, 
contestations of the assessed (verified) performance were a key feature during the feedback 
meetings held early in 2005. From the findings of chapter 6, performance verification 
activities that were central to the pilot and contracted targets were eclipsed by a need to 
collect lots of data to assess the impact of PBC. 
The implication of these measurement problems especially at baseline is that performance 
"improvements" observed in the subsequent pilot activities potentially arose partly from the 
improved capacity of the PVT to audit the records and not necessarily from more clients 
being served by the participating health facilities. These findings support the proposition that 
the changes in the service output volumes generated by the PVT reflected its capacity to 
handle the records as well as changes in the service outputs produced by the participating 
health facilities. 
9.4 Hospital Response to PBC 
At the outset, the propositions for why and how hospitals would respond to PBC were framed 
along five objectives. Among the factors examined albeit in a qualitative manner, were the 
costs and size of the financial incentive implied in the PBC bonus. The "how" question was 
closely related to the effectiveness of the implementation mechanisms for PBC intervention. 
The following section outlines the major findings related to these objectives. The findings 
also show that incentives that are explicitly or implicitly attached to performance measures 
can be demotivating if viewed from a different context. The following illustrates the range of 
influences observed in the findings and their potential effects: 
9.4.1 Effective Performance Influences 
In a resource constrained environment as Uganda's health system, the financing of the 
activities that lead to performance is probably the most direct influence on provider 
organisations like hospitals and the intermediate agencies that support them. In this respect, 
global level providers of international aid for health programmes and National Treasury have 
strong influences on national and sub-national performance. In this respect, the provision of 
funds or withholding funds for health programmes wields strong influence and provides high 
powered incentives for agencies to respond to performance expectations. The withholding of 
funds by the Global Fund provided a powerful incentive to streamline performance and 
governance related problems in the Uganda's HIV programmes supported by the Global Fund 
(GFATM 2003 page 5; UAC 2006). Similarly, MOH has effective performance influence on 
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hospitals due to its central procurement role and discretion to allocate budgets (drug credit 
lines and salaries) and resource inputs such as drugs, vehicles and other hardware goods to 
districts and hospitals. Availability of drugs, for example, has a direct effect on the 
performance as measured by OPD attendance (Nazerali, Oteba et al. 2006). 
9.4.2 Incentive Package for Performance Development 
In general, UCMB case study in section 4.4 suggests that "a package approach" to 
organisational development and performance improvements is more effective for successful 
response from hospitals. As put by Grol et al (2007) "Extra resources, support, training in 
skills, redevelopment of care processes, temporary support or consultants, information 
materials for patients" are necessary for change to be effectively sustained. The case study of 
UCMB also shows an example of a package of incentives that attracted high compliance. The 
multi-component package as contained in the UCMB accreditation regimen (section 4.4) 
boosted the power to influence performance among Catholic health facilities. The UCMB 
case study also showed that building a strong institutional base was required for performance 
improvement activities. In particular, the institutional change processes championed by 
UCMB involved supporting activities for the basic building blocks of the organisational units 
such as revising hospital missions, constitutions, operations manuals, training for managers 
and provision of computers and e-mail capabilities for information systems. UCMB 
mobilised financial resources to support hospitals during the processes of institutional change 
and during the process of reducing user-charges for improved access (UCMB 2003). There 
was good compliance for UCMB's accreditation which suggested a powerful set of 
performance incentives (Giusti, Lochoro et al. 2004; UCMB 2006). The multi-component 
(package) approach of UCMB change process was assisted by its affiliation to Uganda 
Catholic Church (UCC) - which signalled authority and credibility among Catholic health 
facilities. This credibility and authority was also boosted by a broad range of technical 
support, training and information sharing UCMB provided to its members. 
9.4.3 Weak Performance Influences 
The national league table (NLT) and the performance bonuses did not espouse strong 
Performance influences relative to those discussed above. These parameters are expounded 
on below: 
9.4.3.1 National League Table 
In general, the influence mechanisms that were not associated with financing, technical 
support or material resource benefits had weak or moderate power to influence performance 
expectations. Although it ignited performance-related discussions and accountability among 
district leaders, the league table faced strong contestations to its measures. The locus of 
control for improving the National League Table (NLT) indictors was not totally in the hands 
of those whose performance it assessed. For instance, delays in financial disbursements, poor 
drug stocks and capping of staff recruitments were strong performance inhibitors external to 
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the control of districts and hospitals. Some findings also indicate that perverse incentives 
were associated with the NLT. One district health officer complained that the best performing 
districts on the NLT received token awards (placards and certificates) while the worst 
performing districts were awarded vehicle/ambulances and new project to finance 
improvements in health care provision. The misalignment of rewards for the NLT indicates a 
tension between performance-based incentives which promote competition and favour high- 
capacity organisations, and the equity motives which favour the provision of support to weak 
organisations that perform poorly. 
But the fact that the NLT was quickly adopted by the districts shows that it had some 
influence on performance. This may be due to its "name and shame" strategy especially at the 
National Health Assembly -a forum that attracted most political and civic leaders and with 
high media coverage. Despite the weakness in the NLT, it represented a useful tool for 
performance monitoring for the district-level political leaders. It was able to provide them 
with a relative measure of performance that enabled peer comparison among local 
governments and a basis for dialogue with district health mangers. Findings show that 
political leaders had started to ask performance-related questions to their technocrats in 
charge of district health services (section 4.2.3). The district health technocrats were also 
sensitive to the ranking they received from MOH and were quick to adopt the NLT approach 
within their performance management system at the district level. 
9.4.3.2 Awards and Recognition 
The least power to influence performance was at the local government or district level. The 
mechanisms at this level were mostly weak and limited by strong constraints external to 
districts. When available, project-based financing was assisting the district health managers 
to hold performance review meetings and to award certificates of recognition to health 
facilities that posted good performance. Most of these mechanisms of influence were 
financed through projects such as the Yellow Star Programme and thus vulnerable due to 
irregular financing and weak sustainability. When rewards are not reliably linked to 
performance measures, such rewards fail to motivate agents (Lawler 1989). Nonetheless, 
when received, recognition awards enjoyed durable impact. Several years later, a certificate, 
placard or trophy continue to motivate and symbolise appreciation of progress (DISH 2002; 
Ekochu 2005; UCMB 2005b). 
9.4.3.3 PBC Bonuses, their Financing and Size 
Although performance bonuses are known to motivate improved performance, they are prone 
to design and implementation failures (Marsden and Richardson 1994; O'Donnell and Shields 
2002; Petersen, Woodard et al. 2006; Roen, Arai et al. 2006). For instance, bonus payments 
evaluated in this study were coupled to performance feedback activities which caused delays 
in bonus payments. Design failures were also explicit in the lack of secure funds for paying 
performance bonuses. The findings in (section 6.1.4) show that securing the bonus was 
transaction-intensive and negatively affected the implementation of several pilot activities. 
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Despite doubling the bonus size, the amounts remained small compared to the total hospital 
revenues. For instance the total bonus receipts accounted for 3.3 percent of revenue for the 
case-study hospital that succeeded in achieving 10 out of a maximum of 11 bonus points. It 
was not possible in this study to establish the costs of generating a five or 10 percent increase 
among the PBC service targets. Such information would be useful to make firm conclusion 
about the bonus size in relation to the volume of outputs that are required for achieving these 
targets. However, the findings also show that the two case study hospitals in chapter 7 were 
responsible for 82 percent of the entire bonus funds paid out to a total of 19 health facilities. 
As such, efforts seeking to measure the impact and cost-effectiveness of performance 
bonuses (PBC innovation) need to pay more attention to the hospitals. 
9.4.3.4 Bonus Management by Hospitals 
Regarding the value placed on the rewards (bonuses), the findings show that there was need 
for the hospitals to test the benefits of the rewards before undertaking purposeful actions for 
performance improvement. For example, before the case study hospitals received their first 
bonuses, there was limited awareness of the performance expectations of the pilot. Attention 
to the pilot's performance targets was galvanized after the case study hospitals received their 
first bonuses. When the bonus benefits were made visible and shared by all staff, there were 
improvements in the records system of one case study hospital. Also managers in this 
hospital gained leadership capital from the bonuses and were able to use this capital to 
demand performance improvements from their staff. Having appreciated the benefits of the 
first bonus, both hospitals started to actively create awareness about the performance 
requirements of the pilot. This may have design implications for the early phases of PBC 
policy implementation. For instance, PBC implementers need to assist organizations to use 
the bonuses in a manner to secure valued benefits by staff early in the process of policy scale- 
up. Active internal awareness about the bonuses and the performance expectations (targets) 
within the hospitals is also required. 
Additional effects of the performance bonuses are related to the PBC pilot design. The 
randomised experiential design that was used to implement PBC pilot created sentiments that 
reflected a potential for causing dissatisfaction especially among the control groups (This is 
further discussed in the methodological section below). Such effects call for a careful 
understanding of the effects of performance bonuses in different contexts. Findings in the UK 
also show that financial incentives may result in less than optimal performance outcomes. For 
example, the safety of donated blood worsened when financial incentives were introduced to 
replace voluntary (free) donations (Titmuss 1970; Kingma 2003; Le Grand 2003). 
Findings from this study show that receipt of a bonus can ignite an internal decision-making 
process for its allocation. This decision-making process is critical to understanding the effects 
of performance-bonuses that are awarded to the organisation as a whole in contrast to those 
awarded to individual workers or employees. The hygiene of the decision-making processes 
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may boost, dampen or totally negate the performance improvement effect of the bonus 
(Lynch, Eisenberger et al. 1999; Gardner and Schermerhorn 2004). 
".. on the basis of the reciprocity norm, employees who perceive that their organisation values their 
contributions and cares about their well-being are obligated to increase their (. ) performance. In 
contrast, repeated indications that the organisation does not value employee contributions and fails to 
reward increased performance reduce employees' perceived obligations (Lynch, Eisenberger et al. 
1999 page 469) 
The findings also showed that there were differences in the value placed on performance- 
related benefits between the managers and the clinical staff. Exhibitionist rewards such as a 
trophies, buildings and or status symbols such as star-ratings used by the Yellow Star 
Programme were more valued by managers. In contrast, clinical staff valued workplace 
improvements such as social events (parties) and social amenities (kettles for tea) at their 
workplace. 
9.5 Response Actions and Role of the Context 
The basis for performance success with PBC was generally a contingent phenomenon. The 
response to PBC targets can be described in part as hitchhiking on more fundamental 
performance levers the study hospitals were experiencing. The efforts to enhance hospital 
performance were many and varied in their capacity to address more critical constraints to 
performance. Both success and failure of performance was attributed to a number of 
contextual variables, such as increased costs, staff exodus and the flow and size of the 
government grants. Other contextual interventions like Yellow Star Programme (YSP) and 
UCMB's organisational development programmes also provided concurrent synergies and 
alternative drivers for addressing performance improvements among hospitals. 
Among the critical constraints were the increase in the cost of hospital service delivery and 
high dependence on uncertain financial flows (grants) from the government. Erratic financial 
flows probably posed one of the greatest constraints to performance among all hospitals 
during the period of this study. The reduction of user-charges among PNFP hospitals in this 
study also created additional constraints. The reported increase in service utilisation and 
outputs due to the reduction in user-charges also increased the variable costs of inputs like 
drugs. Additional increase in the cost of service delivery among PNFP hospitals was due to a 
substantial increase in staff salaries (about 30 - 50%) as attempts were made to catch-up with 
the much increased salaries of health workers in the government sector (UCMB 2006). 
The dynamism in staff movement in and out of the study hospitals was another major source 
of contextual contingency. Improvements and failures in performance were likewise 
attributed to this problem. Staff movements hit a peak during 2005, the year before the 
presidential elections. Through a presidential directive, money was made available to 
increase the salaries of health workers in the public sector. Likewise, about 3.4 billion 
shillings were made available to recruit about 1,800 health workers into the public sector. 
200 
These two actions precipitated what was described as staff exodus from the PNFP hospitals 
and health centres(Guisti 2007). About 60 percent of the health workers recruited into 
government service were from PNFP health sub-sector (MOH 2008). The loss of staff with 
managerial experience especially affected the continuity of the internal strategies to improve 
performance against PBC service targets (section 7.2). For example, an internal champion 
for PBC strategies in one case study hospital moved out for different employment thus 
precipitating leadership vacuum for PBC targets. Acute staff attrition in the early phase of 
this study escalated the work burden for the remaining staff, making the response to PBC 
more complicated. The fmdings show that service records - the basis for determining 
performance, were more likely to be ignored by the overburdened staff. The implication of 
this action was likely to understate the service outputs of the hospitals. Indeed the 
purposeful actions to respond to PBC in one case-study hospital were related to efforts to 
improve service records as opposed to actions to serve more clients. The focus on records in 
one of the case study hospitals was also synergised by the prevailing district-wide efforts to 
improve the service records and routine systems for reporting of service outputs. These 
district-wide efforts were being driven by a need to improve district performance scores on 
the national MOH League Table. Likewise, the observed strategy in another case study 
hospital i. e. to re-organise and reduce clients' waiting time was also contingent on the prior 
infrastructure developments for expanding hospital space and a prior internal study that 
provided additional rationalisation for re-organisation of client flow to enhance client 
satisfaction. 
Marketing of the hospital services was one of the strategic response behaviour to PBC in both 
case study hospitals. Findings (section 7.3.1) show that the marketing strategy was being 
pushed by several contextual contingencies. These included the need to make the 
communities more aware about the reduction in service charges that had been recently 
introduced and the explicit objective by the Yellow Star Programme (YSP) to create service- 
quality literacy in the community. Availability of grants (from YSP and Govt PHC grant) to 
finance the community-level activities was a strong synergistic factor for a successful 
marketing strategy for attaining PBC service targets. Additional synergistic factors included 
quality assessment, feedback and technical support from YSP to hospitals. This support led to 
the development and monitoring of action plans whose aim was to fix performance gaps 
identified by the YSP assessment. The findings show that preparation of actions plans, 
financial support to fix quality gaps and active monitoring by YSP were essential to the high 
priority and prompt responses to the YSP and UCMB programmes. In a sentence, micro- 
management and a package of supportive actions of YSP and UCMB generated more 
responsive performance action from hospitals relative to arms-length approach by PBC. 
How respondents explained their performance successes, failures and processes for bonus 
allocation were indicative of the contingencies in the context and precedents within the 
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organisations. From a rational perspective, the findings about the context in which the 
hospitals were responding to PBC innovation support strategies to cut costs and/or cutting 
back on service outputs (performance). Indeed strategies to screening against high cost clients 
were explicitly being adopted in some of the study hospitals. Given the increased costs of 
service provision, increases in the size of the grants (government and donors) seemed to hold 
a powerful lever for future performance improvements relative to the PBC bonus. 
9.6 Response Action and Organisational Precedents 
The potential for case study hospitals to increase their service outputs (performance) was 
partly explained by the precedents in the organisation trajectories. Precedents are events in 
the history of the organisation that have influence on current actions and behaviours (Scott 
2001). For example, lower performance baseline in the years prior to PBC was a factor in 
both case study hospitals. Increases in the size of financial grants from Government in the 
years prior to PBC pilot were also important considerations. Improvements in the hospital 
infrastructure were also used to explain successes in improving performance of the hospitals 
in the years prior and during PBC pilot. 
The processes of handling the bonuses illuminated yet another perspective for understanding 
organisational precedents in responding to PBC. Despite the bonus amounts being a meagre 
proportion relative to the overall hospital budgets, the internal processes of decision-making 
were driven by organisation precedents. The decision-making process and outcomes of the 
bonus allocation were a potential source of success or failure to respond appropriately to PBC 
innovation. The two case studies displayed internal processes that could ignite both staff 
satisfaction and dissatisfaction with PBC. For example, in the hospital where the participatory 
decision making processes and consensus outcomes were overridden by administrative 
directives (HOSP-1), perceptions of dissatisfaction among staff were created and risked 
ignoring PBC innovation. Poor handling of the bonuses seemed to fracture the trust between 
staff and those in administration. Given this unsatisfactory precedent, the decision-making 
regarding the allocation of the second bonus was confined to a few persons in administration 
department as opposed to broad consultations used for allocating the first bonus. The 
information about the second bonus was not communicated to staff. Nonetheless, the 
administration attempted to redeem some of the fractured trust by hosting a party in 
accordance with the popular staff decisions made in relation to the first bonus. 
Implicit in the chain of events in this hospital is the fact that, the internal management 
cultures and precedents can influence the handling of the bonuses and can drive performance 
on a downward spiral if the internal processes of bonus allocation are considered unfair. The 
use of arms-length tools like performance-based financial incentives (bonuses) needs to 
consider the institutional competence to handle such financial incentives. Institutional 
economist Williamson captured this point: 
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"... high powered incentives found to be effective in market organisation give rise to dysfunctional 
consequences if introduced into the firm.... Whereas market organisations are associated with 
higher powered incentives, and lesser controls, internal organisation joins lower powered incentives 
with greater controls. The choice (of market or firm) necessarily must make allowance for these 
respective incentive-and-control syndromes "(Williamson 1996 page 178). 
This case study provides evidence that financial incentives introduced in the wrong 
institutional context can do more harm than good. Effective "hands on" or bureaucratic 
controls in form of governance are needed inside the firm. Organisation process theorists 
treat this issue as a matter of building trust in organisation systems to overcome wary 
employee perceptions (Guest 1998; Lynch, Eisenberger et al. 1999; Rousseau 2001; 
O'Donnell and Shields 2002). 
"The culture and history of the organisation can influence responses to factors interpreted as 
threatening within the facility. The internal climate that exists within a facility can determine the 
ability of the staff to accept change in a positive manner. Poor morale, lack of trust, and a feeling of 
disengagement with the organisation are internal factors that influence the organisation's ability to 
reform and succeed.... A secretive senior management also may lead to distrust on the part of 
employees as opposed to an open communication model in which staff are kept apprised of events that 
may impact their future" (Stanfill-Edens 2005 page (web page)). 
The different approaches used to make decisions about the allocation of the bonus in the case 
study hospitals also reflected the organisational precedents. The precedent of open and 
participative decision-making processes in one hospital (HOSP-2) illustrated the potential for 
enhanced visibility of PBC bonus within the hospital and a potential for all staff to internalise 
and increase commitment to the PBC innovation. In this hospital, the bonus allocation 
decisions hitchhiked on the well established internal communication system. The outcomes of 
bonus allocation showed optimism for innovation and visibility within the organisation. The 
positive leadership elements displayed in this hospital - i. e. participatory processes, 
communication that linked performance to the PBC bonus - seem to have emerged as a result 
of learning from a negative historical event namely a staff strike two years prior to the 
introduction of PBC pilot. The strike was mostly about poor communication between people 
in management and the staff. 
9.7 Theoretic Perspectives and Their Utility in PBC Pilot Evaluation 
To understand the context and its influence on both the implementation of and the effects 
arising from PBC, a conceptual framework was used to guide and provide the key dimensions 
for the assessment of the hospital response to PBC pilot. Performance governance assessment 
examined the key relationships the hospitals had with their main external or up-stream 
stakeholders such as the central ministries and district health officers (DHOs), down-stream 
relationships i. e. UCMB and Yellow Star Programme and stakeholders internal to the 
hospitals such as the Boards of Governors (BOG) management teams and staff. Given the 
interdependence of the hospitals to the broad health sector management, additional insights 
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about performance governance were examined at the health sector ministry. The main 
elements examined in these relations included performance expectations, support, influences 
and control mechanisms. The utility of the theoretical frameworks and the emergent themes 
are discussed below. 
Although the framework (see figure 3.1) was vital for structuring the domains and limiting 
the scope of this study, building functional explanations of how and why hospitals responded 
to PBC required the use of functional conceptualisations within the various study domains. In 
this respect, Agency-based theories and Process-based theories were set up as alternatives 
ways to explain the hospital responses with contrasting propositions (see section 3.4). As 
will become apparent below, agency-based theories and process-based theories had elements 
that exhibited different and contracting explanations while in some respects, they both 
provided complimentary explanations. 
9.7.1 Strategic Intents and Their Control 
As a means of examining why and how hospitals respond to performance-based contracting, 
two theoretical lenses from different perspectives were used in this work. These are (1) 
agency-based theories, which are economics-oriented approaches, and (2) process theories 
that reflect both the sequential nature of events as well as the social-psychological 
mechanisms necessary for sustainable performance of organisations. For example, 
satisfactory social-psychological perceptions are vital for durable employment contract 
(Rousseau 2001). 
9.7.2 Agency-based Theory Applications: Use of Bonuses 
The linkage between rewards and performance is a primary concern of agency theory. Better 
linkage boosts the power of incentives to influence performance. In practice, the best 
incentive alignment is achieved by calibrating the reward in accordance to the measured 
performance of the agent (Frant 1996; Gauri 2001; Smith 2002; Stark 2002; Jacobs and 
Dawson 2003; Kingma 2003). Individualisation of incentives such as performance bonuses is 
central to the principle of self-interestedness on which neoeconomic/institutional theory is 
built (Williamson 1985). Incentives achieve optimal power to induce behaviour if there are 
individualised and strictly linked to performance (Sappington 1991). Group incentives have 
a problem of reducing the power of incentive and overall, reducing the productivity of the 
organisation (Dixit 1996; Sinclair-Desgagne 2001). In the context of PBC pilot, high powered 
incentives as predicted from agency theory would imply that the bonuses would be allocated 
to individual workers or departments in accordance to their particular contribution (effort) to 
achieve the PBC targets. By extension, the bonus would lead to winners and losers within the 
organisation. Winners would be those that have made significant effort to the generation of 
the service targets. Losers may include individuals or departments that had little to do with 
the achievement of PBC targets. 
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9.7.2.1 High-powered Versus Low-powered Incentives 
The major finding from this work shows that the use of high-powered incentives as predicted 
by agency theory was debated but discarded in both hospitals. Low-powered incentives were 
used instead. The use of the bonuses indicated some common features in both case-study 
hospitals. Discussions about the criteria for allocating the bonus included "nomination of best 
performers", giving the money to the "departments" where the targets were generated, or 
buying equipment for those departments that were associated with the selected targets. These 
would fit practices predicted from agency theory. Nonetheless, both case-study hospitals 
agreed to use the bonuses for staff cerebration (party/picnic), managers insisted on allocating 
bonus funds towards infrastructure/operational expenses and both groups rejected the use of 
bonus funds for "glorifying" selected individual or groups on the criteria such as 
"hardworking" or "departments" responsible for the achievement of PBC targets. By 
rejecting the use of performance-related criteria for allocation of the bonus, case-study 
hospitals illustrated a preference for low-powered incentives. The findings such as "everyone 
needs to be recognised" or "if you get the prize, you work alone" showed that the justification 
for not using performance-related criteria for bonus allocation was to uphold equity and team 
spirit among the staff. From the perspective of the managers, the staff were being protected 
from feeling unappreciated and from dysfunctional team spirit. 
Equity in the allocation of the bonus funds is the antithesis of high-powered incentives. 
Upholding equity in the use of performance-base bonuses indicated that the hospitals 
preferred low-powered incentives. Both hospitals generated innovative schemes - as 
predicted by process-based theories - to transform the PBC bonuses into low powered 
incentives. Celebrations (party/picnic) were the popular choices for spending the bonus 
money by staff members in both hospitals. Additional means of distributing the bonus 
equitably involved the use of "randomization" to remove bias from the selection of the 
beneficiaries of the items purchased using the bonus funds. For instance, one hospital bought 
bales of second-hand clothes. The clothes were sorted into male and female items, 3-cloth 
item packages were made and wrapped, and each staff randomly picked a package. The use 
of random allocation of packages in this case was interpreted as a signature for equity - i. e. 
optimising fairness in the allocation of PBC bonus benefits. In general, the allocation of 
bonuses towards celebrations, clothings, building staff accommodation, kettles for making tea 
on the wards, farewell gifts for retiring staff, building a fence around the hospital and paying 
arrears for National Social Security Fund have one thing in common - staff welfare. Thus, 
improving the staff welfare and the collective work environment can be inferred from the 
various allocations of the financial bonuses. From the allocation of the bonuses, the 
proposition that economic rationale i. e. the use of high-powered incentives would drive the 
behaviour of the hospitals was not carried. Instead the equity in the work place predicted 
from process theories fit the observed behaviours better. Extrapolation from these 
observations suggest that in contexts similar to the case study hospitals, performance-based 
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incentives should address staff welfare benefits within a framework that optimise process 
fairness and teamwork among hospital staff. 
9.7.3 Process Theory Applications 
Process-based theories try to explain how events must be planned and sequenced to ensure 
effective performance outcomes. For change to be effective communication, participation and 
leadership are important. Structures for governance or leadership and individual champions 
for the change process help to accelerate integration of new innovation. The receiving context 
for the new innovation is also essential. The following findings from this work show the 
relevance of applying the lens of Process theories to PBC pilot. 
9.7.3.1 PBC Implementation and Dynamic Action Theory 
The findings about the implementation of PBC pilot shows marked variation in the sequence 
and organisation of pilot activities. There were numerous adaptations, coupling and 
unbundling of some activities. The findings show that the de-facto implementation markedly 
diverted from the de jure plan that would engender greater effectiveness. Examples here 
include the coupling of performance feedback and performance verification activities - that 
reduced the time or period necessary for hospitals to act on the feedback to improve their 
performance. The performance accountability to the local government officials that was 
considered necessary for the visibility and local sustainability of the pilot at the local 
government level were eliminated from the subsequent pilot activities. Supervision and 
support that was expected to ensure success of hospital plans and strategies for PBC was not 
provided. Financial insufficiency for the pilot was a major reason for these pervasive 
adaptations and omissions. Reimbursement-based financing for pilot activities by WBRG 
was considered "unfriendly" to the pilot implementers who did not have big financial 
reserves to drive activities. Oversights in the design and financing of the pilot left critical 
activities such as the performance bonuses unfunded. Lack of flexibility about the need to 
change the selected service target also got the hospitals locked into a set of targets for which 
little improvement was possible or necessary. For example, some hospitals were scaling-up 
community-based malaria control which would mitigate the need for malaria treatment at the 
hospital, while PBC targets demanded the exact opposite. 
In general the processes of implementing the pilot activities did not fulfil the logical and 
ordered sequence of events for optimal effectiveness of the pilot (de jure). On the contrary 
the findings fit better the theory for complexity and dynamic actions that predict that PBC 
pilot implementation may differ from the planned ones due to contingencies and constraints 
in the context and among agents. Indeed the seminal work on implementation by Pressman 
and Wildavsky (1978) also concluded that: 
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"the planning model does not recognise the point that many, perhaps most, constraints remain hidden 
in the planning stage, and are only discovered in the implementation process. Moreover, feasibility 
conditions keep changing over time: Old constraints disappear or are overcome while new ones 
emerge. The solution space undergoes continuous transformations, shrinking in one direction, 
expanding in another" (page 180). 
From this perspective, the design and evaluation of innovations like PBC should build 
methods to assess the contextual variables and factors that may constrain (or enable) agents 
from acting in a manner to optimise the effectiveness of the innovations. 
9.7.3.2 PBC Implementation and Expectancy Theory Application 
At the minimum, expectancy framework requires a 3-stage process: 1) The process of 
decision making must assure that the effort is linked to accomplishment of performance 
goals; 2) the accomplishment of goals are linked to rewards and 3) the rewards are valued in 
relation to the effort spent or satisfy important needs/wants. The 3-step process is glued 
together by information to make the staff aware of the linkages if expectancy is to motive 
performance improvement. The case studies in chapter 6-7 showed a mix of practices in 
communicating the link between performance expectations of PBC and the bonuses as well 
as the link between the bonuses and benefits to the hospital staff. 
1. Linking performance to rewards: 
The findings in this study show that the link between bonus and performance targets or 
communication to the effect that attaining the targets would lead to receipt of rewards was 
not actively made until the hospitals received their first bonus. Subsequent to their first 
bonus receipt, the linkages were made in one hospital (Hosp-2). However, these links were 
not made in another hospital (Hosp-1) despite two events of bonus receipt. The major 
genesis of the failure to make the linkages in the early phase of the pilot was partly due to a 
long period of uncertainty about the pilot implementation. The findings show (section 6.2.2), 
that nearly a year elapsed from the time hospitals signed the performance contract to the time 
the pilot activities resumed. During this period, expectations of the bonus and memory of the 
contents of PBC pilot contract diminished. The predicted perceptions from expectancy theory 
that attaining the PBC targets would lead to bonus award were not fulfilled in the early phase 
of the pilot. Resumption of the pilot activities especially the award of the first bonus (or 
provision of first performance feedback) was a wakeup call for managers to start active 
innovations to succeed in the subsequent rounds of performance audits. However, the 
implementation and scheduling of pilot activities did not provide enough time for internal 
innovations. Performance feedback to hospitals was tightly coupled with performance 
auditing, thus reducing the capability to use the feedback as a basis for internal learning and 
improvement. These findings show that theoretic link between internal decision making and 
performance improvement was weakened by the design of the pilot. 
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2. Reward attribution problems: 
Contrary to the theorised motivating effects of performance rewards, findings in this work 
show that collective rewards may lead to positive or negative effects on performance. Due to 
the nature of hospital work and its accomplishments, performance rewards at the level of the 
organisation have an attribution problem. How should a hospital manager decide how to 
allocate a performance bonus to various work-units that may have direct and indirect 
contribution to the attainment of a performance target? The attribution problem is more 
pronounced if the rewards are meant to stimulate more effort from the entire organisation as 
opposed to an individual worker. Although tools such as Annual Performance Appraisal for 
individual staff performance have been used as the basis for awarding performance-related 
bonuses in organisations, the same tools have limited value for appraisal of clinical teams that 
may be responsible for achieving a target of 10 percent increase in child immunisations. For 
the purpose of rewarding performance that requires collaborative effort of many individuals, 
team-based performance appraisal is needed. A performance target for a surgical team may 
be easily stated as a number of surgical procedures and rate of post-operation complications. 
If the target is achieved and a financial bonus is awarded, the managers will have a long list 
of legitimate claimants: - the surgeons, the anaesthetists, theatre nurses and recovery-room 
staff. Other claimants include staff from the laboratory, blood bank, laundry, procurement 
(for right tools and surgical supplies) and staff on the convalescent wards that deal with care 
of the surgical wounds. For the bonus to be allocated fairly, the manager requires a robust 
system of measuring the relative contribution of all these work-units (Bokhour et al 2006). If 
the allocation is perceived as unfair to any of the team members in the work chain, the 
manager risks causing dissatisfaction and fracturing the collaboration and team work needed 
for quality outcomes. 
From the findings of this study, there were deliberations of how to link the bonus to the direct 
implementing units or persons but failure of how to "identify performers" was partly a 
problem of lack of valid measures across collaborating work-units for a joint output such as 
OPD, ANC, or Delivery. Similar fmdings have been found in USA. Hospital managers that 
were conscribed into pay-for-quality schemes to improve quality of care outcomes failed to 
pay any bonuses to the hospital staff due to lack of an objective means to fairly distribute the 
bonuses (Bokhour, Burgess et al. 2006). As a consequence, the returns on investments in the 
pay-for-quality schemes were poor (Grossbart 2006). Among the UK nurses, there was 
indifference to financial incentives that were aimed at individual nurses to improve care in 
home care setting (Kingma 2003). In Rwanda, performance bonuses given to the health 
centres were allocated to individuals on the basis of staff ranks and not on the basis of 
personal or group performance criteria (Meessen, Musango et al. 2006). 
3. Communication: awareness of targets and rewards: 
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From the findings, the prerequisites of expectancy theory - ie awareness of the targets and 
rewards - were not observed early in the process of pilot implementation. Findings show that 
the pilot implementation schedules suffered time delays and hospital managers did not create 
awareness about the targets until after a bonus was received - albeit without much evidence 
of purposive strategies. Effective communication and sufficient time for internal adjustments 
are important features for effective implementation of PBC interventions. 
"... Effective communication with physicians is essential for the success of [pay for performance] 
programmes and that policymakers need to build enough resources and time into the implementation 
process to accomplish this. .. findings also highlight the need to consider the "starting point" for physicians when designing rewards " (Christianson 2007 page 530). 
9.7.4. Trust or Audit based Control Systems 
Comparison with other performance improvement frameworks found in this study suggests 
alternatives approaches to performance management of hospitals. Measuring performance of 
contracted agents is a central control mechanism for performance-based contracting. From 
the perspective of agency theory, ability to measure or observe the effort of the agent 
mitigates the agency problem i. e. ensures that the agent exert the required efforts in pursuit of 
the principal's objective. By implication sharp mechanisms such as audit-based approaches 
are used to objectively verify performance (Lawler 1989; Le Grand 2003). 
By contrast, organisational process theories prescribe soft and bureaucratic processes for 
performance assessment. Efforts are invested in the "hygiene" of the processes to grantee 
good performance. In knowledge-intensive industries, the cultivation of trust, group norms or 
culture are vital forms of control for production processes (Ouchi 1980; Weaver and Sorrells- 
Jones 1999). Compared to PBC pilot, UCMB and Yellow star programs employed alternative 
approaches to improving hospital performance. Below are the key reflections about the main 
differences in the conceptual frameworks behind these alternative approaches. 
9.7.4.1 UCMB: Trust-based Performance Control 
The difficulties of metering performance especially in complex and knowledge-based 
organisations like hospitals pose enormous challenges. Although these difficulties were not 
eliminated (table 6.3), the case study of UCMB's performance framework showed that the 
measurement difficulties were minimised by its reliance on the routine reports of service 
outputs. This was possible due to UCMB's investment in supportive infrastructure for data 
capture and processing. Computers, email communication and training to strengthen the 
information system among member organisations had been invested. Greater dependencies 
between UCMB and its members also enabled higher level of trust to build-up over a period 
of about seven years. Trust in the data submitted by the member hospitals enabled UCMB to 
use less sharp approaches like data auditing and instead resort to soft bureaucratic methods 
for data verification. For example, verification of the submitted performance data was done 
through fulfilment of accreditation requirements e. g. endorsement of reports by the 
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chairperson of the Board of Governors before their submission to UCMB and to the districts. 
Additional bureaucratic control and verification of performance data was given to the 
Diocesan Health Coordinators who also have access to the hospital boards. "Faithfulness" to 
the CCU was a mobilizing symbol for compliance and trust building for technical assessment 
of hospital performance. For example, some findings show that "values-based" code of 
conduct or "mission" of the CCU were transformed into "objectively measurable" 
performance indicators that were used to demonstrate "faithfulness" to the Mission (see 
section 4.4.3.4). In a sentence, long term institutional relationships enabled UCMB to control 
performance by a mix of tools i. e. measurement built on trust in the routine performance data 
as well as using low powered incentives like training and resource support to its members. 
Similarly, in Rwanda, the implementation of performance-based contracting required 
building up the institutional framework for the interventions to work optimally. Efforts were 
made to establish structures of accountability within the community and health facilities 
(Meessen, Musango et al. 2006). 
9.7.4.2 Yellow Star: Cultural-cognitive and Market-based Performance Controls 
The Yellow Star programme (YSP) on the other hand was designed to provide a report-card 
to the community about provider quality. In its design, information to the community was a 
central element. External to the hospitals, the YSP was built around symbols, education, 
communication and information about what good quality health services should be. Internal 
to hospital, the programme had an explicit strategy of building a culture for quality 
improvement (Kunda 1999). Several quality measurements were based on behaviours such as 
staff courtesy, following protocols, providing information and some outcomes such as client 
satisfaction. The YSP team also incorporated a peer review element by including clinicians as 
assessors of quality. Again symbolic awards are given to the staff that exhibit the behaviours 
judged as pro-quality. If successful, the desired responses would cause clients and resources 
to shift away from the poor quality providers, thus evoking competitive pressure to improve 
quality. As such, the YSP framework sought to gain performance control via both cultural 
engineering and market-based competition via social-marketing approaches for branding 
hospital quality in the community (McNamara 2006). Although adopted by the Ministry of 
Health as a programme, the institutionalisation of YSP was still uncertain due to its 
dependence on external aid. 
9.7.4.3 PBC Pilot: Audit based Performance Control 
Unlike UCMB and Yellow Star Programme, PBC pilot used an audit-based approach to 
assess performance. The suspicion of forging results led the PBC implementation team to 
shift from using monthly service output reports to using a more rigorous approach based on 
Primary records (Patient Registers) as the basis for their performance audit. The same lack of 
trust was implied among the PBC team that was conducting the performance verification. 
Findings in chapter 6 show that forging of performance data was a behaviour adopted by 
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pilot implementation team. Faced with a heavy workload during the auditing tasks, short-cuts 
and opportunistic behaviours started to arise among the auditing time (box 6.2). 
By implication, the audit-oriented approach to work well, it also needed to be audited and 
monitored closely. With time, this would evolve into a multi-level tiered system - whereby 
secondary auditors are contracted to audit the primary auditors in order to mitigate the 
distortion of performance data by the former. Sustaining a system akin to auditing the auditor 
would increase the costs of PBC in the health system. While referring to United Kingdom's 
National health service (NHS), Saltman made a similar observation in relation to market-like 
reforms that were sweeping the NHS in late 1990s: 
"As a result of the shift to a more entrepreneurial environment both within the public sector and 
beyond, requires not only a similar level of state activity but substantially more sophisticated types 
and levels of activity. This requires better training and motivated personnel, better information and 
greater financial and accounting expertise. All of these in turn requires considerable funding. Thus 
the new regulatory role for the state is likely to be equally if not more expensive than the old 
command-and-control model. This suggest that adopting markets-style incentives as a central 
mechanism to manage a health care system is not a poor state's game" (Saltman 2002)pg 1682). 
It can be urged that audit-oriented performance verification processes such as those used by 
PBC pilot constitute a cost premium for overcoming the lack of trust. The use of monitoring 
and the formalisation of vertical metering may be perceived as an act of distrust (Zucker* 
1986; McMaster and Sawkins 1996). These authors also urge that some industries like health 
care suffer from a "high trust syndrome" due to a broader scope of legitimate discretionary 
actions. Broader discretionary actions create unstable or "highly plastic" outputs/performance 
that in turn complicates performance measurement. 
"... certain dimensions of agents' overall outputs ( ... 
) are conceptually impossible to measure. 
Imperfections in the metering function carry their own implications. (.. ) In plastic activities (like 
health care), the setting of performance targets is also subject to considerable inaccuracies. Where 
inappropriate targeting occurs, the system simply generates inefficiencies ine ciently! " (Zucker 1986 
page 154). 
9.7.5 integration as a Form of Performance Control 
The issue of integration was seen at the district level where district-level donor projects 
tended to take over the roles of collecting and analysing service output data (performance) 
from health facilities, and/or financing the Performance Review Meetings on behalf of the 
District Health Office. The two districts with this practice had attracted a project whose 
success depended on the health service output data of these districts. A similar pattern of 
integration was also found at the national level ministries in the name of Sector-wide 
Approaches (SWAPs) where sector donors were integrated into the sector planning and 
performance review processes as a means of accessing performance information and directly 
influencing the sector plans (Oliveira-Cruz 2007). The UCMB influence mechanisms also 
enabled it to integrate itself into the Boards of Governors at the hospital level through the 
Diocesan Health Coordinators as its agents. Integration of the higher-level authority 
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(principal) with her subsidiaries (agents) was understood to be a means for the principal to 
directly influence performance variables important to her and to access performance 
information. Several institutional economists and process theorists both agree and advance a 
theory that vertical integration is an essential factor to production of goods within 
organisations as opposed to buying such goods from the market (Ouchi 1979; Williamson 
1985; Klein 1993; Hillman and Dalziel 2003). As put by Klein; 
"vertical integration, by shifting ownership of an organisational asset (into a firm), permits 
transactors to avoid the transaction costs associated with hold-up in the presence of specific 
investments. 
... Firms (as opposed to markets) eliminate the need for contracts and create an increased ability to flexibly direct production" (Klein 1993 page 223). 
From these findings, cultivation of trust, engineering appropriate culture, auditing of outputs 
and vertical integration - between the principal and the agent(s) are alternative approaches 
that need to be considered as alternative mechanisms for securing performance improvements 
from hospitals and similar institutions. 
9.7.6 Theoretical Complementarities: Agency and Process theories 
From the foregoing discussion, it can be deduced that agency theory occupies a higher-level 
in providing explanation as to why the agent may be motivated by an incentive scheme to 
undertake a particular task. To that effect, it provides a high-level policymaker with sufficient 
explanations why an incentive scheme may drive improved performance. Nonetheless, 
agency theory is insufficient in providing the guidance about how an implementer of the 
above incentive scheme should organize and plan the scheme to succeed in providing 
sustainable motivation within a given context and for ongoing exchange relationships. 
Intermediate-range theories i. e. process-based theories are vital to the implementers - ie 
providing operational guidance about how to plan and sequence events in a manner that fits 
the value-set of the organization, optimise process-hygiene and fairness, and assure 
satisfactory and continues performance outcomes. In this study, Expectancy theory provided 
an intermediate-range theory to benchmark the internal process of utilizing a bonus to spur 
improved hospital service outputs. Likewise, Complexity theory and the related theory of 
Dynamic Response provided process-based variables to benchmark the implementation 
effectiveness of the pilot. How the incentive scheme interact with an individual's motivation 
to exert effort and meet organizational performance objectives required yet another level of 
theory building or application (Grol and Bosch 2007, Judge and Bauld 2001, Pawson and 
Tilley 2004). This "micro-level" theory was required to explain how and why incentives are 
useful (or not) to the individual worker or work-team. Herzberg's theory about a person's 
motivation for work was employed here to provide the variables for assessing the changes in 
perceptions among the hospital staff during the PBC pilot. In sum, complex health system 
interventions require multiple levels of theory application (or building) for meaningful 
design, implementation and evaluation. 
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9.8 Methodological Insights 
Evaluation of complex interventions within the realm of health systems creates challenges 
from many perspectives. From the perspective of generating rigorous evidence, robust 
scientific methods drive the design of the evaluations in the direction of a "black box" 
approach. For instance evaluations based on randomised controlled trails strive to wipe out 
contextual and confounding variables through random allocation to ensure ex ante similarities 
between control and experimental groups. Strict implementation protocols are developed and 
there is unwavering efforts to insure implementation fidelity to the protocols. This pharmaco- 
epidemiological approach provides robust measures of the EFFECT of the intervention and 
there is rarely a need to explain HOW the intervention works. This is done usually separately 
in the early phase of the research and development (R&D) process usually in laboratory or 
animal models. In contrast to health system, the questions of HOW the intervention works 
and what effects it generates are coupled together. Interventions in health system target 
upstream levers such as regulation, financing, information and procurement system with little 
room for randomisation or controlling the contextual dynamics. Measures of effects of 
intervention are generated at the same time as the intervention protocol is being tested - i. e. 
R&D are inseparable. The context of such experiments plays an important role in the 
outcomes and their replication. As illustrated below, policy practitioners and health 
development agencies desire to learn from both the Research (intervention effectiveness) and 
Development (how to implement the intervention). Among policy practitioners, evidence and 
details of HOW the intervention works and under what CONTEXT is given more value. For 
example, NHS regulators in the Health Development Agency noted that the evaluation of 
interventions should provide contextual factors relevant for transferability of the innovation: 
`7t is important to understand the context in which a public health intervention operates, and thus 
move beyond the `black box' within which much traditional health economic evaluation sits. In 
particular, there is a need to gather information on process outcomes and factors influencing changes 
in the behaviour of individuals and populations, as well as the institutional arrangements that may 
influence both the costs and effectiveness of interventions. Such information can help decision makers 
identify whether a successful (or unsuccessful) initiative undertaken in one locality might be 
generalisable to other settings" (Kelly, McDaid et al. 2005 page 5). 
"The [evaluation] aim is not only to help with interpretation of the success of the programme as it 
evolves, but also to build additional factors into models that might be used to consider the 
programme's transferability to other settings. Such approaches may increase the costs of studies 
considerably, and may not be appropriate for all public health interventions (Hawe, Shiell et al. 
2004). 
9.8.1 Lessons from Mixed Methods 
A mixed methods approach was used in this evaluation. From the start it was clear that PBC 
intervention was complex and required several perspectives to understand its implementation 
as well as the response among hospitals. During the actual study processes, addition methods 
were added and some were dropped. For example, the rigorous measurement of hospital 
output was dropped given the major differences in the required data systems needed to assess 
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numeric increases to PBC targets. The discretionary selection of three service targets out of 
six services created a situation that demanded much more resources than was available for 
this study. On the other hand, opportunities for comparative case studies were discovered 
during the study, thus prompting additional efforts to compare PBC with the performance 
framework for YSP and UCMB. In relation to the methods for evaluation complex health 
system interventions, the following lessons stand out. 
1. Multidisciplinary frameworks were necessary to build explanations that fit the data. The 
multiplicity of variables at different levels of the intervention requires constant iterations 
between findings, and the explanatory frameworks (sections 3.2 and 3.3). This research 
started with two theoretic frameworks for understanding PBC implementation and its 
outcomes i. e. economic one (of agency) and organisational process. During 
implementation, addition frameworks were needed to deal with the complexity of analysis 
of the observations and changes in the intervention and in the context overtime. 
Complexity theory and the theory of dynamic action (Litaker, Tomolo et al. 2006; 
McPake, Blaauw et al. 2006; Leykum, Pugh et al. 2007) were useful to distill contextual 
and emergent variables. The challenges though have been many. These have included 
exploration of new tools and different ways of thinking from other disciplines like 
organisational anthropology, psychology, organisational politics, as well as business and 
entrepreneurial sciences. These were explored to the extent suitable to make progress on 
the analyses or interpretation of research findings. Special skills were sought in 
workshops and meetings and through special literature in journals and books. The 
researcher actively participated in a series of workshops and seminars about the analysis 
of qualitative research. These workshops were held under the auspices of Prof Jude Green 
at LSHTM and included sharing and learning analysis skills among doctoral students with 
qualitative research topics. 
2. Triangulation of different opinions among respondents, findings from interviews, 
documents and observations was an ongoing process from data collection, analysis and 
during the drafting the report. Triangulation was enabled by having alternative templates 
or theories against which to compare the findings. The prospective nature of the study 
also allowed the researcher time to clarify and follow-up additional leads - like annual 
reports or special studies in the past to understand why particular actions or omissions 
were observed or why some opinions were in conflict of the common view among 
respondents. For example, some of the response strategies to PBC that were mentioned by 
hospital managers had long been in plan but PBC pilot provided additional synergy to 
these plans to be executed. Evidence like new buildings and internal studies 
recommending that some clinics be decongesting and client flow reorganized showed that 
the effect of PBC pilot in such a context was to help tip the balance for the planned 
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actions to get executed. The difference was that the hospital managers had the opportunity 
to earn a financial bonus for this planed actions - courtesy of PBC pilot. 
3. Conflicting or divergent findings emerged especially given the wide breadth of the study, 
multiple methods and the complexity of the intervention that was being evaluated. This is 
not unusual especially given the multiple perspectives and complexity of the real world of 
implementation and respondent experience (Pawson and Tilly 2004). Specifically, data 
from in-depth qualitative enquiry among the two case-study hospitals (section 9.4) 
indicated that there was a divergent response - one hospital responding early and getting 
off track, while the second responding late but with more promising strategies. However, 
the quantitative survey findings shows that the staff perceptions of workload from the two 
hospitals (table 8.11) subjected to PBC bonuses were statistically higher and significant in 
2006. The implication of the latter finding was that the pilot had impact on the workload 
among the two case-study hospitals although the qualitative findings did not provide 
obvious explanations as to why this was the case. Possible explanation for higher 
workload perceptions may be related to the reduction in the number of staff in these 
hospitals as opposed to the increase of clients being served. Narratives among HMTs 
indicated that there was a "staff exodus" especially as PNFP hospital staff were crossing 
to government employment data collection in 2005. An alternative explanation can 
be 
linked to the "Ratchet effect" where successful performance in the prior period provides 
even higher targets for the subsequent period. Meessen et al (2007) referred to this 
problem as "pushing the carrot further and further" -a phrase used to describe the moral 
hazard whereby the principal cheats the agent (Allen 2009). 
4. Comparative case study approaches greatly enhance the value of this research. Research 
need to explore comparative cases especially for interventions that lead to similar 
outcomes or with similar mechanisms (Anderson, Crabtree et al. 2005). In this analysis, 
the inclusion of UCMB and Yellow Star programme provided added value and made the 
deductions for policy and programmes more practical. With three different interventions 
all trying to improve performance, it was easier to synthesize the commonalities, the 
positive and negative differences with PBC. 
5. A lot can be learnt about the ongoing implementation of complex intervention. The 
approach used in this research - i. e. going from behind the implementation activities as 
well as observing key events is a promising approach to learn and accumulate evidence 
about how the intervention is working to generate its outcomes. This approach is 
recommended as a source of information for faster normalization of complex 
interventions by generating evidence on practicality, rationale and contextual integration 
within health care settings (Hawe, Shiell et al. 2004; Kelly, McDaid et al. 2005; May 
2006). 
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"Such analysis should retain the shape and feel of a traditional economic framework, but will 
need enough flexibility to capture the multi-dimensional, complex and layered outcomes ofpublic 
health policies and interventions. (Kelly, McDaid et al. 2005 page 5). " 
"... outcomes of community intervention trials have been small or non-significant. Part of this is 
simply because investigators go into communities with intervention designs and theories too weak 
and unsophisticated for the scale of the change process they are seeking to bring about. With 
better planning and theorising, `trial and error learning' in community intervention trials could 
be minimized" (Hawe, Shiell et al. 2004 page 793). 
6. To be even more useful, such an approach needs to be linked to the decision-making and 
appropriate adaptations for the implementation of the intervention. Without this linkage, 
there is a potential for the approach to frustrate the researcher and generate ethical 
dilemmas if the generated evidence is not able to make a difference on the ongoing 
implementation activities. Such frustrations were encountered albeit with little capacity to 
influence the ongoing intervention. 
7. Although qualitative research is discounted as a means for assessing causal links, there 
are promising prospects in explicating causal links in prospective interviews approaches. 
From the perspective of health system intervention, causal triggers for decisions, actions 
and omissions are vital in the generation of evidence for implementation of innovations. 
The prospective approach to inquiry i. e. questions about futuristic strategy or "planned 
action" and after a lapse of time, the researcher returns to conduct "after action reviews" 
was useful to understand how and why the planned strategies for securing a bonus were 
fruitful or not. This was made possible by conducting in-depth interviews (every after 5- 
6 months) with the same persons in management positions (hospital executives) during 
the 12 month period. Typical questioning was "your plan last time to ensure that you get a 
bonus was XX. How did that plan work out? " By assembling together the responses on 
these questions and earlier plans or strategies, some level of causal inferences started to 
emerge(George and McKeown 1985). In one case study hospital (HOSP-2), it was 
possible to prove that efforts to improve clients' records had indeed been implemented. 
Prospective qualitative interviewing of the same group of actors also enabled the 
accumulation of evidence and build-up causal linkages for key decisions and actions. For 
example, earlier evidence of lack of funds for paying the bonuses and the post- 
expenditure reimbursement of expenses by the pilot financiers caused financial 
insufficiency for pilot operations. Subsequent efforts to mobilise funds from alternative 
sources provided a strong causal factor for the observed adjustments in the pilot design 
such as scaling down the participants at the performance-feedback sessions at district 
level. The prospective approach is recommended by qualitative experts (Hamel, Dufour et 
al. 1993; Yin 2003; Anderson, Crabtree et al. 2005) and Mitchell 1983). 
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8. The multi-level approach to understanding the system processes helps to relate upstream 
actions to downstream one. In this study effort was made to link national, district and 
organisational level perspectives and how they inter-relate. This traversing the vertical 
system is essential to understanding entry points, sources of synergies and barriers to 
effective response to health systems interventions. 
"The analytical and evaluation problem is that upstream interventions to improve the 
circumstances in which people live may not be a sufficient condition to produce health 
improvements, but a precondition for other downstream interventions to be effective. (This) has 
implications for how interventions are designed and evaluated. Evaluating single initiatives may 
fail to capture effects that rely on multiple interventions "(Kelly, McDaid et al. 2005page 1) 
In this study it was possible to illuminate conflicts in objectives among agents at different 
levels. It was also possible to gauge how "incentives" at the national level can become 
disincentives at the district or organisational levels. For example, incentives attached to 
the League Table (table 4.4) provided public recognition for districts that performed well 
but provided more valuable benefits like ambulances, more budgets and projects to those 
that performed poorly. 
9. Although more is still to be mastered, the survey tool development process from 
theoretical constructs and techniques for Factor Analysis and interpretation were very 
useful skills for organisational analyses. However, given this highly technical field, there 
is more to be learnt especially in terms of confirmatory factor analysis and approaches to 
refine the item-responsiveness in survey instruments. Despite this shortcoming, the 
analysis of perceptions of staff using this approach provided vital additional evidence for 
supplementary interventions to ensure that performance-based contracting pilot delivers 
effective response among its internal customers at the organisational level. Where 
relevant, this method should be explored and mastered to provide additional evidence of 
the effects of PBC at the organisational level. 
10. A potential to demotivate the participants in the control groups was a constant feature of 
the PBC pilot in Uganda. The randomisation of some hospitals not to receive a bonus 
despite good performance against their targets (or via routine feedback) was perceived as 
unfair by those in control groups of the PBC experiment. In many instances, the health 
centers in the control group had performed better than the ones that were randomized to 
receive the bonuses -a situation that violated the tenet of expectancy theory - i. e. fairness 
or instrumentality. Some findings show poor cooperation during the later part of the pilot 
from the control groups. District managers were also concerned about the negative 
implications the pilot could generate among good performers in the control group. These 
findings show a potential for doing harm if interventions in the health system are not well 
designed or implemented. Active monitoring of adverse outcomes as is done in clinical 
trials need to be extended to interventions within the health system. As the call for'more 
robust experimental evidence with control groups is advocated to evaluate PBC, a keen 
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interest should be placed on the possibility of experimental fallacy - where the 
intervention makes the control groups worse-off and leads to erroneous conclusion that 
the intervention was effective relative to the controls. 
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Chapter 10: Conclusions 
Conclusions are extracted from the discussion chapter and study findings on the basis of the 
theoretical principles that underpinned this work. Alternative theoretical propositions were 
used to filter the evidence and their policy implication. For instance, the principles underlying 
Agency Theory predicted that money-metric incentives and capacity to measure performance 
would drive the implementation patterns and response behaviours or actions. If this 
proposition fits the data, it would imply that policy to rollout PBC would need to fix the size 
of the monetary incentives (bonuses) and perfect the measurement of the specified 
performance. On the contrary, if the proposition about Organisational process theories is 
carried, we would expect that findings fit the conclusion that "getting the processes right" 
drives the implementation and response to PBC. From this perspective, it is not the 
measurement of the effects that matter for the generalization across other PBC interventions 
but the mechanisms, designs and ideas that drive effective implementation and response 
actions of organisations similar to study hospitals and Ugandan context (Mitchell 1983; Yin 
2003). As expressed by Highhouse, (2007) " Theoretical propositions are the vehicles for 
generalization to the real world. The ability to generalise from one situation to another 
requires an understanding of the underlying principles and recognising which principle 
apply in which situation" (Highhouse 2007 page 556). 
Although the findings in this study do mostly fit the proposition for organisational process 
theories, there are clearly some findings that fit Agency Theory. The implication of this is 
that financial incentives do ignite performance responses. It is, however, important to focus 
on supplementary process-oriented interventions to ensure that financial incentives ignite the 
right responses. Process-oriented interventions like governance relationships, optimal 
resource inputs, and maintaining a conducive organisation environment for the workers - 
form the foundation upon which to build effective performance-based initiatives. The 
following are conclusions that attempts to provide practical and policy-level guidance from 
the findings. 
1. A broader package is required for optimal effectiveness of PBC: Comparative findings about PBC and similar interventions such as YSP and UCMB shows 
that a broader package of supportive activities such as training, action plans and 
supplementary resource inputs generated more responsive actions from hospitals relative to 
performance bonuses used by PBC pilot. A broad set of tools such as institutionalised 
systems for accreditation of hospitals enabled UCMB to receive the necessary data for 
performance measurement with good compliance from its members. UCMB's incentive 
package included investments in management training for the managers, information 
technology to support performance date systems and performance reporting, and recognition 
for good performance within its network of health facilities. In addition, support was 
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provided to UCMB hospitals to generate organisational mission statements and charters, and 
to establish operating guidelines and manuals for financial and human resource management. 
Strengthening the capacity for institutional governance was also developed as part of the 
performance improvement processes. From this perspective, efforts to improve hospital 
performance need to design a broader set of support activities capable of addressing the 
multiple drivers that constrain hospital performance. 
2. Direct investments need to be directed to the performance drivers: 
From the findings about the allocation of bonus money (chapter 7), whether these decisions 
were realised or not, it is possible to speculate that the case study hospitals' performance 
constraints lay in 1) hospital infrastructure (i. e. building staff houses and hospital gate), 2) 
operational costs (NSSF arrears) and 3) energising staff (i. e. gifts and parties to cerebrate). 
The findings from the internal clients of the hospitals - i. e. the survey of hospital staff - the 
main drivers of performance improvements were perceived as related to 1) performance 
governance, 2) job satisfaction, 3) availability of medicines and supplies and 4) extent of 
financial satisfaction. These factors map onto the "hardware", "software" and "welfare" 
domains of the hospital functioning. For optimal outcomes of PBC, these findings suggest 
that the strategic entry points for performance improvements in the Uganda hospitals during 
the study period needed to invest in these factors for performance improvement. Findings 
show that financial resources for the study hospitals were not conducive to improving 
performance. In contexts where expenditure per capita on health care services ranges from $ 
8- $11, there is a low ceiling within which efficiency gains can drive performance 
improvements. PBC innovations will have limited impacts if the financial and other resources 
are not concurrently increased to the required $30 - $40 per capita (MoH 2001d). "Tokenism" 
in the form of performance bonuses that account for as little as 3 percent of the annual 
hospital expenditures may not overcome the insufficiency of funds that are required to 
address the above factors for better performance of hospitals. 
3. Hands-on approaches have a role in improving hospital performance: 
The findings show that hands-on or micro-management approaches like assisting hospital 
teams to generate action plans for performance improvements, targeted financial assistance to 
fix quality gaps and active monitoring and support supervision by YSP and UCMB - were 
essential for eliciting prompt performance responses needed by the YSP and UCMB 
programmes. In a nutshell, micro-management and a package of supportive actions of YSP 
and UCMB generated more responsive performance actions from the hospitals relative to 
hands-off approach by PBC pilot in Uganda. Similar micro-management approaches were 
reported in one of the PBC pilot in Rwanda where technical assistance programmes worked 
closely with the health centre managers and provided on-going support (Rusa, Schneidman et 
al. 2009). 
4. Investing in building trust and institutional relationships may be more cost-effective 
than audit-based mechanisms for performance control: 
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Long-term institutional relationships enabled UCMB to control performance of its member 
hospitals by relying more on trust and bureaucratic controls like accreditation, training and 
technical support to its members. Given the difficulties in metering performance that this 
study describes (chapter 6), the high costs of regular auditing of service outputs and the need 
to build supportive relationships between the hospitals and their stakeholders, investing in 
building trust and mutual support systems may yield better performance outcomes. Audit- 
based systems without supportive actions to the agencies being audited may not align well 
with the mutual dependencies needed for health system functioning. Some authors urge that 
auditing approaches espouse values such "assumption of fraud" that may not align well with 
the values needed for support supervision i. e. "expert-junior mentoring" (Meessen, B., W. 
Van Damme 2006). 
5. Innovators with PBC should pay attention to contextual factors for its success: 
Organisational precedents and contextual factors and their dynamics played a key role in the 
response to PBC pilot. How hospital managers explained their performance successes, 
failures and processes for bonus allocation were indicative of the contingencies in the context 
and precedents within the organisations. In the hospital where communication and 
governance systems were relatively dysfunctional, the decision-making processes for bonus 
allocation was associated dissatisfaction among the staff. The continuity of the innovation 
was further affected by the organisational contingencies like the loss of institutional memory 
as well-informed persons and champions of PBC left the hospital. In such contexts, it is 
impossible for the organisational stakeholders to sustain commitment to PBC innovations. 
The implications of these findings are two-fold; 1) implementation of PBC and similar 
system-level innovations need a conducive context and 2) research about the contextual 
variables before, during and after the intervention may help to explain the (in)effectiveness, 
magnitude and sustainability of impacts of innovations similar to PBC. 
6. Allocating money-metric (high-powered) Incentives to Individuals can fracture team- 
based functions: 
From the findings about the allocation of the bonuses, the proposition that economic rationale 
i. e. the use of high-powered incentives would drive the behaviour of the hospitals was not 
supported. Instead the low-powered incentives predicted from process-based theories fit the 
observed behaviours better. For example, imperatives to preserve equality and "team spirit" 
or collaborative relationships caused the rejection of high-powered incentives such as 
allocating the bonus monies on the basis of individual-level effort or "hard work". 
Extrapolation from these observations suggest that in contexts similar to the case study 
hospitals, performance-based incentives should address staff welfare benefits within a 
framework that optimise fairness and teamwork among hospital staff. For settings where 
teamwork and joint effort is a norm, high-powered incentives may achieve sub-optimal 
performance if the incentives are not designed to encourage these norms. 
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7. More research is needed about the internal incentivisation of team-based functions: More research work is required to fully understand the best approaches for performance 
incentives in the context of team-based tasks in hospitals. Team-based tasks being an 
institutional feature of hospital operations, has implications for the allocation of financial 
bonuses that are awarded based on an organisation-wide performance criteria. The processes 
of allocating a bonus awarded to an organisation may engender negative performance risks. 
As illustrated in chapter 7, if organisation-wide bonuses are not handled transparently and 
used/allocated in a participatory manner there is a potential for negative consequences for 
team-based performance outcomes within the organization. Organisation-wide monetary 
rewards (bonuses) for performance may spur internal contestations and conflicts between the 
different interdependent work teams and between organization executives and governance 
boards. Findings in section 7.4 indicate the emergency of these conflicts in both case study 
hospitals. On the other hand, monetary bonuses may work by boosting the capacity or 
legitimacy of the executives (managers) in their performance governance efforts - providing 
resources that could be used to strengthen the psychological contract of the work-teams to 
achieve organisational goals. More research is required to explore the pathways and 
contextual prerequisites for group-based monetary bonuses to optimise performance and 
mitigate against undesired consequences. 
8. Handling the Bonus may generate poor performance impacts: 
Internal handling of the bonus can drive performance on a downward spiral if the internal 
processes of bonus allocation are considered unfair. The use of arms-length tools like 
performance-based financial incentives (bonuses) needs to consider the institutional 
competence to handle such financial incentives. Decision-making processes in one case study 
hospital provided evidence that financial incentives introduced in the wrong institutional 
context can do more harm than good i. e. may triggering worse performance among hospital 
staff. Market-driven, high-powered incentives may need to be transformed into low-powered 
incentives within organisations that depend on cooperative efforts like hospitals. 
Organisational processes to build trust in the handling of the bonuses will be required to 
strengthen the psychological contract (expectancy) required at the level of individual staff 
members. If the hospital workers do not trust their administration (executives) to handle the 
financial bonuses from PBC initiatives, the innovation may not generate the required effort 
among the workers. Likewise, if the executives do not communicate the size and the criteria 
for receipt of performance bonuses, the work teams may have no reason to change their 
performance or task-related behaviours. Where internal trust and leadership is weak, hands- 
on (as opposed to hands-off) approaches are required to strengthen intra-organisational 
processes (e. g. collective decision making) alongside the expansion of monetary incentive 
schemes like performance bonuses. 
9. Early exposure to performance bonuses may boost the response to PBC innovations: 
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After received their first bonuses, both case-study hospitals started to actively create 
awareness about the performance requirements of the PBC pilot and design internal strategies 
to improve performance (section 7.4). This may have design implications for the early phase 
of PBC innovations. For instance, PBC implementers need to let the hospitals "get a feel" of 
the benefits (picnic, celebrations gift items etc) from the bonuses early in the process of 
implementing the innovation by creating "quick wins" and guiding the processes of allocating 
the bonus funds towards valued and visible benefits within the hospitals. From findings in 
this work, better impact on hospital performance may be generated by guidelines that reward 
early-phase activities such as staff awareness of targets, boosting the leadership capital of the 
facility managers and optimising the allocation of bonus funds towards welfare needs and 
resource-inputs (medicines and tools) valued by the work-teams. 
10. Non-financial rewards have a role to play in performance incentivisation: 
Exhibitionistic rewards such as events for public recognition, trophies or status symbols such 
as Star-ratings used by the Yellow Star Programme were found to enjoy wide and durable 
organisational pride relative to financial rewards from the PBC bonuses. More research work 
is required to fully understand the best approaches for performance incentives in the context 
of poorly resourced countries like Uganda. Saltman's advice is relevant here: 
" 
... adopting markets-style incentives as a central mechanism to manage a health care 
system is not a poor state's game" (Saltman 2002)pg 1682). 
11. Micro view of the implementation versus macro view of impact: 
For pilot studies that test policy feasibility within health systems it is essential to learn what 
works and how it works in the particular context. Micro studies of implementation should be 
routinely commissioned for high-stake policy pilots that intervene in complex environments. 
This will generate on-going knowledge for the implementers to adjust their implementation 
arrangements and refine the designs to ensure context relevance and appropriateness. This 
has implications for agencies that commission policy pilots to fix up-stream health system 
functions like Health Financing. A broader decision space would be required for 
implementers of up-stream pilot studies to enable them to adapt and evolve their activities as 
they learn from implementation research embedded within these pilots. Fidelity to an 
implementation protocol should not be a pre-condition for system level innovations and 
interventions as this may "lock in" pervasive and unintended outcomes. 
12. Innovations targeting health system should have greater flexibility for adjusting: 
Rather than designing "one-size-fit-all" interventions that require adherence to a rigid, pre-set 
course of action, creating broader flexibility for implementers to make appropriate 
adjustments to fit their environment may engender less adverse results. Implementers of 
performance-based programmes like PBC and incentive-based innovations like The Global 
Fund, GAVI and similar programmes should be allowed to adjust or deviate from a set plan 
as results and lessons from their activities dictate. This may lead to more effective change. 
The recommendation of Leykum et al (2007) is also relevant to the findings in this work - 
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"We suggest that thinking about the intervention as a participatory, adaptive process rather 
than a set blueprint will lead to more effective interventions" (page 13). Similar advice is 
provided by Pressman and Wildavsky: "the implementer's left hand must be probing 
constantly the feasibility boundaries while his right hand tries to assemble the various 
programme components "(Pressman and Wildavsky 1978 page 180). This calls for active 
operations research programmes alongside key interventions operating at the health systems 
level. Design of system level innovations should have broader flexibility to apply new 
lessons from the operations research programs as well as from experiences of those involved 
in the innovations. 
13. Case study design, mixed methods and theory-driven evaluation of complex 
interventions: 
In general the processes of implementing the PBC pilot activities were complex and required 
a tailor-made assembly of research methods. Multiple theoretical frameworks guided the 
development of tools, analysis and synthesis of findings as a means of building explanations 
for actions in this study. For example, some implementation activities of PBC did not fulfil 
all the predictions of organisational process theories (expectancy theory) or the agency-base 
theories (high powered incentives). Likewise, implementation activities for the pilot required 
a different theoretical framework to explain the logic and sequence of events in the pilot 
implementation (theory of dynamic response). The findings support a non-linear 
implementation process - i. e. pilot events may differ 
from the planed ones due to 
contingencies and constraints in the context. From this perspective, the designers and 
evaluators of innovations like PBC should build appropriate theory-driven methods to assess 
the structural and contextual factors that may constrain organisations and agents from 
responding to innovations. Case study design provided an adequate methodology platform 
upon which to incorporate the mixed methods to build explanations through triangulation of 
findings and resolving conflicts thereof. 
14 Complexity, multi-level theory and flexible intervention: 
This work used a theory driven approach to assess PBC pilot that intervened in a complex set 
of variables that influence the service outputs (production) of hospitals. Hospitals too are 
complex organization units with multiple products, processes, work-teams and stakeholders. 
This work applied the principles of realistic evaluation by building explanations of a complex 
intervention by applying theoretical constructs at different levels in the health system to 
explore the mechanisms, contexts and outcomes of the PBC pilot. The PBC innovation 
sought to influence the prioritization of the set of activities (service targets) for the hospitals 
by using the different elements of PBC including a financial bonus, performance audit and 
feedback. The results in this work support the proposition that the design of complex 
interventions aimed at system-level improvements (like performance-based financing) would 
benefit from a multi-level theory building (up-stream and down-stream) to increase the 
likelihood of successful implementation by up-stream and down-stream agencies. For 
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example, the inter-dependencies of the hospitals to up-stream agencies that provide the 
resource-inputs like finances, medicines, health workers and guidelines - requires that an 
evaluation of a singular innovation (like PBC) is embedded in a realistic framework that 
encompass the dynamics in the context, the evolution in the mechanisms as well as the 
intervention outcomes. 
15 Health system innovations and the "Do no Harm" principle: 
There are findings in this study that show a potential for doing harm if interventions in the 
health system are not well designed or implemented. For example, the design that required 
PBC bonuses to be allocated to a selected set (intervention arm at randomisation) of hospitals 
generated more negative emotions among "control group" hospitals, a situation that had a 
potential for demotivating them to perform less well compared to the time before PBC was 
implemented. Within one study hospital, poor handling of the bonus funds generated similar 
dissatisfaction among staff -a situation that was not evident before the PBC bonuses were 
introduced. Participants in the control group were dissatisfied by the pilot - especially 
because of unfair bonuses allocation only to "intervention group" even though performance 
was better among the "control group". Unintended effects of interventions at the scale of the 
health system have system-wide potential for harm and need to be closely monitored. 
Institutional mechanisms that govern ethical conduct of research and innovations (IRBs) 
should routinely request for a statement of "possible system-level side-effects" and institute 
mechanisms to monitor and to mitigate such effects in the event they arise. This will build 
more responsibility in the design and implementation of health system interventions and 
mitigate the negative impacts before they become too pervasive. 
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Annex I 
Production costs and revenue considerations in PBC response 
Consideration of concepts of average and marginal revenue; and average and marginal costs, 
provides a framework to explain the hospital choice of strategy in responding to targets and 
their pay-offs. In this hypothetical model PNFP hospitals are assumed to be monopolies and 
can set output and price independent of other hospitals. This assumption is not unrealistic 
since hospitals usually have gazetted service area/population by way of health system 
planning but there is evidence that they face some competition on simpler services -a 
situation that may resemble oligopoly (McPake, et al. 2002, Zwanziger, et al 1994). The 
hospital as a production firm faces a downward sloping demand curve equal to the average 
revenue curve - AR (figure IA). The hospital can fix its price and output to maximise its 
surplus (profit) or revenue. 
Figure Annea: 10.1 A and B: Short-run costs and revenue relationships 
Fin 16 
Source (Clewer and Perkins 1998) 
If surplus maximization is assumed as the goal, the hospital would set its output at Q1 such 
that marginal revenue equals marginal cost (MR=MC) and charge price PL For a revenue 
maximization objective, the hospital would set output Q2 such that average revenue equals 
average costs (AR = AC). At Q2, the marginal revenue is zero. Production beyond Q2 would 
lead to a deficit. If a hospital is subject to making a small surplus, as a measure of financial 
viability, it would set output Qm that is consistent with a minimum profit Pm (figure 1B). 
Figure 2A and B, illustrate the effect of the bonus (additional revenue) for output target Q I* 
and Q2* for a hospital maximizing surplus (figure 2 A) or revenue (figure 2 B) respectively. 
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The bonus amount if received allows the hospital to maximise surplus or revenue at a lower 
price P*M and P* R for surplus or revenue maximising respectively 32. 
Strategies which increase input costs such as increasing quality of inputs and outreach visits 
would shift the cost curves upwards and MR curve to the left with a steeper slop. 
Figure Annex 10.1: (A) Bonus effect under surplus maximization and (B) Under 
revenue maximization 
The effect of these strategies would increase price and reduce output in general. However, if 
the effect of higher quality or outreach on output is large relative to increased costs and 
reduced revenue, a price reduction might be predicted if the bonus is much larger. In 
summary, micro-economic considerations of revenue, cost and quality show that the chosen 
strategy is influenced by price, quality and distance (for the outreach option) elasticities of 
demand as well as the marginal costs of quality improvement and outreach activities. 
32 The effect of the bonus can induce the MR curve to cross the MC curve a second time which indicates that the 
strategy to reduce client price e. g. P*M can be a viable strategy to attain target in surplus maximising hospital. A 
similar bonus effect for revenue maximization would lead to price P*R 
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Annex 2 Unstructured Questionnaire Guide for In-depth Key Informant 
Interviews 
Consent statement 
Managers, Board Members and Department Heads 
My name is Freddie Ssengooba of Makerere University Institute of Public Health, Mulago 
hospital. 
The objective of the study is to find out how hospitals are responding to the Performance- 
Based Contracts that the Ministry of Health and World Bank are testing in this hospital and 
several Non-profit hospitals in Uganda. This study is covering 10 hospitals in Arua, 
Mukono, Jinja and Bushenyi districts. The study will contribute information for designing 
better ways to improve hospital performance by understanding how contracting affects 
stakeholders interactions, resources and hospital performance. 
Your participation by providing truthful information will assist the future use of performance 
contracts in a way that will be relevant to you and your hospital situation. If information 
about you or your hospital is wrongly portrayed, the best alternatives to improve the situation 
of your hospital and others may be lost. This survey is part of a study for academic degree by 
the investigator below. 
If you accept to participate in this study, the information you provide will be kept in strict 
confidence and will not be shared with any other person within or outside this hospital. Your 
name and that of the hospital will not be identified in the reports or publications that will 
arise from this study. The questions you are asked seek your opinion and perceptions 
regarding your work and support you get from the hospital, managers and colleagues at work. 
If you agree to respond to this questionnaire, please answer as much as possible. You are free 
to decline answering questions you do not feel comfortable about or to stop the interview at 
any time. It should take between 35 - 45 minutes of your time. Your participation and 
answering as many questions as possible, will is greatly appreciated. 
If you have any concerns about the study you can ask me to explain more or contact the 
following: 
" Prof Fred Wabwire-Mangen Chairman Ethics Review Committee, Makerere 
University, Institute of Public Health, Tel 041 543872. 
Would you like to volunteer answers to this study? Yes No 
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Respondent: Members of the Board of Trustees 
1. Please tell me about the Board of Trustees/Governors for (named) hospital. 
a. What do you see as the main role of the Board for (named) hospital? 
2. How would you describe the interaction between the Board and hospital management? 
a. Content and objectives of interactions 
b. Frequency 
c. Information exchanged 
3. How successful is the hospital management in running the hospital? 
a. What interests do the Board ensure? 
b. What is the basis for judging success? 
i. What are the objectives to be attained? 
ii. What information is exchanged? 
iii. What is the monitoring system? 
4. How does the Board ensure that the managers do the right things? 
a. Any use of financial inducements? 
b. What is the contract for managers like (job security)? 
c. Any sanctions used? 
5. How effective is the Board in supervising the hospital managers? 
a. Who is more involved directly? 
b. What information is regularly exchanged? 
6. In your views, how can the hospital increase the volume of its services? 
7. What is your opinion regarding the financial situation in (named) hospital? 
8. What is your opinion regarding the financial relationships between the (named) hospital 
and the Ministry of Health /DDHS? 
a. Revenue and cash flows 
b. Fee reduction 
c. Contractual arrangements 
d. Service targets 
9. In your opinion, how does a performance-based contract (and service targets) affect the 
hospital? 
a. Check for awareness of PBC 
b. Opportunity for monitoring performance 
c. Risks in financial flows 
Det 
Name 
ails of respond ent 
Main interests in 
being on the board 
Status on board i. e. 
chair, treasurer etc 
Professional 
background 
I)dS 
Respondent: Hospital Superintendent /Administrator/ Matron 
I. Please tell me about your job as a manager in this hospital? 
a. What do you see as your main role(s) as a manager of the (named) hospital? 
2. How would you describe your performance in these roles? 
a. Basis for opinion on performance 
b. What evidence for performance 
3. How would you describe your relationship with the board of trustees? 
4. How do you in the management team prepare for board meetings? 
5. If I was to sit in your board meetings, describe for me what would be the major discussion 
issues on the agenda 
a. Finance/budget issues 
b. Staff issues 
c. Quality of services 
d. Service to community 
6. How does the board judge the performance of the hospital management team? 
a. What information is provided 
b. How regularly is information exchanged 
7. In your opinion, what are the main interests of the Board in this hospital? 
a. What shows these are their interests? 
b. How do they protect these interests 
8. How would you describe the financial situation of this hospital in the last 2-3 years? 
a. Revenues, User-fees as a percentage 
b. Government subsidy as a percentage 
c. How big were the surplus or loss 
d. What is the total budget required to run? 
9. What expenditures have been adjusted (up or down) in the last 2-3 years and why? 
a. Salaries 
b. Development 
c. Drugs and supplies 
d. Equipment and maintenance 
e. Administration costs 
10. How would you describe the interaction between management and clinical staff in the 
hospital? 
a. Frequency of meetings 
b. Opinion on cooperativeness and teamwork 
11. If I was to attend a number of your staff meetings what common issues of discussion would I 
hear being discussed 
a. Issues of interest to managers 
b. Issues of interest to clinical staff (nurses, doctors support staff) 
12. How do you in management judge the performance of the clinical units? 
a. Opinion on general performance of clinical staff 
b. What aspects of performance are you interested in? 
c. What information is used 
d. How regularly is this information sought 
13. How do you as a manager ensure that the clinical staffs do the right things? 
a. How responsive are the clinical groups 
b. What incentives/sanctions are used 
14. How do you motivate the clinical units to do better? 
a. How widely are these motivators used in the recent past? 
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b. Is the motivators appreciated/valued? 
c. Is the motivator effective in motivating higher performance? 
d. Did you have any social events (parties etc) last year? How many? 
15. How would you describe the capacity of this hospital to handle more patients from its current 
workload? 
a. What are the main constraints and potential 
16. In you opinion what is the best way to expand the volume of patients coming to this hospital 
as: 
a. What strategies for increasing volume of patients 
b. Comment about the service targets your hospital selected? 
c. What was the basis for your choice of targets? 
d. Who was involved in choosing of the targets? 
e. What effects does the selected targets have on your budget? 
IT How is the MOH service targets affecting this hospital? 
a. Does the hospital care about success with service targets? 
b. As a manager, how is your roles affected by the service targets? 
c. How are the staffs responding to the service targets? 
d. How are drugs and staff deployments affected? 
e. How did the board and DDHS react to your hospital's performance in the last 
survey? 
18. What is you comment about records and recoding practice in this hospital? 
a. What would you wish to change regarding records? -- And Why? 
Regarding Bonus 
19. What comments do you have about the bonus your hospital received in the last round? 
a. Amounts received (targets achieved) 
b. How was bonus used? Why? Who was involved in decision? 
c. How did the clinical staff react to this way of using bonus? 
d. (Check frontline vs non-frontline departments and conflicts) 
De 
Name 
tails of respond ent 
Management title Duration as a manager Professional 
background 
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Respondent: Departmental leaders (In-charge) 
1. How would you describe the interaction between management and clinical staff in this hospital? 
a. Frequency of meetings 
b. Opinion on cooperativeness and teamwork 
2. How do you as a department leader, ensure that your clinical staffs do the right things? 
a. How responsive are the clinical groups 
b. What incentives/sanctions are used 
3. How do you motivate your staff to perform better? 
a. How widely are these incentives used in the recent past? 
b. Is the incentive appreciated/valued? 
c. Is the reward effective in motivating higher performance? 
d. Number of social events (parties etc) last year 
4. How often do you hold meetings with your staff 
5. If I was to attend a number of your departmental meetings what common issues of 
discussion would I hear being discussed? 
a. Issues of interest to managers 
b. Issues of interest to clinical staff (nurses, doctors support staff) 
6. How do you judge the level of performance of your clinical unit? 
a. Opinion on general performance of clinical staff 
b. What aspects of performance are you interested in? 
c. What information is used 
d. How regularly is this information sought 
7. How would you describe the capacity of this hospital to handle more patients from its 
current workload? 
a. What are the main constraints and potential 
8. In you opinion what is the best way to expand the volume of patients coming to this 
hospital for the following services: 
a. Out patients 
b. Immunisation 
c. Antenatal 
d. Deliveries 
e. Malaria treatment especially in children 
£ Family planning 
9. Can you please explain to me what you understand about service targets that this hospital 
is supposed to achieve? 
10. How service targets affecting what you are supposed to do? 
a. Do you care about success with service targets? 
b. As a dept. manager, how is your roles affected by the service targets? 
c. How are the staffs responding to the service targets? 
d. How did the hospital administration react to your hospital's performance in the 
last survey? 
e. What would you recommend that would ensure this hospital succeed with the 
service targets? 
11. What is your comment about records and recoding practice in this hospital? 
Regarding Bonus 
12. How was the last bonus used by the hospital? 
a. Why used this way? 
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b. How did the clinical staff react to this way of using bonus? 
c. (Check frontline vs non-frontline departments and conflicts) 
Details of respondent 
Name initials Department Duration as a 
Head of Dept. 
Professional 
background 
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Annex 3 Structured Questionnaire 
Staff Questionnaire 
I am writing to kindly request you to participate in an important national research by 
providing information about your work at this hospital. A form for you to fill is attached. This is a second time this information is being collected from you and the hospital. We are interested to know how staff responses have changed since the last survey (ie 6-8 months 
ago). 
The objective of the study is to find out how hospitals are responding to the Performance- 
Based Contracts that the Ministry of Health is testing in several Non-profit hospitals in 
Uganda. This study is covering 10 hospitals in Arua, Mukono, Jinja and Bushenyi districts. 
Your participation by providing truthful information will assist the future use of performance 
contracts in a way that will be relevant to you and your hospital situation. If information 
about you or your hospital is wrongly portrayed, the best alternatives to improve the situation 
of your hospital and others may be lost. This survey is part of a study for academic degree by 
the investigator below. 
If you accept to participate in this study, the information you provide will be kept in strict 
confidence and will not be shared with any other person within or outside this hospital. Your 
name and that of the hospital will not be identified in the reports or publications that will 
arise from this study. The questions you are asked seek your opinion and perceptions 
regarding your work and support you get from the hospital, managers and colleagues at work. 
If you agree to respond to this questionnaire, please answer to all questions - as much as 
possible. It should take between 25 - 35 minutes of your time. Your participation is greatly 
appreciated. 
This study is led by Dr Freddie Ssengooba of Makerere University Institute of Public Health, 
Mulago hospital. 
If you have any concerns about the study please contact: 
  Dr Freddie Ssengooba, Principle Investigator, Tel 077509 316 OR 
  Director, Makerere University, Institute of Public Health, Tel 041 543872. 
Would you like to volunteer answers to this study? Yes No 
If you agree to volunteer, please fill this form and after filling it, seal it in an envelope that 
has been provided to you before submitting it to (the person 
assisting Dr Ssengooba). 
Thank you very much. 
(signed) 
Dr. Freddie Ssengooba 
Makerere University, Institute of Public Health 
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Please Answer All Questions by filling in the spaces 
QUESTION CODING CATEGORIES 
4.1 Date of filling this form/Interview Date], month[-], Year L-] 
4.2 Your Hospital's name 
4.3 Your department in the hospital (eg maternity ward) 
4.4 Your Sex (please circle) Male female 
4.5 Your Date of Birth Date, month, Year 
4.6 Your Cadre of Staff (eg Enrolled Nurse, Registered Midwife, Dr etc) L- I 
4.7 When did you start working in this hospital? Year month 
4.8 Do you have administrative responsibilities (eg In-charge of a ward; 
etc)? 
No Yes If Yes, specify 
A Regarding Staff Deployments (across departments) 
Department Days last 
week 
In the last one week, how many days did you work in the following 1. Out -patient department 
4.9 departments: 2. Antenatal clinic 
3. Immunisation clinic 
(Please insert number of days against the department on the left 4. Family planning clinic 
you can indicate fractions i. e. 5. Outreach station 
0.5 (for half a day) 6. Maternity /labour suite 
1.25( for one and a quarter days) 7. Children's ward Etc 8. Male ward 
9. Female ward 
10. Theatre 
11. Other hospital activity (specify 
............................................ 
B Regarding capacity to do more tasks 
For the statements below, please indicate your opinion by Ticking in 
the appropriate column (like this  in one of the rows) Very low Low Moderate High Very high 
4.10 What is your opinion about the workload you are required to clear 
daily in the last 2 months? 
4.11 What is your opinion about the level of courtesy your patients 
receive from the hospital staff? 
4.12 To what extent were the drugs available for patients in your 
department in the last 2 months? 
. 13a To what extent does the hospital provide the necessary supplies and 
equipment for your tasks to be completed satisfactorily? 
4.13b To what extent can you afford an increase of 10 percent to your 
current daily clinical tasks (or patient numbers)? 
4.14 To what extent do Nurse Assistants (or trainees) help out on regular 
nursing tasks in your department? 
4.15 To what extent did you work beyond normal expectation in the last 2 
months? 
C Regarding Records of clinical activity in the last TWO MONTHS 
4.16 I 
r 
n the last 2 month, to what extent did you fill (complete) the required 
ecords associated with your tasks (eg tallying, registers etc ? 
4.17 T 
t 
o what extent did your colleagues in your department fill (complete) 
he required activity records (eg tallying, registers etc ? 
4.18 I n your opinion, to what extent were records changed to indicate 
? 5I 
more than the true number of activity in your department? 
D Regarding Support from Managers in last TWO MONTHS Very low Low Moderate High Very high 
4.19 To what extent did the working conditions in this hospital meet your 
expectations? 
4.20 To what extent did you receive supervision from your superiors? 
4.21 To what extent did your superiors have confidence in your work? 
4.22 To what extent did your department hold meetings to evaluate clinica 
activities? 
l 
4.23 To what extent did your superiors show appreciation for your work? 
4.24 To what extent were rules and regulation fairly applied to workers? 
4.25 To what extent does your job-contract provide security for your work? 
4.26 To what extent did superiors encourage hard-working persons (or 
departments)? 
4.27 To what extent were your superiors friendly to their staff members? 
4.28 To what extent did your superiors entrust responsibilities to junior 
staff to enable the juniors to gain expertise? 
E Regarding Cooperation from fellow staff in last TWO MONTHS Very low Low Moderate High Very high 
4.29 To what extent did your workmates cover your duty hours if you 
request them to help? 
4.30 To what extent did conflicts exist among workmates in your 
department? 
4.31 What degree of cooperation existed between your department and 
the following departments? 
a OPD 
b Children ward 
c Maternity ward 
d Male ward 
e Female ward 
Other (specify) 
4.32 What degree of cooperation did you get from the following 
departments: 
a Laboratory 
b Pharmacy 
c Laundry 
d X-ray 
e Theatre 
Administration 
F Regarding Satisfaction With Your Job in last TWO MONTHS Very Low Low Moderate High Very High 
4.33 T o what extent did your job provide you satisfaction? 
4.34 T 
_p 
o what extent does working at this hospital improve your 
rofessional status? 
4.35 I n your view, how much more satisfaction would you get if your 
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supervisors and superiors showed appreciation for your work? 
4.36 In your view, how much more satisfaction would you get if your fellow 
staff were more cooperative and supportive to you? 
Very Low Low Moderate High Very High 
4.37 In your view, how much more satisfaction would you get if your job 
contract was extended by 5 years? 
4.38 How much more satisfaction would you get if administrative rules 
ere made more flexible? 
4.39 How much satisfaction would you get if you were entrusted with more 
_ 
responsibilities at work? 
4.40 How much more satisfaction would you get if you received a trophy 
as one of the most hardworking person in your department? 
4.41 How much more satisfaction would you get if your hospital was 
recognised by MOH as the best performer in the count ? 
4.42 How much more satisfaction would you get if your salary was 
increased by 10 percent from its current level? 
4.51 How much more satisfaction would you get if there was more in-kind 
benefits such as a staff party ? 
4.43 To what extent does your job benefits (salary etc) cover your basic 
needs? 
4.44 To what extent are the job benefits (salary etc) different among your 
colleagues doing similar jobs? 
4.45 To what extent do you supplement your hospital salary by doing 
private activities to earn more income? 
G Regarding service targets, please indicate your opinion Very Low Low Moderate High Very High 
4.46 How well informed are you about the total number of service outputs 
tar ets this hospital is required to achieve during this financial year? 
4.47 In the last 2 months, to what extent did you work beyond your normal 
experience because of these service targets? 
4.48 To what extent have service targets made your colleagues work 
beyond normal levels? 
. 49 To what extent have service targets made you improve records and 
registers? 
4.50 How likely are you to get a reward (or benefit) if the hospital achieves 
the service targets? 
4.51 To what extent are you willing to contribute in achieving this year's 
service targets? 
H Suppose that the hospital is given a bonus of 10 million shillings 
for outstanding performance by the Ministry of Health. Indicate your 
reference for spending the money : Very Low Low Moderate High Very High 
4.52 Use money to purchase drugs that are in short supply 
4.53 Use money to make a party for all hospital staff 
4.54 Use money to repair hospital building or equipment 
4.55 Divide and pay the money directly to each department 
4.56 Divide and pay the money directly to each staff member 
4.57 Leave the administration to decide how to use the money 
4.58 Leave the clinical staff to decide how to use the money 
4.59 The administration and clinical staff should decide together 
how to use the money 
Thank you for your time 
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